Anti-corruption

There’s a gap between what laws say and what people do. How is that useful for anti-corruption work?

In episode 37 of the podcast Sophie au pays des possibles, host and anti-corruption expert Sophie Lemaître conversed with Claudia Baez Camargo, Director of Prevention, Research and Innovation at the Basel Institute on Governance. Claudia leads a specialised team of researchers who leverage behavioural science, political economy analysis and field research to design context-sensitive anti-corruption strategies. Among others, they advance approaches based on understanding and targeting social norms. This Q&A is an edited extract of their discussion on why top-down laws often fail against local realities and how practical, bottom-up solutions can empower citizens to drive real change. Sophie Lemaître: What are social norms, and why is it essential to consider them when addressing corruption? Claudia Baez Camargo: Essentially, social norms are what we perceive as typical, expected or socially accepted behaviour in a given context. For example, if a traffic officer stops you in Mexico – where I was born and grew up – most would offer a bribe to get out of the predicament. Or when accessing healthcare services, people might give a “gift” or bribe before receiving care. If they don't, they fear they won't receive the service or the correct medicine. Even if they are personally against corruption and know the law forbids it, the social expectation can push them to do it anyway. Understanding these expectations is key to designing effective anti-corruption interventions. Sophie: I've heard statements like "Corruption is part of the culture of this country." Can we say some cultures or countries are more corrupt than others? Claudia: I've often been told, across Africa, Latin America, the Balkans or Asia, "Oh, Claudia, it's in our culture. What are we going to do?" But these regions have such vastly different cultures that I doubt culture is the defining factor. In my view, the real drivers are structural. - First, there are resource constraints: living in poverty and unmet need drives corruption. - Second, there are weak state institutions. When the state fails to deliver, it generates incentives to bypass the law just to solve problems, make money or access services. Culture simply adapts around these realities, absorbing corrupt practices through local names and jokes. Social norms apply to concrete, narrow situations – they dictate what we're expected to do. Culture is something we all have an emotional stake in, so calling a culture corrupt is self-degrading and ignores how rich cultures are. I prefer to focus on social norms because they provide a concrete entry point where we can actually act and change things. Sophie: Have you noticed people saying that addressing corruption is a Western thing? Claudia: Government and anti-corruption officials across the board have assimilated the language of good governance, largely because their laws follow UN Conventions. At that level, a Westernised view definitely prevails. At the grassroots, it's completely different. In research in Uganda and Tanzania, we used fictional "vignettes" to ask citizens about their perceptions of public officials, presenting two characters: - One who strictly abides by the law and refuses bribes. - Another who uses their authority to extract resources, but distributes them to their family and community. Stealing in order to share, like Robin Hood. Almost without exception, people said the one stealing and sharing was great, loved and respected, while the law-abiding official was called a traitor who ignored his community responsibilities. From this view, the "corrupt" ones are those who fail to use power to look after their network. Ultimately, there is vast room for interpretation regarding what corruption is, depending entirely on social norms, cultural environments and practical needs. Sophie: How can we induce behaviour change to create a culture of integrity when the situation involves so many social norms, informal practices and other drivers? Claudia: A lot of anti-corruption projects and investments are still very prescriptive. Focusing purely on top-down "best practices" and laws creates an "implementation gap": countries with excellent laws on paper but terrible results in practice. To achieve sustainable change, we must go bottom-up. Working at the subnational or municipal level shows a lot of promise, because it allows local governments to engage directly with constituents, jointly identify priorities and co-design solutions. As scholar Yuen Yuen Ang argues in her work on adaptive political economy, you cannot expect context-defying behaviours to emerge just because you pass a law. We need to use what is already there – local practices, social networks and community groups – to solve problems sustainably without corruption. It does not have to be a textbook Western "best practice", as long as it works. Sophie: Do you have a success story or promising initiative you could share? Claudia: On success stories, once I worked on a project on a remote island in the Philippines where the mayor was a true champion for his community. He even gave his personal mobile number to every citizen. It was a very poor community, but because things were decided collectively, their few resources were visibly used in the best interest of everyone. On promising initiatives, I'm currently supporting a Swiss-funded project in Moldova that takes this bottom-up approach seriously: its first year is dedicated purely to building trust among local stakeholders. Without trust, people can't collaborate or identify joint priorities. Investing in trust, then letting the community take the driver's seat, is essential for sustainability. Otherwise, once funding dries up, everything regresses. Sophie: Anti-corruption progress is slow, and we’re experiencing a global backlash. What keeps you motivated? Claudia: What I love about my job is going to different countries and speaking with mayors, citizen groups, civil society organisations and the private sector – the real people on the ground whose lives would be transformed if there were less corruption. That's what motivates me. Corruption remains a devastating barrier to development and poverty reduction. We often hear we need to "raise awareness", but that isn't true; in almost every context, people already know what's corrupt, suffer from it and dislike it. We simply cannot give up. The climate can be demotivating, but if we're passive spectators, we can say goodbye to the institutions we've fought for. With our actions, we can intervene and change the course of events. Sophie: One final question: how can we as individual citizens play a role in fighting corruption? Claudia: First, by understanding our duties. Good governance is fundamentally linked to democracy, and whether you live in an established or fragile democracy, the legal framework almost always gives citizens instruments to engage with their representatives. If we normalise using these tools to question authority and demand accountability, we strengthen the rule of law and put corrupt actors under scrutiny. If enough people do this, a lot can change. Learn more ::: links - Quick Guide: Social norms and corruption - Research Case Study: Harnessing behavioural approaches against corruption - Blog – Bridging the gap: How behavioural science can strengthen anti-corruption and crime prevention - Article – Corruption and Social Norms: A New Arrow in the Quiver - Episode 37 of Sophie au pays des possibles :::

What can corruption sanctions really achieve?

For victims of corruption and related human rights abuses, justice is often out of reach. Courts may be compromised, prosecutors unwilling to act and political leaders implicated in the wrongdoing. In such cases, corruption sanctions cannot deliver justice on their own. They may, however, provide something else: accountability, recognition and consequences. These questions were at the heart of a Basel Institute on Governance webinar marking the launch of the working paper Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know. Commissioned by the Basel Institute's International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR and written by Dr Anton Moiseienko, the paper examines how governments can use corruption sanctions more strategically as part of wider anti-corruption efforts. Andrew Dornbierer, Head of Policy and Research at ICAR moderated the online launch event bringing together experts with experience across sanctions policy, litigation, advocacy and victims' rights. Dr Anton Moiseienko was joined by Sir William Browder KCMG, CEO of Hermitage Capital and Head of the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign, Michael O'Kane , Senior Partner at Peters & Peters, and Lyra Nightingale , Senior Legal Advisor at REDRESS. Recognition matters Sanctions are often judged by whether they change behaviour, recover assets or deter future wrongdoing. Lyra Nightingale argued that this overlooks another form of impact. If a targeted sanction, such as a corruption sanction, can convey recognition, acknowledgement and some sense of justice for victims, it has already had an impact. Drawing on REDRESS's work with survivors of torture and other serious abuses linked to corruption, Nightingale described how sanctions can validate victims' experiences and demonstrate international solidarity when other routes to justice have failed. Examples from Iran and Angola illustrated the point. Victims and civil society groups viewed sanctions not simply as restrictions imposed on perpetrators, but as public acknowledgement that wrongdoing had occurred and that it mattered. Sanctions cannot provide a complete remedy, but they help signal that impunity is not absolute. Success means different things A recurring theme throughout the webinar was that sanctions are expected to achieve many things at once. Moiseienko argued that governments use corruption sanctions for a range of purposes: disrupting access to international financial systems, deterring future misconduct, condemning wrongdoing and supporting accountability efforts. Given this broad scope: It would be perverse to conclude that if corruption does not stop, sanctions have failed. That observation goes to the heart of the debate. Corruption sanctions are often directed at the most powerful and entrenched offenders. Eliminating corruption entirely is rarely a realistic objective. The more relevant question is whether sanctions increase pressure, restrict opportunities and support broader accountability efforts. The answer depends on what governments are trying to achieve. Do sanctions work? Here the panellists diverged. Drawing on years of experience representing sanctioned individuals, Michael O'Kane cautioned against assuming that sanctions automatically produce meaningful results. For some people, sanctions are profoundly impactful. For others, they are not particularly impactful at all. He argued that sanctions are most effective when they form part of a broader strategy that includes enforcement, asset recovery and clear incentives for behavioural change. Sir William Browder took a more forceful view. Reflecting on Russia's response to Magnitsky sanctions, he pointed to the extraordinary lengths taken to challenge and discredit the measures. So we know that we hit the Achilles' heel. For Browder, the reaction itself is evidence of effectiveness. Sanctions restrict access to assets, travel and international financial networks. They also create uncertainty among others who may fear becoming targets themselves. The disagreement was less about whether sanctions matter than about how much they can achieve on their own. Legitimacy is part of effectiveness The discussion repeatedly returned to legitimacy. Several speakers warned that sanctions derive much of their power from public confidence in their fairness and credibility. If they are perceived as arbitrary or politically motivated, their effectiveness may weaken over time. Moiseienko argued that governments should resist the temptation to use sanctions indiscriminately. The moment governments begin to look trigger-happy, indiscriminate or undisciplined in their use of sanctions, confidence in the entire system risks collapsing. Questions of transparency, evidence and due process therefore matter not only for legal reasons but also for practical ones. The legitimacy of sanctions is one of their greatest strengths. It can also be one of their greatest vulnerabilities. An evolving tool Corruption sanctions are now firmly established in the international anti-corruption landscape. Yet many of the questions surrounding them remain unresolved. - How should success be measured? - What role should sanctions play alongside criminal investigations and asset recovery efforts? - How can governments maintain public confidence while responding to evolving geopolitical pressures? As Andrew Dornbierer noted: Corruption sanctions are still a relatively new area of law and policy, and there will undoubtedly be significant developments in the years ahead. The webinar offered no single answer to these questions, but gave a sense of both the promise and the limitations of corruption sanctions. They are neither a cure-all nor a symbolic gesture. Used strategically, they can support accountability, recognise victims and increase pressure on those who have long operated with impunity. Learn more ::: links - Working Paper "Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know" - For policymakers grappling with these challenges, this Basel Institute’s Working Paper provides a valuable starting point. - Quick Guide to corruption sanctions - For an easy introduction to the concept. - Webinar recording - Watch the full webinar on YouTube. :::

How will the EU Anti-Corruption Directive affect enforcement against corruption?

What does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive actually change, and where does it fall short? This article by Rita Simões of the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery takes a closer look at the final text. She looks at what was adopted, what was left out during negotiations, and what the final text is likely to mean for enforcement across the EU. For a broader reflection on what the directive reveals about changing corruption risks and the future direction of EU anti-corruption policy, see a companion analysis by Dr Jacopo Costa. The European Union EU has adopted and published its Anti-Corruption Directive, concluding a process that began with the Commission’s proposal in May 2023. Its adoption comes amid a broader recalibration of global anti-corruption enforcement, marked by decreased U.S. leadership through the scaling back of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement and increased expectations for the EU to assume a more central role in global anti-corruption efforts. Following a lengthy negotiation period, the final directive is a compromise between the widely differing levels of ambition reflected in the proposals put forth by the European Parliament and European Commission. It establishes a common baseline of corruption offences, corporate liability rules and jurisdiction, but leaves member states significant discretion to limit the scope of new measures. The final version also omits key provisions relating to political financing, non-trial resolutions and victims’ rights. Therefore, the directive's central achievement is the harmonisation of anti-corruption offences and sanctions. Its central limitation is that it leaves key aspects of enforcement practice largely in the hands of member states. Important changes in criminal law, liability and jurisdiction The directive establishes a detailed enforcement and prevention framework. It requires member states to, among others: - create independent anti-corruption bodies; - adopt national strategies; - conduct sector-specific risk assessments; - provide training for officials; and - use Europol’s SIENA system for information exchange. These measures are complemented by harmonised statistical reporting obligations on investigations, prosecutions and sanctions. On substantive criminal law, the directive introduces a harmonised baseline of corruption offences across member states including domestic and foreign bribery, trading in influence, misappropriation, abuse of functions and obstruction of justice. The directive also requires member states to establish a broad criminal liability regime for legal persons . Under this framework, companies can be held accountable for corruption offences, including those resulting from lapses in senior management supervision. Notably, the directive reinforces this regime through obligating the use of dissuasive measures, such as fines based on global turnover and exclusion from public procurement. The directive also strengthens jurisdictional rules. Member states must assert jurisdiction over offences committed on their territory or by their nationals. Furthermore, a member state can prosecute offences committed abroad without needing the state where the crime occurred to report it first. . How these could help enhance anti-corruption enforcement These measures aim to strengthen the EU’s enforcement capacity by expanding the legal tools available to investigate and prosecute corruption, particularly in cross-border cases. Measures on corporate liability, for instance, will strengthen the ability of member states to address complex bribery schemes involving multinational structures. Similarly, the enhanced jurisdictional rules will enable member states to pursue corruption cases that occurred outside their territory, even where the state in which the corruption took place is unwilling or unable to act. In addition, the institutional and procedural framework – particularly coordination, risk assessments and dedicated enforcement bodies – should strengthen the EU’s ability to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute corruption. However, enforcement effectiveness will still depend heavily on national implementation capacity and political will. Three missed opportunities: political financing, non-trial resolutions and victim participation Previously identified as areas of significant potential, several key measures proposed by the European Parliament that could have further enhanced enforcement were excluded or significantly watered down in the final directive. Political financing The European Parliament had proposed stronger measures to tackle illicit political financing, including enhanced transparency requirements and potential criminalisation of certain violations. However, member states are only encouraged – not required – to address risks linked to political funding, with no binding obligation to implement transparency measures or criminalise political financing. This leaves the EU without a harmonised framework in this area. This is a critical gap given growing concerns about how illicit funding can distort electoral processes and enable undue influence over public decision-making, both globally and at the European level653631 EN.pdf . Non-trial resolutions Proposed mandatory frameworks for non-trial resolutions in cases involving legal persons, reflecting established practice in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, were not retained as binding obligations in the final directive. As a result, this instrument does not establish a level playing field across the EU. This is likely to lead to divergent enforcement approaches, with some jurisdictions relying on negotiated resolutions while others depending on full criminal proceedings. Such fragmentation may weaken the effective imposition of financial sanctions on companies, as well as the recovery of proceeds and their use for compensating victims of corruption or enhance anti-corruption efforts. Victim and public participation in corruption cases The final version of the directive requires member states to grant procedural rights to victims and members of the public affected by corruption offences. But it largely relies on existing EU frameworks and national law, providing participation rights only where they already exist domestically. By contrast, the European Parliament’s proposal was more ambitious: it sought to define these categories explicitly, regulate their procedural rights and grant victims a clear right to compensation. As a result, recognition of victims in corruption cases remains uneven across member states. This approach also may limit victim and civil society participation, despite growing international support for more participatory approaches. Anti-corruption ambition is now up to member states The directive adopts an anti-corruption approach that strengthens enforcement powers while maintaining deference to national legal systems. Its effectiveness will depend heavily on implementation, particularly where it sets only minimum standards or leaves room for national discretion. In practice, this is likely to produce uneven legal frameworks across the EU, shaped more by domestic political will than by EU-led harmonisation. Member states implementing the directive will face a choice: - Should they adhere to the minimum requirements only? - Or take the opportunity to pursue more ambitious anti-corruption reforms, including some of the broader measures originally proposed by the European Parliament? Choosing a more ambitious approach presents an opportunity to lead by example and influence future EU reform.

Corruption in the age of networks, data and influence – does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive rise to the challenge?

This article by Dr Jacopo Costa is one of two Basel Institute commentaries on the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive. While the companion piece by Rita Simões examines the directive's legal and institutional implications, this article takes a political economy perspective. It considers what the directive reveals about changing understandings of corruption, how corruption risks are evolving in an increasingly interconnected and technology-driven environment, and where future EU anti-corruption efforts may need to focus. The key message is that the directive represents an important advance in legal harmonisation, but that effective anti-corruption policy will also require stronger strategic thinking, greater use of data and technology, and closer attention to emerging corruption risks linked to procurement, border security and financial infrastructure. April 2026, the European Union formally adopted Directive 2026/1021 on combatting corruption. Following years of negotiations, political disagreements and institutional bargaining, the EU now has a comprehensive anti-corruption framework establishing common definitions, offences, sanctions and preventive measures across its member states. This is a landmark achievement. But it would be a mistake to view the directive as the culmination of the European anti-corruption journey. In fact, its adoption marks the beginning of a much larger challenge: turning a legal framework into an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy that can address the evolving forms of corruption emerging in an increasingly complex geopolitical and technological landscape. Why the directive matters For years, the EU lacked a coherent anti-corruption framework. Although member states had their own legislation, there were significant differences in how corruption offences were defined, investigated and punished. These discrepancies created loopholes that could be exploited by corrupt individuals and hindered cross-border cooperation between national authorities. The new directive aims to address these issues by introducing common minimum standards across the EU. In particular, it: - harmonises the definitions of bribery in the public and private sectors, trading in influence, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment and the concealment of criminal proceeds; - introduces common standards for criminal sanctions, corporate liability, statutes of limitation, whistleblower protection, anti-corruption strategies and specialised anti-corruption bodies; and - broadens the definition of public officials to encompass not only national officeholders, but also senior EU officials and individuals performing public duties on behalf of public institutions. This reflects the reality of contemporary governance, where public services are increasingly delivered through hybrid public–private arrangements. It is the most ambitious attempt yet to establish a shared European anti-corruption framework. A more modern understanding of corruption One of the directive's most significant strengths is its recognition that corruption is not confined to the traditional notion of an envelope stuffed with cash being exchanged. We welcome this change in perspective greatly, because our research demonstrates clearly that contemporary corruption is increasingly networked, sophisticated and relational. It often relies on intermediaries, influence brokers, hidden financial channels, luxury gifts, preferential treatment, future career opportunities and informal exchanges of favours. Including offences such as trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealing criminal proceeds and aiding or abetting corruption schemes shows an understanding of how corruption operates in modern societies. This evolution is important because anti-corruption frameworks often struggle to keep up with the evolving nature of corruption. The directive is a valuable attempt to address this issue and close the resulting gap. The price of political compromise Legislation is never produced in isolation from politics. Significant disagreements emerged among EU institutions and member states during the adoption process. Several governments expressed concerns about subsidiarity and the potential consequences of criminalising particular behaviours. So, the final directive is less ambitious than the original proposal. One example concerns the offence previously known as “abuse of office”. Following intense political resistance, particularly from countries such as Germany and Italy, the final text replaced it with the more cautious formulation of “unlawful exercise of public functions”. The compromise facilitated agreement, but introduced ambiguity that could hinder enforcement. Similarly, criminal sanctions and limitation periods were reduced during negotiations. Maximum prison sentences were reduced, and statutes of limitation were scaled back considerably compared to earlier drafts. These compromises highlight a recurring dilemma in policymaking not only in Europe but everywhere: achieving consensus often necessitates compromising on ambition. The result is a directive that establishes a common baseline, yet leaves considerable room for interpretation among member states. The missing security lens Perhaps the most significant limitation of the directive is its relatively little guidance on what anti-corruption efforts should look like in today's rapidly changing security environment. This is because corruption is increasingly also a geopolitical and security issue. Foreign influence operations, sanctions evasion schemes, strategic corruption, illicit financial networks, organised crime infiltration and the manipulation of critical supply chains all represent corruption-related risks affecting European security and resilience. Yet these challenges remain largely outside the directive's core focus. There is a risk that anti-corruption efforts will continue to focus on traditional forms of misconduct while underestimating emerging threats linked to geopolitical competition and hybrid forms of influence. The technology gap Considering the hype around artificial intelligence in society generally, the most striking omission in the directive is the limited attention devoted to technological innovation. Over the past decade, governments, international organisations and researchers have been exploring how artificial intelligence, big data analytics, risk indicators, predictive modelling and open-source intelligence can bolster anti-corruption initiatives. Technology is now essential for identifying suspicious procurement patterns, pinpointing conflicts of interest, tracing illicit financial flows and exposing corruption networks. Yet the directive contains almost no strategic vision regarding the role of technology in anti-corruption governance, which is surprising. Research conducted under the EU-funded FALCON project – of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member – demonstrates that effective anti-corruption systems are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures capable of collecting, integrating, analysing and cross-referencing large volumes of information. Without these capabilities, many corruption risks remain invisible until significant damage has already occurred. It’s important to stress that adopting new technologies – purchasing software, etc. – is the easy part. EU states also need to create the institutional and data infrastructures that allow these technologies to function effectively. Digitisation, interoperability, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and cross-border information sharing are all prerequisites for the next generation of anti-corruption systems. Three areas that deserve greater attention From our research in the following areas, we can say for sure that they deserve particular attention in the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy and future initiatives: 1\. Public procurement Public procurement remains one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. This issue is exacerbated by Europe's increased investment in defence, critical infrastructure, energy security, technological innovation and strategic industrial policies. Central priorities should include strengthening transparency, reducing direct awards, improving oversight of sub-threshold contracts, and introducing AI-based risk assessment tools. 2\. Border governance Managing borders and customs procedures is another critical challenge, as research at the Port of Rotterdam and the Kapitan Andreevo crossing demonstrates. Corruption at the border facilitates a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, evasion of sanctions, tax fraud and the movement of illicit goods. Greater automation, data integration and harmonisation of border management systems across member states could significantly reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the EU's capacity to detect emerging threats. 3\. Financial infrastructures Modern corruption relies heavily on financial infrastructure. Complex financial networks, shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and, increasingly, cryptoassets can facilitate the movement and concealment of illicit funds. The future of anti-corruption policy hinges on strengthening the links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks, and on developing new approaches that can address digital financial ecosystems. Will the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy help put the directive into action? The adoption of Directive 2026/1021 sends an important message that corruption remains a priority issue for the European Union. The directive establishes a much-needed common foundation and introduces valuable innovations to improve both prevention and enforcement. It provides a stronger legal framework than the fragmented system that existed previously. But legal harmonisation alone will not be enough. The directive's effectiveness will ultimately depend on how member states implement its provisions, and on whether the European Union can develop a broader strategic vision capable of addressing emerging corruption risks. This is where the forthcoming EU Anti-Corruption Strategy could play a decisive role. To be effective and not just a paper exercise, it must be adaptive, technology-driven and security-conscious. This strategy must respond to current corruption and anticipate its potential evolution. And it needs to be based on a participative process that considers the valuable research and perspectives of civil society organisations, academics and others outside of government. If the directive provides the legal architecture, the strategy can provide the direction. Together, they could form the basis of a more adaptive and forward-looking European anti-corruption framework – one that is able to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.

Holding the corrupt to account: the promise and potential of corruption sanctions

When states fail to hold corrupt actors to account, ordinary citizens pay the price. Corruption sanctions were born from the idea that no one should be above the law, no matter where they are in the world. In a new Working Paper, Dr Anton Moiseienko explores how these tools have evolved and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use. Here we share the foreword to his paper by the Basel Institute's Andrew Dornbierer, Head of Policy and Research, International Centre for Asset Recovery. Foreword Every state has an obligation to investigate and prosecute corruption within their jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many states around the world are not willing to fulfil this responsibility. As a result, the very individuals within these states tasked with serving the public interest are instead given free rein to commit acts that not only serve themselves but also corrode the fabric of the state. And ordinary citizens have no alternative but to endure the ensuing economic and social damage. The development of sanctions tools targeting corruption stemmed from the idea that justice should be universal; that no one in any society around the world should be above the law. They are powerful tools, built on powerful principles. States introducing them understand that unchecked corruption will always suffocate a state’s ability to provide security, fairness and prosperity to its citizens. Comparatively though, corruption sanctions are still an underdeveloped concept and are far from perfect. Only a handful of states have introduced them, and those that have are not often using them to their full potential. They also spark valid concerns surrounding due process. These criticisms shouldn’t be ignored: they offer an insight on how these tools could be further developed and enhanced to ensure that they are more credibly and consistently applied. In his paper, Anton Moiseienko provides an excellent and well-researched overview of how corruption sanctions could be designed and employed to better achieve their potential. He explains how these tools have evolved over the last two decades and how they could be further refined to be more effective and achieve a wider range of impact. Critically, his paper is an indispensable resource for those looking to understand exactly how such sanctions can help states deter, disrupt and debilitate the notoriously corrupt that are unreachable through standard criminal justice tools. Learn more Read Dr Anton Moiseienko’s Working Paper “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know” for a deeper analysis of the topic and key policy recommendations. Get a brief introduction to corruption sanctions from our related Quick Guide. Register for our public webinar "Corruption sanctions – reaching those beyond the law" on 18 June 2026, marking the launch of Dr Moiseienko's Working Paper.

Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions

Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know

The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession