Ukraine
News and blog
Operational credibility is a strategic asset in the defence industry. What does that mean for Ukraine and its partners?
Europe’s defence sector is changing fast. More money, political attention and international partnerships are flowing into the industry. At the same time, defence companies face growing pressure to show not just what they produce, but how they operate. In this blog, Yuliia Brusko explores why transparency and operational credibility are becoming more important – especially for Ukraine’s wartime-built defence industry. The article builds on the Basel Institute’s ongoing work in Ukraine, including with defence-sector stakeholders on governance, integrity and operational resilience under wartime conditions. Defence companies are entering a new era of scrutiny European defence companies are attracting unprecedented levels of capital, political attention and strategic relevance. Yet alongside this growth comes a level of external scrutiny many firms were never built for. A recent public dispute involving Czech defence company Czechoslovak Group CSG illustrates this shift. A report published by Hunterbrook Media questioned aspects of CSG’s production claims, business model and corporate structure. Among other issues, the report raised questions about the transparency of certain ownership and subsidiary structures, the company’s reliance on intermediary and external procurement arrangements, and the extent to which publicly communicated production and business claims could be independently substantiated by external actors. While the company strongly rejected the allegations, the case reveals a broader structural change: the increasing demand for operational verifiability. In the booming defence industry, investors, procurement actors and international partners are no longer relying on growth narratives or high-level political positioning. Increasingly, they are trying to independently verify how companies actually operate, including: Where key dependencies sit How production is organised Whether public claims align with realities This shift is partly driven by the changing structure of the defence market itself. Alongside traditional defence primes, the sector now includes rapidly scaling private manufacturers, drone producers and venture-backed technology firms. Many are entering international financing and export ecosystems that expect a level of operational accountability historically uncommon in parts of the defence sector. Bridging wartime pragmatism and market expectations in Ukraine This demand for clarity creates a unique challenge for Ukraine’s defence industry. Developed under wartime conditions, Ukrainian companies have prioritised speed, adaptability and survivability over externally defensible corporate structures. Distributed manufacturing, fragmented supply chains and parallel operational entities are practical wartime adaptations, not signs of weak governance. However, as the sector seeks deeper integration with European partners, these same features can create friction. Documentation and traceability systems built under the urgency of survival often struggle to meet the requirements of international financing and export ecosystems. The problem is not necessarily the complexity or the inherent opacity of these arrangements; it is the inability to credibly explain and defend them to external stakeholders who can no longer rely on informal trust alone. Operational credibility is becoming a strategic requirement As scrutiny becomes more operational, companies are increasingly assessed not only on what they produce, but on whether their operational realities can withstand external examination. When structures are too opaque to confidently assess, perceived risk can outweigh strategic value. This creates pressure not only for Ukrainian manufacturers, but also for European defence companies navigating a rapidly changing market. For those seeking long-term integration into international financing, procurement and partnership ecosystems, the ability to defend operational realities is becoming a core business capability. A shift from trust-based networks to verifiable systems The transition from relatively closed government and industry networks toward a more financialised and internationally interconnected market is reshaping how defence companies are assessed. Shifting to this next step is crucial as deftech companies move from niche producers to systemically important security providers. As their technology increasingly moves independently from the large defense primes, the obvious question arises of “going it alone.” While technologically, the choice is obvious, providing sufficient assurance for direct competitive government procurements will require solid systems. The challenge is not eliminating operational complexity or wartime opacity. In many cases, these are unavoidable features of how modern defence industries function under pressure. The challenge is whether companies can credibly explain and defend those realities once they enter ecosystems built around external review, institutional accountability and sophisticated due diligence. For many defence companies, this will require the ability to clearly explain aspects like: How production is organised How supplier and partnership structures operate in practice How key decisions are documented under wartime conditions How public production claims can be substantiated when questioned by investors, procurement actors or international partners. This is likely to require more structured approaches to documentation, traceability and internal oversight – not to replicate peacetime bureaucracy, but to ensure that wartime realities can be credibly defended when scrutiny arises. Adaptability alone will no longer be enough In this environment, the ability to combine wartime adaptability with institutional credibility may increasingly determine which companies are able to scale, attract financing and secure long-term positions within international markets. This increases the importance of building credible systems for transparency, documentation, internal oversight and operational accountability in individual companies and across the defence ecosystem. Achieving this is no easy task. It will require sustained cooperation between Ukrainian defence companies, international partners, investors, procurement actors and policymakers – indeed, any actor keen to see Ukraine’s phenomenal defence capabilities more deeply integrated into international markets and partnerships. At the Basel Institute, we are increasingly working directly with Ukrainian defence companies and their associations to strengthen compliance on an individual or collective basis and welcome new partners. The Basel Institute's work on Ukraine's defence integrity is supported by Norway. This blog represents the views of the author only.
Ukraine’s place in Europe’s defence industry: could compliance catalyse integration?
Ukraine is already central to Europe’s security. Its defence manufacturers are increasingly eligible for participation in the rapidly growing EU defence procurements. However, unless Ukraine’s defence manufacturers are able to meet strict EU anti-corruption and ESG standards, they risk being shut out of EU supply chains. Europe needs Ukraine’s battlefield-tested innovation and production capacity, yet compliance gaps and unclear expectations are slowing integration. Juhani Grossmann, who leads the Basel Institute’s anti-corruption programme in Ukraine, explains how joint actions to overcome compliance barriers can help secure Ukraine’s place in Europe’s defence ecosystem and strengthen our collective security. Ukraine’s central role in EU defence The last three and a half years have been hard fought in Ukraine. Ukrainian resilience on the battlefield is legendary. The unparalleled military support from Ukraine’s allies, fused with its own relentless technical innovation, have forged bonds that could define Europe’s emerging security infrastructure. Daring political decisions by Ukraine and its allies have hastened this integration. Among them: the European Union has adopted the Security Action For Europe SAFE mechanism, using its combined fiscal firepower to raise low-cost loans on capital markets to encourage joint military procurement. SAFE explicitly includes Ukrainian firms in its stringent corporate and sourcing geographical origin requirements, which are designed to stimulate a native European defence industry. This recognises both Ukraine’s ongoing contribution to Europe’s security and the value of the country’s combat-driven technical innovations. From this angle, Ukraine’s defence industry is now even more critical to the EU than the UK, historically the continent’s dominant player. Europe is vulnerable – but can’t meet its demand for defence hardware The United States’ interest in taking responsibility for European and global security is waning, while Russia continues to probe Europe’s hard and soft defences. Feeling justifiably vulnerable, European nations have therefore committed to a huge increase in defence spending, which could reach EUR 2 trillion over the next five years. Yet EU defence industry leaders struggle to manufacture defence equipment in sufficient quality and quantity to meet the unprecedented demand and lack the battlefield-tested innovations that are at the core of Ukraine’s industry. Ukraine could help meet demand for military equipment Partly due to the above dynamics, deep public debates are taking place in Ukraine about lifting a de facto ban on the export of military goods in place since the full-scale invasion. The government is establishing defence production offices in Berlin and Copenhagen to facilitate limited export. This sounds counterintuitive, considering the devastating shortage of materiel at the front. Yet the truth is: Ukraine’s military is simply unable to afford all the weaponry that its manufacturers can deliver. So, the economic argument for export is strong: Selling excess capacity for a profit could generate significant revenue. That revenue could be used for economies of scale in production as well as for research and development. The resulting taxes would allow the state to increase the procurement of materiel for its own troops. In a confirmation of the compelling market forces, Ukrainian drone manufacturers have started investments in Europe to set up production outside of Ukraine. They certainly have products that would be marketable: their innovation has resulted in weekly software updates and continued hardware improvements. The more traditional howitzers, tanks and armoured personnel carriers are cost competitive and highly scalable. Battlefield command and control software is reported to be top notch. What could derail Ukraine’s integration in EU defence markets On the surface, the pieces of the puzzle of European defence are aligning neatly. But one major obstacle needs to be cleared for a healthy and thriving trade: Ukrainian defence manufacturers must meet EU standards on anti-corruption compliance and related environmental, social and governance ESG matters. These include issues such as sustainable sourcing of aviation fuel, employee protections and human rights across the supply chain, as well as good governance of these topics. They also include regulations and standards on integrity and anti-corruption. The defence sector globally is struggling to meet many of these requirements. And Ukraine’s fast-growing innovators have understandably not prioritised such matters over the wartime need to deliver at speed. Without a rapid move to address this shortfall, Ukraine’s innovators could be shut out from European markets. The EU defence industry – and its citizens – would in turn be deprived of crucial expertise, leaving all allies weaker and poorer. Temptations would mount to soften standards, as is already the case with fiscal probity requirements when it pertains to military spending. That would be a mistake for both Ukraine and its European allies. Instead, overcoming these challenges could be a boost for both the EU and the Ukrainian defence industry and further cement their partnership. Robust internal controls bring many benefits The measures required to attain EU standards on anti-corruption compliance and related ESG topics are no doubt arduous. Solid internal control systems, which can produce verifiable data, will need to be established. But that brings solid benefits. Information from internal control systems will help to convince customers that the products they are literally entrusting their lives to are reliable, safe and effective. It will provide the basis for ESG reporting in future. And while the effectiveness of Ukraine’s defence systems is convincingly demonstrated through frontline usage, as its defence industry matures, it could greatly benefit from the efficiencies that robust internal control systems bring. Challenges meeting EU regulations European defence firms are eager to work with Ukrainian partners, yet are finding it difficult to meet their own regulatory obligations at the same time. We see several reasons for this: Sourcing of components is swift, creative and results driven. Without control systems, companies might struggle to verifiably certify their ability to meet the SAFE requirement that 65 percent of the weapon’s value must originate from EU/EEA/EFTA member states or Ukraine. Corporate ownership structures in Ukraine can be challenging for due diligence – particularly when it comes to establishing ultimate beneficial owners of companies. There is a lack of consensus on what good anti-corruption and ethics policy implementation looks like. This leaves Ukrainian partners unsure of the priorities, direction and speed of any required internal reforms. Track and trace measures are insufficiently robust. This makes it hard to reliably avoid sanctions violations in the procurement of components and to ensure environmentally sustainable sourcing of raw materials. Wartime lack of physical access to sites makes traditional verification mechanisms impossible. These obstacles are formidable and have the potential to threaten otherwise promising partnerships. There is a joint path forward Thankfully, we see a strong desire on both sides to navigate a path through these obstacles. Reforms are progressing fast. Ukrainian Defence Industry, the holding company for the majority of state-owned defence manufacturers, has made impressive strides in adopting reforms at the top level. It is gradually cascading these down to the 50+ companies under its purview, including the producers of such notable products as the Lyutii drone, the Neptune subsonic cruise missile , the Bohdana howitzer and the Stugna / Skif anti-tank missile. While a long road remains to reform these highly traditional producers, the political will and technical capacity at the top are formidable. Anti-corruption policies are being implemented. The more established private manufacturers are increasingly adopting and publicising ethics and anti-corruption policies. They are also implementing and developing channels for reporting violations of integrity standards, and organising contractual activities based on ethical and compliance requirements. Engagement is strengthening. European manufacturers, who act as both suppliers and potential customers, are keen to engage more closely with their existing or potential Ukrainian partners to smooth the compliance obstacles as their relationships develop. These manufacturers are also keen to bolster their own contextual understanding of the operating environment in Ukraine, allowing them to manage the reputational and legal risks more professionally. Corruption is being investigated and prosecuted. Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau NABU and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office SAPO are making significant headway in pursuing officials and company representatives who are willing to use criminal behaviour, including corruption, to personally benefit from wartime deprivations. Risk prevention measures are underway. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention NACP is leading the process of conducting a comprehensive risk assessment in the defence sector. International support is there. Increasingly, Ukrainian and international policy and advisory supporters are engaging in the sector. This includes the International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct for the Aerospace and Defence Industry IFBEC , NATO’s Building Integrity programme and Norway’s Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector CIDS . The Basel Institute on Governance has recently commenced efforts in this space through funding from Norway. Together, these efforts have the potential to make significant progress in overcoming obstacles. How to accelerate progress While progress is happening, it is still insufficient given the urgency of the security situation in Europe. That is why we propose the following five catalysts: Set clear compliance requirements. EU member states at the forefront of defence procurement should spell out their internal control and anti-corruption requirements in plain and detailed terms. This would enable Ukrainian firms to participate in projects, either in collaboration with EU partners or independently. Providing early support and education would help potential Ukrainian partners meet these standards quicker. Improve implementation and verification systems. Industry associations should strengthen their anti-corruption standards and/or guidance by creating clear systems for implementation, verification and measurement. Allow time to comply. Companies should share their subcontracting compliance requirements with prospective partners well ahead of procurement deadlines, and work with them to build the systems needed to meet these standards. Share risk insights. Independent corruption risk assessment findings in the defence manufacturing sector, in both Europe and Ukraine, should be shared widely within the professional community. Collective integrity standards. Private manufacturers in Ukraine should create joint anti-corruption standards, ideally through a Collective Action approach – i.e. involving all relevant stakeholders working together in a trust-based environment over a sustained period of time. This would help stop individual companies using corrupt practices while others play fair, and reduce compliance costs for individual companies. At the Basel Institute we are proud to continue and expand our work in this space with the generous support of Norway. We welcome partners to join these efforts and help ensure Ukraine’s defence innovation becomes a permanent pillar of Europe’s security.
Strengthening integrity in Ukraine’s natural resources, energy and defence sectors with Norway’s support
We are delighted to announce a new grant that will enable the Basel Institute on Governance to continue and expand its support to Ukraine on integrity and accountability. Through the Government of Norway's Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, the Basel Institute will work from 2025 to 2028 to promote transparency and accountability in three strategically vital sectors: Natural resources: Tackling corruption risks in forestry and the critical minerals sector, building on our long-standing work to combat corruption in Ukraine’s forestry industry and the expertise of our wider Green Corruption programme. Energy: Supporting transparency and accountability in energy-related enterprises. In the first year, this will begin with our collaboration with the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine Gas TSO , a vital state-owned enterprise with which we recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a comprehensive anti-corruption compliance system. Defence industries: Strengthening compliance and integrity systems in defence manufacturers as they produce vital materiel for Ukraine’s defence and integrate with Europe’s broader security architecture. This builds on our ongoing partnership with Ukraine Defense Industries UkrOboronProm or UOP . Strengthening integrity where it matters most This programme is significant because natural resources, energy and defence are at the heart of Ukraine’s resilience and recovery. They are essential for the country’s security, economic stability and EU integration – yet also among the most vulnerable to corruption. Weak governance in these sectors risks undermining resilience, slowing reconstruction and eroding donor confidence. The Government of Norway recognises that “combating corruption and building strong institutions are central” to achieving the goals of its comprehensive Nansen Support Programme, which aims to “help secure a safe, free and independent Ukraine, strengthen vital state functions and reduce human suffering”. Like the Basel Institute, our partners in Norway acknowledge Ukraine’s progress in tackling corruption and the strong commitment of Ukrainian civil society and the public to building robust anti-corruption institutions. Sustaining Ukraine’s path to resilience Jorun Nossum, Director of Norad’s Department for the Nansen Support Programme, said: We are very pleased to be able to continue our partnership with Basel Institute on Governance in working to prevent corruption in sectors central to Ukraine’s resistance and reforms. Juhani Grossmann, who leads the Basel Institute’s work in Ukraine and the opening of our new office in Kyiv, commented: The support of Norway allows us to boost our integrity-building partnerships in Ukraine for the long term at a time when reliability is especially crucial. The three priority areas have been carefully selected to reflect both Ukraine's immediate needs and the desire for a sustainable recovery. Our natural resource partnerships will seek to ensure Ukraine’s people derive the maximum benefit from its environment and natural resources. Our energy partnerships will help build trustworthy energy partners as Ukraine integrates into European energy markets. Our defence partnerships are designed to enable Ukraine’s manufacturers to reap the full benefits for Ukraine’s security from their technical prowess. Enhanced and more compliant corporate structures will unlock Ukraine’s full potential to contribute to Europe’s emerging security infrastructure. A decade of partnership with Ukraine As featured in the Basel Institute’s Annual Report 2024, we have been engaged in Ukraine for over a decade, supporting both corruption prevention and enforcement. On the prevention side, our work since 2013 has included Collective Action and compliance initiatives in government permitting and corporate governance. We have also advised on the establishment of the Business Ombudsman, provided guidance to the Ukrainian Road Authority and supported independent commissions tasked with recruiting leaders of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Following the full-scale invasion in 2022, we significantly expanded our anti-corruption support, recognising it as both a contribution to Ukraine’s long-term European integration and to its short-term wartime resilience. With significant funding from Switzerland and contributions from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and NEFCO, we have helped Ukrainian authorities and state-owned enterprises ensure the integrity of the wartime economy and reconstruction efforts. Priority areas have included restoration, transport and natural resources.
Mitigating corruption risks in Ukraine's restoration: new report
Today, the Basel Institute on Governance jointly published a report with Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention and State Audit Service on corruption risks in Ukraine's civil infrastructure restoration efforts. With damage from the Russian aggression estimated to exceed EUR 500 billion, safeguarding state and foreign donor investments in restoration projects is imperative. The report highlights 10 key priority risks and suggests mitigation measures. These cover areas such as establishing clear prioritisation criteria for projects, improving public procurement processes and strengthening oversight for construction projects. The report, Assessment of corruption risks in the construction, reconstruction and renovation of civilian infrastructure of Ukraine , is available here in Ukrainian on the NACP website. The Basel Institute and our Kyiv-based team contributed to its development with the support of Switzerland. The launch event brought together key stakeholders in the restoration process, including Members of Parliament, representatives of the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, the State Agency for Restoration and Development of Infrastructure of Ukraine, the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, the Antimonopoly Committee, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, as well as representatives of local self-government and the private sector. Juhani Grossmann, who leads the Basel Institute's support to Ukraine on anti-corruption, delivered introductory remarks highlighting the centrality of a robust and independent anti-corruption infrastructure to safeguard restoration funds. These are found below: Dear colleagues, dear friends, It is a pleasure to be with you today and discuss this crucial topic: restoring Ukraine's infrastructure and services efficiently and transparently, making the best use of limited funds. Allow me to start by acknowledging the exceptionally challenging circumstances you operate under and my appreciation for your continued bravery in the light of seemingly impossible obstacles. As members of the European family, your sacrifices made at the front are the investment in our collective European security. You are protecting the family, a fact which we have to treat with respect. It is my ardent hope that we will be able to honour these sacrifices by jointly building a Ukrainian future that makes today’s deprivations worthwhile. Family members support each other, and so we at the Basel Institute seek to support you. A top priority for us is to provide the tools you need in the face of unprecedented challenges. Those of us not in the military space provide support to the extent of our own capacity. For us at the Basel Institute, that means supporting your efforts to combat corruption – an enemy you have been fighting for decades, and an enemy that continues to have the potential to threaten your ability to mount an effective defence and restoration of your country today. Corruption is such a complicated topic: most of us just want to wish it away, like a bad dream, but unfortunately, it continues to be a reality. That does not mean it is stagnant. Like any enemy, it adapts, mutates, strengthens or weakens, depending on how we treat it. Ukraine’s relentless fight against corruption over the last decade has meant that you, in turn, have been able to hone your anti-corruption weapons. Conceptually similar to your relentless military innovation, you have step by step built your anti-corruption arsenal to a degree where Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure – consisting of specialised agencies, decentralised corruption prevention officers, robust civil society and independent media – met some of the highest global standards and often exceeded that of Western counterparts. There is a dedicated international standard about the independence of anti-corruption agencies, called the Jakarta Principles. This highlights the importance of ensuring independence in the appointment of the leadership, continuity in the agencies’ work and budgetary autonomy, as well as protecting employees from malicious civil and criminal proceedings. I don't say this lightly: when I travel around the world to the countries with which I work, and tell them about the fact that you continue to robustly pursue corruption during a full-scale war, my colleagues tell me they wish they had your anti-corruption infrastructure. We understand that this anti-corruption infrastructure is not something that was achieved easily. Rather, you had to fight for every law to remain intact, strengthen every regulation repeatedly to address residual risk, build and protect every case against obstacles, shepherd every risk assessment to the mitigation stage and then negotiate, argue, cajole and convince opponents to have these mitigation measures implemented. I know how carefully you considered the recruitment of every detective, analyst, prosecutor and judge. And the resulting system has been impressive – a national treasure. You should be proud of it, as should all Ukrainian citizens and leaders alike. We have certainly been privileged to be associated with it. The value of this anti-corruption infrastructure to Ukraine is not only sentimental. It is also of crucial importance as a counter-message to those who say – often without any personal experience or understanding of the issue – that any money or resources sent to Ukraine will only fuel corruption. It is also a crucial counter-message to russian propaganda which loves to portray Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt. You, the anti-corruption institutions, helped us build the arguments against these sceptics: How can Ukraine be hopeless, we argue, if it has managed to decrease corruption perceptions by 5 points between 2019 and this year, showing one of the best results in the region? How can Ukraine be hopeless if it manages to investigate, arrest and convict high-level corrupt officials? How can Ukraine be hopeless if the maturity of its anti-corruption institutions, as recently assessed by the OECD, surpasses many of those in OECD member countries? How can Ukraine be hopeless if it has one of the most transparent public procurement systems? How can it be hopeless if its public service digitalisation has drastically decreased opportunities for rent-seeking by bureaucrats? How can Ukraine’s restoration be hopeless if it has as sophisticated a corruption risk analysis as the one we are presenting today? These are real-life arguments that result in real-life financial, political and military support because they confirm your responsible stewardship of the support you receive. They have allowed us to say that Ukraine is not a corrupt country; it is a country that fights corruption. To those of you in the anti-corruption community: thank you for your hard work over the last 12 years to build and sustain this anti-corruption infrastructure against extraordinary odds. We understand that this week’s efforts have changed the landscape drastically, but fighting corruption remains as important as ever. Your work has been inspiring us, and we will continue to support Ukraine’s anti-corruption aspirations to safeguard this essential dimension of your national defence and restoration.
Five Ukrainian anti-corruption practitioners certified as national trainers
Five practitioners from Ukraine’s leading anti-corruption institutions have been certified as national trainers in financial investigations and asset recovery following their successful completion of the Train-the-Trainer programme of our International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR . The group includes Andrii Kasian, Rostyslav Batih and Serhii Podhorets from the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office SAPO , Oleksii Geiko from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine NABU and Oleksii Kravchuk from the High Anti-Corruption Court HACC . Congratulations to all. Amid the ongoing full-scale invasion, Ukraine and its international partners continue to invest in long-term solutions to strengthen the fight against corruption. The certification of these trainers marks an important step towards embedding sustainable, practitioner-led training across national anti-corruption institutions. It also brings a valuable secondary impact: as practitioners themselves, the trainers are well placed to promote and apply innovative approaches to investigations and asset recovery within their institutions. Investing in local capacity Across four financial investigation and asset recovery workshops, which began in June 2024, the newly certified trainers received close mentoring from our ICAR training team. During the process, they gradually progressed from co-facilitators to fully independent trainers. In the final workshop, they successfully delivered the programme to 25 peers from their own institutions. This brings the total number of anti-corruption practitioners trained during the programme to 102. With certification now complete, the newly qualified trainers are expected to lead further sessions in the coming months. Practical, immersive and localised ICAR's methodology is built around realistic case simulations that mirror the complexity of actual financial investigations. Participants analyse documents, follow leads and justify evidence requests from foreign counterparts. This enables them to develop the mindset and skills needed to tackle real cases. A key aim of the Train-the-Trainer programme was to ensure this approach could be effectively localised and delivered by Ukrainian professionals. When taught by national practitioners who understand the legal and institutional context, the methodology becomes even more relevant and impactful. One participant from the final workshop described the training as “a chance to piece together knowledge like a puzzle and sharpen judgement like a diamond being polished”. Another commented: It was probably the best and most practical training I’ve attended in recent years. From training to practice: dual impact Beyond their new role, the certified trainers are experienced practitioners embedded in key anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine. This dual role enables them to reinforce training messages through daily casework and to champion innovative practices from within. All trainers noted that they are currently testing and promoting new tools, including standalone money laundering prosecutions, the use of circumstantial evidence and a "follow the money" approach that reduces reliance on direct proof of financial crimes like bribery. One trainer reflected that the sessions provided: “structured knowledge of money laundering that I used in one of my cases”. They also noted the training offered clear guidance to work through lengthy civil confiscation materials, which come in constantly. Beyond improving casework, the opportunity to train others was described as a chance to test and discuss ideas, receive additional knowledge of the subject and valuable points of view from other specialists in the same field of work. Now equipped to deliver training, and with further workshops planned, they are bridging training and practice. Their work is helping to embed good practices in their institutions and shape how complex financial crime cases are tackled in Ukraine. About the training and the Basel Institute’s wider support to Ukraine The ICAR Train-the-Trainer programme was supported by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation through the Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Support Project ACARSU . The final workshop, held on 26–30 May 2025, received additional financial and logistical support from the US Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. More broadly, the Basel Institute on Governance has supported Ukraine’s anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts since 2014. Our holistic programme includes: Helping government ministries, agencies and state-owned enterprises to prevent corruption in critical sectors related to reconstruction, infrastructure and natural resources. Assisting with transnational corruption investigations and the recovery of assets from abroad. Working with investors and contractors to minimise integrity risks in construction and development cooperation projects. This programme of work is carried out by a combination of a local team based in Kyiv and Basel Institute staff who travel regularly to Ukraine.
Publications
Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions
How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?
Weak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.
Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.
This Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.
About this Quick Guide
You are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
International cooperation in the Migori County corruption case
This Case Study describes how Kenya obtained crucial overseas intelligence in a corruption case through the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre, leading to the recovery of USD 1.8 million in assets for the Kenyan people.
About this Case Study
This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, ISSN 2813-3900. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
It is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.
While we have made reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of information provided in this Case Study, neither the authors nor the Basel Institute’s donors and partners assume any responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions.
Back in Action: How the UK is reviving unexplained wealth orders (The Academy Bulletin)
In an article published in the Fall 2025 issue of the Bulletin of the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, Andrew Dornbierer explores the revival of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in the United Kingdom.
Introduced in 2017 as a tool to combat the abuse of UK’s markets to launder criminal proceeds, the UWO mechanism suffered a severe setback in 2020. After only a handful of attempts to use it, a decision by the High Court effectively left it sprawled on the canvas.
In the last year or so, however, the mechanism has slowly started to prove itself. Most recently, the UK’s Serious Fraud Office – in its first use of the UK’s UWO mechanism – secured GBP 1.1 million from the sale of a property belonging to the ex-wife of a convicted fraudster.
This article offers a short history of UWOs in the UK. It examines how, after a turbulent start and subsequent amendments to the mechanism, UWOs are now back to being used by UK authorities to tackle illicit financial flows. If applied responsibly, proportionately and in harmony with established legal rights, unexplained wealth orders promise to be a powerful tool in the UK’s fight to recover criminal assets.
This is the fifth issue of The Academy’s Bulletin. It has been established to transmit the work of Academy Fellows, draw attention to matters of importance to the legal community and provide high-level analysis of cutting-edge issues in global financial crime investigations and litigation. The Basel Institute on Governance acts as Secretariat to the Academy.
Assessment of corruption risks in the construction, reconstruction and renovation of civilian infrastructure of Ukraine
Progress in Ukraine's anti-corruption efforts - July 2025 update
This document takes stock of recent progress (March to June 2025) in strengthening Ukraine’s anti-corruption ecosystem. It builds on a series of previous reports and is published ahead of the fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference, held in Rome 10–11 July 2025.
The report highlights key developments, including in the context of Ukraine’s European integration, and touches on:
- the status of the national Anti-Corruption Strategy;
- the nascent reform of Ukraine’s Asset Recovery and Management Agency;
- the risks related to the selection of members for the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ);
- criminal justice developments, including the first audit of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau;
- the reform of the State Register of Corrupt Officials; and
- considerations in the area of recovery and reconstruction.
This document is a joint publication of Transparency International Ukraine and the Basel Institute on Governance.
Disclaimer: This publication has been produced with the support of Switzerland. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Basel Institute on Governance and TI Ukraine and do not necessarily reflect the views of the development partner.