Informality

How informal power networks can instrumentalise anti-corruption institutions

In many countries with high levels of corruption, there is also a strong demand for government to do something about it. With the right conditions, that can fuel solid political commitments. We’ve seen, however, that even in cases where governments do all the right things on paper – strengthen legal frameworks, establish dedicated anti-corruption agencies, etc. – there's a gap between what they promise and what happens in practice. In a chapter for the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Anti-Corruption Research and Practice , we go deeper into exploring one reason for this gap, namely the political instrumentalisation of efforts to prevent and curb corruption. We explain why and how it happens and provide examples from countries across the globe. This article presents the key findings. Why? Informal governance and corruption If you want to understand why and how anti-corruption institutions and laws can be used and abused to achieve strategic goals, you have to understand how informal networks of elites function and how this relates to corruption. High levels of corruption are often associated with informal governance practices. Informal governance is established through powerful networks that connect political elites, business interests and ordinary citizens. These informal networks can have different objectives. They help: political elites win and stay in power; business interests to access profitable benefits such as government contracts; and citizens cope and gain access to public services where governance is weak and resources are scarce. When informal networks rule, decisions, including on allocating public resources, are made for personal gain. Resources are redistributed informally for the benefit of insiders and at the expense of those outside these networks. Power is used to protect and ensure impunity for the loyal. Informal governance practices become entrenched and persist independently of individual network members. The result is a vicious cycle of informal governance and corruption that undermines the effectiveness of formal institutions. Informal governance practices are particularly evident in contexts characterised by state capture, defined as “a type of systematic corruption whereby narrow interest groups take control of the institutions and processes through which public policy is made, directing public policy away from the public interest and instead shaping it to serve their own interests”. Instrumentalisation as a way out of the dilemma Political power networks that face pressure to do something to curb corruption find themselves in a dilemma. They need to respond to demands for anti-corruption, but corruption is functional to the network's very survival. To prevent negative consequences and sanctions for the informal political power network itself, those pulling the strings need to ensure that anti-corruption institutions and their efforts are not too effective. They must be reined in, for example by instrumentalising anti-corruption endeavours. Here, political instrumentalisation means that dedicated anti-corruption agencies, or other public institutions charged with preventing and combating corruption or ensuring transparency and accountability, are informally repurposed to benefit those within the network. The result is that formal governance is weakened and the basic principles of the rule of law erode. The purpose can be two-fold not mutually exclusive : To undermine the anti-corruption institution's formal powers and weaken its impact on the power network. To shape the institution’s operations in a way that favours and strengthens the power network. Three strategies: co-optation, control and camouflage Based on research on informal governance and corruption combined with insights on mechanisms of state capture, we can identify three general strategies informal power networks use to shape anti-corruption institutions or undermine their formal powers: Co-optation : aligning institutional incentives with that of the power network This can be achieved by appointing allies and building informal loyalties both between the anti-corruption institution and the power network, and with other stakeholders in the law enforcement system i.e. the prosecution or judiciary. Control : weakening the influence of the institution in relation to the power network This is possible by limiting the resources or mandate of the anti-corruption institution, and by limiting the space for anti-corruption accountability stakeholders such as the media and civil society. Power networks shape the institution’s operations in a manner favourable to maintaining the network through: Camouflage : formal rules create the façade of commitment to anti-corruption... but they work to protect the network, because: they do not apply to corrupt network insiders impunity ; they are selectively applied to corrupt outsiders or to discipline network dissenters weaponisation or “rule by law” . Overarching insights and reflections Hard to “see” Given that political instrumentalisation of anti-corruption is enacted through formal structures and processes, it can be hard to observe. It can also look different on the surface. Control can happen through restrictions that weaken institutions. But it can also work through the provision of more resources, for example to institutions that have been co-opted to protect network insiders. A web of formal and informal rules Anti-corruption actions can be ambivalent when formal rules are selectively applied to camouflage corrupt informal practices. Formal and informal interests and rules are at play simultaneously, with different narratives being offered to insiders and outsiders. A successful corruption prosecution can give the appearance of a commitment to fighting corruption while in reality serving to target individuals outside the power network. Rule of law or rule by law? With high levels of informality, it’s difficult to tell if anti-corruption outcomes reflect genuine efforts to enforce the law equally and predictably rule of law , or if they indicate a strategic use of formal rules for the benefit of the informal network rule by law . Does a low number of high-profile corruption cases mean that control of corruption is strong, that investigation and prosecution capacities are weak, or that someone is being protected? Any bright sides? The book chapter concludes by providing practical entry points on what can be done, even in challenging contexts, to strengthen anti-corruption efforts. Three entry points are worth exploring: Let’s keep in mind: Power networks are fluid and can change. When their incentives align with the anti-corruption objectives of promoting integrity and curbing corruption, informal governance practices can also have a positive impact. It’s important to look for changes in the power structure to seize windows of opportunity. Ambivalence in institutional decision-making can be reduced by pushing for transparent, standard operating procedures for anti-corruption institutions. Even if formal political commitments to anti-corruption seem more rhetorical than genuine, they can still provide a useful anchor to promote and drive efforts for real change. Research shows that when governments fail to deliver on their commitments, they come under pressure to explain why change has not happened. This keeps anti-corruption high on the political agenda and in societal discourse. A starting point is to gain a thorough understanding of the broader political and governance context. In this regard, we have developed a framework for assessing and monitoring contextual factors that impact the performance of anti-corruption institutions. It allows us to better interpret anti-corruption actions, identify emerging positive or negative trends and respond more effectively to risks and opportunities. Learn more Saba Kassa’s chapter “Insights on the Political Instrumentalisation of Anti-Corruption Institutions: In Between a Rock and a Hard Place?” will be published in The Routledge Handbook of Anti-Corruption Research and Practice , available for pre-order on the publisher’s website. Kassa, Saba. 2024. “Navigating the political context: Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain”, Working Paper 52, Basel Institute on Governance. Baez-Camargo, Claudia and Alena Ledeneva. 2017. “Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? Informal Governance and the Public/Private Crossover in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania.” Slavonic and East European Review 95, no. 1: 49-75. Baez-Camargo, Claudia and Lucy Koechlin. 2018. “Informal Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Co-optation, Control and Camouflage in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.” International Development Policy Journal , 78-100. Basel Institute on Governance. 2023. “Informal Governance.” Dávid-Barrett, Elizabeth. 2023. “State capture and development: a conceptual framework.” Journal of International Relations and Development 26, 224-244.

Enhancing cooperation in asset recovery is vital for crime prevention

This article by Iker Lekuona explains the importance of asset recovery for crime prevention and highlights three vital aspects of international cooperation in corruption and asset recovery cases: informal cooperation mechanisms, trust and technical assistance. It is republished with permission from the 6th Newsletter of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network of Institutes PNI . We participate in this network of 18 institutes and entities and strongly support the PNI's mission to "assist the international community in strengthening cooperation in crime prevention and criminal justice on the global, regional and sub-regional levels, within the framework of the United Nations Crime Programme." Find all newsletters and information about the PNI here. At first glance, the Kyoto Declaration’s fourth pillar may appear to combine two separate things. Why should “international cooperation” and “technical assistance” be connected? The Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR provides technical assistance to over 18 jurisdictions across Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. We work hand in hand with our partner governments to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement and criminal justice systems to investigate and prosecute financial crimes and recover illicit assets. International cooperation is a vital part of the asset recovery process and of the technical assistance that we provide. The transnational, high-level cases of corruption and money laundering that we support often involve multiple jurisdictions in which criminal proceeds are sourced, transferred, laundered, hidden and spent. We see constantly that when it comes to asset recovery as a means to prevent and address corruption and other serious transnational crimes, international cooperation and technical assistance go hand in hand. Asset recovery: key to preventing crime In the eyes of the public, asset recovery is often seen through the lens of enforcement. It is linked to prosecutions and sanctions and to the desire for justice to be done. But as Article 70 of the Kyoto Declaration emphasises, asset recovery is “an important element of crime prevention… particularly in cases involving corruption”. At the Basel Institute, we see prevention and enforcement as two sides of the same coin – complementary ways to change behaviours and social norms towards integrity. For asset recovery, three areas stand out. Deterrence: Confiscating criminal assets tackles the primary incentive to engage in financial crimes: the money, which is a gateway to power and influence. When public agencies and their foreign counterparts work efficiently to investigate, confiscate and recover illicit assets, this has a strong deterrent effect. Disruption: The financial investigations at the heart of the asset recovery process are key to understanding and disrupting organised criminal networks. Techniques such as social network analysis can build on these investigations, mapping the relationships between individuals and entities involved in criminal enterprises, from wildlife trafficking to grand corruption and money laundering schemes. Trust: When citizens see that illicit assets are confiscated from corrupt individuals and high-level criminals, this helps to build trust in state institutions and to foster a more stable social environment. This effect is enhanced when recovered assets are reinvested in public goods – for example as Kenya did to pay for hospital equipment during the Covid-19 pandemic or as Zambia has done to fund university education for underprivileged students. Our technical assistance to partner governments focuses on strengthening every link in the asset recovery process or “chain” – from detection of criminal assets right through to their recovery and return. Sometimes this can go further. In Peru, assets recovered in landmark cases from Switzerland and Luxembourg are being channelled into strengthening the criminal justice system, under an ongoing tripartite agreement that ICAR facilitated. Through this approach, we see tangible impacts on the strength and functioning of criminal justice systems as a whole in our partner countries. And that can only be positive for crime prevention. Evolutions in international cooperation for asset recovery Over the nearly two decades that ICAR has been active as a specialised centre of the Basel Institute on Governance, we have seen promising evolutions in international cooperation in the context of asset recovery: 1\. Informal cooperation mechanisms and networks In line with the Kyoto Declaration’s articles 63 and 64, we have seen a blossoming of positive initiatives to boost informal cooperation between competent authorities on transnational cases of corruption and asset recovery. Such informal cooperation is vital to obtaining intelligence and building connections between counterparts from across borders. The Global Operational Network of Anti-Corruption Law Enforcement Authorities GlobE Network facilitated by UNODC is one such initiative. It eases the exchange of information between frontline anti-corruption law enforcement practitioners across the world. As an observer member, ICAR contributes its experience to the network’s growing efforts to accelerate efforts to identify, trace and confiscate the proceeds of crime. The International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre IACCC and the Global Forum for Asset Recovery Action Series are two other initiatives that have been game changers in terms of expediting intelligence sharing and cooperation on priority cases. The first is hosted by the UK government, while the second is an initiative of ICAR and the World Bank’s StAR Initiative together with the IACCC. These mechanisms are leading to tangible results in smoothening and complementing formal mutual legal assistance processes. 2\. Trust and relationships The softer aspects of international cooperation shouldn’t be underestimated. We see daily in our work how trust and good relationships between authorities engaged in mutual legal assistance are essential to smoothen the process and lead to a successful result. This aspect was vital to achieving Colombia’s first-ever international asset return using its non-conviction based forfeiture law in 2024, of nearly half a million dollars in proceeds of drug trafficking from Guernsey. The Colombian authorities recognised ICAR’s “contribution and experience \ which\ facilitated the rapprochement and communication between the Colombian Attorney General’s Office and His Majesty’s Procureur’s Office in Guernsey.” They noted that “\ t\ his has been an excellent example of how judicial authorities can work together to ensure the recovery of the proceeds derived from criminal activities.” Trust, sustained collaboration, communication and positive relationships are also at the heart of successful asset return agreements and frameworks. One example is Jersey’s return of around USD 3.7 million in corruptly obtained funds to Kenya, in a case that had previously been stalled for a decade. Proactive informal cooperation, which ICAR helped to facilitate, was key to building trust between the parties, breaking the deadlock, finding legal solutions to recover the funds and agreeing their safe return for the benefit of Kenyan citizens. This case was the first asset return under another innovative cooperation agreement based on a sustained relationship of trust: the Framework for the Return of Assets from Corruption and Crime in Kenya FRACCK . Agreed and signed by the Governments of Kenya, Jersey, Switzerland and the UK, this was praised by UNODC’s Officer-in-Charge of the Corruption and Economic Crime Branch as being an “innovative” and “novel” approach to asset return. 3\. Building capacity among international counterparts Article 66 of the Kyoto Declaration makes it clear why it is not enough just to focus on formal and informal cooperation mechanisms, and why technical assistance is vital to the functioning of the system as a whole. States, it says, should: promote, facilitate and support the widest measures of technical assistance, including material support and training, with a view to enabling law enforcement authorities and criminal justice institutions to effectively prevent and combat crimes, taking into account the specific challenges faced by and the particular needs of developing countries. International cooperation is a two-way street. Financial centres seeking to detect and confiscate illicit assets will need information and evidence from the countries in which the crimes took place. And a lot of time can be wasted if mutual legal assistance requests are poorly drafted or not in line with the receiving state’s requirements. Yet many jurisdictions that suffer the worst effects of corruption and crime have low capacity and resources for asset recovery and for international cooperation in general. That is why it is so vital for international donors to support technical assistance programmes aimed at supporting the international cooperation process and building the capacity of counterparts in lower-resource jurisdictions. This could take the form of financial support, such as the kind provided by ICAR’s core donor group: the governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. This financial support for our hands-on mentoring and training in low-capacity jurisdictions has been vital in enabling us to remain agile and innovative, to pilot new methods before scaling them up, and to provide sustained assistance in partner countries beyond the usual short-term project lifecycle. To take just one example, our ongoing technical assistance programme in Peru has resulted in the development and implementation of a non-conviction based forfeiture law that has already led to the confiscation of millions in stolen assets domestically and internationally. Developing asset recovery communities and leaders is another area where states can provide resources and active participation as part of their efforts to promote technical assistance. Practitioner networks are vital for peer learning and to build those trust-based relationships that are so crucial to international cooperation. A standout example is the annual Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies, which we organise with Europol and which UNODC hosted this year in Vienna. Conclusion Our ICAR teams around the world see at first hand the importance of asset recovery for crime prevention, as the Kyoto Declaration emphasises. Recovering assets helps to deter corruption and criminality, disrupt criminal networks and build citizens' trust. To boost asset recovery, we need to strengthen every link in the asset recovery process or "chain", from early detection of illicit assets to their eventual recovery and return. And for that, technical assistance is vital. This article highlights three key areas of technical assistance that align with the Kyoto Declaration's spirit, ICAR's strategic approach and UN-led actions: informal information-sharing mechanisms and networks; efforts to build trust and relationships to smoothen international cooperation; and capacity building between countries. Learn more Read Working Paper 51: Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States, by Andrew Dornbierer.

Culture and corruption: a complex relationship

If someone gives a healthcare worker a “gift” in return for faster treatment, is that a bribe or just a cultural expectation? Are some cultures inherently more corrupt than others? And does the meaning of corruption vary according to cultural context? These are just some of the controversial and complex issues that scholars have asked in relation to culture and corruption. We summarised the key debates in a chapter contributed to the new Elgar Concise Encyclopedia of Corruption Law . In brief: A tricky topic Even the juxtaposition of “culture and corruption” causes unease: the word “culture” tends to have a neutral or positive connotation, while “corruption” is practically always negative. Many are understandably uneasy about the risk of labelling entire cultural groups as “corrupt” and warn against simplistic explanations of corrupt behaviour because "it’s in their culture". In contrast, others refer to cultural relativism, claiming that the concept of corruption is an artefact of the West and that local standards for what is and is not correct behaviour vary widely. Still others apply quantitative research methods to understand the links, for example comparing measures of cultural factors in different countries with indices of perceived corruption in those same countries. One study found a correlation between high levels of perceived corruption and more unequal and risk-averse societies that favour materialistic rewards. But correlation is not causation, as we know, so it is hard to draw conclusions about whether corruption causes those cultural factors or vice versa. Going deeper into social norms Qualitative research approaches focus on local conditions, narratives and legitimisation processes. And what stands out across many countries is the importance of personal relationships in citizens’ interactions with the state. As our research in Tanzania and Uganda has shown, for example, relationships are used instrumentally to gain easier access to public services, circumvent formal rules and gain undue advantages in business dealings, among other things. While these personal relationships are shaped by social and cultural norms around status, respect, shame, guilt, peer pressure, etc., they occur across many different countries and cultures. So it is not only simplistic but flatly wrong to say that entire groups of people are inherently corrupt because of their culture. Overcoming shortcomings of the state Personal relationships are necessary to overcome or compensate for the shortcomings of formal state institutions. Participants in our field research in various countries typically condemn corrupt behaviours, including the use of personal relationships to gain an undue advantage. But they continue to engage in these behaviours regardless. Why the paradox? First, because conflicting values of public duty versus social obligations may trap public officials, no matter how honest they are in their hearts. That is especially the case where unwritten social norms like reciprocity are stronger than formal, legal rules. Second, citizens may be forced to resort to corruption as the only way to access essential services – and they become especially likely to do this when they see and believe that “everyone is doing it”. Where the state can provide access to services, equal treatment and decent standards of living through its formal laws and institutions, it is far less likely that corruption will be seen as necessary and a normal cultural practice. The conclusion: nobody is inherently corrupt because of their culture. But corruption can become socially legitimised in contexts where it is the only way to get around the shortcomings of the state. Learn more The Elgar Concise Encyclopedia of Corruption Law is co-edited by Mark Pieth the Basel Institute’s founder and former President and Tina Søreide of the Norwegian School of Economics. Enter the code CRPT35 at the checkout for a 35 percent discount off the list price. Read Claudia Baez Camargo’s quick guide to social norms and corruption. See a summary of our research project exploring how individuals invest in creating informal relationships and networks in order to obtain public services or business deals. Learn more about the work of our Prevention, Research and Innovation formerly Public Governance team.

New Policy Brief on how Collective Action initiatives can benefit from studying informal corrupt networks

What can we learn from studying corrupt informal networks linking the public and private sectors? A lot – including how to build stronger multi-stakeholder partnerships against corruption through Collective Action. Our latest Policy Brief draws on our recent research in East Africa into how informal networks link private and public sector actors to pursue common illicit goals, such as gaining an unfair business advantage or decreasing taxes owed. Held together by corruption, the networks are highly resilient and effective. Collective Action initiatives also typically create networks of private and public sector actors, but the goals here are positive and transparent. They may include raising standards of integrity and fair business in a specific industry sector or geographical area. Understanding how corrupt networks function – and the problems they solve for the actors involved – could help Collective Action practitioners increase the effectiveness and resilience of their initiatives. Key takeaways The Policy Brief distils lessons for anti-corruption practitioners seeking to engage with the private sector through Collective Action, covering: solving problems as a way to create stronger incentives to engage offering transparent alternatives to those who feel they have little choice but to engage in corruption recruiting strategically to get the right people around the table building trust while maintaining credibility establishing effective reporting or whistleblowing mechanisms The publication also explains why anti-corruption initiatives that focus purely on adding formal controls to high-risk processes, like audits and sanctions, can backfire. Initiatives that include monitoring project implementation and outcomes may be a smarter choice. And the good news is that although informal networks can be resilient and effective, there may well be windows of opportunity to break them up. Examples include if a new government comes to power on an anti-corruption ticket or where there is strong pressure from citizens to increase transparency and accountability. About the research The publication is a collaboration between our Public Governance and Collective Action teams, with the support of Lucy Koechlin, Senior Lecturer at the University of Basel. The field research underpinning the Policy Brief was conducted under the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence GI-ACE Programme, funded with UK Aid from the British people. Although the original field research took place in Tanzania and Uganda, the findings will be of relevance to Collective Action practitioners and others seeking to address corruption all over the world. Download Policy Brief 8: It takes a network to defeat a network – What Collective Action practitioners can learn from research into corrupt networks

Bribery isn’t only an exchange of money: what new research tells us about how informal networks enable corruption and vice versa

Bila watu hufiki popote. “Without people or connections you won’t reach anywhere,” said a Tanzanian businessman participating in our recently completed research project on informal networks and corruption. His words encapsulate something we see time and again in our research on corruption: that bribery is far more than just a brute monetary transaction. Often more important, and far less studied, are the informal social networks that connect private individuals and public officials. Exploring informal networks and corruption Our two-year research project, part of the UK Aid-funded Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme GI-ACE , builds on our previous extensive research project on informal governance across seven countries. The evidence from this project highlighted that corruption is usually not the result of individual “rotten apples” acting in isolation to abuse their entrusted power for private gain. Rather, corrupt behaviour takes place according to unwritten rules and through informal social networks that connect the public and private sectors. It is becoming increasingly clear that anti-corruption practitioners need to pay more attention to networks, not only individuals. But a lot of questions still remained to be answered. Are distinct types of informal networks associated with particular types of corruption? How, why and by whom are these networks built? What roles and functions do different individuals have within the networks? What unwritten expectations, understandings and norms govern such networks? What are the implications for anti-corruption practice? Case studies: snapshots of corruption from a network lens With my colleague at the Basel Institute, Senior Research Fellow Jacopo Costa, and Lucy Koechlin, Senior Lecturer at the University of Basel, we set about answering these questions with the help our local researchers Danstan Mukono and Robert Lugolobi in Tanzania and Uganda. What emerged were 10 short case studies six from Tanzania and four from Uganda that illustrate ways in which citizens and business people invest significant efforts in building informal social networks to overcome shortcomings in public service delivery and to access business opportunities. The case studies give life to the research report, which show how monetary bribes and associated benefits are essential to developing informal networks, especially in societies with strong norms around reciprocity and gift-giving. In turn, these networks enable and perpetuate corruption in public service delivery. Importantly, informal networks may go beyond simply friends and acquaintances. In many cases, citizens and business people must use “brokers” – individuals with existing strong connections with relevant public officials – to act as door-openers. How do informal networks help to “get things done”? The stories we heard illustrate how informal networks help citizens and business people to gain benefits in three main areas: 1 - Ease access to public services At a basic level, this can mean someone using personal connections to skip red tape or speed up a service to which they are officially entitled but may otherwise be delayed. As one research participant said, for example: “For those who don’t have ‘jamaa’ a social connection and sometimes ability to provide money, it takes time to get a business license.” Highly bureaucratic procedures such as land transactions are especially vulnerable to this type of behaviour. At a more pernicious level, social networks can help users to obtain services they are not entitled to, or manipulate processes to their advantage. Examples include obtaining a driver’s licence despite not having the right documents, and influencing land valuations to minimise tax. 2 - Secure business opportunities with government The case studies illustrate that informal networks play a vital role in facilitating fraud and corruption in public procurement. Business people with the right connections need only pay the requested “fee” to be awarded a public tender, said one participant, referring to a bribe or kickback. Informal networks can also facilitate privileged access to information about tenders. To build those connections, said participants in both countries, business people may secretly collect information on public officials’ tastes and habits, or develop sophisticated strategies to cultivate links with them. 3 – Help businesses run smoothly Informal networks help entrepreneurs to leapfrog the many bureaucratic hurdles they face when establishing and running businesses. As one of the Tanzanian case studies shows, numerous informal connections have to be established with various public agencies and the officials that work there to get the business off the ground. These connections then form the basis for a network that will allow the business to run smoothly going forward. Complex networks can be built to solve seemingly simple problems. Another Tanzanian case study illustrates how a transport company owner built a “bribery network” involving drivers, conductors, traffic police, bus agents and the transportation regulatory authority. The network ensures that the company’s vehicles can provide a faster and more reliable service compared to competitors by avoiding roadblocks and speeding fines. What else does the research show? The research report also details, using examples from the case studies: The six functional roles that different individuals play in informal networks – from the “seekers” citizens seeking connections to public officials to the “doers” – those who have the ability to “make things happen”. How entry to these informal networks is controlled to make them exclusive for insiders. Social dimensions, including how people invest time and effort in developing their networks and cultivating trust. The case studies offer a wealth of qualitative information and evidence on informal networks, corruption and the links between them. So, what does this mean? In our analysis, we emphasise that anti-corruption practitioners should consider how to save the positive aspects of these informal networks which, in effect, act as efficient mutual support mechanisms in challenging contexts while eliminating their negative effects. Understanding how these informal networks work can help to understand, and target, the motivations of those who engage in bribery and other illicit practices. Addressing the hurdles that individuals experience while accessing public services and competing in public tenders should be a central element of an informed anti-corruption approach. Otherwise, the case studies show how adding formal control mechanisms to prevent corruption for example in competitive public bidding processes can actually generate more corruption than would have occurred otherwise – if only because of the fact that more people need to be bribed to obtain the desired result. The evidence from this research can also point the way to alternative approaches to tackling corruption in such contexts. These include harnessing social norms the topic of our second GI-ACE project and/or introducing efficient ways to resolve business-related disputes between the public and private sectors, such as Ukraine’s Business Ombudsman Council.

Research Case Study 5: Harnessing behavioural approaches against corruption

Research Case Study 3: Exposing the networks behind transnational corruption and money laundering schemes

Research case study 2: Leveraging informal networks for anti-corruption in East Africa