Illicit financial flows
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Corruption in the age of networks, data and influence – does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive rise to the challenge?
This article by Dr Jacopo Costa is one of two Basel Institute commentaries on the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive. While the companion piece by Rita Simões examines the directive's legal and institutional implications, this article takes a political economy perspective. It considers what the directive reveals about changing understandings of corruption, how corruption risks are evolving in an increasingly interconnected and technology-driven environment, and where future EU anti-corruption efforts may need to focus. The key message is that the directive represents an important advance in legal harmonisation, but that effective anti-corruption policy will also require stronger strategic thinking, greater use of data and technology, and closer attention to emerging corruption risks linked to procurement, border security and financial infrastructure. April 2026, the European Union formally adopted Directive 2026/1021 on combatting corruption. Following years of negotiations, political disagreements and institutional bargaining, the EU now has a comprehensive anti-corruption framework establishing common definitions, offences, sanctions and preventive measures across its member states. This is a landmark achievement. But it would be a mistake to view the directive as the culmination of the European anti-corruption journey. In fact, its adoption marks the beginning of a much larger challenge: turning a legal framework into an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy that can address the evolving forms of corruption emerging in an increasingly complex geopolitical and technological landscape. Why the directive matters For years, the EU lacked a coherent anti-corruption framework. Although member states had their own legislation, there were significant differences in how corruption offences were defined, investigated and punished. These discrepancies created loopholes that could be exploited by corrupt individuals and hindered cross-border cooperation between national authorities. The new directive aims to address these issues by introducing common minimum standards across the EU. In particular, it: - harmonises the definitions of bribery in the public and private sectors, trading in influence, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment and the concealment of criminal proceeds; - introduces common standards for criminal sanctions, corporate liability, statutes of limitation, whistleblower protection, anti-corruption strategies and specialised anti-corruption bodies; and - broadens the definition of public officials to encompass not only national officeholders, but also senior EU officials and individuals performing public duties on behalf of public institutions. This reflects the reality of contemporary governance, where public services are increasingly delivered through hybrid public–private arrangements. It is the most ambitious attempt yet to establish a shared European anti-corruption framework. A more modern understanding of corruption One of the directive's most significant strengths is its recognition that corruption is not confined to the traditional notion of an envelope stuffed with cash being exchanged. We welcome this change in perspective greatly, because our research demonstrates clearly that contemporary corruption is increasingly networked, sophisticated and relational. It often relies on intermediaries, influence brokers, hidden financial channels, luxury gifts, preferential treatment, future career opportunities and informal exchanges of favours. Including offences such as trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealing criminal proceeds and aiding or abetting corruption schemes shows an understanding of how corruption operates in modern societies. This evolution is important because anti-corruption frameworks often struggle to keep up with the evolving nature of corruption. The directive is a valuable attempt to address this issue and close the resulting gap. The price of political compromise Legislation is never produced in isolation from politics. Significant disagreements emerged among EU institutions and member states during the adoption process. Several governments expressed concerns about subsidiarity and the potential consequences of criminalising particular behaviours. So, the final directive is less ambitious than the original proposal. One example concerns the offence previously known as “abuse of office”. Following intense political resistance, particularly from countries such as Germany and Italy, the final text replaced it with the more cautious formulation of “unlawful exercise of public functions”. The compromise facilitated agreement, but introduced ambiguity that could hinder enforcement. Similarly, criminal sanctions and limitation periods were reduced during negotiations. Maximum prison sentences were reduced, and statutes of limitation were scaled back considerably compared to earlier drafts. These compromises highlight a recurring dilemma in policymaking not only in Europe but everywhere: achieving consensus often necessitates compromising on ambition. The result is a directive that establishes a common baseline, yet leaves considerable room for interpretation among member states. The missing security lens Perhaps the most significant limitation of the directive is its relatively little guidance on what anti-corruption efforts should look like in today's rapidly changing security environment. Because corruption is increasingly also a geopolitical and security issue. Foreign influence operations, sanctions evasion schemes, strategic corruption, illicit financial networks, organised crime infiltration and the manipulation of critical supply chains all represent corruption-related risks affecting European security and resilience. Yet these challenges remain largely outside the directive's core focus. There is a risk that anti-corruption efforts will continue to focus on traditional forms of misconduct while underestimating emerging threats linked to geopolitical competition and hybrid forms of influence. The technology gap Considering the hype around artificial intelligence in society generally, the most striking omission in the directive is the limited attention devoted to technological innovation. Over the past decade, governments, international organisations and researchers have been exploring how artificial intelligence, big data analytics, risk indicators, predictive modelling and open-source intelligence can bolster anti-corruption initiatives. Technology is now essential for identifying suspicious procurement patterns, pinpointing conflicts of interest, tracing illicit financial flows and exposing corruption networks. Yet the directive contains almost no strategic vision regarding the role of technology in anti-corruption governance, which is surprising. Research conducted under the EU-funded FALCON project – of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member – demonstrates that effective anti-corruption systems are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures capable of collecting, integrating, analysing and cross-referencing large volumes of information. Without these capabilities, many corruption risks remain invisible until significant damage has already occurred. It’s important to stress that adopting new technologies – purchasing software, etc. – is the easy part. EU states also need to create the institutional and data infrastructures that allow these technologies to function effectively. Digitisation, interoperability, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and cross-border information sharing are all prerequisites for the next generation of anti-corruption systems. Three areas that deserve greater attention From our research in the following areas, we can say for sure that they deserve particular attention in the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy and future initiatives: 1\. Public procurement Public procurement remains one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. This issue is exacerbated by Europe's increased investment in defence, critical infrastructure, energy security, technological innovation and strategic industrial policies. Central priorities should include strengthening transparency, reducing direct awards, improving oversight of sub-threshold contracts, and introducing AI-based risk assessment tools. 2\. Border governance Managing borders and customs procedures is another critical challenge, as research at the Port of Rotterdam and the Kapitan Andreevo crossing demonstrates. Corruption at the border facilitates a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, evasion of sanctions, tax fraud and the movement of illicit goods. Greater automation, data integration and harmonisation of border management systems across member states could significantly reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the EU's capacity to detect emerging threats. 3\. Financial infrastructures Modern corruption relies heavily on financial infrastructure. Complex financial networks, shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and, increasingly, cryptoassets can facilitate the movement and concealment of illicit funds. The future of anti-corruption policy hinges on strengthening the links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks, and on developing new approaches that can address digital financial ecosystems. Will the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy help put the directive into action? The adoption of Directive 2026/1021 sends an important message that corruption remains a priority issue for the European Union. The directive establishes a much-needed common foundation and introduces valuable innovations to improve both prevention and enforcement. It provides a stronger legal framework than the fragmented system that existed previously. But legal harmonisation alone will not be enough. The directive's effectiveness will ultimately depend on how member states implement its provisions, and on whether the European Union can develop a broader strategic vision capable of addressing emerging corruption risks. This is where the forthcoming EU Anti-Corruption Strategy could play a decisive role. To be effective and not just a paper exercise, it must be adaptive, technology-driven and security-conscious. This strategy must respond to current corruption and anticipate its potential evolution. And it needs to be based on a participative process that considers the valuable research and perspectives of civil society organisations, academics and others outside of government. If the directive provides the legal architecture, the strategy can provide the direction. Together, they could form the basis of a more adaptive and forward-looking European anti-corruption framework – one that is able to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.
Basel Institute joins regional effort to strengthen security, justice and development in Latin America
Reducing the economic power of organised crime is essential to improving security, strengthening justice systems and supporting sustainable development across Latin America and the Caribbean. And doing that requires strong and dependable partnerships. Building on more than a decade of support to authorities across the region, the Basel Institute on Governance has formally joined the Alliance for Security, Justice and Development, a regional initiative led by the Inter-American Development Bank IDB . The Alliance seeks to strengthen coordinated responses to organised crime in Latin America and the Caribbean through dialogue, cooperation, knowledge exchange and resource mobilisation. Supporting the fight against illicit financial flows For the Basel Institute and its International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR , participation in the Alliance represents a further opportunity to contribute its expertise in financial investigations, asset recovery, international cooperation and public financial management while working alongside governments, international organisations and other partners committed to strengthening security, justice and development across the region. Executive Director Elizabeth Andersen signed the declaration formalising the Basel Institute’s participation in the Alliance in Washington, D.C. The signing followed close engagement between senior IDB and Alliance representatives and Oscar Solórzano, Head of ICAR Latin America. Strengthening regional cooperation The Alliance for Security, Justice and Development is a regional platform for dialogue, cooperation, knowledge exchange and resource mobilisation aimed at preventing and responding to organised crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. Coordinated by the IDB through its Citizen Security Division, the Alliance currently brings together 23 member states and multiple strategic partners from the international, development and security sectors. Its work is structured around three strategic pillars: protecting vulnerable communities from organised crime and violence; strengthening institutional resilience within security and justice systems; and reducing illicit financial flows and illicit markets to weaken the operational capacity and influence of criminal organisations. Bringing expertise in asset recovery and financial investigations The Basel Institute will contribute particularly to the third pillar, leaning on the expertise and two decades of experience of its specialised International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR . Elizabeth Andersen stated that the Basel Institute is honoured to participate in such a high-level initiative focused on issues of critical importance for Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as for the broader international community. Oscar Solórzano highlighted that the Alliance represents an important opportunity to support countries in strengthening asset recovery systems, international cooperation and institutional capacities against increasingly sophisticated forms of organised crime and illicit economies. Building on a decade of support in Latin America Our participation builds on more than a decade of operational and technical support to authorities across Latin America in areas including financial investigations, asset recovery, international cooperation and – through a dedicated programme – public financial management. Activities under the Alliance framework are expected to begin in the region in the coming months, with our teams supporting key initiatives and technical workstreams developed through the Alliance in the years ahead. Our participation reflects our longstanding commitment to helping countries tackle corruption, illicit financial flows and organised crime, and our belief that sustainable impact is achieved through strong partnerships that bring together public authorities, international organisations and practitioners around shared goals.
Working Paper sheds fresh light on the sanctions and confiscation debate
As the war in Ukraine intensifies, calls are growing for states to confiscate Russian assets frozen under sanctions and redirect them to provide support to Ukraine. Our latest Working Paper argues that states can and should do this by enhancing the effectiveness and scope of established asset recovery measures – not by introducing new untested mechanisms that risk inviting future legal challenges, defeating the purpose of sanctions and violating the rule of law. Go straight to Working Paper 42: From sanctions to confiscation while upholding the rule of law or read the key takeaways: Executive summary In light of recent world events, political leaders around the world have questioned whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression. Some states have even sought to introduce legislative mechanisms to make it possible to confiscate an asset frozen under sanctions, purely on the basis that the asset has been made subject to a sanction. One state – Canada – has already done so. The intention behind these mechanisms is clear: assets frozen under sanctions could be confiscated and repurposed to provide assistance and compensation to the victims of the sanctioned target. In the context of the Ukraine war, for example, proponents argue that these measures will allow states to permanently confiscate Russian-linked assets under sanction and redirect them to provide support to Ukraine. The debate Should states be able to confiscate sanctioned assets\ purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned? The justifiability and legality of mechanisms such as Canada’s is currently the subject of debate. Two key issues include whether the confiscation of assets in such circumstances: is acceptable in the context of established legal rights and norms; defeats the primary purpose of sanctions as a tool of coercion. Issues of property and due process rights With regards to the first point, the lack of adequate judicial oversight included in such mechanisms, and the fact that these mechanisms aim to permanently deprive sanctioned targets of their assets, raises serious questions surrounding property and due process rights. If such a mechanism was introduced in Europe for example, it is likely to be challenged on the grounds that it violates Protocol 1 Article 1 as well as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. If such mechanisms were also applied to state-linked assets such as sanctioned assets belonging to central banks then this would also raise concerns regarding a possible infringement of domestic and international laws relating to state immunity. Undermining the purpose of sanctions With regards to the second point, permitting the confiscation of sanctioned assets arguably annuls the coercive purpose of sanctions regimes to act as a tool to persuade targets to cease their adverse behaviour. If states are permitted to confiscate sanctioned assets and make it impossible for a target to retrieve their frozen assets then this effectively removes any incentive for the target to change their behaviour. In such cases, rather than operating as tools of coercion, sanctions would instead primarily operate to punish a target and provide compensation to the victims for the harm that has been caused. Of course, some have argued that there is a greater need for these latter objectives, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine where financial assistance is required urgently. Others however argue that despite the urgency this situation presents, the long-term objective of sanctions should remain coercion, particularly if sanctioning states wish to compel the aggressing state, Russia, to contribute to post-war reconstruction efforts in the future. Other options through which to confiscate assets under sanction There are, in addition, several established avenues for seeking war reparations that should also be explored. Such established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets include: Traditional conviction-based confiscation measures, including ‘extended confiscation’ mechanisms Non-conviction based confiscation NCB measures Unexplained wealth laws These measures could be used to target: Assets that are involved in sanctions violations Sanctioned assets that are also the proceeds of crimes unrelated to the sanctions regime, such as corruption or organised crime offences Unexplained wealth Maximising effectiveness of established asset recovery mechanisms While these avenues may be limited, and can only result in the permanent confiscation of a portion of sanctioned assets, states could take various steps to maximise their effectiveness. For example legislative amendments could be considered to broaden the scope of relevant terms like ‘money laundering’ and to specifically permit confiscated assets to be redirected to the victims of state aggression. Domestic and international coordination could be improved by creating dedicated law enforcement bodies for example, or through participating in international coordination initiatives. Importantly, these avenues target established criminal activity and/or include defined judicial processes through which a targeted person can challenge any attempts to confiscate their property. Therefore they can be applied without unacceptably infringing on legal rights. Moreover, if states take measures to enhance the effectiveness and scope of established asset recovery measures, additional benefits can be derived for the broader fight against financial crime and kleptocracy. The bottom line: maintaining the rule of law Opting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law. \ The term ‘sanctioned assets’ is used as a shorthand to refer to assets of a sanctioned person or country. Learn more Download the Working Paper. Watch or read the main takeaways from a December 2022 panel discussion on asset recovery developments since the start of the war in Ukraine.
Slow progress against dirty money harms people and undermines democracy
A joint blog by Kateryna Boguslavska, Basel Institute on Governance and Maria Nizzero, Royal United Services Institute RUSI . Effectively tackling illicit finance and money laundering is crucial to the integrity not only of financial systems, but of democratic societies. And alongside fresh ideas and commitments on fighting financial crimes, we need faster progress on existing ones. These points are reflected in the latest findings of both the Basel AML Index and RUSI’s Taskforce on a Transatlantic Response to Illicit Finance TARIF . The two projects approach the issue of dirty money from different angles. TARIF convened leading illicit finance experts and former policymakers to explore the negative impacts on illicit finance in the US and UK. It focused on the two countries’ vulnerabilities and responses to illicit finance linked to corruption and kleptocracy. It also laid bare the strategic use of illicit finance for malign purposes, and its impact on democracy, security, and financial integrity. In contrast, the Basel AML Index is a data-based index that calculates countries’ risks of money laundering and terrorist financing ML/TF . It draws on 18 indicators providing reliable data on countries’ vulnerabilities to ML/TF threats and their capacity to respond. The 11th Public Edition report highlighted trends in global progress against money laundering. Yet despite the differences, two points stood out in both projects. First, that the fight against illicit finance and money laundering goes beyond protecting the financial system; it is essential to protect ordinary citizens and democratic society. Second, that even though it is often clear what needs to be done, progress is far too slow. As the final TARIF Policy Brief stated: Many of the proposed actions and reforms are not new but have been hindered for years by perceived technical or legal barriers. Leaders should support, through resources and rhetoric, an uncompromising drive for solutions with… an acknowledged need to go further than the status quo. So what are those actions that need – well, actioning? Coming clean about risks and vulnerabilities According to TARIF, key to a transatlantic response to illicit finance is for the US and the UK to come clean about their own deficiencies. Commitments to combat corruption and illicit finance have been made in international fora, such as the FATF, G7, G20 and Summit for Democracy. However, a change in narrative is only the starting point for a plan to tackle kleptocracy to be credible. Concrete actions have to follow. Similarly, the 11th Basel AML Index report highlighted the importance of a risk-based approach to addressing money laundering. Tackling money laundering starts with a thorough understanding a country’s risks and vulnerabilities, plus a concrete plan to allocate resources efficiently to address the main risks. The Public Edition found that over the last five years, countries have progressed in conducting risk assessments and identifying high-risk jurisdictions. The next step should be the effective implementation of policies and strategies through robust plans based on these risks assessments. Fixing long-standing issues In terms of implementing a robust plan, TARIF set out how the US and the UK can practically and effectively strengthen their financial systems, close loopholes and develop safeguards. Many of the recommendations set out in the Policy Brief cover topics discussed in policy forums for years, including enhancing asset recovery, dealing with professional enablers and increasing beneficial ownership transparency. This year’s Basel AML Index report highlighted many of the same issues, noting that previous reports have continued to flag these over the years. For example, the report noted with concern the growing gap between countries’ technical compliance with international standards and the effectiveness of their efforts in practice. The data also shows that issues of poor transparency of beneficial ownership, poor progress in the investigation and prosecution of ML/TF offences, and low quality of supervision remain problems for all jurisdictions. The current challenges many jurisdictions are encountering with enforcing sanctions against Russian oligarchs only serve to illustrate problems that have long been present. Applying standards and aligning goals The good news is that we don’t need to reinvent the wheel, just make it turn faster. For some of the above challenges, especially those related to addressing money laundering directly, there are well-established standards like the FATF’s 40 Recommendations . For other aspects, different countries’ approaches may look very different but should ultimately all move towards the same destination. That includes approaches aimed at addressing the strategic use of illicit finance for malign purposes, supporting democracy and enhancing security, including moving from sanctions-based asset freezes to confiscation. Beyond financial implications These actions, TARIF stresses, are not only essential to the fight against corruption. They are also necessary to prevent future abuses by kleptocratic actors and their influence, to strengthen democratic societies and both national and international security. The Basel AML Index also notes that tackling money laundering: …is about more than just fighting financial crime. It is about protecting people and the environment. Ultimately, effective implementation is the plea at the heart of both reports. Reforms need political will and funding to be successful, whether they are aimed at tackling illicit finance or money laundering specifically. And at the end of the day, it is neither new technology nor blue-sky ideas that will be a gamechanger in the fight against dirty money. Rather, progress will be driven by the effective application of agreed standards and by good old-fashioned principles – in RUSI’s words, of “honesty, cross-border and cross-sector collaboration, and ambition”.
Research on illicit financial flows and natural resource corruption – new synthesis for practitioners
Crimes involving wildlife, forests and fish are typically undertaken for profit. Understanding the financial aspects of such crimes and related corruption could help practitioners to tackle them more effectively, improving conservation outcomes. Over the last years, the USAID-funded Targeting Natural Resource Corruption TNRC project has made significant progress in exploring and explaining illicit financial flows and their relation to natural resource corruption. To help practitioners navigate the relevant articles, how-to guidance and eLearning courses on the TNRC Knowledge Hub, the Basel Institute's Green Corruption team has developed an introductory guide in collaboration with TNRC consortium partners and external experts. It: outlines the impact of illicit financial flows on conservation goals; explains approaches that can help conservation and natural resource management practitioners to strengthen their programming and related responses; offers guidance on risks and constraints to such financial approaches. The guide leads the Illicit Financial Flows topic page of the TNRC Knowledge Hub and stresses three main takeaways: Understanding the financial aspects of natural resource crimes and corruption can reveal opportunities to reduce the incentives to illegally exploit and trade in natural resources, as well as to strengthen law enforcement against those who profit from environmental destruction. Targeting the financial aspects of natural resource crimes, especially where money crosses borders, can help to identify and break up corrupt and criminal networks and lead to the recovery of illicit proceeds. "Follow the money” approaches vary according to context, but generally require multi-stakeholder and cross-sector collaboration and information sharing. Learn more about the Green Corruption programme and view all TNRC research.
Publications
Quick Guide 42: Non-conviction based confiscation
Criminals exploit legal loopholes, borders and other avenues to conceal the proceeds of their illegal activities and evade prosecution. Meanwhile, they use their illicit proceeds to buy luxury villas or increase their power and influence. Victims of crime – including communities affected by corruption – suffer the losses.
One tool to address this problem is non-conviction based confiscation: legal mechanisms that allow states to recover illicit assets even in the absence of a criminal conviction. It is also known as non-conviction based forfeiture or, in some jurisdictions, civil confiscation or civil forfeiture.
This Quick Guide outlines in simple terms how non-conviction based confiscation is used, the concerns and challenges it faces and how it can be implemented in line with established legal safeguards.
About this Quick Guide
You are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 59: Using corrupt proceeds to fight corruption: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery
Only a handful of states have been actively pursuing the enforcement of foreign bribery. Switzerland is one of them and its efforts to crack down on this offence is commendable.
Between 2011 and 2024, Switzerland issued 14 final judicial orders at a federal level against Swiss-linked companies that engaged in foreign bribery. In these proceedings, the companies were ordered to hand over approximately CHF 730 million (combined) in illicit profits that they had obtained through their foreign bribery schemes, and an additional CHF 30 million in fines.
This paper contends that Switzerland could further leverage this success to reinforce its status as a world anti-corruption leader. It examines how Switzerland could repurpose the illicit profits obtained from companies in foreign bribery cases to benefit the countries and people most affected by these corrupt acts and to enhance global anti-corruption efforts.
It outlines arguments as to why Switzerland should consider legislative action to enable the sharing of these profits in this way and the potential methodology for doing so.
About this Working Paper
This paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 International Licence.
This is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.
The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.
Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2025. ‘Using corrupt proceeds to fight corruption: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery.’ Working Paper 59, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-59.
Policy Brief 15: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery settlements
Only a handful of states have been actively pursuing the enforcement of foreign bribery. Switzerland is one of them and its efforts to crack down on this offence is commendable.
Between 2011 and 2024, Switzerland issued 14 final judicial orders at a federal level against Swiss-linked companies that engaged in foreign bribery. In these proceedings, the companies were ordered to hand over approximately CHF 730 million (combined) in illicit profits that they had obtained through their foreign bribery schemes, and an additional CHF 30 million in fines.
This Policy Brief contends that Switzerland could further leverage this success to reinforce its status as a world anti-corruption leader. It examines how Switzerland could repurpose the illicit profits obtained from companies in foreign bribery cases to benefit the countries and people most affected by these corrupt acts and to enhance global anti-corruption efforts.
It outlines arguments as to why Switzerland should consider legislative action to enable the sharing of these profits in this way and the potential methodology for doing so.
About this Policy Brief
This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.
Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2025. ‘Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery settlements.’ Policy Brief 15, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/publications/pb-15.
This Policy Brief is based on the executive summary of the Working Paper 59: ‘Using corrupt proceeds to fight corruption: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery.’ Available at: baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-59.
This is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.
Policy Brief 14: Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery
The European Union’s 2024 Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation obliges Member States to, among other things, introduce legislative measures to enable the confiscation of “unexplained wealth”.
This policy paper examines this Article and the powers and restrictions that Member States will need to include in such “unexplained wealth” measures to ensure compliance with the Directive.
In brief, the Directive gives legislators in EU Member States flexibility to decide the scope of their own unexplained wealth measures. At a minimum, they must introduce measures that can be used to target unexplained wealth linked to organised crime.
Member States could, however, adopt broader measures target unexplained wealth relating to all criminal activity, including corruption.
About this Policy Brief
This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669.
You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery.’ Policy Brief 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/pb-14.
This is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.
Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America
This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, Extinción de dominio.
It argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.
The paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.
About this report
The paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.
This paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Suggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-54.