Dr Jacopo Costa
Senior Specialist, Prevention, Research and Innovation
Dr Jacopo Costa joined the Basel Institute on Governance’s research team in April 2019.
He holds a PhD in Sociology and Political Studies from the University of Turin. During his doctorate, he held two visiting research posts, one at the Centre International de Criminologie Comparée of the University of Montreal, and the other at the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Northeastern University in Boston. He also holds a master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Florence and a bachelor’s degree in Culture and Human Rights from the University of Bologna.
His research has focused on a variety of topics, including the nature of informal networks, the corrupt exchange in the public works and football industry, illegal wildlife trade between East Africa and South East Asia, and the nexus between corruption and money laundering. Using social network analysis and ethnographic techniques, Jacopo has studied the structures, functions and norms that make it possible to achieve illegal and criminal goals. His research has been published in renowned academic journals in the field of criminology and political science, such as *Governance*, *Global Crime*, *Trends in Organized Crime*, and *Crime, Law, and Social Change*.
See Jacopo’s research profiles on Google Scholar and ResearchGate.
Publications
The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession
Published in the Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance, this article examines how Bulgaria’s 2007 accession to the European Union transformed illegal activities and corruption at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint.
While the introduction of stricter EU regulations and advanced surveillance technology aimed to secure the border, these measures had the effect of transforming criminal strategies and corruption. The authors detail a shift from blatant smuggling to more sophisticated financial frauds, VAT carousel schemes and the illicit privatisation of public border functions.
The article highlights that in some cases, it was the bribery schemes that evolved to bypass new standards. In other cases – particularly involving drug trafficking and the smuggling of human beings – it was the criminal strategies that transformed, including advanced concealment methods or new smuggling routes.
The study also offers a nuanced perspective on the relationship between corruption and criminal activites at border checkpoints: stronger capacity to counter criminal activities could lead to an increase in the risk of corruption, while a more coherent anti corruption framework could trigger criminal activities to evolve. Ultimately, the article argues that anti-crime and anti-corruption policies must account for this evolutionary nature.
Tackling the complexity of border corruption: How technological tools such as the project FALCON dashboard can support investigations
Corruption at land and sea borders facilitates smuggling, sanctions evasion, tax offences and the entry of counterfeit, substandard or unsafe goods into countries including EU member states. This report conceptualises border corruption as a complex system of actors, events and illicit exchanges that is difficult to detect and investigate.
Drawing on research from the Horizon Europe FALCON (Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project, it explores how innovative technological tools – illustrated by the “FALCON dashboard” – can help investigators manage, visualise, interpret and report large volumes of heterogeneous data in support of more effective investigations.
About this report
You may share or republish this report under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.
This report was written as part of the FALCON project. FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).
The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.
Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy
In a new peer-reviewed journal article, Jacopo Costa and Claudia Baez Camargo look into why and how corruption evolves over time, drawing on an empirical analysis from Italy. The article was published in Trends in Organized Crime.
Abstract
Corruption evolves over time. This paper investigates why and how this evolution happens. The analysis has employed a combination of qualitative network and document analysis to explore the configuration of corruption in two moments in Italy and the changes that have happened in between them.
The findings have disclosed that a higher efficiency of the activities of the criminal-justice chain, the transformation of the critical actors and the reform of legal frameworks and governance systems have been critical in determining the evolution of corruption.
The added value of the research lies in its ability to examine these transformative mechanisms within a conceptual framework that keeps together the fact that corruption is networked and that networks evolve over time.
Working Paper 60: Understanding the enemy: Insights from corrupt networks to improve anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives
Corruption is not simply about individual misconduct. It is a networked phenomenon that arises from entrenched social, economic and political interactions. It is orchestrated through coordination between groups and clusters of individuals.
This Working Paper explores the networked nature of corruption and the opportunities this presents for anti-corruption efforts. The aim is to understand how shifting the unit of analysis from individuals to networks helps to understand the persistence and resilience of corruption, while opening up new anti-corruption perspectives.
A meta-analysis of findings from more than 15 years of research on informal networks and corruption underpins the conceptualisation of corrupt networks. The paper argues that a focus on networks helps to shed light on the functionality of corruption – from petty bribery to large-scale public procurement fraud – and the underlying social norms that enable it.
Understanding the structures, functions and modus operandi of the informal networks associated with corruption and applying the network logic to anti-corruption strategies can help to achieve better outcomes. The paper specifically looks at anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives, suggesting that these should emulate positive aspects of informal networks.
About this Working Paper
This paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 International Licence.
The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.
Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam
Quick Guide 38: Border corruption
Border corruption – defined simply as an illegal exchange between border officials and private actors – is a complex phenomenon with serious impacts on safety, health and security. And stopping it isn’t as easy as just stepping up enforcement.
This Quick Guide covers the what, who and why of border corruption. It is based on deep research for the EU-funded FALCON project. More such research is needed to help design effective strategies to prevent corruption from undermining border security.
About this Quick Guide
You are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Turning Legally Obtained Resources into Illegal Payments: A Money Dirtying Scheme
Everyone knows about money laundering – but what about money dirtying, i.e. secretly turning legally acquired money into illegal payments? A new peer-reviewed journal article looks at this phenomenon. Contact the co-author Jacopo Costa for questions.
Abstract
This study focuses on the movement of money in a financial infrastructure built to conceal its origin and destination. The literature has addressed this theme in the field of money laundering, converting illegal money into a legitimate source, yet less is known about the reverse process, hiding and transferring legally generated resources to pay kickbacks to officials.
We aim to analyze how these money dirtying schemes operate and explore their hidden mechanisms. The paper studies what happens to money in an unseen financial cluster and identifies the main actors and infrastructures essential for managing such process.
Using desk research and qualitative analysis of various documents, the article examines the corruption scheme designed by the Odebrecht group to generate resources to bribe politicians and bureaucrats in Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries. It zooms in on one key component of this system, a cluster around two Peruvian entrepreneurs, where money becomes hidden from the eyes of law enforcement agencies and investigators.
The main contribution lies in the conceptual distinction between money laundering and money dirtying schemes and the opportunity to expose and interpret the otherwise invisible critical processes of such illicit resource movements.
Suggested citation
Costa, J., Jancsics, D. Turning Legally Obtained Resources into Illegal Payments: A Money Dirtying Scheme. Eur J Crim Policy Res (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-024-09591-z
Quick Guide 23: Informal networks and anti-corruption
Why do many countries still struggle with high levels of corruption, in spite of years of investment in anti-corruption programmes and even where the right laws, rules and institutions are in place?
We believe one reason is that anti-corruption laws and policies are too often focused narrowly on individuals, rather than networks of individuals.
In our research, we see repeatedly how high levels of corruption are rarely the result of individual behaviour – some isolated rotten apples transgressing the formal legal order and leading others astray. Rather, corruption more frequently springs from the social norms and group dynamics of well-articulated and resilient informal networks.
And it’s those networks that have much to lose from integrity and ethics. Their behaviour as a group entrenches corruption, and they block attempts at reforms. This quick guide takes a look at what this means and the implications for anti-corruption programming.
About this Quick Guide
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Research case study 4: Deconstructing a criminal network involved in illegal wildlife trade between East Africa and Southeast Asia
The illegal wildlife trade threatens biodiversity and security worldwide. Criminal networks pocket billions of dollars in illicit profits from stripping the world bare of endangered species and corrupting politicians and public officials in the process.
Yet there is very little empirical evidence on the role of both ordinary citizens and criminal networks in the illegal wildlife trade. Our research aims to fill this gap.
We used social network analysis and network ethnography techniques to study the criminal network of a wildlife trafficker based in East Africa. The insights can bolster law enforcement efforts aimed at identifying and dismantling wildlife trafficking networks.
Organisational forms of corruption networks: the Odebrecht-Toledo case
Actors in grand corruption schemes often conspire and deliberately create sophisticated networks to extract huge amounts of public resources from government systems. They hide such conspiracies behind hybrid formal/informal arrangements.
Using a mixed methods approach, this study investigates the corruption scheme initiated by former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo and the Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht Group. We argue that separating the networks of the client (Odebrecht) and the agent (Toledo) sides provides analytical leverage for studying complex corrupt arrangements.
We found that the organisational forms designed by corrupt actors on either side were essential to ensuring the secret and safe operation of the network. Introducing the concept of organisational form into corruption research helps better understand the nature of these networks. We also found that different parts of the networks are shaped by different types of corruption. The article concludes with implications for practice.
News and blog
Corruption in the age of networks, data and influence – does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive rise to the challenge?
This article by Dr Jacopo Costa is one of two Basel Institute commentaries on the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive. While the companion piece by Rita Simões examines the directive's legal and institutional implications, this article takes a political economy perspective. It considers what the directive reveals about changing understandings of corruption, how corruption risks are evolving in an increasingly interconnected and technology-driven environment, and where future EU anti-corruption efforts may need to focus. The key message is that the directive represents an important advance in legal harmonisation, but that effective anti-corruption policy will also require stronger strategic thinking, greater use of data and technology, and closer attention to emerging corruption risks linked to procurement, border security and financial infrastructure. April 2026, the European Union formally adopted Directive 2026/1021 on combatting corruption. Following years of negotiations, political disagreements and institutional bargaining, the EU now has a comprehensive anti-corruption framework establishing common definitions, offences, sanctions and preventive measures across its member states. This is a landmark achievement. But it would be a mistake to view the directive as the culmination of the European anti-corruption journey. In fact, its adoption marks the beginning of a much larger challenge: turning a legal framework into an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy that can address the evolving forms of corruption emerging in an increasingly complex geopolitical and technological landscape. Why the directive matters For years, the EU lacked a coherent anti-corruption framework. Although member states had their own legislation, there were significant differences in how corruption offences were defined, investigated and punished. These discrepancies created loopholes that could be exploited by corrupt individuals and hindered cross-border cooperation between national authorities. The new directive aims to address these issues by introducing common minimum standards across the EU. In particular, it: - harmonises the definitions of bribery in the public and private sectors, trading in influence, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment and the concealment of criminal proceeds; - introduces common standards for criminal sanctions, corporate liability, statutes of limitation, whistleblower protection, anti-corruption strategies and specialised anti-corruption bodies; and - broadens the definition of public officials to encompass not only national officeholders, but also senior EU officials and individuals performing public duties on behalf of public institutions. This reflects the reality of contemporary governance, where public services are increasingly delivered through hybrid public–private arrangements. It is the most ambitious attempt yet to establish a shared European anti-corruption framework. A more modern understanding of corruption One of the directive's most significant strengths is its recognition that corruption is not confined to the traditional notion of an envelope stuffed with cash being exchanged. We welcome this change in perspective greatly, because our research demonstrates clearly that contemporary corruption is increasingly networked, sophisticated and relational. It often relies on intermediaries, influence brokers, hidden financial channels, luxury gifts, preferential treatment, future career opportunities and informal exchanges of favours. Including offences such as trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealing criminal proceeds and aiding or abetting corruption schemes shows an understanding of how corruption operates in modern societies. This evolution is important because anti-corruption frameworks often struggle to keep up with the evolving nature of corruption. The directive is a valuable attempt to address this issue and close the resulting gap. The price of political compromise Legislation is never produced in isolation from politics. Significant disagreements emerged among EU institutions and member states during the adoption process. Several governments expressed concerns about subsidiarity and the potential consequences of criminalising particular behaviours. So, the final directive is less ambitious than the original proposal. One example concerns the offence previously known as “abuse of office”. Following intense political resistance, particularly from countries such as Germany and Italy, the final text replaced it with the more cautious formulation of “unlawful exercise of public functions”. The compromise facilitated agreement, but introduced ambiguity that could hinder enforcement. Similarly, criminal sanctions and limitation periods were reduced during negotiations. Maximum prison sentences were reduced, and statutes of limitation were scaled back considerably compared to earlier drafts. These compromises highlight a recurring dilemma in policymaking not only in Europe but everywhere: achieving consensus often necessitates compromising on ambition. The result is a directive that establishes a common baseline, yet leaves considerable room for interpretation among member states. The missing security lens Perhaps the most significant limitation of the directive is its relatively little guidance on what anti-corruption efforts should look like in today's rapidly changing security environment. Because corruption is increasingly also a geopolitical and security issue. Foreign influence operations, sanctions evasion schemes, strategic corruption, illicit financial networks, organised crime infiltration and the manipulation of critical supply chains all represent corruption-related risks affecting European security and resilience. Yet these challenges remain largely outside the directive's core focus. There is a risk that anti-corruption efforts will continue to focus on traditional forms of misconduct while underestimating emerging threats linked to geopolitical competition and hybrid forms of influence. The technology gap Considering the hype around artificial intelligence in society generally, the most striking omission in the directive is the limited attention devoted to technological innovation. Over the past decade, governments, international organisations and researchers have been exploring how artificial intelligence, big data analytics, risk indicators, predictive modelling and open-source intelligence can bolster anti-corruption initiatives. Technology is now essential for identifying suspicious procurement patterns, pinpointing conflicts of interest, tracing illicit financial flows and exposing corruption networks. Yet the directive contains almost no strategic vision regarding the role of technology in anti-corruption governance, which is surprising. Research conducted under the EU-funded FALCON project – of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member – demonstrates that effective anti-corruption systems are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures capable of collecting, integrating, analysing and cross-referencing large volumes of information. Without these capabilities, many corruption risks remain invisible until significant damage has already occurred. It’s important to stress that adopting new technologies – purchasing software, etc. – is the easy part. EU states also need to create the institutional and data infrastructures that allow these technologies to function effectively. Digitisation, interoperability, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and cross-border information sharing are all prerequisites for the next generation of anti-corruption systems. Three areas that deserve greater attention From our research in the following areas, we can say for sure that they deserve particular attention in the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy and future initiatives: 1\. Public procurement Public procurement remains one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. This issue is exacerbated by Europe's increased investment in defence, critical infrastructure, energy security, technological innovation and strategic industrial policies. Central priorities should include strengthening transparency, reducing direct awards, improving oversight of sub-threshold contracts, and introducing AI-based risk assessment tools. 2\. Border governance Managing borders and customs procedures is another critical challenge, as research at the Port of Rotterdam and the Kapitan Andreevo crossing demonstrates. Corruption at the border facilitates a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, evasion of sanctions, tax fraud and the movement of illicit goods. Greater automation, data integration and harmonisation of border management systems across member states could significantly reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the EU's capacity to detect emerging threats. 3\. Financial infrastructures Modern corruption relies heavily on financial infrastructure. Complex financial networks, shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and, increasingly, cryptoassets can facilitate the movement and concealment of illicit funds. The future of anti-corruption policy hinges on strengthening the links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks, and on developing new approaches that can address digital financial ecosystems. Will the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy help put the directive into action? The adoption of Directive 2026/1021 sends an important message that corruption remains a priority issue for the European Union. The directive establishes a much-needed common foundation and introduces valuable innovations to improve both prevention and enforcement. It provides a stronger legal framework than the fragmented system that existed previously. But legal harmonisation alone will not be enough. The directive's effectiveness will ultimately depend on how member states implement its provisions, and on whether the European Union can develop a broader strategic vision capable of addressing emerging corruption risks. This is where the forthcoming EU Anti-Corruption Strategy could play a decisive role. To be effective and not just a paper exercise, it must be adaptive, technology-driven and security-conscious. This strategy must respond to current corruption and anticipate its potential evolution. And it needs to be based on a participative process that considers the valuable research and perspectives of civil society organisations, academics and others outside of government. If the directive provides the legal architecture, the strategy can provide the direction. Together, they could form the basis of a more adaptive and forward-looking European anti-corruption framework – one that is able to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.
How stronger borders can create smarter corruption: lessons from one of Europe's most strategic border crossings
When Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007, many believed it would lead to more secure, transparent and less corrupt borders. New regulations, infrastructure modernisation and digitalised customs procedures all followed. European standards and money arrived together. Yet corruption did not disappear at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, the main land crossing between Bulgaria and Türkiye and one of the busiest gateways between Europe and Asia. Instead, it evolved. This is the central finding of a recent article by the Prevention, Research and Innovation team of the Basel Institute on Governance – Dr Jacopo Costa, Dr Claudia Baez Camargo, Noémi Jäger and Dr Saba Kassa – published in the Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance . The article examines how criminal networks, smugglers, businesses and corrupt officials adapted to Bulgaria’s EU integration. It illustrates how corruption behaves like an adaptive ecosystem: when regulations and border control technologies change, corruption changes with them. A border built for opportunity – legal and illegal Border spaces concentrate discretionary power in the hands of customs officers, border guards, inspectors and regulators, while bringing together also traders, transport companies, migrants, smugglers, criminal groups and political actors. Kapitan Andreevo is a particularly instructive case due to its strategic location, with thousands of trucks, travellers and goods passing through the border checkpoint daily. Before Bulgaria’s EU accession, corruption at the checkpoint was already deeply embedded. The 1990s brought economic crisis, shortages of consumer goods, weak state capacity and rapidly expanding informal markets. Smuggling became a profitable survival strategy. Border officials could be bribed to overlook undeclared goods, counterfeit products and tax evasion. Duty-free shops in the "no man's land" between Bulgaria and Türkiye became hubs for smuggling cigarettes, alcohol and petroleum products. Corruption operated at multiple levels: everyday exchanges between traders, drivers and officials, often based on long-standing personal relationships, at the lower level connections between politicians, senior civil servants, business elites and organised crime at the higher level. Smuggling routes required political protection. Profits flowed upward through patronage systems. EU accession changed the rules of the game Bulgaria’s EU accession radically transformed the legal and institutional environment. The country had to align its customs regulations, VAT rules, excise tax systems, phytosanitary standards and border procedures with EU standards – a gradual process requiring significant investment. The reforms affected almost every aspect of border governance. Customs procedures became increasingly digitalised. New systems such as the VAT Information Exchange System VIES and the Excise Movement and Control System EMCS improved cross-border monitoring. Phytosanitary and veterinary inspections became stricter. Migration controls tightened through alignment with Schengen rules and access to systems like the Schengen Information System SIS and international databases of stolen documents and vehicles. Meanwhile, new border control technologies – X-ray machines, scanners, thermal cameras and risk-analysis tools – expanded the state’s capacity to detect illicit activity. From a policy perspective, this appeared to be a modernisation success story. But criminal systems rarely remain static when the environment changes. Corruption did not decline – it adapted The most striking finding is that stronger controls often increase the strategic value of corruption. After EU accession, crossing the border illegally became more difficult, risky and expensive. Corruption became necessary not only to speed up procedures but to bypass sophisticated control and regulatory systems. In other words, modernisation transformed the function of corruption: Criminal actors began targeting specialised procedures, such as food safety inspections, VAT systems, automated license plate recognition, laboratory testing and digital customs controls. VAT fraud and the manipulation of digital systems VAT fraud illustrates this adaptation clearly. Within the EU, exports are often subject to a VAT rate of 0 zero percent, which means companies can reclaim any VAT they have already paid domestically. Criminal actors exploited this through "carousel fraud" schemes involving fictitious transactions chains. At Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, for example, corruption allegedly enabled traders to manipulate customs procedures. One method involved corrupt officials manually entering fake truck registrations into customs systems to simulate border crossings, enabling fraudulent VAT refunds for exports that never occurred. Even more revealing was the manipulation of automated license plate recognition: corrupt actors reportedly disabled automated recognition and manually entered altered plates using Cyrillic characters resembling Latin letters, allowing smugglers to bypass alerts and inspections. This illustrates a pattern seen in many modern corruption systems: digitalisation does not automatically eliminate corruption. Instead, corruption turns towards the technological systems themselves. Food safety, privatisation and rent-seeking EU food safety and phytosanitary regulations created new bottlenecks and forms of discretionary authority. The research describes two recurring manipulation strategies: selective sampling during inspections, where officials took samples only from "clean" sections of shipments; and falsification of laboratory tests to certify unsafe products as compliant. These risks increased after some border functions were outsourced to private companies. At Kapitan Andreevo, food testing, parking operations and vehicle disinfection were privatised. This reform, intended to increase efficiency, allegedly created new opportunities for rent extraction. The controversy surrounding Eurolab 2011, which reportedly obtained monopolistic control over food safety testing under questionable legal arrangements became emblematic of these tensions. The broader implication: privatisation of public functions does not necessarily reduce corruption risks. It can shift them into hybrid public-private arrangements where accountability is weaker and oversight is more fragmented. The rise of “routinised” corruption The study highlights the increased organisation of corruption itself. Today, no single official can independently guarantee a smuggling route. Procedures involve multiple agencies, overlapping inspections and layered oversight. As a result, corruption evolved towards collective coordination. Customs officers, border guards, supervisors, intermediaries and sometimes political actors participate in networks where bribes are pooled and redistributed. These schemes resemble coordinated organisational systems with revenue-sharing mechanisms, internal hierarchies and protection structures rather than isolated rogue actors. This reflects an important conceptual change: border corruption can function as an embedded institutional ecosystem sustained through cooperation, mutual dependence and political protection. Drug trafficking: when corruption becomes too risky Interestingly, corruption is not always the preferred strategy. In drug trafficking, for example, the risks are dramatically higher. Border officials caught facilitating drug trafficking could face severe criminal penalties, including organised crime charges and lengthy prison sentences. As a result, traffickers increasingly invest in sophisticated concealment methods. One example is the "twin trucks" strategy: several nearly identical trucks carrying similar cargo cross the border simultaneously during heavy traffic, with only one of them containing drugs. Since inspection capacity is limited, the probability is high that the "clean" trucks are checked while the drug shipment passes undetected. This shows that corruption and criminality do not always go hand in hand. Sometimes, stronger anti-corruption measures push criminals towards deception and concealment rather than bribery. The bigger lesson: criminal systems are adaptive The case study of the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing is not just about Bulgaria. Policymakers often assume that more technology, controls and regulation will automatically reduce corruption and illicit trade. But criminal systems and corruption adapt. Informal networks reorganise around the vulnerabilities created by reforms. Every regulatory innovation creates new incentives, bottlenecks and opportunities for exploitation. This does not mean reforms are useless. Many EU measures have clearly strengthened border management. However, reforms must be designed with an understanding of adaptive behaviour. Otherwise, states risk producing unintended consequences: stronger incentives for bribery, use of alternative trafficking routes, technological manipulation, new forms of collusion or opaque privatisation structures. I and my co-authors argue for a more integrated approach that combines anti-corruption and anti-crime strategies. We also emphasise the importance of anticipatory governance and foresight-oriented policymaking that try to predict how illicit actors will respond to institutional changes before reforms are implemented. This may be the most important lesson from Kapitan Andreevo. Borders are not static lines defended by static institutions against static threats. They are evolving ecosystems where states, markets, technologies and criminal actors constantly adapt to one another. Learn more Access the full article, “The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession”. Read our Quick Guide 38 to border corruption for a short introduction. Read our Working Paper 58, “Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam” for a related analysis.
How corruption helps drug traffickers adapt to strengthened border enforcement
Corruption at border points remains a pressing global issue, threatening not only border integrity but also the health, safety and security of our societies. It enables illicit trafficking, facilitates organised crime and undermines trust in public institutions. In our Working Paper 58 , Saba Kassa and Jacopo Costa examine how corruption facilitates drug trafficking through the port of Rotterdam. Through in-depth interviews with stakeholders, a review of judicial cases and desk research, the paper shows how trafficking and corruption strategies are changing in response to strengthened enforcement at border spaces. It contributes to the growing body of work that looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive. The Working Paper was written as part of the FALCON Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks project. The research supports efforts to develop more robust and forward-looking approaches to combat corruption and drug trafficking. Read the executive summary below. Unintended consequences of strengthened enforcement This Working Paper examines how corruption facilitates drug trafficking specifically cocaine through the port of Rotterdam, looking at the underlying drivers and strategies involved. Legal trade routes and commercial ports are especially attractive because of the high volumes of cargo, which make it possible to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. The spatial complexity of the port of Rotterdam also makes it difficult to fully secure it against criminal activity. Digging deeper into the facilitating factors of trafficking, the paper finds that, paradoxically, a main driver of rising border corruption is the increased political attention on and resources dedicated to fighting trafficking. Desk research and stakeholder interviews highlight that as authorities deploy new technology to improve detection, traffickers face more obstacles to operating effectively. Having someone on the inside then becomes increasingly important. So, an unintended but important consequence of the strengthened fight against drug trafficking is that corruption becomes even more essential for the operational success of organised crime networks. Customs officials are specifically vulnerable This study focuses specifically on the role of customs. Tasked with monitoring the import and export of goods, customs officers are important actors in the fight against drug trafficking. However, their role also makes them vulnerable: they have crucial knowledge on processes and procedures, access to systems and discretionary power that can be exploited by criminals. The desk research shows that corruption is used strategically to circumvent two important bottlenecks: the container screening and security as cargo enters the port, and the exit of drugs from the port. Traffickers may seek to obtain key information or direct assistance from customs officers. Collusion – coercion – infiltration These corrupt relationships and the emerging networks between members of crime groups and the customs officials are diverse. Some relationships can be characterised by collusion, where customs officials offer their services or are persuaded to cooperate. This collusion may be opportunistic or targeted. Other relationships can be characterised by coercion. Customs officials may be lured by financial reward, but this is accompanied by intimidation or the threat of violence to ensure that the officer cooperates and continues to cooperate. Our research highlights that the boundary between collusion and coercion is often blurred. Beyond collusion and coercion, we also see infiltration, which crosses the boundaries between the criminal, public and private. What emerges is less a matter of individual corruption and more akin to regulatory capture, where the public office position is held by a member of the criminal network. The review of the judicial cases shows that bribes involved in these schemes can amount to millions. To hide and use the illicit gains, traffickers rely on money laundering, disguising its source as legitimate. They often enlist the help of family and friends, a trusted inner circle or professional specialists. They may also hide cash at home or invest it in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad. Adaptive corruption strategies A key finding of our research is that the criminal and corruption strategies used to facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive. The underlying driver of this adaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and high profitability of the crime. This pushes traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in supplying the demand. Corruption strategies adapt in response to new enforcement measures. When control systems are changed and/or strengthened, corruption strategies evolve alongside them. This research identifies some key patterns: Stronger detection efforts increase the incentives for corruption. Evolving systems encourage a similar shift in corruption strategies. Anti-corruption and anti-trafficking measures may change the profile of those most vulnerable to being co-opted. The characteristics of corruption can also evolve, from collusion to coercion, to full infiltration of institutions and systems – with blurred lines in between. Trafficking strategies evolve, too Trafficking strategies are similarly adaptive. There have been increased efforts by the port to combat trafficking through enhanced detection and technology. This was initially reflected by increased drug seizures. But since 2024, drugs seizures have declined. The research findings provide an explanation for this: As detection strengthens, more drug seizures are made. But what may happen, too, is a response to these new measures. As the risk of detection increases, criminals may adapt their trafficking strategies to overcome the additional hurdles, including: changing concealment strategies; and changing modes of transport and trafficking routes, including to ports outside of the Netherlands. Red flags and risk indicators These developments highlight the complexity in understanding the impact of stronger anti-trafficking measures on both corruption and trafficking strategies. Trafficking and corruption are typically measured by detection, for example, by changes in the volume of drug seizures or the number of public officials caught engaging in corruption. But the elephant in the room is that increasingly sophisticated criminal strategies can hide what is really happening. This underscores the need to continuously strengthen our ability to recognise “red flags” of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools and refined risk indicators are critical for understanding how crime and corruption strategies are changing. A holistic understanding and improved foresight The evolving nature of criminal strategies is often likened to a game of chess: enforcement makes a move, and criminal networks adapt. But what now seems to be emerging is more troubling. When barriers to drug trafficking increase while demand remains unchanged, crime and corruption strategies adapt in ways that can deepen their impact on society, leading for example to the hardening of crime and associated violence. This makes anticipating how crime may adapt to changing anti-corruption and anti-trafficking strategies critical. Improved foresight and scenario-building capacities will be vital in order to develop more robust enforcement efforts against drug trafficking and mitigate the negative impact on society. A holistic approach is essential. Addressing corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking requires a broad view of crime that focuses on understanding vulnerabilities, leveraging data and harnessing collaboration. The risk of trafficking routes changing are high, therefore, we must use every tool at our disposal to ensure effective and sustainable enforcement efforts. Learn more Download the full Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam: Drivers, strategies and implications View related online workshop for enforcement and research communities: Red flags at the frontier: detecting and disrupting border corruption in the EU , 23 September 2025 Acknowledgement and disclaimer FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI . The contents of the Working Paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.
Money dirtying: shining a light on how clean money turns into bribes
There’s a lot of attention to the laundering of “dirty money” – but very little about how clean money can be turned into bribes, kickbacks or payments to terrorists. Together with David Jancsics, I examined the money-dirtying strategies at the heart of one of the world’s most dramatic corruption scandals: the Lava Jato or Car Wash case. How did the multinational company Odebrecht manage to secretly channel millions in legitimately earned funds to bribe politicians and bureaucrats across the continent? Our article Turning Legally Obtained Resources into Illegal Payments: A Money Dirtying Scheme attempts to answer this question and to explore the networks of individuals and entities that made the schemes possible. Exploring the concept and practice of money dirtying could help practitioners get a more holistic view of major financial crime cases. It could also potentially lead to new ways to prevent, detect and intercept illicit financial flows. What is “money dirtying”? We use the term “money dirtying” to refer to the process by which clean, legitimate resources are turned into illicit payments used for corruption, the financing of terrorism and other illegal activities. The term was originally coined to describe the mechanisms of terrorism financing in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, researchers worked to understand the financial structures that allowed Al-Qaeda to finance the attacks. We have repurposed the term to fit the field of corruption, but the underlying idea is the same. What are the typical characteristics? On the face of it, money dirtying has similar characteristics to money laundering: Complex, multi-layered schemes using redundant payments and fake contracts to make funds difficult to trace. The use of specialised professionals who can create sophisticated financial infrastructures and know all the tricks to evade detection. The use of informal actors such as halawadars or doleiros to escape regulatory radars. Often transnational, with money, resources and information shared along a cross-border network of individuals and entities. What makes it different to money laundering? The key differences lie in the purpose and the direction of the flow. Money laundering seeks to clean dirty money by reintegrating it into the legal financial system. It is a circular system, where the funds return to their point of origin. Money dirtying serves to transfer money undetected from the bribe giver to the bribe taker. It is linear. For example, in our case study, the money took the following route: In reality, it looked more like this: The Lava Jato case The Lava Jato case Operation Car Wash was a major judicial investigation launched in Brazil in 2009. Initially focused on money laundering and illegal activities linked to a car wash company, it quickly expanded into one of the largest corruption investigations in history. By the early 2010s, investigations and plea deals had exposed the intricate financial structures and corrupt management systems of the Odebrecht Group at the heart of a web of illicit payments in countries across the region. Unlike other cases, there is significant public information available about Lava Jato thanks to judicial investigations, journalistic work, academic studies and other reports. This allowed us to map and analyse the “money dirtying” network in detail. The case is also an ideal case study in advanced corruption schemes. It was large, long-running and used complex, multi-layered networks that spread across the world. Skeleton and muscles To map the complex networks of the Odebrecht Group’s money dirtying networks we looked at the data in two ways: We analysed the transactions, performing a social network analysis and looking at the “skeleton” of the network – how it was shaped, where transactions centred and how they moved. At the same time, we tried to understand the substance of the network. If you like, the muscles surrounding the skeleton. We read interviews and wiretaps, and looked at personal histories to understand the relationships between people in the network and how they operated together. We then created a coherent framework of both the “skeleton” and “muscles”. This includes a description of each role and its function within the network. So what? Paying more attention to how legitimate funds are channelled towards illegal activities can help anti-corruption practitioners to gain a more holistic view of major corruption schemes. With the increase in internal controls and regulatory scrutiny, those that engage in corruption are forced to use more sophisticated methods than just declaring bribes as “consultancy fees”, for example. A better understanding of these methods could help inform stronger internal controls and compliance systems. This focus also helps practitioners to see how some of the same methods – legal structures in offshore financial centres, shell companies, professional enablers, informal value transfer service providers for example – can be misused not only for money laundering but for other parts of a corruption scheme. The research also showcases the power of social network analysis in mapping the key individuals and entities involved in transforming clean money into illicit payments. Combined with evidence of their relations and interactions, this can create a valuable source of information for both law enforcement and the development of evidence-based strategies for targeting corrupt networks. Learn more Organisational forms of corruption networks: the Odebrecht-Toledo case Quick Guide 4: Social network analysis in combating organised crime and trafficking Research Case Study 3: Exposing the networks behind transnational corruption and money laundering schemes
Culture and corruption: a complex relationship
If someone gives a healthcare worker a “gift” in return for faster treatment, is that a bribe or just a cultural expectation? Are some cultures inherently more corrupt than others? And does the meaning of corruption vary according to cultural context? These are just some of the controversial and complex issues that scholars have asked in relation to culture and corruption. We summarised the key debates in a chapter contributed to the new Elgar Concise Encyclopedia of Corruption Law . In brief: A tricky topic Even the juxtaposition of “culture and corruption” causes unease: the word “culture” tends to have a neutral or positive connotation, while “corruption” is practically always negative. Many are understandably uneasy about the risk of labelling entire cultural groups as “corrupt” and warn against simplistic explanations of corrupt behaviour because "it’s in their culture". In contrast, others refer to cultural relativism, claiming that the concept of corruption is an artefact of the West and that local standards for what is and is not correct behaviour vary widely. Still others apply quantitative research methods to understand the links, for example comparing measures of cultural factors in different countries with indices of perceived corruption in those same countries. One study found a correlation between high levels of perceived corruption and more unequal and risk-averse societies that favour materialistic rewards. But correlation is not causation, as we know, so it is hard to draw conclusions about whether corruption causes those cultural factors or vice versa. Going deeper into social norms Qualitative research approaches focus on local conditions, narratives and legitimisation processes. And what stands out across many countries is the importance of personal relationships in citizens’ interactions with the state. As our research in Tanzania and Uganda has shown, for example, relationships are used instrumentally to gain easier access to public services, circumvent formal rules and gain undue advantages in business dealings, among other things. While these personal relationships are shaped by social and cultural norms around status, respect, shame, guilt, peer pressure, etc., they occur across many different countries and cultures. So it is not only simplistic but flatly wrong to say that entire groups of people are inherently corrupt because of their culture. Overcoming shortcomings of the state Personal relationships are necessary to overcome or compensate for the shortcomings of formal state institutions. Participants in our field research in various countries typically condemn corrupt behaviours, including the use of personal relationships to gain an undue advantage. But they continue to engage in these behaviours regardless. Why the paradox? First, because conflicting values of public duty versus social obligations may trap public officials, no matter how honest they are in their hearts. That is especially the case where unwritten social norms like reciprocity are stronger than formal, legal rules. Second, citizens may be forced to resort to corruption as the only way to access essential services – and they become especially likely to do this when they see and believe that “everyone is doing it”. Where the state can provide access to services, equal treatment and decent standards of living through its formal laws and institutions, it is far less likely that corruption will be seen as necessary and a normal cultural practice. The conclusion: nobody is inherently corrupt because of their culture. But corruption can become socially legitimised in contexts where it is the only way to get around the shortcomings of the state. Learn more The Elgar Concise Encyclopedia of Corruption Law is co-edited by Mark Pieth the Basel Institute’s founder and former President and Tina Søreide of the Norwegian School of Economics. Enter the code CRPT35 at the checkout for a 35 percent discount off the list price. Read Claudia Baez Camargo’s quick guide to social norms and corruption. See a summary of our research project exploring how individuals invest in creating informal relationships and networks in order to obtain public services or business deals. Learn more about the work of our Prevention, Research and Innovation formerly Public Governance team.
New analysis of the Toledo-Odebrecht case illuminates the complex transnational networks behind corruption and money laundering schemes
What does the web of connections look like that underlies grand corruption and money laundering schemes and the abuse of offshore financial centres? Who are the people involved, how do they interact and what do they do? And what insights can we draw by looking at complex corruption and money laundering schemes from the perspective of social networks, rather than solely individuals? These questions are at the heart of a new analysis of the so-called Lava Jato or Odebrecht scandal that has engulfed Latin America. In Working Paper 36: Revealing the networks behind corruption and money laundering schemes , we have applied a combination of social network analysis and network ethnography to a specific nexus within this complex of cases: former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo and the network that enabled him to launder bribes obtained from the construction giant Odebrecht through offshore jurisdictions. What do the results show? First, it shows how the illicit scheme worked, step by step, and the functions of the different individuals and clusters of individuals involved. The scheme was highly sophisticated both technologically and financially, involving complex illicit exchanges across borders and within the murky space of offshore financial infrastuctures. The interaction between the “business” pillar Odebrecht’s leadership and representatives and the “political” pillar senior public officials and other politically exposed persons was smooth and efficient, facilitated by a web of service providers and revolving around companies, offshore corporate vehicles and bank accounts. It was this “social-financial complex” of individuals and structures that enabled the beneficiaries to disconnect themselves from the corrupt acts and money laundering – not just the technical and legal loopholes that exist in offshore financial centres or even the weaknesses of international cooperation on crime and corruption. Second, the research illuminates the social norms and informal governance practices that regulated the scheme. The inner circles of the key players on both the business and the political sides acted as the first line of defence. This is common in corruption schemes and made possible by the level of proximity, trust and reciprocity between a business leader and their subordinates, or between a politically exposed person and their circle of relatives, colleagues and friends. The second line of defence is the set of knowledge, skills and social capital that service providers and financial intermediaries bring to the table. Through their services, these actors design the complex financial infrastructure that allows the illicit proceeds of corruption to be laundered through multiple layers and tangled chains until it is nearly impossible to be traced. These service providers and intermediaries, together with the financial infrastructure they design, form a multi-layered ecosystem that works efficiently thanks to a strong informal governance system. Strategic decisions on inputs, outputs and rules are centralised among the core political and business actors. Operations are decentralised and spread out among lower-level business managers or employees and among the political actors’ sprawling networks, who in turn employ service providers and financial intermediaries to carry out the work. This mix between centralisation and decentralisation results in an efficient, effective and resilient way to govern such a large, cross-border, multi-layered and complex social-financial structure – and most importantly, to keep it hidden for so long. Shifting the focus from individuals to networks The research results add a further illustration to the growing recognition that corruption is a form of collective, social behaviour that slips easily across borders and involves highly sophisticated financial strategies and transactions. The clear implication is that narrow approaches to corruption, from a national perspective and focused on individuals and their self-interested behaviours, provide an incomplete picture at best. Shifting the focus from individuals to networks through techniques such as social network analysis and network ethnography can offer valuable insights to inform anti-corruption policies, law enforcement strategies and the academic theories that underpin these. For law enforcement, this analysis illustrates how SNA and network ethnography techniques can be applied to identify key individuals and clusters, the spaces in which they operate and the criminal strategies they employ. This approach has the potential to make major investigations and prosecutions more efficient, more targeted and more likely to succeed, as it opens up new pathways and tools to break into the case and gain the information hidden within the network. For policy, the research provides further insight into some of the legislative weaknesses that allow offshore financial centres to be abused, as well as the consequence of these weaknesses for global efforts to combat corruption and other crime. Shining a light on the illicit nexus that exists between corruption and money laundering may help policymakers to close those gaps. For the academic debate, the research adds fresh empirical evidence to the study of the relation between grand corruption and money laundering. It explores key analytical and theoretical concepts that are as yet under-explored in this field, and provides a starting point for future research to illuminate these. Widening perspectives All of us who wish to find more effective ways to combat corruption and money laundering should be open to new ways to analyse corruption schemes, understand their workings and to follow the money as it flows around the world. The value of the “network” perspective is something that our wider Public Governance research demonstrates time and again in very different contexts. Learn more about the research, training and technical assistance activities of our Public Governance team and about how our International Centre for Asset Recovery helps build the capacity of partner countries to trace illicit financial flows and recover money stolen through corruption. View and download Working Paper 36: Revealing the networks behind corruption and money laundering schemes: an analysis of the Toledo–Odebrecht case using social network analysis and network ethnography.
Mind the gap: building a bridge between research and practice to better fight illegal wildlife trade
When you have a difficult problem to solve, it often helps to look at it from a different angle. And it always helps to collaborate with experts who have different perspectives and skillsets. This is the simple premise behind my latest short report on Social network analysis in the fight against illegal wildlife trade. It draws on my experience as a social network analyst keen to apply this technique in support of law enforcement activities against organised crime, including wildlife trafficking. Few of us would disagree that collaboration between researchers and practitioners is fundamental to increase our capacity as a community to fight crime in the contemporary world. Strategies to fight crime should be based on evidence, right? But while opportunities for such collaboration are plentiful, real-life examples are surprisingly challenging and all too rare. This situation is no different with bridging the gap between researchers such as myself specialised in social network analysis SNA and investigators of wildlife trafficking offences. The first challenge is promoting wider understanding of what SNA is and what it can do. If you are one of those who aren’t sure, feel free to read my quick guide to social network analysis in combating organised crime and trafficking. The second challenge is demonstrating just how much SNA research can support investigations relating to illegal wildlife trade or, for that matter, any form of trafficking or serious organised crime. Some of the specific benefits I explore in the report are: analysis of datasets to generate a wide range of valuable intelligence products; structuring the intelligence through SNA to enable its systematic application by investigators; identifying criminal actors previously hidden in the data; assessing vulnerabilities in criminal networks; developing evidence-based strategies to counter IWT. The advantages go both ways. Law enforcement activities and practitioners can support SNA research on wildlife trafficking through: providing a rich source of primary and secondary data; helping to frame research questions and hypotheses; introducing researchers to the field and making connections; clarifying queries around specific data and the roles/functions of actors in the network; acting as a sounding board to confirm or reject the findings of the SNA. In order to harness such synergies, we need to think of ways in which information can be better shared between the fields of research and practice. Transparency and access to enforcement information is a first step. Documents such as electronic wiretapping and shadowing records, or pre-trial detention orders and sentences, are incredibly valuable for SNA yet almost impossible for researchers to obtain. High-quality SNA needs high-quality data, so this challenge impacts the depth and breadth of findings that SNA can achieve. Weaker findings in turn make a weaker contribution to law enforcement efforts. Do we want to create a virtuous circle between research and practice in support of our shared goal – that of fighting wildlife crime and taking down the criminal networks responsible? Of course. So let’s figure out how to build bridges over the gaps. Bringing different fields of knowledge and skillsets together in a context of openness and collaboration will not only produce better knowledge, but also improve processes. Meaningful collaborations are planned from the outset and designed to share and build on capacities, perspectives and practices. In this way, our vision becomes sharper and our body of knowledge becomes greater than the sum of its parts. Learn more My quick guide to social network analysis offers a brief introduction to SNA, its goals and techniques. I recently published a preliminary report on my initial findings: Examining wildlife trafficking networks in East Africa through the lens of social network analysis. For broader background, see the Basel Institute's Working Paper 30: Corruption and wildlife trafficking: exploring drivers, facilitators and networks behind illegal wildlife trade in East Africa, published in 2019 in collaboration with my colleagues Claudia Baez Camargo and Saba Kassa. See further information on the Basel Institute's IWT programme and the focus of the programme's research and social network analysis component. Photo by Nikolai Ulltang from Pexels.
Jacopo Costa’s quick guide to social network analysis in combating organised crime and trafficking
Social network analysis SNA can help us to better understand and tackle the transnational organised crime and dark networks that sustain corruption, money laundering and illicit trafficking. In my work for the Basel Institute’s Public Governance team, I am currently focused on using SNA to support research into the organised crime networks behind the multibillion-dollar global trade in illegal wildlife products. But the methodology and techniques are just as powerful when applied to any major trafficking network – people, drugs and weapons – as well as gambling, match-fixing and other organised crimes. SNA is also useful to understand other types of social networks that are linked to many different patterns of corruption. For example, networks of political and business elites often collude to get away with grand corruption schemes in procurement for public infrastructure projects. Social networks sustain and perpetuate practices of bribery and favouritism in the provision of public services. What is it in a nutshell? Social network analysis is a set of theories, methods, techniques and software to study social relational structures. In other words, networks created by social interactions between individuals and groups. SNA allows us to capture the structural and functional characteristics of each network. This includes the role of each actor, the dynamics, mechanisms and rules behind the network’s establishment and evolution, and how all the different elements – nodes – are linked together. What can SNA tell us? SNA can help us answer questions like this: How dense, or closely connected is the network? Is it highly centralised or is there a lot of activity at the periphery? What kind of clusters and sub-groups exist? Which are the most powerful nodes, or “hubs”? Which nodes are acting as “brokers”, mediating between other elements? Which nodes are supplying information, advice or professional services to the illicit networks, staying mostly invisible on the periphery? How is the network evolving over time? And ultimately – which nodes must we target to disrupt the network and break it down permanently? It's also valuable to look at how criminal networks interact with each other. What goes into the analysis? Social network analysts and researchers use publicly available information such as judicial documents, institutional reports and newspaper articles, along with interviews, questionnaires and focus groups. The more information we have, the more clearly we can highlight the main structural characteristics of the criminal and dark networks. Applying different models also deepens the analytical potential. An exponential random graph model, for example, identifies sociometric determinants – age, place of birth, nationality, profession, ethnic group, religion, etc. – that affect the probability of a link existing between two nodes. This is because, as the English saying goes, birds of a feather flock together – people with similar social characteristics are more likely to develop a connection. This and other specific models can illuminate how a criminal network functions while at the same time supplying useful insights into the nature and origin of the criminal links. How can SNA help law enforcement authorities and policymakers? Traffickers necessarily operate across borders, exploiting transnational criminal organisations, global dark markets and the growing possibilities offered by technology. Understanding how these networks of traffickers and criminals work, and how the networks interact with other networks, is essential to planning how to target the key players and act efficiently to dismember the networks. More importantly, SNA is essential to planning how to prevent criminal networks and trafficking rings from – like snakes or worms – re-growing and regaining their strength even after they are dismembered. Learn more Find out more about the Basel Institute's research into social networks and current projects in this area. Download a PDF of this quick guide.
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