Kazakhstan
News and blog
New publication: informal governance and corruption in Kazakhstan
If you are interested in the links between informal governance and corruption, you'll want to read this new publication on Human resource management practices of anti corruption mechanisms within informal networks. It is by Maral Muratbekova-Touron and Tolganay Umbetalijeva, our partners in a current research project on Informal Governance and Corruption funded by DFID through its Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme. The article deals with how corruption in procurement in Kazakhstan can be understood in similar terms as human resource management practices, but applied to informal networks of powerful interests. You'll find this publication and many more on our Informal Governance website.
Patterns of informality: A novel approach to understanding failing anti-corruption methods
In the context of a multi-centre research project, the Institute and its partners seek to map the manner in which informality is associated with the resilience of corruption. In this innovative project, researchers shift the focus away from analysing the implementation of formal legal frameworks, regulations and policies to concentrate on informal actions and practices that may be effectively taken into consideration where conventional anti-corruption interventions have failed. For this purpose dedicated local researchers are conducting fieldwork in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda studying patterns of informality that are linked to high corruption levels and associated with the poor performance of conventional anti-corruption approaches. Amongst potential factors assessed in this context are the role of electoral processes in heightening corruption risks, the role of informal networks based on kinship, ethnicity as well as opportunistic considerations as well as the role that informality may play or not in two "success stories" namely Rwanda and Georgia.
Basel Institute’s Public Governance division to lead corruption research projects in East Africa and post-Soviet countries
The Basel Institute has been awarded two new research grants; one by the British Academy as part of its GBP 4 million global anti-corruption research scheme in partnership with the Department for International Development DFID in the context of DFID’s Anti-Corruption Evidence 'ACE' Research Programme; the second by DFID’s East Africa Research Fund EARF . The BA grant will support a 24-month research project titled Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms. Under the leadership of the Basel Institute’s Head of Governance Research, Dr Claudia Baez Camargo, and in close collaboration with Professor Alena Ledeneva from University College London and Dr Scott Newton from SOAS University of London this research project proposes to adopt a bottom-up perspective to understand the role that informality plays in fuelling corruption and stifling anti-corruption policies. By suggesting this emphasis on informality, the project seeks to shift away from the more commonly held perspective of viewing endemic corruption as a collective action problem and prescribing the strengthening of formal mechanisms top-down. Through the application of a comparative research design, the research will thus test the impact of informality on corruption and anti-corruption within a wider set of countries in East Africa Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda and the former Soviet Union Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia . A second grant, by DFID’s EARF, provides funding for an 18-month research study on “Corruption, Social Norms and Values in East Africa.” The project will also be led by Dr Claudia Baez Camargo in close cooperation with a number of local researchers in the target countries in East Africa Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda . In order to gain a better understanding of how endemic corruption “works” from the perspective of the affected populations themselves, this research project focuses on petty corruption, and in doing so intends to: understand social norms and mental models associated with the propensity of officials to ask for, accept or reject bribes; and that of citizens to offer, concede, resist and report bribery in daily interactions; understand the factors including social norms, habits, emotions, mental biases, sense of agency which influence these; and identify further evidence gaps and consider implications for anti-corruption interventions in the three concerned countries.
ICAR hosts International Experts Workshop on Returning Stolen Assets
On 24-25 October 2013, in coordination with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the International Centre for Asset Recovery organised and hosted a two-day workshop on the topic of "Returning Stolen Assets." The workshop took place in Küsnacht Zürich , Switzerland. The workshop is the first in a series of workshops focusing on the return of stolen assets. More than 30 participants from requesting and requested countries from around the world attended this year’s workshop with the aim to share and discuss their experiences with mechanisms applied in the repatriation of stolen assets that have successfully been traced and recovered. Presentations and discussions focused on past experiences and future considerations for increasingly closing the gaps between international standards and current practices. Key issues discussed in this context included, notably, transparency, end use, and the role of different stakeholder groups. As a background document to the workshop, a report was prepared on four asset recovery case studies in Peru, Nigeria, Kazakhstan and Angola. View the workshop agenda here.
Publications
Working Paper 38: Cryptocurrencies in Asia and beyond: law, regulation and enforcement
The crypto industry has exploded in recent years, and authorities in different countries have been reacting in very different ways. Some have banned cryptocurrencies, while others are embracing them to varying degrees. Some are working hard to align their anti-money laundering regulations with FATF standards, while others are turning a blind eye. A few countries have confiscated huge quantities of crypto assets linked to crime and money laundering. Others are at square one in terms of enforcement, risking becoming a hub for crypto crime and money laundering and posing a serious vulnerability in the world’s financial system.
This Working Paper draws on a detailed analysis of how selected countries are addressing legal, regulatory and enforcement issues around cryptocurrencies and other virtual assets. The analysis is focused on Asia, but set in the context of global trends in crypto law, regulation and enforcement. It explores critical questions that will shape policies around virtual assets at the corporate, national and international levels:
- What is working in terms of crypto regulation and enforcement?
- What are the implications of different policy choices on crypto assets – for the industry, for the countries themselves and for global financial integrity as a whole?
- What would the crypto wave possibly bring next?
The Paper also highlights broader developments needed to bring light and clarity to laws, policies and practices around the crypto industry, such as collaboration between both market players and governments.
Jurisdictions touched upon in this Working Paper alphabetically include Bhutan, Central African Republic, El Salvador, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the Philippines, the People’s Republic of China, Thailand, Ukraine and Vietnam.
A list of key terms and abbreviations have been prepared in the Annex to this Working Paper for the readers’ easy reference.
About this Working Paper
This Working Paper is a collaboration between Dorothy Siron, Co-Managing Partner, Zhong Lun Law Firm LLP and Federico Paesano, Senior Financial Investigation Specialist, Basel Institute on Governance.
Dorothy Siron provided the bulk of the analysis and discussion, while Federico Paesano provided a selection of case studies and was co-author of the seven recommendations contained in section 4. The collaboration was facilitated by the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, an independent, non-partisan global centre that shapes and advances financial crime litigation practices for the future.
The publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform eterna as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: 10.12685/bigwp.2022.38.1-69.
It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
Disclaimer: This Working Paper does not, and is not intended to, constitute and/or substitute legal or other professional advice. The content of this Working Paper is updated as of 4 May 2022 and is intended for general informational purposes only. No representations have been made as to its accuracy and completeness. You should seek independent legal or other professional advice before acting or relying on any of the information contained herein.
Insider’s corruption versus outsider’s ethicality? Individual responses to conflicting institutional logics
This article arises from the work of the Basel Institute’s Public Governance team on informal governance. It was produced by research partners at the ESCP Business School (Paris) and the EDC Paris Business School (Courbevoie), France.
Abstract
In this article, we seek to understand whether and to what extent the sense of belonging to a powerful network affects individual decision-making in terms of ethicality with regard to a corrupt situation. We study the behaviour of insiders (individuals who belong to a power network, i.e. a network of individuals connected by interpersonal relationships to a person in a position of power) and outsiders in a corrupt versus non-corrupt environments using the theoretical frameworks of institutional logics and informal networks. Our hypotheses were tested with the help of a vignette-based experiment with 464 participants from countries considered as corrupt (Kazakhstan and Russia) and non-corrupt (UK and USA).
About this research
This research was funded by the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the British Academy through the British Academy/DFID Anti-Corruption Evidence Program. However, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the British Academy or DFID.
For more information on the wider project and to download other country findings, see the Basel Institute’s Informal Governance website.
Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms in Kazakhstan
This Kazakhstan country report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy.
The project has identified informal practices in selected countries in order to establish their general and specific features in comparative analysis; assess their impact based on the functions they perform in their respective economies and indicate the extent to which they fuel corruption and stifle anticorruption policies.
The comparative research design involves seven countries from two geopolitical groups East Africa and Post-Soviet countries as follows:
- East Africa: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda
- Post-Soviet countries: Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia
The goal of the research is to produce evidence for the relevance of informality in support of the ‘localisation’ of anticorruption strategies and promoting the development of a new generation of policies that may harness the transformative potential of local patterns of informality.
See the research findings on the Basel Institute’s Informal Governance website.
Working Paper 24: It takes two to tango. Decision-making processes on asset return
This Working Paper presents findings from a research project that sought to better understand decision-making processes on the return of illegally obtained assets using the examples of past cases of returning assets that had been stolen from Kazakhstan, Peru and the Philippines. While previous papers on the subject of returning stolen assets and end-use of returned assets were based on third-party and desk research, the research feeding into this working paper is based on first-hand accounts collected through semi-structured interviews with key decision makers involved in these cases in the concerned states.
The key objective of the research was to better understand the motivations, considerations and processes that led to the decisions on how and for what purpose to use returned assets. In this context, the report in particular looks at a question often debated in asset recovery circles, namely whether there may be a power imbalance between requesting and requested states in these processes despite the fact that requesting states are legally empowered through the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).
The potential existence of such a power imbalance has in the past often given rise to concern, as it is perceived to potentially compromise the fundamental principles of asset return of UNCAC and the sovereignty of the concerned states.
About this Working Paper
This paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform eterna as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: 10.12685/bigwp.2017.24.1-28.
Returning Stolen Assets - Learning from past practice
Before the adoption of UNCAC, there was no policy or international legal framework guiding the disposal and monitoring of repatriated assets. As a result, there were no globally accepted rules to follow when repatriating confiscated assets to requesting countries.
Even after the adoption of UNCAC, global practice regarding the disposal of repatriated assets remains unclear. Indeed Article 57 (5) of UNCAC does not provide clear guidance in relation to the final disposal of confiscated assets.
The selected case studies in Peru, Nigeria, Kazakhstan and Angola explore the proactive and innovative practice of Switzerland in the past decade in recovering, repatriating and monitoring stolen assets.
These four cases, which are different from various aspects, in particular the types of the mechanism of monitoring, are insightful and yield some important lessons. The lessons drawn in the respective cases highlight the successes achieved as well as some challenges encountered. The Swiss experience has influenced reflection on existing policies and legislation regarding the disposal and monitoring of repatriated assets, including in the context of the introduction by the Federal Council of the Restitution of Illicit Assets Act (RIAA 2011) and, in May 2013, the opening of a consultation procedure on the draft of a new federal act on the freezing and restitution of potentates’ assets.
This selection of case studies has been drafted as background document to the two-day workshop on Returning Stolen Assets, organised by the Basel Institute on Governance’s International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) in collaboration with the Directorate for Public International Law of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA/DPIL) in October 2013 in Küsnacht/Zürich, Switzerland.