With a follow-on grant from the British Academy’s Anti-Corruption Evidence programme (ACE), funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Basel Institute will pursue a “phase two” research project stemming from the original and completed research study on "Informal Governance and Corruption: Transcending the Principal-Agent and Collective Action Paradigms".

This follow-on project will be led by Dr. Scott Newton of SOAS as Principal Investigator and Dr. Claudia Baez-Camargo of the Basel Institute as Co-Investigator.

Dr. Claudia Baez-Camargo, Head of Governance Research at the Basel Institute, presented her team’s findings from its two-year research project on Informal Governance and Corruption: Transcending the Principal-Agent and Collective Action Paradigms at the award holders’ event of the ACE programme at the British Academy in London on 27 February.

Our programme of work in Malawi, led by the International Centre for Asset Recovery with funding support from the UK Department for International Development, has been expanded to complement its original focus on corruption investigations and the recovery of stolen assets with prevention components.

These include assistance with a review of the national anti-corruption strategy, fresh engagements with the private sector and training on research methods and corruption risk assessment strategies. 

How can we empower citizens to make anti-corruption initiatives more effective? In a new brief for the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Claudia Baez Camargo, Head of Governance Research at the Basel Institute on Governance, offers guidance to practitioners on "Harnessing the power of communities against corruption".

All those interested in the latest research on how informal structures and social conventions drive corruption should visit our new online resource on informal governance and corruption

This user-friendly and interactive site was created by the Public Governance division as part of our research project in the context of the Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme of the UK Department for International Development and the British Academy.

This Georgia country report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. 

The project has identified informal practices in selected countries in order to establish their general and specific features in comparative analysis; assess their impact based on the functions they perform in their respective economies and indicate the extent to which they fuel corruption and stifle anticorruption policies. 

This three-part Kyrgyzstan country report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. 

The project has identified informal practices in selected countries in order to establish their general and specific features in comparative analysis; assess their impact based on the functions they perform in their respective economies and indicate the extent to which they fuel corruption and stifle anticorruption policies. 

This Kazakhstan country report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. 

The project has identified informal practices in selected countries in order to establish their general and specific features in comparative analysis; assess their impact based on the functions they perform in their respective economies and indicate the extent to which they fuel corruption and stifle anticorruption policies. 

This Rwanda country report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. 

The project has identified informal practices in selected countries in order to establish their general and specific features in comparative analysis; assess their impact based on the functions they perform in their respective economies and indicate the extent to which they fuel corruption and stifle anticorruption policies.