Organised crime

How corruption helps drug traffickers adapt to strengthened border enforcement

Corruption at border points remains a pressing global issue, threatening not only border integrity but also the health, safety and security of our societies. It enables illicit trafficking, facilitates organised crime and undermines trust in public institutions. In our Working Paper 58 , Saba Kassa and Jacopo Costa examine how corruption facilitates drug trafficking through the port of Rotterdam. Through in-depth interviews with stakeholders, a review of judicial cases and desk research, the paper shows how trafficking and corruption strategies are changing in response to strengthened enforcement at border spaces. It contributes to the growing body of work that looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive. The Working Paper was written as part of the FALCON Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks project. The research supports efforts to develop more robust and forward-looking approaches to combat corruption and drug trafficking. Read the executive summary below. Unintended consequences of strengthened enforcement This Working Paper examines how corruption facilitates drug trafficking specifically cocaine through the port of Rotterdam, looking at the underlying drivers and strategies involved. Legal trade routes and commercial ports are especially attractive because of the high volumes of cargo, which make it possible to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. The spatial complexity of the port of Rotterdam also makes it difficult to fully secure it against criminal activity. Digging deeper into the facilitating factors of trafficking, the paper finds that, paradoxically, a main driver of rising border corruption is the increased political attention on and resources dedicated to fighting trafficking. Desk research and stakeholder interviews highlight that as authorities deploy new technology to improve detection, traffickers face more obstacles to operating effectively. Having someone on the inside then becomes increasingly important. So, an unintended but important consequence of the strengthened fight against drug trafficking is that corruption becomes even more essential for the operational success of organised crime networks. Customs officials are specifically vulnerable This study focuses specifically on the role of customs. Tasked with monitoring the import and export of goods, customs officers are important actors in the fight against drug trafficking. However, their role also makes them vulnerable: they have crucial knowledge on processes and procedures, access to systems and discretionary power that can be exploited by criminals. The desk research shows that corruption is used strategically to circumvent two important bottlenecks: the container screening and security as cargo enters the port, and the exit of drugs from the port. Traffickers may seek to obtain key information or direct assistance from customs officers. Collusion – coercion – infiltration These corrupt relationships and the emerging networks between members of crime groups and the customs officials are diverse. Some relationships can be characterised by collusion, where customs officials offer their services or are persuaded to cooperate. This collusion may be opportunistic or targeted. Other relationships can be characterised by coercion. Customs officials may be lured by financial reward, but this is accompanied by intimidation or the threat of violence to ensure that the officer cooperates and continues to cooperate. Our research highlights that the boundary between collusion and coercion is often blurred. Beyond collusion and coercion, we also see infiltration, which crosses the boundaries between the criminal, public and private. What emerges is less a matter of individual corruption and more akin to regulatory capture, where the public office position is held by a member of the criminal network. The review of the judicial cases shows that bribes involved in these schemes can amount to millions. To hide and use the illicit gains, traffickers rely on money laundering, disguising its source as legitimate. They often enlist the help of family and friends, a trusted inner circle or professional specialists. They may also hide cash at home or invest it in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad. Adaptive corruption strategies A key finding of our research is that the criminal and corruption strategies used to facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive. The underlying driver of this adaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and high profitability of the crime. This pushes traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in supplying the demand. Corruption strategies adapt in response to new enforcement measures. When control systems are changed and/or strengthened, corruption strategies evolve alongside them. This research identifies some key patterns: Stronger detection efforts increase the incentives for corruption. Evolving systems encourage a similar shift in corruption strategies. Anti-corruption and anti-trafficking measures may change the profile of those most vulnerable to being co-opted. The characteristics of corruption can also evolve, from collusion to coercion, to full infiltration of institutions and systems – with blurred lines in between. Trafficking strategies evolve, too Trafficking strategies are similarly adaptive. There have been increased efforts by the port to combat trafficking through enhanced detection and technology. This was initially reflected by increased drug seizures. But since 2024, drugs seizures have declined. The research findings provide an explanation for this: As detection strengthens, more drug seizures are made. But what may happen, too, is a response to these new measures. As the risk of detection increases, criminals may adapt their trafficking strategies to overcome the additional hurdles, including: changing concealment strategies; and changing modes of transport and trafficking routes, including to ports outside of the Netherlands. Red flags and risk indicators These developments highlight the complexity in understanding the impact of stronger anti-trafficking measures on both corruption and trafficking strategies. Trafficking and corruption are typically measured by detection, for example, by changes in the volume of drug seizures or the number of public officials caught engaging in corruption. But the elephant in the room is that increasingly sophisticated criminal strategies can hide what is really happening. This underscores the need to continuously strengthen our ability to recognise “red flags” of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools and refined risk indicators are critical for understanding how crime and corruption strategies are changing. A holistic understanding and improved foresight The evolving nature of criminal strategies is often likened to a game of chess: enforcement makes a move, and criminal networks adapt. But what now seems to be emerging is more troubling. When barriers to drug trafficking increase while demand remains unchanged, crime and corruption strategies adapt in ways that can deepen their impact on society, leading for example to the hardening of crime and associated violence. This makes anticipating how crime may adapt to changing anti-corruption and anti-trafficking strategies critical. Improved foresight and scenario-building capacities will be vital in order to develop more robust enforcement efforts against drug trafficking and mitigate the negative impact on society. A holistic approach is essential. Addressing corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking requires a broad view of crime that focuses on understanding vulnerabilities, leveraging data and harnessing collaboration. The risk of trafficking routes changing are high, therefore, we must use every tool at our disposal to ensure effective and sustainable enforcement efforts. Learn more Download the full Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam: Drivers, strategies and implications View related online workshop for enforcement and research communities: Red flags at the frontier: detecting and disrupting border corruption in the EU , 23 September 2025 Acknowledgement and disclaimer FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI . The contents of the Working Paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.

Keeping Europe safe means keeping up with corruption and financial crime threats

Two recent EU publications underscore the central role of corruption and money laundering in enabling organised crime and threatening security – and how essential it is to invest more in efforts to investigate, seize and confiscate criminal assets. Europol’s 2025 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment SOCTA painted a sobering picture of how organised crime is “evolving at an unprecedented pace”, with corruption and money laundering as key enablers. The SOCTA, among other inputs, informed the new European internal security strategy, ProtectEU. This equally sobering document sets out how the EU needs to involve all of society in tackling threats to security including organised crime, cybercrime and terrorism. It urges the rapid passing and implementation of the EU Anti-Corruption Directive and emphasises that “seizing assets and confiscating criminal gains is essential.” What does this mean in practice for anti-corruption and asset recovery in Europe? SOCTA: three factors driving organised crime’s transformation The SOCTA is an intelligence-driven report that evaluates the impact of serious and organised crime on society. Published every four years, it is essential in shaping the EU’s criminal priorities. This year’s assessment points to a profound transformation that “is making organised crime more dangerous, posing an unprecedented challenge to security across the EU and its Member States”. The report reveals how organised criminal groups increasingly destabilise society. This includes by collaborating with so-called hybrid threat actors that seek to undermine European stability and institutions in order to achieve their economic or political objectives. For example, criminal networks can further the agendas of hybrid threat actors through orchestrated ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure, businesses and government agencies. Again, corruption exacerbates this destabilisation effect by enabling criminal networks to evade justice, undermine good governance, consolidate power and expand their operations. The ease of laundering illicit money also enables organised crime groups to bridge “the gap between the licit and illicit worlds”. Second, criminal networks increasingly benefit from shifting their operations online. Digital infrastructure like the dark web, social media and e-commerce platforms make it easier for them to recruit individuals, market their illicit services, buy and sell products, conduct financial transactions, communicate via encrypted platforms and identify targets and victims. Third, the report highlights how new technologies – such as artificial intelligence and blockchain-based technologies such as crypto – act as catalysts for organised crime. Cyber-enabled fraud schemes have reached unprecedented levels and are expected to keep growing. Going forward, such technologies will continue to increasingly “drive criminal operations’ efficiency by amplifying their speed, reach, and sophistication”. Parallel financial underworld grows; asset recovery remains low The SOCTA highlights the evolving nature of money laundering techniques, emphasising that these “serve as crucial components of a parallel financial criminal underworld” circumventing anti-money laundering regulations. Cryptocurrencies, non-fungible tokens NFTs , decentralised finance DeFi platforms and AI-driven automation now facilitate greater anonymity and complexity in the money laundering process. As a result, even if illicit transactions are detected, the money may still disappear before it can be seized – and the individuals laundering the money may remain unknown. These newer methods complement the existing – but still growing – use of cash-intensive businesses such as restaurants to launder illicit funds. The enhanced capability of organised crime groups to hide their proceeds therefore contributes to “an alarmingly modest level of approximately 2%” confiscation rate of criminal proceeds. Innovation to tackle evolving corruption risks This complex and evolving landscape of organised crime and security threats demands a multi-faceted approach. And addressing corruption and enhancing asset recovery are a crucial part of that. Innovation will help. Just as criminals take advantage of increased access to data and digital technologies, so we – governments, law enforcement, citizens, business – need to leverage data and digital tools effectively. That kind of research and innovation is a major goal of the EU-funded FALCON research project to which the Basel Institute is contributing. A 2025 Policy Brief distills concrete insights and red flags from an analysis of 63 corruption cases, for example. This research will help policymakers to develop measures to identify and proactively address weaknesses in legal and administrative procedures that increase corruption risks. In terms of tools, automated corruption risk assessment platforms could help law enforcement analyse data more efficiently and to uncover corruption patterns and new leads. Digitalisation can also help to minimise the discretion of public officials, for example at borders or in public procurement processes. Meanwhile, sophisticated tools and methods for blockchain analytics can help trace illicit crypto flows and to uncover the individuals and networks behind the transactions. Enhancing asset recovery: laws, investigations, coordination As highlighted by the SOCTA, “asset recovery is a powerful deterrent and an effective tool to tackle serious and organised crime”, because it cuts off criminal networks from their resources and prevents them from using these funds to undertake further criminal activity. From nearly two decades of experience of the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR , we can say that improving success rates in asset recovery demands a comprehensive approach to enhancing confiscation mechanisms, financial investigations and coordination. In terms of asset recovery legislation, there are well-documented good practices. For the EU specifically and in the context of sophisticated methods to conceal illicit wealth, we would highlight the need to maximise non-conviction-based and unexplained wealth confiscation mechanisms. When well drafted and implemented, these are especially effective in targeting assets links to organised crime or corruption that are difficult to trace back to specific illegal activities. Financial investigations are crucial to identify criminal assets, but not all financial investigations are the same. For example, investigating financial flows involving crypto requires specialist skills and analytical tools, as well as rapid, proactive collaboration with private-sector crypto asset service providers. In contrast, financial investigations involving predominantly cash or unregulated remittance methods such as hawala banking require the use of more traditional investigative methods, such as surveillance, searches and witness interviews. Coordination could be improved through the use of multi-agency asset recovery task forces. These harness the expertise, resources and legal mandates of law enforcement, prosecutors, asset recovery offices and financial intelligence units, among others, and ensure a coordinated approach to recovering illicit assets. Meanwhile, public-private partnerships can help enhance the sharing of financial intelligence – thus closing the gap between the detection of money laundering and the enforcement of freezing measures. Building defences against corruption and illicit finance ======================================================== Organised crime will continue to exploit regulatory loopholes and rapidly adapt to evolving legal and technological landscapes. In the current geopolitical landscape, we are glad that European institutions are taking a fresh look at the links between corruption, organised crime and security. At the Basel Institute we will continue to support our partners in governments, international organisations, the private sector and civil society to, among other things: improve the effectiveness of anti-money laundering systems as new forms of financial crime evolve; address weaknesses in regulatory frameworks and gaps in the effective implementation of rules and laws; and improve all stages of the asset recovery chain, from detection and tracing to recovering criminal assets.

Cryptocurrencies key to tackling organised crime – Europol and Basel Institute on Governance

The 6th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies 6CRC – a two-day gathering of thousands of crypto specialists and financial investigators from law enforcement, regulators and the private sector – came to an end today at Europol’s headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands. As cryptocurrency use expands into practically every country and sector, so does its abuse to commit new forms of crime and launder dirty money, said speakers. Yet with the right tools, capacity and cooperation, the unique characteristics of blockchain-based technologies offer an unprecedented opportunity to investigate organised crime and money laundering networks and to recover stolen funds. Keeping up as crypto enters the mainstream The speeches and panels painted a picture of how “traditional” and virtual organised crime and money laundering typologies are merging. Cryptocurrencies are increasingly involved in trade-based money laundering cases, for example, and linked to a broad range of crimes including drug smuggling, sports match fixing and proliferation financing. Professional money launderers are taking advantage of the ever-growing options provided by crypto assets – from mining to decentralised services – to launder proceeds from both physical and cyber crimes. But law enforcement, regulators and the private sector are working hard to stay ahead of those who abuse crypto assets to commit crimes and launder money. Legislation is tightening. New EU regulations, for example, will ensure that crypto assets are treated like any other assets for the purposes of anti-money laundering regulation and supervision. Multiple successful cases, some laid bare during the conference, illustrate how investigators are taking advantage of the unique characteristics of blockchain-based technologies to “follow the money”. This has allowed them to identify not only scammers and hackers but also more traditional organised crime groups and money laundering networks. Law enforcement and judicial authorities are increasingly treating virtual assets like any other asset from a legal perspective, easing their seizure, management and eventual transformation into fiat currency. Private companies are innovating fast to provide the tools and analytical capacity to trace funds laundered across multiple blockchains using different obfuscation techniques. Increasing understanding and capacity in the crypto sphere among all players – regulators, law enforcement, the private sector – is vital to tackling organised crime and money laundering, both physical and virtual. About the conference The 6th edition of the annual Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies took place in hybrid format on 1–2 September 2022. The conference was hosted by Europol with the support of the Basel Institute on Governance through the joint Working Group on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies. With over 1,700 registered participants from 119 countries, the first day was dedicated to public-private cooperation and exchange. Speakers represented regulators European Parliament , law enforcement Europol , think tanks Royal United Services Institute , virtual asset service providers Binance , and specialised companies involved in crypto investigations, data analysis and asset recovery Asset Reality, Chainalysis, CipherTrace, Sportradar and TRM Labs . The second day of the conference was strictly limited to law enforcement and related public authorities, such as financial intelligence units. Specialised cryptocurrency investigators from France, Korea, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States shared case studies and experiences with their international colleagues, which numbered more than 1,100 from 95 countries. Learn more See the joint recommendations: Seizing the opportunity: 5 recommendations for crypto assets-related crime and money laundering To view recommendations and videos from the previous 2021 conference, which was hosted by the Basel Institute on Governance, see baselgovernance.org/5crc. Media enquiries: press@europol.europa.eu Europol ; monica.guy@baselgovernance.org Basel Institute on Governance .

Three things countries and companies must do to address illegal financial flows from environmental crimes

Three critical imperatives to tackle the hundreds of billions in illegal funds flowing annually from environmental crimes arose from the latest OECD-Basel Institute virtual dialogue on 17 March. First, proper assessments of financial crime risks arising from environmental crimes, by governments and the private sector. Second, more proactive cooperation across sectors and countries, through public-private partnerships and similar mechanisms. Third, applying good ideas and effective tools from other areas of financial crime-fighting to the challenge of environmental crime. Most of all, everyone everywhere dealing with financial services, crime and risk needs to start working proactively together, because the challenge is tremendous. By many estimates, illegal financial flows from environmental crime surpass those of other serious and organised crimes like drugs, arms and human trafficking, which are often committed by the same actors. Yes, it is a complex and fluid topic. Compared to other crimes there is less information and more grey areas where legal and illegal activity merge. Yes, there are hurdles, like differences in national laws on predicate offences and data protection. But the panellists, representing the views of both the public and the private sectors, were clear: these are not an excuse to wait and watch. Environmental crime remains a top priority of the FATF under the current German presidency, broadening the scope from an initial focus on illegal wildlife trade IWT under the 2019 Chinese presidency. The risks that environmental crime poses to sustainable development everywhere are also recognised by the G7 and will only become more critical as the planet warms and biodiversity degrades. And the G20 likewise has long highlighted the role that corruption plays in facilitating the illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products. National risk assessments – a fundamental first step The first imperative is for both the public and private sectors to properly assess financial crime risks arising from environmental crimes. This starts with incorporating the multi-faceted risks of environmental crimes in national risk assessments, which is still only rarely done. In light of many competing priorities, environmental crimes will otherwise inevitably drop down the priority lists of financial intelligence units FIUs and financial institutions, or even off the radars. In Malawi, the inclusion of IWT in the national risk assessment in 2018 unlocked the ability for the Financial Intelligence Authority FIA to launch systematic efforts to address illegal funds from such crimes. The assessment revealed that, in fact, IWT was one of the most proceeds-generating crimes in the country. Coupled with new investigative powers and efforts to build relationships and awareness among stakeholders including law enforcement, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife and supporting NGOs, Malawi’s FIA has become a leader in the fight against IWT. Lessons learned? FIUs may need to push proactively for environmental crimes to be included in the national risk assessment. Then, analysts need specialised training in what is, for many, a new field and particularly challenging in economies where hard-to-trace cash is king. Governments need to provide a clear division of powers and responsibilities among authorities on environmental crimes. The other major need for FIUs is cooperation with the private sector. Here the question is: how are financial institutions working to understand and address risks related to environmental crimes? Supporting a risk-based approach in the private sector The answer: with some exceptions, not yet very well. In a recent ACAMS Compliance Effectiveness and Risks Survey, only a quarter of participating compliance professionals said their institutions were ready to flag transactions potentially linked to wildlife trafficking and other environmental crimes. South Africa-based Absa Group is one financial institution that is developing sophisticated data analysis, transaction monitoring and customer due diligence systems to assess and address its exposure to environmental crime-related risks. This needs high-quality intelligence on local risks related to geography, industry sectors, and customer typologies and activity. Though still in its early stages, the United for Wildlife Financial Taskforce has been crucial in collating and providing this intelligence including through a monthly intelligence bulletin as well as facilitating cooperation and knowledge-sharing regionally, internationally and across sectors. While the client risk profiles in typically source countries such as South Africa or Malawi look very different to those in financial centres such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein, there is a lot that financial sector actors at different stages of the value chain can still learn from one another. Public-private partnerships for proactive cooperation This is why cooperation is essential, both among the private sector and between the public and private sectors, to galvanize the potential inherent in the work of all parties who are on the right side of the fight against environmental crime. FIUs have significant analytical capabilities, as well as access to data and informal cooperation, that are currently underutilised to address environmental crime. The Egmont Group is supporting capacity building and cooperation within FIUs on environmental crimes, including through a recent report, workshops and eLearning. But without proper platforms for public-private cooperation, these efforts will achieve too little. Why? Partly because financial institutions and other reporting entities need support and intelligence to help identify suspicious transactions relating to environmental crimes. Partly also as they are sitting on information that can be vital for law enforcement, such as mobile phone numbers that can be used to trace mobile money payments and geolocate suspects. Public-private partnerships can also bring in the expertise and knowledge of other actors, from lawyers and accountants to logging or mining companies and NGOs. And they are a proven way to overcome legal barriers to information-sharing. In South Africa, for example, the South Africa Integrated Money Laundering Task Force SAMLIT provides a legal platform for information-sharing among financial institutions and has launched a working group on IWT that integrates the United for Wildlife Financial Taskforce. Countries have a responsibility to set up and support such mechanisms, which have the potential to transform individual efforts to address illegal funds from environmental crimes into coordinated and effective action. What can we learn from other finance-focused partnerships? Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking FAST , a multi-stakeholder collaboration arising from the Liechtenstein Initiative, has had a transformational effect on financial sector action against modern slavery and human trafficking that can serve as inspiration and a source of practical ideas. The latest report, Unlocking Potential: A Blueprint for Mobilizing Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking , contains five goals and an implementation toolkit through which financial sector actors can work to achieve them through individual and collective action. There are many parallels between human trafficking and environmental crime, and much potential for mutual learning from the frameworks, tools and experiences. What could we learn from Brazil’s experience in establishing a public “dirty list” of citizens and companies caught benefitting from modern slavery? On the policy and regulatory side, experience shows that individual and collective action by the private sector needs support from regulators to push the industry forward and maintain a level playing field. In sum: we all need to better understand our risks and better cooperate to address them, taking inspiration and motivation from the initiatives that work. For more inspiration, watch the full event on YouTube and learn more about Green Corruption. About the event Titled Connecting the dots: Tracing funds from environmental crimes , the event on 17 March 2021 was part of the Corrupting the environment event series co-hosted by the OECD and the Basel Institute’s Green Corruption team. Moderated by David Lewis, Executive Secretary of the FATF, the panel featured: Olivier de Perregaux, CEO LGT Private Banking, Liechtenstein Werner Venter, Senior Manager, Financial Crime Intelligence Unit, Absa Group Ltd. Daniel Thelesklaf, Anti-Money Laundering / Anti-Corruption Expert Atuweni Juwayeyi-Agbermodji, AML/CFT Program Officer, UNODC Southern Africa; former Director General, Financial Intelligence Agency, Malawi Our next event on 14 April looks at how behavioural approaches can complement interventions to fight illegal wildlife trade and environmental crimes. You can register directly here. Watch on YouTube

Mind the gap: building a bridge between research and practice to better fight illegal wildlife trade

When you have a difficult problem to solve, it often helps to look at it from a different angle. And it always helps to collaborate with experts who have different perspectives and skillsets. This is the simple premise behind my latest short report on Social network analysis in the fight against illegal wildlife trade. It draws on my experience as a social network analyst keen to apply this technique in support of law enforcement activities against organised crime, including wildlife trafficking. Few of us would disagree that collaboration between researchers and practitioners is fundamental to increase our capacity as a community to fight crime in the contemporary world. Strategies to fight crime should be based on evidence, right? But while opportunities for such collaboration are plentiful, real-life examples are surprisingly challenging and all too rare. This situation is no different with bridging the gap between researchers such as myself specialised in social network analysis SNA and investigators of wildlife trafficking offences. The first challenge is promoting wider understanding of what SNA is and what it can do. If you are one of those who aren’t sure, feel free to read my quick guide to social network analysis in combating organised crime and trafficking. The second challenge is demonstrating just how much SNA research can support investigations relating to illegal wildlife trade or, for that matter, any form of trafficking or serious organised crime. Some of the specific benefits I explore in the report are: analysis of datasets to generate a wide range of valuable intelligence products; structuring the intelligence through SNA to enable its systematic application by investigators; identifying criminal actors previously hidden in the data; assessing vulnerabilities in criminal networks; developing evidence-based strategies to counter IWT. The advantages go both ways. Law enforcement activities and practitioners can support SNA research on wildlife trafficking through: providing a rich source of primary and secondary data; helping to frame research questions and hypotheses; introducing researchers to the field and making connections; clarifying queries around specific data and the roles/functions of actors in the network; acting as a sounding board to confirm or reject the findings of the SNA. In order to harness such synergies, we need to think of ways in which information can be better shared between the fields of research and practice. Transparency and access to enforcement information is a first step. Documents such as electronic wiretapping and shadowing records, or pre-trial detention orders and sentences, are incredibly valuable for SNA yet almost impossible for researchers to obtain. High-quality SNA needs high-quality data, so this challenge impacts the depth and breadth of findings that SNA can achieve. Weaker findings in turn make a weaker contribution to law enforcement efforts. Do we want to create a virtuous circle between research and practice in support of our shared goal – that of fighting wildlife crime and taking down the criminal networks responsible? Of course. So let’s figure out how to build bridges over the gaps. Bringing different fields of knowledge and skillsets together in a context of openness and collaboration will not only produce better knowledge, but also improve processes. Meaningful collaborations are planned from the outset and designed to share and build on capacities, perspectives and practices. In this way, our vision becomes sharper and our body of knowledge becomes greater than the sum of its parts. Learn more My quick guide to social network analysis offers a brief introduction to SNA, its goals and techniques. I recently published a preliminary report on my initial findings: Examining wildlife trafficking networks in East Africa through the lens of social network analysis. For broader background, see the Basel Institute's Working Paper 30: Corruption and wildlife trafficking: exploring drivers, facilitators and networks behind illegal wildlife trade in East Africa, published in 2019 in collaboration with my colleagues Claudia Baez Camargo and Saba Kassa. See further information on the Basel Institute's IWT programme and the focus of the programme's research and social network analysis component. Photo by Nikolai Ulltang from Pexels.

Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy

Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam