Organised crime

Corruption in the age of networks, data and influence – does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive rise to the challenge?

This article by Dr Jacopo Costa is one of two Basel Institute commentaries on the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive. While the companion piece by Rita Simões examines the directive's legal and institutional implications, this article takes a political economy perspective. It considers what the directive reveals about changing understandings of corruption, how corruption risks are evolving in an increasingly interconnected and technology-driven environment, and where future EU anti-corruption efforts may need to focus. The key message is that the directive represents an important advance in legal harmonisation, but that effective anti-corruption policy will also require stronger strategic thinking, greater use of data and technology, and closer attention to emerging corruption risks linked to procurement, border security and financial infrastructure. April 2026, the European Union formally adopted Directive 2026/1021 on combatting corruption. Following years of negotiations, political disagreements and institutional bargaining, the EU now has a comprehensive anti-corruption framework establishing common definitions, offences, sanctions and preventive measures across its member states. This is a landmark achievement. But it would be a mistake to view the directive as the culmination of the European anti-corruption journey. In fact, its adoption marks the beginning of a much larger challenge: turning a legal framework into an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy that can address the evolving forms of corruption emerging in an increasingly complex geopolitical and technological landscape. Why the directive matters For years, the EU lacked a coherent anti-corruption framework. Although member states had their own legislation, there were significant differences in how corruption offences were defined, investigated and punished. These discrepancies created loopholes that could be exploited by corrupt individuals and hindered cross-border cooperation between national authorities. The new directive aims to address these issues by introducing common minimum standards across the EU. In particular, it: - harmonises the definitions of bribery in the public and private sectors, trading in influence, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment and the concealment of criminal proceeds; - introduces common standards for criminal sanctions, corporate liability, statutes of limitation, whistleblower protection, anti-corruption strategies and specialised anti-corruption bodies; and - broadens the definition of public officials to encompass not only national officeholders, but also senior EU officials and individuals performing public duties on behalf of public institutions. This reflects the reality of contemporary governance, where public services are increasingly delivered through hybrid public–private arrangements. It is the most ambitious attempt yet to establish a shared European anti-corruption framework. A more modern understanding of corruption One of the directive's most significant strengths is its recognition that corruption is not confined to the traditional notion of an envelope stuffed with cash being exchanged. We welcome this change in perspective greatly, because our research demonstrates clearly that contemporary corruption is increasingly networked, sophisticated and relational. It often relies on intermediaries, influence brokers, hidden financial channels, luxury gifts, preferential treatment, future career opportunities and informal exchanges of favours. Including offences such as trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealing criminal proceeds and aiding or abetting corruption schemes shows an understanding of how corruption operates in modern societies. This evolution is important because anti-corruption frameworks often struggle to keep up with the evolving nature of corruption. The directive is a valuable attempt to address this issue and close the resulting gap. The price of political compromise Legislation is never produced in isolation from politics. Significant disagreements emerged among EU institutions and member states during the adoption process. Several governments expressed concerns about subsidiarity and the potential consequences of criminalising particular behaviours. So, the final directive is less ambitious than the original proposal. One example concerns the offence previously known as “abuse of office”. Following intense political resistance, particularly from countries such as Germany and Italy, the final text replaced it with the more cautious formulation of “unlawful exercise of public functions”. The compromise facilitated agreement, but introduced ambiguity that could hinder enforcement. Similarly, criminal sanctions and limitation periods were reduced during negotiations. Maximum prison sentences were reduced, and statutes of limitation were scaled back considerably compared to earlier drafts. These compromises highlight a recurring dilemma in policymaking not only in Europe but everywhere: achieving consensus often necessitates compromising on ambition. The result is a directive that establishes a common baseline, yet leaves considerable room for interpretation among member states. The missing security lens Perhaps the most significant limitation of the directive is its relatively little guidance on what anti-corruption efforts should look like in today's rapidly changing security environment. Because corruption is increasingly also a geopolitical and security issue. Foreign influence operations, sanctions evasion schemes, strategic corruption, illicit financial networks, organised crime infiltration and the manipulation of critical supply chains all represent corruption-related risks affecting European security and resilience. Yet these challenges remain largely outside the directive's core focus. There is a risk that anti-corruption efforts will continue to focus on traditional forms of misconduct while underestimating emerging threats linked to geopolitical competition and hybrid forms of influence. The technology gap Considering the hype around artificial intelligence in society generally, the most striking omission in the directive is the limited attention devoted to technological innovation. Over the past decade, governments, international organisations and researchers have been exploring how artificial intelligence, big data analytics, risk indicators, predictive modelling and open-source intelligence can bolster anti-corruption initiatives. Technology is now essential for identifying suspicious procurement patterns, pinpointing conflicts of interest, tracing illicit financial flows and exposing corruption networks. Yet the directive contains almost no strategic vision regarding the role of technology in anti-corruption governance, which is surprising. Research conducted under the EU-funded FALCON project – of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member – demonstrates that effective anti-corruption systems are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures capable of collecting, integrating, analysing and cross-referencing large volumes of information. Without these capabilities, many corruption risks remain invisible until significant damage has already occurred. It’s important to stress that adopting new technologies – purchasing software, etc. – is the easy part. EU states also need to create the institutional and data infrastructures that allow these technologies to function effectively. Digitisation, interoperability, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and cross-border information sharing are all prerequisites for the next generation of anti-corruption systems. Three areas that deserve greater attention From our research in the following areas, we can say for sure that they deserve particular attention in the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy and future initiatives: 1\. Public procurement Public procurement remains one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. This issue is exacerbated by Europe's increased investment in defence, critical infrastructure, energy security, technological innovation and strategic industrial policies. Central priorities should include strengthening transparency, reducing direct awards, improving oversight of sub-threshold contracts, and introducing AI-based risk assessment tools. 2\. Border governance Managing borders and customs procedures is another critical challenge, as research at the Port of Rotterdam and the Kapitan Andreevo crossing demonstrates. Corruption at the border facilitates a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, evasion of sanctions, tax fraud and the movement of illicit goods. Greater automation, data integration and harmonisation of border management systems across member states could significantly reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the EU's capacity to detect emerging threats. 3\. Financial infrastructures Modern corruption relies heavily on financial infrastructure. Complex financial networks, shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and, increasingly, cryptoassets can facilitate the movement and concealment of illicit funds. The future of anti-corruption policy hinges on strengthening the links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks, and on developing new approaches that can address digital financial ecosystems. Will the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy help put the directive into action? The adoption of Directive 2026/1021 sends an important message that corruption remains a priority issue for the European Union. The directive establishes a much-needed common foundation and introduces valuable innovations to improve both prevention and enforcement. It provides a stronger legal framework than the fragmented system that existed previously. But legal harmonisation alone will not be enough. The directive's effectiveness will ultimately depend on how member states implement its provisions, and on whether the European Union can develop a broader strategic vision capable of addressing emerging corruption risks. This is where the forthcoming EU Anti-Corruption Strategy could play a decisive role. To be effective and not just a paper exercise, it must be adaptive, technology-driven and security-conscious. This strategy must respond to current corruption and anticipate its potential evolution. And it needs to be based on a participative process that considers the valuable research and perspectives of civil society organisations, academics and others outside of government. If the directive provides the legal architecture, the strategy can provide the direction. Together, they could form the basis of a more adaptive and forward-looking European anti-corruption framework – one that is able to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.

Basel Institute joins regional effort to strengthen security, justice and development in Latin America

Reducing the economic power of organised crime is essential to improving security, strengthening justice systems and supporting sustainable development across Latin America and the Caribbean. And doing that requires strong and dependable partnerships. Building on more than a decade of support to authorities across the region, the Basel Institute on Governance has formally joined the Alliance for Security, Justice and Development, a regional initiative led by the Inter-American Development Bank IDB . The Alliance seeks to strengthen coordinated responses to organised crime in Latin America and the Caribbean through dialogue, cooperation, knowledge exchange and resource mobilisation. Supporting the fight against illicit financial flows For the Basel Institute and its International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR , participation in the Alliance represents a further opportunity to contribute its expertise in financial investigations, asset recovery, international cooperation and public financial management while working alongside governments, international organisations and other partners committed to strengthening security, justice and development across the region. Executive Director Elizabeth Andersen signed the declaration formalising the Basel Institute’s participation in the Alliance in Washington, D.C. The signing followed close engagement between senior IDB and Alliance representatives and Oscar Solórzano, Head of ICAR Latin America. Strengthening regional cooperation The Alliance for Security, Justice and Development is a regional platform for dialogue, cooperation, knowledge exchange and resource mobilisation aimed at preventing and responding to organised crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. Coordinated by the IDB through its Citizen Security Division, the Alliance currently brings together 23 member states and multiple strategic partners from the international, development and security sectors. Its work is structured around three strategic pillars: protecting vulnerable communities from organised crime and violence; strengthening institutional resilience within security and justice systems; and reducing illicit financial flows and illicit markets to weaken the operational capacity and influence of criminal organisations. Bringing expertise in asset recovery and financial investigations The Basel Institute will contribute particularly to the third pillar, leaning on the expertise and two decades of experience of its specialised International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR . Elizabeth Andersen stated that the Basel Institute is honoured to participate in such a high-level initiative focused on issues of critical importance for Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as for the broader international community. Oscar Solórzano highlighted that the Alliance represents an important opportunity to support countries in strengthening asset recovery systems, international cooperation and institutional capacities against increasingly sophisticated forms of organised crime and illicit economies. Building on a decade of support in Latin America Our participation builds on more than a decade of operational and technical support to authorities across Latin America in areas including financial investigations, asset recovery, international cooperation and – through a dedicated programme – public financial management. Activities under the Alliance framework are expected to begin in the region in the coming months, with our teams supporting key initiatives and technical workstreams developed through the Alliance in the years ahead. Our participation reflects our longstanding commitment to helping countries tackle corruption, illicit financial flows and organised crime, and our belief that sustainable impact is achieved through strong partnerships that bring together public authorities, international organisations and practitioners around shared goals.

How corruption helps drug traffickers adapt to strengthened border enforcement

Corruption at border points remains a pressing global issue, threatening not only border integrity but also the health, safety and security of our societies. It enables illicit trafficking, facilitates organised crime and undermines trust in public institutions. In our Working Paper 58 , Saba Kassa and Jacopo Costa examine how corruption facilitates drug trafficking through the port of Rotterdam. Through in-depth interviews with stakeholders, a review of judicial cases and desk research, the paper shows how trafficking and corruption strategies are changing in response to strengthened enforcement at border spaces. It contributes to the growing body of work that looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive. The Working Paper was written as part of the FALCON Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks project. The research supports efforts to develop more robust and forward-looking approaches to combat corruption and drug trafficking. Read the executive summary below. Unintended consequences of strengthened enforcement This Working Paper examines how corruption facilitates drug trafficking specifically cocaine through the port of Rotterdam, looking at the underlying drivers and strategies involved. Legal trade routes and commercial ports are especially attractive because of the high volumes of cargo, which make it possible to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. The spatial complexity of the port of Rotterdam also makes it difficult to fully secure it against criminal activity. Digging deeper into the facilitating factors of trafficking, the paper finds that, paradoxically, a main driver of rising border corruption is the increased political attention on and resources dedicated to fighting trafficking. Desk research and stakeholder interviews highlight that as authorities deploy new technology to improve detection, traffickers face more obstacles to operating effectively. Having someone on the inside then becomes increasingly important. So, an unintended but important consequence of the strengthened fight against drug trafficking is that corruption becomes even more essential for the operational success of organised crime networks. Customs officials are specifically vulnerable This study focuses specifically on the role of customs. Tasked with monitoring the import and export of goods, customs officers are important actors in the fight against drug trafficking. However, their role also makes them vulnerable: they have crucial knowledge on processes and procedures, access to systems and discretionary power that can be exploited by criminals. The desk research shows that corruption is used strategically to circumvent two important bottlenecks: the container screening and security as cargo enters the port, and the exit of drugs from the port. Traffickers may seek to obtain key information or direct assistance from customs officers. Collusion – coercion – infiltration These corrupt relationships and the emerging networks between members of crime groups and the customs officials are diverse. Some relationships can be characterised by collusion, where customs officials offer their services or are persuaded to cooperate. This collusion may be opportunistic or targeted. Other relationships can be characterised by coercion. Customs officials may be lured by financial reward, but this is accompanied by intimidation or the threat of violence to ensure that the officer cooperates and continues to cooperate. Our research highlights that the boundary between collusion and coercion is often blurred. Beyond collusion and coercion, we also see infiltration, which crosses the boundaries between the criminal, public and private. What emerges is less a matter of individual corruption and more akin to regulatory capture, where the public office position is held by a member of the criminal network. The review of the judicial cases shows that bribes involved in these schemes can amount to millions. To hide and use the illicit gains, traffickers rely on money laundering, disguising its source as legitimate. They often enlist the help of family and friends, a trusted inner circle or professional specialists. They may also hide cash at home or invest it in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad. Adaptive corruption strategies A key finding of our research is that the criminal and corruption strategies used to facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive. The underlying driver of this adaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and high profitability of the crime. This pushes traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in supplying the demand. Corruption strategies adapt in response to new enforcement measures. When control systems are changed and/or strengthened, corruption strategies evolve alongside them. This research identifies some key patterns: Stronger detection efforts increase the incentives for corruption. Evolving systems encourage a similar shift in corruption strategies. Anti-corruption and anti-trafficking measures may change the profile of those most vulnerable to being co-opted. The characteristics of corruption can also evolve, from collusion to coercion, to full infiltration of institutions and systems – with blurred lines in between. Trafficking strategies evolve, too Trafficking strategies are similarly adaptive. There have been increased efforts by the port to combat trafficking through enhanced detection and technology. This was initially reflected by increased drug seizures. But since 2024, drugs seizures have declined. The research findings provide an explanation for this: As detection strengthens, more drug seizures are made. But what may happen, too, is a response to these new measures. As the risk of detection increases, criminals may adapt their trafficking strategies to overcome the additional hurdles, including: changing concealment strategies; and changing modes of transport and trafficking routes, including to ports outside of the Netherlands. Red flags and risk indicators These developments highlight the complexity in understanding the impact of stronger anti-trafficking measures on both corruption and trafficking strategies. Trafficking and corruption are typically measured by detection, for example, by changes in the volume of drug seizures or the number of public officials caught engaging in corruption. But the elephant in the room is that increasingly sophisticated criminal strategies can hide what is really happening. This underscores the need to continuously strengthen our ability to recognise “red flags” of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools and refined risk indicators are critical for understanding how crime and corruption strategies are changing. A holistic understanding and improved foresight The evolving nature of criminal strategies is often likened to a game of chess: enforcement makes a move, and criminal networks adapt. But what now seems to be emerging is more troubling. When barriers to drug trafficking increase while demand remains unchanged, crime and corruption strategies adapt in ways that can deepen their impact on society, leading for example to the hardening of crime and associated violence. This makes anticipating how crime may adapt to changing anti-corruption and anti-trafficking strategies critical. Improved foresight and scenario-building capacities will be vital in order to develop more robust enforcement efforts against drug trafficking and mitigate the negative impact on society. A holistic approach is essential. Addressing corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking requires a broad view of crime that focuses on understanding vulnerabilities, leveraging data and harnessing collaboration. The risk of trafficking routes changing are high, therefore, we must use every tool at our disposal to ensure effective and sustainable enforcement efforts. Learn more Download the full Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam: Drivers, strategies and implications View related online workshop for enforcement and research communities: Red flags at the frontier: detecting and disrupting border corruption in the EU , 23 September 2025 Acknowledgement and disclaimer FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI . The contents of the Working Paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.

Keeping Europe safe means keeping up with corruption and financial crime threats

Two recent EU publications underscore the central role of corruption and money laundering in enabling organised crime and threatening security – and how essential it is to invest more in efforts to investigate, seize and confiscate criminal assets. Europol’s 2025 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment SOCTA painted a sobering picture of how organised crime is “evolving at an unprecedented pace”, with corruption and money laundering as key enablers. The SOCTA, among other inputs, informed the new European internal security strategy, ProtectEU. This equally sobering document sets out how the EU needs to involve all of society in tackling threats to security including organised crime, cybercrime and terrorism. It urges the rapid passing and implementation of the EU Anti-Corruption Directive and emphasises that “seizing assets and confiscating criminal gains is essential.” What does this mean in practice for anti-corruption and asset recovery in Europe? SOCTA: three factors driving organised crime’s transformation The SOCTA is an intelligence-driven report that evaluates the impact of serious and organised crime on society. Published every four years, it is essential in shaping the EU’s criminal priorities. This year’s assessment points to a profound transformation that “is making organised crime more dangerous, posing an unprecedented challenge to security across the EU and its Member States”. The report reveals how organised criminal groups increasingly destabilise society. This includes by collaborating with so-called hybrid threat actors that seek to undermine European stability and institutions in order to achieve their economic or political objectives. For example, criminal networks can further the agendas of hybrid threat actors through orchestrated ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure, businesses and government agencies. Again, corruption exacerbates this destabilisation effect by enabling criminal networks to evade justice, undermine good governance, consolidate power and expand their operations. The ease of laundering illicit money also enables organised crime groups to bridge “the gap between the licit and illicit worlds”. Second, criminal networks increasingly benefit from shifting their operations online. Digital infrastructure like the dark web, social media and e-commerce platforms make it easier for them to recruit individuals, market their illicit services, buy and sell products, conduct financial transactions, communicate via encrypted platforms and identify targets and victims. Third, the report highlights how new technologies – such as artificial intelligence and blockchain-based technologies such as crypto – act as catalysts for organised crime. Cyber-enabled fraud schemes have reached unprecedented levels and are expected to keep growing. Going forward, such technologies will continue to increasingly “drive criminal operations’ efficiency by amplifying their speed, reach, and sophistication”. Parallel financial underworld grows; asset recovery remains low The SOCTA highlights the evolving nature of money laundering techniques, emphasising that these “serve as crucial components of a parallel financial criminal underworld” circumventing anti-money laundering regulations. Cryptocurrencies, non-fungible tokens NFTs , decentralised finance DeFi platforms and AI-driven automation now facilitate greater anonymity and complexity in the money laundering process. As a result, even if illicit transactions are detected, the money may still disappear before it can be seized – and the individuals laundering the money may remain unknown. These newer methods complement the existing – but still growing – use of cash-intensive businesses such as restaurants to launder illicit funds. The enhanced capability of organised crime groups to hide their proceeds therefore contributes to “an alarmingly modest level of approximately 2%” confiscation rate of criminal proceeds. Innovation to tackle evolving corruption risks This complex and evolving landscape of organised crime and security threats demands a multi-faceted approach. And addressing corruption and enhancing asset recovery are a crucial part of that. Innovation will help. Just as criminals take advantage of increased access to data and digital technologies, so we – governments, law enforcement, citizens, business – need to leverage data and digital tools effectively. That kind of research and innovation is a major goal of the EU-funded FALCON research project to which the Basel Institute is contributing. A 2025 Policy Brief distills concrete insights and red flags from an analysis of 63 corruption cases, for example. This research will help policymakers to develop measures to identify and proactively address weaknesses in legal and administrative procedures that increase corruption risks. In terms of tools, automated corruption risk assessment platforms could help law enforcement analyse data more efficiently and to uncover corruption patterns and new leads. Digitalisation can also help to minimise the discretion of public officials, for example at borders or in public procurement processes. Meanwhile, sophisticated tools and methods for blockchain analytics can help trace illicit crypto flows and to uncover the individuals and networks behind the transactions. Enhancing asset recovery: laws, investigations, coordination As highlighted by the SOCTA, “asset recovery is a powerful deterrent and an effective tool to tackle serious and organised crime”, because it cuts off criminal networks from their resources and prevents them from using these funds to undertake further criminal activity. From nearly two decades of experience of the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR , we can say that improving success rates in asset recovery demands a comprehensive approach to enhancing confiscation mechanisms, financial investigations and coordination. In terms of asset recovery legislation, there are well-documented good practices. For the EU specifically and in the context of sophisticated methods to conceal illicit wealth, we would highlight the need to maximise non-conviction-based and unexplained wealth confiscation mechanisms. When well drafted and implemented, these are especially effective in targeting assets links to organised crime or corruption that are difficult to trace back to specific illegal activities. Financial investigations are crucial to identify criminal assets, but not all financial investigations are the same. For example, investigating financial flows involving crypto requires specialist skills and analytical tools, as well as rapid, proactive collaboration with private-sector crypto asset service providers. In contrast, financial investigations involving predominantly cash or unregulated remittance methods such as hawala banking require the use of more traditional investigative methods, such as surveillance, searches and witness interviews. Coordination could be improved through the use of multi-agency asset recovery task forces. These harness the expertise, resources and legal mandates of law enforcement, prosecutors, asset recovery offices and financial intelligence units, among others, and ensure a coordinated approach to recovering illicit assets. Meanwhile, public-private partnerships can help enhance the sharing of financial intelligence – thus closing the gap between the detection of money laundering and the enforcement of freezing measures. Building defences against corruption and illicit finance ======================================================== Organised crime will continue to exploit regulatory loopholes and rapidly adapt to evolving legal and technological landscapes. In the current geopolitical landscape, we are glad that European institutions are taking a fresh look at the links between corruption, organised crime and security. At the Basel Institute we will continue to support our partners in governments, international organisations, the private sector and civil society to, among other things: improve the effectiveness of anti-money laundering systems as new forms of financial crime evolve; address weaknesses in regulatory frameworks and gaps in the effective implementation of rules and laws; and improve all stages of the asset recovery chain, from detection and tracing to recovering criminal assets.

Cryptocurrencies key to tackling organised crime – Europol and Basel Institute on Governance

The 6th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies 6CRC – a two-day gathering of thousands of crypto specialists and financial investigators from law enforcement, regulators and the private sector – came to an end today at Europol’s headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands. As cryptocurrency use expands into practically every country and sector, so does its abuse to commit new forms of crime and launder dirty money, said speakers. Yet with the right tools, capacity and cooperation, the unique characteristics of blockchain-based technologies offer an unprecedented opportunity to investigate organised crime and money laundering networks and to recover stolen funds. Keeping up as crypto enters the mainstream The speeches and panels painted a picture of how “traditional” and virtual organised crime and money laundering typologies are merging. Cryptocurrencies are increasingly involved in trade-based money laundering cases, for example, and linked to a broad range of crimes including drug smuggling, sports match fixing and proliferation financing. Professional money launderers are taking advantage of the ever-growing options provided by crypto assets – from mining to decentralised services – to launder proceeds from both physical and cyber crimes. But law enforcement, regulators and the private sector are working hard to stay ahead of those who abuse crypto assets to commit crimes and launder money. Legislation is tightening. New EU regulations, for example, will ensure that crypto assets are treated like any other assets for the purposes of anti-money laundering regulation and supervision. Multiple successful cases, some laid bare during the conference, illustrate how investigators are taking advantage of the unique characteristics of blockchain-based technologies to “follow the money”. This has allowed them to identify not only scammers and hackers but also more traditional organised crime groups and money laundering networks. Law enforcement and judicial authorities are increasingly treating virtual assets like any other asset from a legal perspective, easing their seizure, management and eventual transformation into fiat currency. Private companies are innovating fast to provide the tools and analytical capacity to trace funds laundered across multiple blockchains using different obfuscation techniques. Increasing understanding and capacity in the crypto sphere among all players – regulators, law enforcement, the private sector – is vital to tackling organised crime and money laundering, both physical and virtual. About the conference The 6th edition of the annual Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies took place in hybrid format on 1–2 September 2022. The conference was hosted by Europol with the support of the Basel Institute on Governance through the joint Working Group on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies. With over 1,700 registered participants from 119 countries, the first day was dedicated to public-private cooperation and exchange. Speakers represented regulators European Parliament , law enforcement Europol , think tanks Royal United Services Institute , virtual asset service providers Binance , and specialised companies involved in crypto investigations, data analysis and asset recovery Asset Reality, Chainalysis, CipherTrace, Sportradar and TRM Labs . The second day of the conference was strictly limited to law enforcement and related public authorities, such as financial intelligence units. Specialised cryptocurrency investigators from France, Korea, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States shared case studies and experiences with their international colleagues, which numbered more than 1,100 from 95 countries. Learn more See the joint recommendations: Seizing the opportunity: 5 recommendations for crypto assets-related crime and money laundering To view recommendations and videos from the previous 2021 conference, which was hosted by the Basel Institute on Governance, see baselgovernance.org/5crc. Media enquiries: press@europol.europa.eu Europol ; monica.guy@baselgovernance.org Basel Institute on Governance .

Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy

Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam