Anti-corruption

Holding the corrupt to account: the promise and potential of corruption sanctions

When states fail to hold corrupt actors to account, ordinary citizens pay the price. Corruption sanctions were born from the idea that no one should be above the law, no matter where they are in the world. In a new Working Paper, Dr Anton Moiseienko explores how these tools have evolved and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use. Here we share the foreword to his paper by the Basel Institute's Andrew Dornbierer, Head of Policy and Research, International Centre for Asset Recovery. Foreword Every state has an obligation to investigate and prosecute corruption within their jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many states around the world are not willing to fulfil this responsibility. As a result, the very individuals within these states tasked with serving the public interest are instead given free rein to commit acts that not only serve themselves but also corrode the fabric of the state. And ordinary citizens have no alternative but to endure the ensuing economic and social damage. The development of sanctions tools targeting corruption stemmed from the idea that justice should be universal; that no one in any society around the world should be above the law. They are powerful tools, built on powerful principles. States introducing them understand that unchecked corruption will always suffocate a state’s ability to provide security, fairness and prosperity to its citizens. Comparatively though, corruption sanctions are still an underdeveloped concept and are far from perfect. Only a handful of states have introduced them, and those that have are not often using them to their full potential. They also spark valid concerns surrounding due process. These criticisms shouldn’t be ignored: they offer an insight on how these tools could be further developed and enhanced to ensure that they are more credibly and consistently applied. In his paper, Anton Moiseienko provides an excellent and well-researched overview of how corruption sanctions could be designed and employed to better achieve their potential. He explains how these tools have evolved over the last two decades and how they could be further refined to be more effective and achieve a wider range of impact. Critically, his paper is an indispensable resource for those looking to understand exactly how such sanctions can help states deter, disrupt and debilitate the notoriously corrupt that are unreachable through standard criminal justice tools. Learn more Read Dr Anton Moiseienko’s Working Paper “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know” for a deeper analysis of the topic and key policy recommendations. Get a brief introduction to corruption sanctions from our related Quick Guide. Register for our public webinar "Corruption sanctions – reaching those beyond the law" on 18 June 2026, marking the launch of Dr Moiseienko's Working Paper.

How stronger borders can create smarter corruption: lessons from one of Europe's most strategic border crossings

When Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007, many believed it would lead to more secure, transparent and less corrupt borders. New regulations, infrastructure modernisation and digitalised customs procedures all followed. European standards and money arrived together. Yet corruption did not disappear at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, the main land crossing between Bulgaria and Türkiye and one of the busiest gateways between Europe and Asia. Instead, it evolved. This is the central finding of a recent article by the Prevention, Research and Innovation team of the Basel Institute on Governance – Dr Jacopo Costa, Dr Claudia Baez Camargo, Noémi Jäger and Dr Saba Kassa – published in the Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance . The article examines how criminal networks, smugglers, businesses and corrupt officials adapted to Bulgaria’s EU integration. It illustrates how corruption behaves like an adaptive ecosystem: when regulations and border control technologies change, corruption changes with them. A border built for opportunity – legal and illegal Border spaces concentrate discretionary power in the hands of customs officers, border guards, inspectors and regulators, while bringing together also traders, transport companies, migrants, smugglers, criminal groups and political actors. Kapitan Andreevo is a particularly instructive case due to its strategic location, with thousands of trucks, travellers and goods passing through the border checkpoint daily. Before Bulgaria’s EU accession, corruption at the checkpoint was already deeply embedded. The 1990s brought economic crisis, shortages of consumer goods, weak state capacity and rapidly expanding informal markets. Smuggling became a profitable survival strategy. Border officials could be bribed to overlook undeclared goods, counterfeit products and tax evasion. Duty-free shops in the "no man's land" between Bulgaria and Türkiye became hubs for smuggling cigarettes, alcohol and petroleum products. Corruption operated at multiple levels: everyday exchanges between traders, drivers and officials, often based on long-standing personal relationships, at the lower level connections between politicians, senior civil servants, business elites and organised crime at the higher level. Smuggling routes required political protection. Profits flowed upward through patronage systems. EU accession changed the rules of the game Bulgaria’s EU accession radically transformed the legal and institutional environment. The country had to align its customs regulations, VAT rules, excise tax systems, phytosanitary standards and border procedures with EU standards – a gradual process requiring significant investment. The reforms affected almost every aspect of border governance. Customs procedures became increasingly digitalised. New systems such as the VAT Information Exchange System VIES and the Excise Movement and Control System EMCS improved cross-border monitoring. Phytosanitary and veterinary inspections became stricter. Migration controls tightened through alignment with Schengen rules and access to systems like the Schengen Information System SIS and international databases of stolen documents and vehicles. Meanwhile, new border control technologies – X-ray machines, scanners, thermal cameras and risk-analysis tools – expanded the state’s capacity to detect illicit activity. From a policy perspective, this appeared to be a modernisation success story. But criminal systems rarely remain static when the environment changes. Corruption did not decline – it adapted The most striking finding is that stronger controls often increase the strategic value of corruption. After EU accession, crossing the border illegally became more difficult, risky and expensive. Corruption became necessary not only to speed up procedures but to bypass sophisticated control and regulatory systems. In other words, modernisation transformed the function of corruption: Criminal actors began targeting specialised procedures, such as food safety inspections, VAT systems, automated license plate recognition, laboratory testing and digital customs controls. VAT fraud and the manipulation of digital systems VAT fraud illustrates this adaptation clearly. Within the EU, exports are often subject to a VAT rate of 0 zero percent, which means companies can reclaim any VAT they have already paid domestically. Criminal actors exploited this through "carousel fraud" schemes involving fictitious transactions chains. At Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, for example, corruption allegedly enabled traders to manipulate customs procedures. One method involved corrupt officials manually entering fake truck registrations into customs systems to simulate border crossings, enabling fraudulent VAT refunds for exports that never occurred. Even more revealing was the manipulation of automated license plate recognition: corrupt actors reportedly disabled automated recognition and manually entered altered plates using Cyrillic characters resembling Latin letters, allowing smugglers to bypass alerts and inspections. This illustrates a pattern seen in many modern corruption systems: digitalisation does not automatically eliminate corruption. Instead, corruption turns towards the technological systems themselves. Food safety, privatisation and rent-seeking EU food safety and phytosanitary regulations created new bottlenecks and forms of discretionary authority. The research describes two recurring manipulation strategies: selective sampling during inspections, where officials took samples only from "clean" sections of shipments; and falsification of laboratory tests to certify unsafe products as compliant. These risks increased after some border functions were outsourced to private companies. At Kapitan Andreevo, food testing, parking operations and vehicle disinfection were privatised. This reform, intended to increase efficiency, allegedly created new opportunities for rent extraction. The controversy surrounding Eurolab 2011, which reportedly obtained monopolistic control over food safety testing under questionable legal arrangements became emblematic of these tensions. The broader implication: privatisation of public functions does not necessarily reduce corruption risks. It can shift them into hybrid public-private arrangements where accountability is weaker and oversight is more fragmented. The rise of “routinised” corruption The study highlights the increased organisation of corruption itself. Today, no single official can independently guarantee a smuggling route. Procedures involve multiple agencies, overlapping inspections and layered oversight. As a result, corruption evolved towards collective coordination. Customs officers, border guards, supervisors, intermediaries and sometimes political actors participate in networks where bribes are pooled and redistributed. These schemes resemble coordinated organisational systems with revenue-sharing mechanisms, internal hierarchies and protection structures rather than isolated rogue actors. This reflects an important conceptual change: border corruption can function as an embedded institutional ecosystem sustained through cooperation, mutual dependence and political protection. Drug trafficking: when corruption becomes too risky Interestingly, corruption is not always the preferred strategy. In drug trafficking, for example, the risks are dramatically higher. Border officials caught facilitating drug trafficking could face severe criminal penalties, including organised crime charges and lengthy prison sentences. As a result, traffickers increasingly invest in sophisticated concealment methods. One example is the "twin trucks" strategy: several nearly identical trucks carrying similar cargo cross the border simultaneously during heavy traffic, with only one of them containing drugs. Since inspection capacity is limited, the probability is high that the "clean" trucks are checked while the drug shipment passes undetected. This shows that corruption and criminality do not always go hand in hand. Sometimes, stronger anti-corruption measures push criminals towards deception and concealment rather than bribery. The bigger lesson: criminal systems are adaptive The case study of the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing is not just about Bulgaria. Policymakers often assume that more technology, controls and regulation will automatically reduce corruption and illicit trade. But criminal systems and corruption adapt. Informal networks reorganise around the vulnerabilities created by reforms. Every regulatory innovation creates new incentives, bottlenecks and opportunities for exploitation. This does not mean reforms are useless. Many EU measures have clearly strengthened border management. However, reforms must be designed with an understanding of adaptive behaviour. Otherwise, states risk producing unintended consequences: stronger incentives for bribery, use of alternative trafficking routes, technological manipulation, new forms of collusion or opaque privatisation structures. I and my co-authors argue for a more integrated approach that combines anti-corruption and anti-crime strategies. We also emphasise the importance of anticipatory governance and foresight-oriented policymaking that try to predict how illicit actors will respond to institutional changes before reforms are implemented. This may be the most important lesson from Kapitan Andreevo. Borders are not static lines defended by static institutions against static threats. They are evolving ecosystems where states, markets, technologies and criminal actors constantly adapt to one another. Learn more Access the full article, “The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession”. Read our Quick Guide 38 to border corruption for a short introduction. Read our Working Paper 58, “Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam” for a related analysis.

Building trust: how Collective Action strengthens business ecosystems

In this article, Celia Lourens examines the role of cross-sectoral trust for a functional business environment. Collective Action, she argues, can be an approach to overcoming trust deficits between relevant stakeholders. Celia Lourens supports the organisation of our 6th International Collective Action Conference. At its core, anti-corruption Collective Action is about tackling corruption challenges together, rather than alone. Collective Action is primarily driven by businesses, often in collaboration with government representatives and civil society, to address a shared challenge and attain a common objective. Building trust is one critical element of Collective Action efforts, as it requires a genuine and sustained willingness from all involved stakeholders to collaborate. Trust across sectors: the foundation of effective markets Markets depend on trust – not only between businesses and their customers or employees and their organisational leadership, but between the institutions that shape the business environment: Business relies on regulatory bodies to create fair and predictable markets. Governments depend on businesses to act with integrity, beyond merely meeting compliance requirements. Civil society holds both public and private sectors accountable whilst advancing transparency and public confidence. Where these relationships are founded in trust, business ecosystems function more effectively and markets remain stable. Yet, cross-sector trust is increasingly under strain. Geopolitical volatility, tightening regulations and elevated complexity within supply chains are creating distance between the very actors who need to collaborate. The cost of low-trust systems When trust between the private sector, government and civil society breaks down, the consequences are immediate: slower transactions, higher compliance costs and due diligence burdens, duplicated oversight and heightened reputational risk. Oversight becomes adversarial, compliance turns reactive and businesses invest more time managing risks than creating value. In an era of heightened competitiveness, trust across sectors becomes the most valuable currency. Where it is systemically weak, a vicious cycle takes hold: low trust demands heightened scrutiny and more controls, which in turn erode trust further. Government enforcement of standards becomes inconsistent and civil society turns sceptical rather than being a partner. Breaking this cycle requires a different approach – one built on shared commitment, sustained engagement and coordinated action. This is where Collective Action comes into play. Collective Action as a trust-building mechanism In practice, Collective Action enables organisations to jointly raise integrity standards across industries, develop sector-specific norms and tackle systemic risks such as bribery and unethical conduct. Its ultimate objective – and the key incentive to participate in Collective Action initiatives – is to create fairer, more transparent markets where companies can compete on equal terms. But beyond its role as an anti-corruption approach, Collective Action also serves as a powerful trust-building mechanism. In a low-trust environment, individual organisations acting ethically on their own can find themselves at a disadvantage. Collective Action changes this dynamic. Shared commitments level the playing field, the involvement of multiple stakeholders builds credibility and joint accountability mechanisms increase transparency. Over time, this collaborative approach fosters trust where it is hardest to achieve – between actors with different roles, responsibilities and pressures. The result is a shift in systemic behaviour that lowers the cost of doing business and drives a more predictable business environment. From compliance to competitive advantage Too often, doing business with integrity is treated as a compliance obligation rather than a source of competitive advantage. Yet, in high-trust business environments, stronger partnerships and faster decision-making enable organisations to withstand disruptions. Organisations invested in building trust across their business ecosystem are better positioned to navigate complexity and sustain long-term value. Collective Action supports this shift by helping to shape markets that reward integrity, moving beyond a risk mitigation exercise. Building trust in practice This is exactly the focus of the 6th International Collective Action Conference, taking place on 9–10 June 2026 in Basel, Switzerland. Bringing together leaders from business, government and civil society, the conference is designed as a space not just for dialogue, but for practical exchange. It showcases how Collective Action initiatives are being implemented across sectors, what makes them effective and how they can be adapted to different contexts. The conference reflects a core conviction: trust across sectors does not happen by default but must be actively built. Organisations that commit to building trust together, as a collective, will not only manage risks more effectively, but help shape a new competitive advantage rooted in integrity. Learn more 6th International Collective Action Conference 2026 B20 Collective Action Hub Working Paper 56: Anti-corruption Collective Action: A typology for a new era Book: Collective Action in practice: a game-changer for business integrity

Corruption is a complex, adaptive network. What does this mean for anti-corruption policy and practice?

Corruption is not just a collection of isolated acts by individuals. It is a complex, adaptive system that evolves in response to efforts to control it. And seeing it this way opens up new possibilities to tackle it more effectively. This was the central message of a recent Basel Institute on Governance research webinar exploring how corruption evolves and what this means for designing interventions that remain effective over time. Two senior researchers from the Basel Institute's Prevention, Research and Innovation – Dr Claudia Baez Camargo and Dr Jacopo Costa – were joined by Dr Maria Nizzero, Head of Sanctions Policy at UK Finance and Associate Research Fellow at RUSI, to explore corruption's networked nature and its implications. These implications are practical as much as conceptual. Understanding corruption as a networked, adaptive system changes how corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and related threats need to be addressed in practice. Corruption as a dynamic system A recent academic paper by Dr Baez Camargo and Dr Costa highlights a key gap in how corruption is typically analysed. While it is widely accepted that corrupt and criminal strategies change over time, the mechanisms driving that change have received far less attention. Their analytical framework suggests that corruption evolves through changes in the behaviour of individuals within networks, shaped by shifts in the broader environment. These shifts may include stronger enforcement, legal and regulatory reforms, technological developments, or wider political and economic change. When new strategies prove effective, they spread across networks through collaboration, brokerage and imitation. A case study of Italy illustrates this process. In the early 1990s, corruption operated through relatively centralised, pyramidal structures linked to political parties. Over time, following scandals, reforms and increased scrutiny, this system became more fragmented and decentralised. Corrupt practices moved away from formalised exchanges and became more networked, informal and embedded in relationships. The outcome was not less corruption, but different corruption. As Dr Costa noted, corruption and anti-corruption are engaged in an “uninterrupted dance”, in which “very often, corrupt actors are two steps ahead of us”. The concept of the “kleptocratic enterprise” Looking at corruption through a network lens also opens up new ways of thinking about how to tackle it. Research by Dr Nizzero and co-authors Professor John Heathershaw and Professor Tom Mayne highlights the persistent challenges of asset recovery and enforcement in cases of large-scale corruption. Illicit wealth is often concealed through complex ownership structures, dispersed across jurisdictions and distanced from its original source over time. Legal frameworks may exist, but applying them effectively remains difficult. A key part of the problem lies in the role of professional service providers. Lawyers, accountants, real estate actors, company service providers and others help move, manage and shield assets. These actors often operate across borders and may serve a wide range of clients, including both organised crime groups and politically exposed individuals. This has led to the idea of a “kleptocratic enterprise”: a networked system in which clients demand services such as concealment and asset protection, and a range of actors supply those services. Viewing corruption in this way shifts attention towards patterns of conduct, relationships and enabling structures. It also suggests that tools used to tackle organised crime, such as anti-racketeering or anti-mafia approaches, may offer useful insights. These frameworks often focus on networks rather than individuals, combine multiple legal tools and allow for a broader understanding of harm, including the impact on society. At the same time, responses must remain grounded in due process and the rule of law. Stronger measures can create new risks, including displacement of illicit activity to other jurisdictions or unintended consequences linked to overreach. The challenge is to expand the toolkit without compromising core legal principles. When enforcement creates new risks Field research by the Basel Institute under the EU-funded FALCON project shows how quickly corrupt and criminal networks adapt to enforcement pressure. At the Port of Rotterdam, increased inspections and surveillance aimed at tackling drug trafficking made insider access more valuable. Corruption became a critical mechanism for bypassing strengthened controls, illustrating how enforcement can shift incentives in ways that reinforce the role of corruption. At the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing between Bulgaria and Turkey, changes linked to EU accession, including new regulatory frameworks and stronger border controls, were followed by new forms of corruption and criminal activity. These included routinised extractive practices, shifts in smuggling strategies and the emergence of new actors. Across both cases, the pattern is consistent. Measures designed to reduce corruption and illicit activity can reshape how those activities are organised and carried out. Why networks are so resilient One reason corruption adapts so effectively lies in the nature of the networks themselves. As Dr Baez Camargo explains, enforcement-focused approaches can become a “whack-a-mole game” when underlying incentives remain unchanged. Efforts to close one avenue often lead to the emergence of another. Informal networks are particularly resilient because they are built on more than financial exchange. Trust, personal relationships and shared social norms play a central role. These elements are difficult to detect, harder to regulate and highly adaptable. Criminal and corrupt networks are also flexible and opportunistic. They can shift strategies, routes and methods quickly, drawing on significant resources and expertise. Formal institutions, by contrast, operate within legal and procedural constraints, which can limit their ability to respond at the same pace. Towards more adaptive responses If corruption behaves like a complex adaptive system, anti-corruption efforts need to reflect that reality. One emerging approach is to place greater emphasis on understanding systems rather than focusing narrowly on individual interventions. This involves mapping relationships, incentives and behavioural patterns in much greater depth, and remaining alert to how these evolve over time. It also requires a shift away from strictly linear theories of change. Fixed indicators and predefined outcomes can miss important developments, particularly when systems are dynamic and interconnected. A more flexible approach allows practitioners to identify early signals of change, whether positive or negative, and adjust their strategies accordingly. As Dr Baez Camargo puts it, “we cannot keep thinking that change is linear”. A better understanding of systems, combined with the ability to detect and respond to change, is essential for staying relevant in rapidly evolving contexts. A shift in perspective Taken together, these insights point to a broader conclusion. Corruption is not static, and responses to it cannot be static either. Understanding corruption as a networked, adaptive system changes how problems are defined and how solutions are designed. It brings greater attention to relationships, incentives and enabling structures. It also highlights the importance of anticipating how systems will respond to interventions. For practitioners working on corruption, organised crime or related risks, this shift is increasingly important. Integrating it into programming should help us not only respond more quickly as corruption adapts – i.e. whack the moles more rapidly when they pop up. It should also help us design flexible, creative and context-sensitive interventions that can genuinely disrupt these resilient illicit networks and themselves adapt to remain effective over time. Learn more Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy, by Dr Jacopo Costa and Dr Claudia Baez Camargo. Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam, by Dr Saba Kassa and Dr Jacopo Costa The Kleptocratic Enterprise: Lessons from organised crime to target transnational corruption and strengthen asset recovery in the UK, by Dr Maria Nizzero, Professor John Heathershaw and Professor Tom Mayne Webinar recording Disclaimer This webinar and summary are part of the FALCON Fight Against Largescale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks project. FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI . The contents of this summary are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.

Professor Anne Peters on how anti-corruption organisations can survive in today’s volatile world

Professor Anne Peters, a renowned scholar of international law and governance, stepped down from her role as Vice President of the Basel Institute on Governance at the end of 2025. In this Q&A she looks back at her involvement with the Basel Institute since its inception more than 23 years ago. Her insights emphasise the importance of underpinning anti-corruption and governance efforts with interdisciplinary academic research, and of connecting abstract concepts like governance and asset recovery to real-world challenges like human rights, biodiversity and climate change. She traces the Basel Institute’s path from a small group of friends driven by individual passion to a highly professional, global centre of expertise on anti-corruption and asset recovery. This professionalism, she says, is essential for non-profit organisations to survive and even thrive in today’s unstable new world. Anne is known for her pioneering work on animal rights, human rights and corruption. She holds long-standing academic positions as Director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law MPIL Heidelberg and Professor of International Law at the University of Basel. You were a part of the Basel Institute from the beginning. How did it all start? My engagement with the Institute took root when I joined the University of Basel in 2001 and met Professor Mark Pieth, the Institute’s founder and former President. He was involved in establishing the Wolfsberg Group, an early multi-stakeholder initiative of banks focused on developing anti-money laundering guidelines. This was a time when concepts like banking due diligence and know-your-customer were relatively unknown, and the idea of multi-stakeholder associations didn’t even exist. Because of Mark Pieth’s personal standing as a Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Basel and as Chair of the OECD Working Group on Bribery, he received requests for advisory and consultancy services on problems of corruption and governance. The Basel Institute gradually rose out of those beginnings, helped by individuals like Gemma Aiolfi and Thomas Christ, who continued to play key roles at the Institute for the next two decades. Back then we used to meet in cafés or in Mark’s office, and we just had a letterhead and a flyer describing the Basel Institute on Governance. Things became more formalised when we received seed funding from a foundation, drafted statutes and – this was the game-changer – hired Gretta Fenner in 2005. Gretta was the first paid staff member. We miss her dearly. What excited you about it? What did you bring from the academic world? I was young, I had energy and I liked Mark as a colleague and friend. The concept of governance was also quite new and exciting. I am a public international lawyer, not a criminal lawyer, so I had little technical expertise in corruption or money laundering. But since these crimes have clear transnational dimensions, my background in international law made sense. I was able to bring the academic perspective to the Institute’s work, later reinforced by Lucy Koechlin and Claudia Baez Camargo, who joined to lead research on public and global governance. The association with the University of Basel was crucial. It gave structure to the original idea: providing practical advice and assistance on corruption and governance, grounded in academic research. An important aspect was financing doctoral students who would work at the Basel Institute while completing their PhDs. I supervised three such dissertations. This academic underpinning and insistence on research and evidence is still one of the Basel Institute’s strongest points. What other milestones and innovations do you remember? A major academic milestone was our conference on non-state actors and the resulting book, Non-State Actors as Standard Setters , which was published with Cambridge University Press in 2009. The term “non-state actor” – covering the private sector as well as non-profit organisations, academia, the media and the like – was still novel. I co-edited the book with Gretta Fenner, Lucy Koechlin and our former Board colleague and social anthropologist Till Förster. It was a serious and influential publication that is still cited today. I remember us retreating for a full day to review drafts. At first the mix of different writing styles and perspectives – political science, law, social anthropology and sociology – was a bit of a shock. Then we realised the value of this interdisciplinary nature in helping to gain a holistic perspective of how non-state actors can contribute to setting governance standards in the messy world of real life. Again, this interdisciplinary approach remains central to the Basel Institute’s current work. How did the Basel Institute’s work expand into so many different areas – from asset recovery to conflicts of interest, to money laundering in the art market. What’s the connection? Personal interests, reputations and networks mattered greatly. And new concepts were appearing in the international anti-corruption arena. People and governments needed help working out how to apply them in practice in different contexts. That’s what happened with asset recovery, a concept that appeared in the 2003 UN Convention Against Corruption with the aim of depriving corrupt actors of their criminal gains. We developed a distinct workstream at the Basel Institute that soon became the International Centre for Asset Recovery. The concept and practice of Collective Action – sustained, trust-based multi-stakeholder collaboration with the private sector to address specific corruption challenges – evolved in large part thanks to our colleague Gemma Aiolfi’s tireless efforts. Similarly, it was a personal interest that led myself and fellow board member Lukas Handschin to edit a book on Conflict of Interest in Global, Public and Corporate Governance published by Cambridge University Press. It’s a topic that I was convinced was underappreciated at the time and is now, in these current times, showing its importance. We did early work on money laundering in the art market. Again this was a personal interest of our board member Thomas Christ that is now a key concern for not only money laundering but sanctions evasion. A newer area we have helped to establish internationally is green corruption, i.e. applying anti-corruption and governance tools to address challenges like the mass extinction of species, biodiversity decline, the climate crisis. This is a topic that is dear to me personally and that is evolving fast. Common to this all is how the Basel Institute applies anti-corruption and governance research and tools to different fields that really matter in the world, from business to health to environmental protection. And human rights? How does that connect to corruption? My interest in the intersection between corruption and human rights grew from Gretta’s involvement in several side events at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. I began thinking about legal relationships between corruption and human rights and whether, for example, states have a human rights obligation to protect citizens from corruption. I wrote a Working Paper on the topic for the Basel Institute back in 2015 and later published two academic papers. You can get a short overview of the topic in this Quick Guide to corruption and human rights. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights UN Human Rights references my work in a recently published practical guide on corruption and human rights to which I contributed, as well as other work of the Basel Institute on human rights in the context of asset recovery laws. It’s great to see our scholarly work being used to underpin practical international guidance that will ultimately have impact on people’s lives. What does the current global context mean for anti-corruption efforts and organisations like the Basel Institute? We are in a period of profound global change. The political order is fundamentally shifting and the optimism of the 1990s is all but gone. The United States, an early driver of international anti-corruption treaties, efforts and successes, is retreating from its role. In some countries, anti-corruption laws and campaigns are misused for political purposes. Even if concepts like good governance, rule of law, human rights and democracy don’t seem to be en vogue right now, they remain important. Not least because they, and corruption, are key to understanding and tackling today’s toughest challenges, from poverty and inequality to crime and conflict. So non-profit organisations like the Basel Institute are more essential than ever, as are other non-state actors dedicated to tackling corruption and governance challenges. But it’s not easy for small organisations to survive in this rocky world, and many face their own governance challenges. That’s why it’s good that the Basel Institute has professionalised its governance and compliance structures over the years, while keeping the sense of passion and personal conviction that characterised its early years. Any bright side for those who care about anti-corruption and governance? On the positive side, public awareness, opposition and global debate about corruption is far stronger than in the past. And much of international law – on travel, transportation, communication, diplomatic relations etc. – functions quietly and effectively every day. Despite how dire the current situation seems, change for the better has only ever occurred after major catastrophes. For example, the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 was a direct result of the rape camps and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The question is how severe crises must become and how much they must affect people directly before meaningful reform occurs. Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, for example, are slow-moving crises that still feel abstract to many. What’s coming up for you personally? In my research I remain focused on the big-picture development of the international legal order. I look forward to the publication in 2026 of the Oxford Handbook of Global Animal Law , which I co-edited and which seeks to authoritatively establish this fairly new field of international law. Alongside my research I continue to advise the German Foreign Affairs Department and sometimes the Swiss, too , and will serve as an expert witness on international legal questions in a case before a domestic court. And, of course I will continue to follow and support what the Basel Institute is doing. The organisation and its mission remain dear to my heart. Thank you, Anne Peters, for your time and for your unwavering support and guidance over so many years. We wish you well in your future endeavours and adventures.

The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession