Im Rahmen von UNO und OECD diskutiert die internationale Gemeinschaft zurzeit intensiv, warum die meisten Entwicklungsländer nicht über ausreichend Ressourcen zur Finanzierung der für sie notwendigen Investitionen und ihrer öffentlichen Dienstleistungen verfügen. Dabei fällt das Augenmerk jeweils schnell auf die Ausgestaltung des internationalen Finanz- und Steuersystems. Mit welcher Art Investitionen kann man eine nachhaltige Entwicklung fördern?

It is a fact that states with a high corruption rate (or a high corruption perception) are at the same time those with a bad human rights situation. Beyond this coincidence, the paper seeks to identify a concrete legal relationship between corruption and deficient human rights protection. This seems relevant and practical terms, because the extant international norms against corruption have so far yielded only modest success; their implementation could be improved with the help of human rights arguments and instruments.

This paper therefore discusses a dual question:

The responsibility for governments to address bribe solicitation derives from internationally recognised anticorruption standards all of which prohibit the ‘demand side’ of bribery, namely, the solicitation by a public official of an undue advantage.

Financial crimes such as corruption, fraud, and embezzlement generate significant profits, often at the expense of the public budget. These proceeds of crime are usually hidden outside of the country where the crime was originally committed, and laundered through complex financial and commercial transactions, often spanning across numerous jurisdictions.

It has been estimated that roughly 1.6 trillion USD in criminal proceeds are laundered through the international financial system each year. To put this in perspective, this sum is more than the combined GDPs of Switzerland, Portugal, Romania, Belarus, and Austria in 2011.

Anti-money laundering systems have the potential to curb the use of proceeds of corruption and other crimes by the perpetrators. An effectively implemented anti-money laundering framework limits the channels through which illicit funds can be laundered, making crime riskier and reducing the incentives for corrupt activities.

The art trade market is global, highly fragmented and complex, involving a great variety of operators. In light of this complexity, the current level of regulation and existing compliance efforts by individual operators has proven to be insufficient. With some competitors engaged in unethical or illegal behaviour, operating profitably while acting with integrity and ethics is increasingly difficult.

The transition process in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe from a one-party state to a democratic system has been long and difficult and has frequently been accompanied by institutional instability.

The judiciary and law enforcement bodies have been no exception. Both have suffered from a weak legal tradition in many countries of the region, weak implementation of existing legislation, limited operational effectiveness, corruption and the influence of informal personal networks. These developments can also be observed in the area of financial intelligence.