Illicit financial flows
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Working Paper sheds fresh light on the sanctions and confiscation debate
As the war in Ukraine intensifies, calls are growing for states to confiscate Russian assets frozen under sanctions and redirect them to provide support to Ukraine. Our latest Working Paper argues that states can and should do this by enhancing the effectiveness and scope of established asset recovery measures – not by introducing new untested mechanisms that risk inviting future legal challenges, defeating the purpose of sanctions and violating the rule of law. Go straight to Working Paper 42: From sanctions to confiscation while upholding the rule of law or read the key takeaways: Executive summary In light of recent world events, political leaders around the world have questioned whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression. Some states have even sought to introduce legislative mechanisms to make it possible to confiscate an asset frozen under sanctions, purely on the basis that the asset has been made subject to a sanction. One state – Canada – has already done so. The intention behind these mechanisms is clear: assets frozen under sanctions could be confiscated and repurposed to provide assistance and compensation to the victims of the sanctioned target. In the context of the Ukraine war, for example, proponents argue that these measures will allow states to permanently confiscate Russian-linked assets under sanction and redirect them to provide support to Ukraine. The debate Should states be able to confiscate sanctioned assets\ purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned? The justifiability and legality of mechanisms such as Canada’s is currently the subject of debate. Two key issues include whether the confiscation of assets in such circumstances: is acceptable in the context of established legal rights and norms; defeats the primary purpose of sanctions as a tool of coercion. Issues of property and due process rights With regards to the first point, the lack of adequate judicial oversight included in such mechanisms, and the fact that these mechanisms aim to permanently deprive sanctioned targets of their assets, raises serious questions surrounding property and due process rights. If such a mechanism was introduced in Europe for example, it is likely to be challenged on the grounds that it violates Protocol 1 Article 1 as well as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. If such mechanisms were also applied to state-linked assets such as sanctioned assets belonging to central banks then this would also raise concerns regarding a possible infringement of domestic and international laws relating to state immunity. Undermining the purpose of sanctions With regards to the second point, permitting the confiscation of sanctioned assets arguably annuls the coercive purpose of sanctions regimes to act as a tool to persuade targets to cease their adverse behaviour. If states are permitted to confiscate sanctioned assets and make it impossible for a target to retrieve their frozen assets then this effectively removes any incentive for the target to change their behaviour. In such cases, rather than operating as tools of coercion, sanctions would instead primarily operate to punish a target and provide compensation to the victims for the harm that has been caused. Of course, some have argued that there is a greater need for these latter objectives, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine where financial assistance is required urgently. Others however argue that despite the urgency this situation presents, the long-term objective of sanctions should remain coercion, particularly if sanctioning states wish to compel the aggressing state, Russia, to contribute to post-war reconstruction efforts in the future. Other options through which to confiscate assets under sanction There are, in addition, several established avenues for seeking war reparations that should also be explored. Such established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets include: Traditional conviction-based confiscation measures, including ‘extended confiscation’ mechanisms Non-conviction based confiscation NCB measures Unexplained wealth laws These measures could be used to target: Assets that are involved in sanctions violations Sanctioned assets that are also the proceeds of crimes unrelated to the sanctions regime, such as corruption or organised crime offences Unexplained wealth Maximising effectiveness of established asset recovery mechanisms While these avenues may be limited, and can only result in the permanent confiscation of a portion of sanctioned assets, states could take various steps to maximise their effectiveness. For example legislative amendments could be considered to broaden the scope of relevant terms like ‘money laundering’ and to specifically permit confiscated assets to be redirected to the victims of state aggression. Domestic and international coordination could be improved by creating dedicated law enforcement bodies for example, or through participating in international coordination initiatives. Importantly, these avenues target established criminal activity and/or include defined judicial processes through which a targeted person can challenge any attempts to confiscate their property. Therefore they can be applied without unacceptably infringing on legal rights. Moreover, if states take measures to enhance the effectiveness and scope of established asset recovery measures, additional benefits can be derived for the broader fight against financial crime and kleptocracy. The bottom line: maintaining the rule of law Opting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law. \ The term ‘sanctioned assets’ is used as a shorthand to refer to assets of a sanctioned person or country. Learn more Download the Working Paper. Watch or read the main takeaways from a December 2022 panel discussion on asset recovery developments since the start of the war in Ukraine.
Slow progress against dirty money harms people and undermines democracy
A joint blog by Kateryna Boguslavska, Basel Institute on Governance and Maria Nizzero, Royal United Services Institute RUSI . Effectively tackling illicit finance and money laundering is crucial to the integrity not only of financial systems, but of democratic societies. And alongside fresh ideas and commitments on fighting financial crimes, we need faster progress on existing ones. These points are reflected in the latest findings of both the Basel AML Index and RUSI’s Taskforce on a Transatlantic Response to Illicit Finance TARIF . The two projects approach the issue of dirty money from different angles. TARIF convened leading illicit finance experts and former policymakers to explore the negative impacts on illicit finance in the US and UK. It focused on the two countries’ vulnerabilities and responses to illicit finance linked to corruption and kleptocracy. It also laid bare the strategic use of illicit finance for malign purposes, and its impact on democracy, security, and financial integrity. In contrast, the Basel AML Index is a data-based index that calculates countries’ risks of money laundering and terrorist financing ML/TF . It draws on 18 indicators providing reliable data on countries’ vulnerabilities to ML/TF threats and their capacity to respond. The 11th Public Edition report highlighted trends in global progress against money laundering. Yet despite the differences, two points stood out in both projects. First, that the fight against illicit finance and money laundering goes beyond protecting the financial system; it is essential to protect ordinary citizens and democratic society. Second, that even though it is often clear what needs to be done, progress is far too slow. As the final TARIF Policy Brief stated: Many of the proposed actions and reforms are not new but have been hindered for years by perceived technical or legal barriers. Leaders should support, through resources and rhetoric, an uncompromising drive for solutions with… an acknowledged need to go further than the status quo. So what are those actions that need – well, actioning? Coming clean about risks and vulnerabilities According to TARIF, key to a transatlantic response to illicit finance is for the US and the UK to come clean about their own deficiencies. Commitments to combat corruption and illicit finance have been made in international fora, such as the FATF, G7, G20 and Summit for Democracy. However, a change in narrative is only the starting point for a plan to tackle kleptocracy to be credible. Concrete actions have to follow. Similarly, the 11th Basel AML Index report highlighted the importance of a risk-based approach to addressing money laundering. Tackling money laundering starts with a thorough understanding a country’s risks and vulnerabilities, plus a concrete plan to allocate resources efficiently to address the main risks. The Public Edition found that over the last five years, countries have progressed in conducting risk assessments and identifying high-risk jurisdictions. The next step should be the effective implementation of policies and strategies through robust plans based on these risks assessments. Fixing long-standing issues In terms of implementing a robust plan, TARIF set out how the US and the UK can practically and effectively strengthen their financial systems, close loopholes and develop safeguards. Many of the recommendations set out in the Policy Brief cover topics discussed in policy forums for years, including enhancing asset recovery, dealing with professional enablers and increasing beneficial ownership transparency. This year’s Basel AML Index report highlighted many of the same issues, noting that previous reports have continued to flag these over the years. For example, the report noted with concern the growing gap between countries’ technical compliance with international standards and the effectiveness of their efforts in practice. The data also shows that issues of poor transparency of beneficial ownership, poor progress in the investigation and prosecution of ML/TF offences, and low quality of supervision remain problems for all jurisdictions. The current challenges many jurisdictions are encountering with enforcing sanctions against Russian oligarchs only serve to illustrate problems that have long been present. Applying standards and aligning goals The good news is that we don’t need to reinvent the wheel, just make it turn faster. For some of the above challenges, especially those related to addressing money laundering directly, there are well-established standards like the FATF’s 40 Recommendations . For other aspects, different countries’ approaches may look very different but should ultimately all move towards the same destination. That includes approaches aimed at addressing the strategic use of illicit finance for malign purposes, supporting democracy and enhancing security, including moving from sanctions-based asset freezes to confiscation. Beyond financial implications These actions, TARIF stresses, are not only essential to the fight against corruption. They are also necessary to prevent future abuses by kleptocratic actors and their influence, to strengthen democratic societies and both national and international security. The Basel AML Index also notes that tackling money laundering: …is about more than just fighting financial crime. It is about protecting people and the environment. Ultimately, effective implementation is the plea at the heart of both reports. Reforms need political will and funding to be successful, whether they are aimed at tackling illicit finance or money laundering specifically. And at the end of the day, it is neither new technology nor blue-sky ideas that will be a gamechanger in the fight against dirty money. Rather, progress will be driven by the effective application of agreed standards and by good old-fashioned principles – in RUSI’s words, of “honesty, cross-border and cross-sector collaboration, and ambition”.
Research on illicit financial flows and natural resource corruption – new synthesis for practitioners
Crimes involving wildlife, forests and fish are typically undertaken for profit. Understanding the financial aspects of such crimes and related corruption could help practitioners to tackle them more effectively, improving conservation outcomes. Over the last years, the USAID-funded Targeting Natural Resource Corruption TNRC project has made significant progress in exploring and explaining illicit financial flows and their relation to natural resource corruption. To help practitioners navigate the relevant articles, how-to guidance and eLearning courses on the TNRC Knowledge Hub, the Basel Institute's Green Corruption team has developed an introductory guide in collaboration with TNRC consortium partners and external experts. It: outlines the impact of illicit financial flows on conservation goals; explains approaches that can help conservation and natural resource management practitioners to strengthen their programming and related responses; offers guidance on risks and constraints to such financial approaches. The guide leads the Illicit Financial Flows topic page of the TNRC Knowledge Hub and stresses three main takeaways: Understanding the financial aspects of natural resource crimes and corruption can reveal opportunities to reduce the incentives to illegally exploit and trade in natural resources, as well as to strengthen law enforcement against those who profit from environmental destruction. Targeting the financial aspects of natural resource crimes, especially where money crosses borders, can help to identify and break up corrupt and criminal networks and lead to the recovery of illicit proceeds. "Follow the money” approaches vary according to context, but generally require multi-stakeholder and cross-sector collaboration and information sharing. Learn more about the Green Corruption programme and view all TNRC research.
Targeting unexplained wealth in British Columbia and beyond – new analysis
“Money laundering is a significant problem requiring strong and decisive action,” concluded Honourable Austin F. Cullen in the final report of his widely discussed Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia in June 2022 . Despite the billions of dollars of illicit funds estimated to be laundered in British Columbia alone each year, the Commission’s final report found that the “value of assets seized through the asset forfeiture system in British Columbia is shockingly low.” The “failure to vigorously pursue these assets”, the report says, is “a missed opportunity to disrupt and deter the activities of organized crime groups and others involved in serious criminality.” The Report outlines 101 recommendations to reduce the amount of illicit funds flowing into British Columbia, and to more effectively seize those that do. The 101st of these outlines that the Province should: …proceed with its plan to develop an unexplained wealth order regime in British Columbia. The Commission recommends the UK’s controversial unexplained wealth order UWO as a model. If implemented, this mechanism would empower the British Columbian Civil Forfeiture Office to seek court orders that obligate a person to provide information on how they legally acquired assets suspected of being connected to criminal activity. If the person fails to comply with the order, a presumption would be made in a separate civil recovery action that the assets are criminal proceeds – potentially subjecting them to forfeiture – despite the fact that no one has been convicted of a crime. What would a UWO mean for British Columbia? As part of a collaboration between the Basel Institute on Governance and the Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, we have developed a Working Paper that analyses the feasibility of Recommendation 101. How would a UK-style UWO support efforts to investigate financial crimes and recover illicit proceeds in British Columbia – or indeed in the rest of Canada? Would this mechanism be too powerful, or not powerful enough? What models from other countries could also be emulated? And what constitutional and charter factors should legislators consider to ensure the UWO has the best chance of success? Our Working Paper explores these issues, and brings in examples from the UK and other jurisdictions that have implemented some form of unexplained wealth mechanism to date. In brief, we are doubtful that a carbon copy of the original UK UWO would result in the identification and recovery of substantial amounts of illicit funds in British Columbia, particularly given the limited success of the UK’s mechanism so far. To bolster the chances of success however, lawmakers could adapt certain elements of this model to the British Columbian context, and also consider adopting elements from other legislative models present in Australian and Ireland. … and beyond? Additionally, due to the fact that money can be laundered with ease across both provincial and international borders, we believe policy makers should couple any British Columbian initiatives to counter money laundering with wider-reaching initiatives, particularly those recommended by the Commission. Enhancing dialogue between Canada’s provinces would, for example, help to develop more consistent and coordinated approaches to both UWOs and civil forfeiture mechanisms more generally. At the federal level, it would be useful to explore the feasibility of introducing illicit wealth provisions in the criminal law, to bring the country into line with international anti-corruption treaties, or to include UWO provisions into existing legislation such as the Special Economic Measures Act or the Magnitsky Act. The findings of the Commission are clear. British Columbia – and Canada – need tools and powers to help uphold the rule of law and prevent the detrimental impacts of organised crime and money laundering on citizens. As stated in the report, “…there can be few things more destructive to a community’s sense of well-being than a governing regime that fails to resist those whose opportunities are unfairly gained at the expense of others.” It is therefore essential that government take decisive action to counter this, including through the introduction of new and stronger mechanisms to target proceeds of crime. More Download the Working Paper. The collaboration was facilitated by the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, an independent, non-partisan global centre that shapes and advances financial crime litigation practices for the future. The Academy’s co-founder Lincoln Caylor, Partner at Canadian law firm Bennett Jones, has written the foreword. Andrew Dornbierer’s open-access book Illicit Enrichment: A Guide to Laws Targeting Unexplained Wealth , was published in open-access format in 2021 by the Basel Institute on Governance and is available in English, French and Spanish. See illicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org or order the paperback via Amazon at cost price.
Enriquecimiento ilícito – open-access book on illicit enrichment laws now available in Spanish
Versión en español aquí. We are delighted to announce that our open-access book, Illicit Enrichment: A Guide to Laws Targeting Unexplained Wealth by Andrew Dornbierer is now available in Spanish. The book explores the rapid growth of illicit enrichment unexplained wealth legislation around the world and its use to target corruption and recover illicitly obtained assets. Like the original English version, it is a peer-reviewed publication that is freely available to read, download and share at illicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org. Targeting unexplained wealth in the Spanish-speaking world Many Spanish-speaking countries have drafted and introduced illicit enrichment legislation to target corruption. These laws are particularly prevalent in South and Central America, where 25 countries have already enacted some form of this type of law. While some countries have had success using these laws – such as Argentina and Mexico – other countries seem hesitant to consistently enforce these laws. Most of these countries have never actually used their laws at all. This is a common problem throughout the world. Why? One reason is that there isn’t a significant amount of commentary and guidance regarding how these laws can be drafted, investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated. Enriquecimiento ilícito: una guía sobre las leyes que abordan los activos de procedencia inexplicable will provide much-needed guidance to Spanish-speaking law enforcement agencies throughout the Americas region. It will also provide some foundational knowledge to practitioners regarding the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of these laws. The challenge of translating concepts, laws and practice This book was translated from English into Spanish by Pantoglot, Ltda. The translation was reviewed by Sandra Comesaña of Hengeler Mueller, a leading international corporate and white-collar law firm based in Germany. Commenting on the experience, she said: Andrew Dornbierer's and the Basel Institutes's work on Illicit Enrichment is an important contribution to the international effort of detecting, sanctioning and eventually preventing corruption and other financial crimes by "going after the money". The book's practical guidance on asset recovery in more than 100 jurisdictions is an invaluable tool for practitioners from both the private and public sectors and academics alike that is now finally available in Spanish, facilitating ready access for individuals and institutions specifically from the Spanish and Latin American markets. Hengeler Mueller is grateful for having had the opportunity to contribute to the Spanish version. Hengeler Mueller regularly advises international clients in various matters involving complex questions of multi-jurisdictional asset recovery both on its own and together especially with the members of its Best Friends network of Europe's leading independent law firms. The pro-bono support for the translation review was facilitated by The Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, an independent, non-partisan global centre that shapes and advances financial crime litigation practices for the future. About the book Published in English by the Basel Institute on Governance in June 2021, Illicit Enrichment by Senior Asset Recovery Specialist Andrew Dornbierer features: Extensive analysis of jurisprudence and cases from around the world Tables, flow charts and graphics explaining key concepts Discussion of common questions and challenges Contributions from practitioners around the world, including a discussion of the introduction and evolution of Peru’s criminal illicit enrichment offence by Dr. Alcides Chinchay, a Senior Prosecutor of the Peruvian Public Prosecutor’s Office. Annex 1: A collection of laws from 103 jurisdictions, also as an online database in English Annex II: A step-by-step guide to financial investigations and source and application analyses to support illicit enrichment cases in English Illicit Enrichment was developed and published by the Basel Institute on Governance through its International Centre for Asset Recovery, with research support from the NYU School of Law. Where to find it You can find the online version in both languages at: illicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org. Re-use and re-sharing are encouraged under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. The book is also available to print at cost price from Amazon worldwide.
Publications
Quick Guide 42: Non-conviction based confiscation
Criminals exploit legal loopholes, borders and other avenues to conceal the proceeds of their illegal activities and evade prosecution. Meanwhile, they use their illicit proceeds to buy luxury villas or increase their power and influence. Victims of crime – including communities affected by corruption – suffer the losses.
One tool to address this problem is non-conviction based confiscation: legal mechanisms that allow states to recover illicit assets even in the absence of a criminal conviction. It is also known as non-conviction based forfeiture or, in some jurisdictions, civil confiscation or civil forfeiture.
This Quick Guide outlines in simple terms how non-conviction based confiscation is used, the concerns and challenges it faces and how it can be implemented in line with established legal safeguards.
About this Quick Guide
You are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America
This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, Extinción de dominio.
It argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.
The paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.
About this report
The paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.
This paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Suggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-54.
Working Paper 51: Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States
Asset recovery tools are integral to combating corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and other profit-motivated crimes. However, in many participating States of the OSCE, the range of asset recovery tools available to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies is limited.
This Working Paper identifies legislative mechanisms in OSCE participating States that empower the state to confiscate suspected or proven proceeds of crime. The overall objective is to ascertain:
- Established good practices with regard to the design of these legislative mechanisms.
- Any unique approaches that particular countries have taken in this context that could be replicated and tested in other jurisdictions.
It covers:
- Conviction-based asset recovery mechanisms.
- Non-conviction based mechanisms including civil recovery.
- Additional mechanisms such as illicit enrichment laws and other laws that reverse the burden of proof regarding the legitimacy of assets.
- Considerations regarding the adoption of broader asset recovery laws.
- Approaches to the disposal of confiscated assets.
- Common challenges in the implementation of asset recovery mechanisms.
About this report
This comparative study was conducted and drafted by the International Centre for Asset Recovery at the Basel Institute on Governance for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The paper was commissioned under the extra-budgetary project ‘Strengthening asset recovery efforts in the OSCE region’ implemented by the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.
It is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.
Disclaimer
This Working Paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and/or substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, the OSCE and its participating States.
Policy Brief 14: Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery
The European Union’s 2024 Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation obliges Member States to, among other things, introduce legislative measures to enable the confiscation of “unexplained wealth”.
This policy paper examines this Article and the powers and restrictions that Member States will need to include in such “unexplained wealth” measures to ensure compliance with the Directive.
In brief, the Directive gives legislators in EU Member States flexibility to decide the scope of their own unexplained wealth measures. At a minimum, they must introduce measures that can be used to target unexplained wealth linked to organised crime.
Member States could, however, adopt broader measures target unexplained wealth relating to all criminal activity, including corruption.
About this Policy Brief
This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669.
You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery.’ Policy Brief 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/pb-14.
This is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.
[Forthcoming] Working Paper 42: Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law
This paper will be released on 21 February 2023.
Written in the light of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the Working Paper explores whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression.
The paper first explores the concept of sanctions and financial sanctions (asset freezes) and what they mean in practice.
Using the example of Canada, which has introduced a legislative mechanism for this purpose, the paper analyses whether states should be able to confiscate sanctioned assets purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned.
It then looks at more established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets, including:
- Traditional conviction based confiscation measures, including ‘extended confiscation’ mechanisms
- Non-conviction based confiscation (forfeiture) measures
- Unexplained wealth laws
The paper recommends ways to maximise the effectiveness of these alternative avenues for recovering assets, which are much less controversial and can arguably be applied without infringing on legal rights.
Opting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law.
About this Paper
This Working Paper was prepared by the Basel Institute on Governance.
It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2023. ‘Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law.’ Working Paper 42, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-42.
Acknowledgements
The Basel Institute would like to thank Isys Lam and the law firms of Bonifassi Avocats (France), Hengeler Mueller (Germany), Bennett Jones (Canada) and Rogério Alves & Associados (Portugal) for their support in providing research for this paper.
The Basel Institute would also like to thank Stefan Lenz, Stefan Cassella, Maria Nizzero, Nicola Bonucci and Oscar Solórzano for their support in reviewing the content of the paper and recommending amendments.