This paper suggests that the effectiveness of current anticorruption policy suffers from a focus on the scale of the corruption problem instead of type of corruption that is to be fought. I make a distinction between need and greed corruption. Contrary to the most commonly used distinctions this distinction focuses on the basic motivation for paying a bribe, and whether the bribe is used to gain services that citizens are legally entitled to or not.
Collective action refers to actions undertaken by individuals and/or groups towards a collective purpose or goal. Attempting to foment collective action as an anti-corruption strategy is a tactic that is enjoying growing support. However, experience suggests that collective action is difficult to foster, and evidence of success is scarce.
The Anti-Corruption Summit held in London on 12 May 2016 intended to ’put fighting corruption at the heart of our international institutions’. The Summit saw 43 Governments, including 12 Heads of Government, and seven international organisations come together to issue a Global Declaration against Corruption, sign a detailed communique and make individual country-specific commitments to ending corruption.
This book represents the first systematic qualitative analysis of a new type of collective anti-corruption initiatives. The author describes how companies can take responsibility in the fight against corruption and which six success factors play an important role in this difficult endeavor. Despite great international efforts throughout the last two decades, corruption has not significantly decreased on a global level. In light of globalization, private actors increasingly cooperate in the fight against corruption in the context of sector-specific coordinated governance initiatives.
Business Case for Anticorruption in India: Principles, Economics and Application of Transparency Tools
This is the third and final publication of Global Compact Network India's Collective Action Project. In it, UNGC companies and business entities share practical experiences as to how they have been investing in getting their processes and procedures in order, so that businesses could be free of corruption, ensuring transparency in their supply chains and procurement mechanism.
All the major financial centres have experienced a rise in anti-money laundering rules and regulations. Initially, anti-money laundering laws were used as a weapon in the war on drugs, whilst more recently they have been deployed in the ongoing fight against terrorism. These developments, the authors reveal, have had serious consequences for banks and other financial institutions – affecting not only profit margins but also the way in which business is conducted.
Revisit the furtive corporate backroom dealings of bribery and corruption in this third collection of works by investigative journalists, former prosecutors and bribery experts from around the world. Behind the newspaper headlines and government investigations, these are the true to life stories of what leads people down bribery's crooked path. Explore the unscrupulous lengths to which some will go in order to win business, from setting up shady offshore front companies in the Caribbean to bogus charities in Eurasia.
We are delighted that a tailored High Level Reporting Mechanism will be established for the construction of the first line of the Bogotá Metro. The HRLM will allow complaints related to possible acts of corruption to be analysed rapidly and dealt with pragmatically and transparently.
Norm diffusion and reputation: The rise of the extractive industries transparency initiative
Transparency in the extractives sector is widely seen as a key tool for improving accountability and deterring corruption. Yet for those very reasons, it is a puzzle that so many governments in corruption-prone countries have voluntarily signed up to greater scrutiny in this area, by joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
Collective action initiatives in which governments and companies make anti-corruption commitments have proliferated in recent years.
This apparently prosocial behavior defies the logic of collective action and, given that bribery often goes undetected and unpunished, is not easily explained by principal-agent theory. Club theory suggests that the answer lies in the institutional design of anti-corruption clubs: collective action can work as long as membership has high entry costs, members receive selective benefits, and compliance is adequately policed.