Corruption risks

New international project targets corruption risks in carbon markets

Carbon markets are meant to help finance forest protection and climate action. Yet too often they are undermined by weak governance, corruption risks and a lack of transparency. Concerns over the credibility of some carbon credits erode trust in a system designed to channel climate finance and support forest-dependent communities. A new international project aims to address these challenges head-on by strengthening governance and anti-corruption safeguards across forest carbon markets. The Basel Institute on Governance is pleased to join this effort as a project partner, contributing its expertise through the Green Corruption programme. A collaborative effort for better carbon market governance The project, Towards Inclusive Governance for Forest Carbon Markets, is led by Transparency International and funded by the UK Government through the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office FCDO Forest Governance, Markets and Climate programme. Running until March 2028, the initiative brings together a consortium including the Basel Institute on Governance, Resource Extraction Monitoring and local Transparency International chapters in focus countries. Together, the partners will work to reduce corruption risks in forest carbon markets and strengthen the integrity of carbon credit systems. The project will focus on three key countries – Indonesia, Ghana and Cameroon – supporting governments, civil society organisations, certifiers, private sector actors and forest-dependent communities to better identify and mitigate corruption risks linked to carbon credit projects. Carbon markets are inherently transnational: credits may be generated in one country, verified in another and purchased in a third. This complexity creates opportunities for corruption networks to exploit regulatory gaps, conflicts of interest and weak oversight mechanisms. The project aims to close those gaps by combining evidence generation, national advocacy and international engagement. Bringing anti-corruption expertise to forest carbon markets The Basel Institute will play a central role through our Green Corruption programme, which focuses on tackling corruption linked to environmental crimes and natural resource governance. Our team is leading the project’s first major output: consolidating available data, gathering evidence to identify typologies of corruption risks in forest carbon markets and developing global, gender-sensitive guidelines to help prevent them. Working closely with partners and national stakeholders, we are leading the organisation of corruption risk identification workshops in Indonesia and Ghana. These workshops will bring together key actors across the carbon market ecosystem to map corruption vulnerabilities in carbon markets systems and identify practical actions to mitigate these risks. The findings will feed into country-specific risk assessments. In parallel, our team is conducting an assessment of global carbon markets governance dynamics and vulnerabilities to corruption. Ultimately national and international assessments will inform the development of global guidelines, which will be designed to strengthen anti-corruption safeguards across carbon markets. These global guidelines will then support advocacy and reform efforts led by Transparency International and its national chapters. We will also contribute to global advocacy efforts by advising international certification bodies and other actors on improving safeguards and governance standards in carbon markets. Dr Amanda Cabrejo le Roux, Deputy Director of the Basel Institute’s Green Corruption programme, said: “Carbon markets hold real promise for forests, communities, and the climate — but promise alone isn't protection. Like any system that moves money at scale, they are vulnerable to those who would bend the rules for personal gain. The first step is a rigorous analysis of corruption risks: mapping scenarios and building clear typologies, through sector-wide workshops and consultations with all key stakeholders. From there, those same actors can work together to develop practical mitigation measures — building a system that is genuinely resilient. That is exactly what this project sets out to do." Part of a wider “green” governance agenda The project aligns with the Basel Institute’s Green Corruption strategy, which increasingly focuses on corruption and governance challenges linked to climate change and the global energy transition. Forest carbon markets involve complex financial flows, transnational actors and high-stakes environmental outcomes, making strong governance and anti-corruption safeguards essential. With years of experience analysing corruption risks in environmental and natural resource sectors and beyond, the Basel Institute is well placed to contribute to this work. By contributing our expertise to the project, we aim to help ensure that carbon markets deliver on their promise: protecting forests, supporting communities and advancing credible climate action. Learn more View the full project overview on the Transparency International website. Interested in corruption and governance in the environmental space? Join the Countering Environmental Corruption Practitioners Forum, a global community of practitioners jointly led by the Basel Institute on Governance, Transparency International, WWF and TRAFFIC.

How stronger borders can create smarter corruption: lessons from one of Europe's most strategic border crossings

When Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007, many believed it would lead to more secure, transparent and less corrupt borders. New regulations, infrastructure modernisation and digitalised customs procedures all followed. European standards and money arrived together. Yet corruption did not disappear at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, the main land crossing between Bulgaria and Türkiye and one of the busiest gateways between Europe and Asia. Instead, it evolved. This is the central finding of a recent article by the Prevention, Research and Innovation team of the Basel Institute on Governance – Dr Jacopo Costa, Dr Claudia Baez Camargo, Noémi Jäger and Dr Saba Kassa – published in the Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance . The article examines how criminal networks, smugglers, businesses and corrupt officials adapted to Bulgaria’s EU integration. It illustrates how corruption behaves like an adaptive ecosystem: when regulations and border control technologies change, corruption changes with them. A border built for opportunity – legal and illegal Border spaces concentrate discretionary power in the hands of customs officers, border guards, inspectors and regulators, while bringing together also traders, transport companies, migrants, smugglers, criminal groups and political actors. Kapitan Andreevo is a particularly instructive case due to its strategic location, with thousands of trucks, travellers and goods passing through the border checkpoint daily. Before Bulgaria’s EU accession, corruption at the checkpoint was already deeply embedded. The 1990s brought economic crisis, shortages of consumer goods, weak state capacity and rapidly expanding informal markets. Smuggling became a profitable survival strategy. Border officials could be bribed to overlook undeclared goods, counterfeit products and tax evasion. Duty-free shops in the "no man's land" between Bulgaria and Türkiye became hubs for smuggling cigarettes, alcohol and petroleum products. Corruption operated at multiple levels: everyday exchanges between traders, drivers and officials, often based on long-standing personal relationships, at the lower level connections between politicians, senior civil servants, business elites and organised crime at the higher level. Smuggling routes required political protection. Profits flowed upward through patronage systems. EU accession changed the rules of the game Bulgaria’s EU accession radically transformed the legal and institutional environment. The country had to align its customs regulations, VAT rules, excise tax systems, phytosanitary standards and border procedures with EU standards – a gradual process requiring significant investment. The reforms affected almost every aspect of border governance. Customs procedures became increasingly digitalised. New systems such as the VAT Information Exchange System VIES and the Excise Movement and Control System EMCS improved cross-border monitoring. Phytosanitary and veterinary inspections became stricter. Migration controls tightened through alignment with Schengen rules and access to systems like the Schengen Information System SIS and international databases of stolen documents and vehicles. Meanwhile, new border control technologies – X-ray machines, scanners, thermal cameras and risk-analysis tools – expanded the state’s capacity to detect illicit activity. From a policy perspective, this appeared to be a modernisation success story. But criminal systems rarely remain static when the environment changes. Corruption did not decline – it adapted The most striking finding is that stronger controls often increase the strategic value of corruption. After EU accession, crossing the border illegally became more difficult, risky and expensive. Corruption became necessary not only to speed up procedures but to bypass sophisticated control and regulatory systems. In other words, modernisation transformed the function of corruption: Criminal actors began targeting specialised procedures, such as food safety inspections, VAT systems, automated license plate recognition, laboratory testing and digital customs controls. VAT fraud and the manipulation of digital systems VAT fraud illustrates this adaptation clearly. Within the EU, exports are often subject to a VAT rate of 0 zero percent, which means companies can reclaim any VAT they have already paid domestically. Criminal actors exploited this through "carousel fraud" schemes involving fictitious transactions chains. At Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, for example, corruption allegedly enabled traders to manipulate customs procedures. One method involved corrupt officials manually entering fake truck registrations into customs systems to simulate border crossings, enabling fraudulent VAT refunds for exports that never occurred. Even more revealing was the manipulation of automated license plate recognition: corrupt actors reportedly disabled automated recognition and manually entered altered plates using Cyrillic characters resembling Latin letters, allowing smugglers to bypass alerts and inspections. This illustrates a pattern seen in many modern corruption systems: digitalisation does not automatically eliminate corruption. Instead, corruption turns towards the technological systems themselves. Food safety, privatisation and rent-seeking EU food safety and phytosanitary regulations created new bottlenecks and forms of discretionary authority. The research describes two recurring manipulation strategies: selective sampling during inspections, where officials took samples only from "clean" sections of shipments; and falsification of laboratory tests to certify unsafe products as compliant. These risks increased after some border functions were outsourced to private companies. At Kapitan Andreevo, food testing, parking operations and vehicle disinfection were privatised. This reform, intended to increase efficiency, allegedly created new opportunities for rent extraction. The controversy surrounding Eurolab 2011, which reportedly obtained monopolistic control over food safety testing under questionable legal arrangements became emblematic of these tensions. The broader implication: privatisation of public functions does not necessarily reduce corruption risks. It can shift them into hybrid public-private arrangements where accountability is weaker and oversight is more fragmented. The rise of “routinised” corruption The study highlights the increased organisation of corruption itself. Today, no single official can independently guarantee a smuggling route. Procedures involve multiple agencies, overlapping inspections and layered oversight. As a result, corruption evolved towards collective coordination. Customs officers, border guards, supervisors, intermediaries and sometimes political actors participate in networks where bribes are pooled and redistributed. These schemes resemble coordinated organisational systems with revenue-sharing mechanisms, internal hierarchies and protection structures rather than isolated rogue actors. This reflects an important conceptual change: border corruption can function as an embedded institutional ecosystem sustained through cooperation, mutual dependence and political protection. Drug trafficking: when corruption becomes too risky Interestingly, corruption is not always the preferred strategy. In drug trafficking, for example, the risks are dramatically higher. Border officials caught facilitating drug trafficking could face severe criminal penalties, including organised crime charges and lengthy prison sentences. As a result, traffickers increasingly invest in sophisticated concealment methods. One example is the "twin trucks" strategy: several nearly identical trucks carrying similar cargo cross the border simultaneously during heavy traffic, with only one of them containing drugs. Since inspection capacity is limited, the probability is high that the "clean" trucks are checked while the drug shipment passes undetected. This shows that corruption and criminality do not always go hand in hand. Sometimes, stronger anti-corruption measures push criminals towards deception and concealment rather than bribery. The bigger lesson: criminal systems are adaptive The case study of the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing is not just about Bulgaria. Policymakers often assume that more technology, controls and regulation will automatically reduce corruption and illicit trade. But criminal systems and corruption adapt. Informal networks reorganise around the vulnerabilities created by reforms. Every regulatory innovation creates new incentives, bottlenecks and opportunities for exploitation. This does not mean reforms are useless. Many EU measures have clearly strengthened border management. However, reforms must be designed with an understanding of adaptive behaviour. Otherwise, states risk producing unintended consequences: stronger incentives for bribery, use of alternative trafficking routes, technological manipulation, new forms of collusion or opaque privatisation structures. I and my co-authors argue for a more integrated approach that combines anti-corruption and anti-crime strategies. We also emphasise the importance of anticipatory governance and foresight-oriented policymaking that try to predict how illicit actors will respond to institutional changes before reforms are implemented. This may be the most important lesson from Kapitan Andreevo. Borders are not static lines defended by static institutions against static threats. They are evolving ecosystems where states, markets, technologies and criminal actors constantly adapt to one another. Learn more Access the full article, “The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession”. Read our Quick Guide 38 to border corruption for a short introduction. Read our Working Paper 58, “Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam” for a related analysis.

How corruption helps drug traffickers adapt to strengthened border enforcement

Corruption at border points remains a pressing global issue, threatening not only border integrity but also the health, safety and security of our societies. It enables illicit trafficking, facilitates organised crime and undermines trust in public institutions. In our Working Paper 58 , Saba Kassa and Jacopo Costa examine how corruption facilitates drug trafficking through the port of Rotterdam. Through in-depth interviews with stakeholders, a review of judicial cases and desk research, the paper shows how trafficking and corruption strategies are changing in response to strengthened enforcement at border spaces. It contributes to the growing body of work that looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive. The Working Paper was written as part of the FALCON Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks project. The research supports efforts to develop more robust and forward-looking approaches to combat corruption and drug trafficking. Read the executive summary below. Unintended consequences of strengthened enforcement This Working Paper examines how corruption facilitates drug trafficking specifically cocaine through the port of Rotterdam, looking at the underlying drivers and strategies involved. Legal trade routes and commercial ports are especially attractive because of the high volumes of cargo, which make it possible to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. The spatial complexity of the port of Rotterdam also makes it difficult to fully secure it against criminal activity. Digging deeper into the facilitating factors of trafficking, the paper finds that, paradoxically, a main driver of rising border corruption is the increased political attention on and resources dedicated to fighting trafficking. Desk research and stakeholder interviews highlight that as authorities deploy new technology to improve detection, traffickers face more obstacles to operating effectively. Having someone on the inside then becomes increasingly important. So, an unintended but important consequence of the strengthened fight against drug trafficking is that corruption becomes even more essential for the operational success of organised crime networks. Customs officials are specifically vulnerable This study focuses specifically on the role of customs. Tasked with monitoring the import and export of goods, customs officers are important actors in the fight against drug trafficking. However, their role also makes them vulnerable: they have crucial knowledge on processes and procedures, access to systems and discretionary power that can be exploited by criminals. The desk research shows that corruption is used strategically to circumvent two important bottlenecks: the container screening and security as cargo enters the port, and the exit of drugs from the port. Traffickers may seek to obtain key information or direct assistance from customs officers. Collusion – coercion – infiltration These corrupt relationships and the emerging networks between members of crime groups and the customs officials are diverse. Some relationships can be characterised by collusion, where customs officials offer their services or are persuaded to cooperate. This collusion may be opportunistic or targeted. Other relationships can be characterised by coercion. Customs officials may be lured by financial reward, but this is accompanied by intimidation or the threat of violence to ensure that the officer cooperates and continues to cooperate. Our research highlights that the boundary between collusion and coercion is often blurred. Beyond collusion and coercion, we also see infiltration, which crosses the boundaries between the criminal, public and private. What emerges is less a matter of individual corruption and more akin to regulatory capture, where the public office position is held by a member of the criminal network. The review of the judicial cases shows that bribes involved in these schemes can amount to millions. To hide and use the illicit gains, traffickers rely on money laundering, disguising its source as legitimate. They often enlist the help of family and friends, a trusted inner circle or professional specialists. They may also hide cash at home or invest it in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad. Adaptive corruption strategies A key finding of our research is that the criminal and corruption strategies used to facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive. The underlying driver of this adaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and high profitability of the crime. This pushes traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in supplying the demand. Corruption strategies adapt in response to new enforcement measures. When control systems are changed and/or strengthened, corruption strategies evolve alongside them. This research identifies some key patterns: Stronger detection efforts increase the incentives for corruption. Evolving systems encourage a similar shift in corruption strategies. Anti-corruption and anti-trafficking measures may change the profile of those most vulnerable to being co-opted. The characteristics of corruption can also evolve, from collusion to coercion, to full infiltration of institutions and systems – with blurred lines in between. Trafficking strategies evolve, too Trafficking strategies are similarly adaptive. There have been increased efforts by the port to combat trafficking through enhanced detection and technology. This was initially reflected by increased drug seizures. But since 2024, drugs seizures have declined. The research findings provide an explanation for this: As detection strengthens, more drug seizures are made. But what may happen, too, is a response to these new measures. As the risk of detection increases, criminals may adapt their trafficking strategies to overcome the additional hurdles, including: changing concealment strategies; and changing modes of transport and trafficking routes, including to ports outside of the Netherlands. Red flags and risk indicators These developments highlight the complexity in understanding the impact of stronger anti-trafficking measures on both corruption and trafficking strategies. Trafficking and corruption are typically measured by detection, for example, by changes in the volume of drug seizures or the number of public officials caught engaging in corruption. But the elephant in the room is that increasingly sophisticated criminal strategies can hide what is really happening. This underscores the need to continuously strengthen our ability to recognise “red flags” of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools and refined risk indicators are critical for understanding how crime and corruption strategies are changing. A holistic understanding and improved foresight The evolving nature of criminal strategies is often likened to a game of chess: enforcement makes a move, and criminal networks adapt. But what now seems to be emerging is more troubling. When barriers to drug trafficking increase while demand remains unchanged, crime and corruption strategies adapt in ways that can deepen their impact on society, leading for example to the hardening of crime and associated violence. This makes anticipating how crime may adapt to changing anti-corruption and anti-trafficking strategies critical. Improved foresight and scenario-building capacities will be vital in order to develop more robust enforcement efforts against drug trafficking and mitigate the negative impact on society. A holistic approach is essential. Addressing corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking requires a broad view of crime that focuses on understanding vulnerabilities, leveraging data and harnessing collaboration. The risk of trafficking routes changing are high, therefore, we must use every tool at our disposal to ensure effective and sustainable enforcement efforts. Learn more Download the full Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam: Drivers, strategies and implications View related online workshop for enforcement and research communities: Red flags at the frontier: detecting and disrupting border corruption in the EU , 23 September 2025 Acknowledgement and disclaimer FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI . The contents of the Working Paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.

How tackling green corruption can help us get ahead in the race to net zero

Juhani Grossmann and Amanda Cabrejo le Roux explain the strategic re-focusing of our Green Corruption programme on energy and climate: What is “green” corruption and why does it matter? Green corruption refers to corruption and other financial crimes and governance failures that harm the environment and hinder global efforts to combat climate change. It’s the reason crimes such as illicit deforestation, mining and wildlife trade continue to be multimillion-dollar illegal industries making organised criminals rich at the expense of our planet and the livelihoods of local communities. Green corruption also diverts crucial investments intended for renewable energy and other climate-related projects. Adapting to humanity’s changing energy needs in a just and sustainable manner are challenging enough. We cannot afford to let corruption undermine these generational challenges. What are some key achievements of the programme so far? We are proud that since its launch in 2018, the Green Corruption programme has contributed to significant strides in tackling corruption affecting the environment. Our programme started with an enforcement focus: applying “follow the money” approaches to environmental crimes like illegal wildlife trade and illegal logging. In practice, that means mentoring and training law enforcement officers of national partner agencies to investigate financial transactions that fuel environmental crimes, including between criminal groups and corrupt facilitators. And ideally, to seize and confiscate illicit profits or assets used in the crimes. That’s the only way to get beyond the low-level perpetrators – such as poachers – to the high-level facilitators and organised crime networks. And the only way to take the profit out of the crime, reducing the incentives to engage in it. At the end of 2024, assets worth around CHF 29.6 million were being targeted in 56 cases directly supported by our advisors. We had quite a few “firsts” – like Uganda’s first ever indictment for tax evasion and money laundering against a wildlife trafficking syndicate, Malawi’s first ever corruption cases related to natural resource crimes, Peru’s confiscation of over CHF 3 million in assets related to forestry and gold trafficking, and Indonesia’s first ever conviction on money laundering in relation to an illegal logging case. Behind the headlines lie many more positive steps towards changing mindsets and the priorities of law enforcement agencies to go after the finances of environmental criminals. Our prevention work rapidly grew as we and our partners realised the chronic under-investment in building systems that strengthen resilience to corruption in the environmental sector. Government agencies and state-owned enterprises in countries as diverse as Indonesia, Malawi, Ukraine and Bolivia have now begun to systematically assess and address corruption risks that are affecting their ability to carry out their important functions of protecting the environment and natural resources. Our prevention specialists supported these in applying our bespoke methodology of assessing and prioritising corruption risks and implementing targeted mitigation measures. We developed a customised internal controls maturity assessment tool to reflect the historic lack of investment in this space, which meant that mainstream assessment tools were insufficiently granular at the first stage of maturity to reflect nuances and chart paths to growth. As result of our partnerships, mitigation measures have been institutionalised in many agencies – for example: in Malawi through the creation of Internal Integrity Committees in environmental agencies; in Ukraine through the empowerment of anti-corruption officers to participate in key decision-making processes; in Ecuador by reducing unsupervised discretion in environmental inspections; in Indonesia in the adoption of conflict of interest regulations in the management of timber sales; and in Peru through the automation and digitalisation of numerous permitting and licensing processes related to the wood value chain. Also pleasing to see are the many collaborations and partnerships that have sprung from our work. In Latin America, for example, forestry officials in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador are now collaborating on protecting the Amazon rainforest through corruption prevention. Still, targeting and preventing corruption tends to be a lonely effort. So, we have established the Countering Environmental Corruption Practitioners Forum together with WWF, TRAFFIC and Transparency International as a support network, and it has now grown to over 800 members and four working groups. There are frequent meetings and collaborations between practitioners dedicated to tackling corruption and improving governance, and those specialised in environmental conservation or climate initiatives. It’s a sign there’s much appetite and energy for action against green corruption Why is now the time to focus on the energy transition? Whatever happens in these volatile times, one thing is certain: we’ll continue to see growing demands for energy transition and climate mitigation and adaptation. The urgency of tackling the energy transition, and the rapid increase in investments from both the public and private sectors, leaves the door wide open to criminals and the corrupt seeking to profit at the expense of investors and donors – as well as the planet. A clear example in this space is the growing geopolitical centrality of critical minerals and rare earths. The rapid rise in demand has been accompanied by particularly fragile governance structures, intense political and economic subsidies, and even warfare. Our experience shows that these are all breeding grounds for corruption. We are therefore prioritising efforts to analyse and mitigate corruption risks in this space in Bolivia, Indonesia and Ukraine. Ensuring that the energy transition is safeguarded from corruption is essential for achieving net-zero goals. As outlined in our Working Paper on good governance and the just transition, corrupt practices can jeopardise renewable energy investments and hinder the development of clean energy infrastructure. Rapidly emerging market-based solutions to stimulate responsible behaviour, such as carbon offsets, are also affected by weak governance systems and opportunities for corruption. The fast-evolving and highly technical nature of these activities only increases this risk. Corruption risks similarly threaten the effectiveness of climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. If funds are embezzled, used fraudulently or diverted to benefit powerful elites, that’s bad for donors and investors. And it’s bad for local communities, many of which are also directly affected by climate change. On the other hand, there are opportunities. Using corruption risk management tools and enhancing enforcement capabilities can help companies and governments to create thriving, profitable supply chains of critical minerals needed for renewable energy facilities, electric vehicles and the like. What does this shift in priorities mean in practice? Through our Green Corruption programme, we are adapting to this evolving landscape by sharpening our focus on transition minerals and the renewable energy sector. We will continue our dual approach of prevention and enforcement, working closely with long-standing partners in Ukraine, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. Some things you might see us doing in the next years: Strengthening transparency and anti-corruption measures in the extraction and trade of lithium, nickel, germanium and other minerals and rare earths essential for the energy transition. Customising financial investigation and asset recovery tools to the specifics of the energy transition. Working with governments, financial institutions and civil society to safeguard energy transition and climate mitigation funds from corruption, fraud and related crimes. We will continue full force our ongoing engagement related to metals gold in particular and the forestry sector, which remain highly strategic. In other areas, such as illegal wildlife trade, fisheries and waste, we will be more discerning, carefully assessing the potential of engagements prior to pursuing them. What impact do we hope to achieve? By applying our expertise to emerging climate and energy challenges, we want to contribute to measurable improvements in the energy transition, environmental conservation, climate change mitigation and equitable economic development. Through these efforts, our Green Corruption programme will continue to play a vital role in ensuring that the green transition is not only sustainable but also just, transparent and a win-win for all: businesses, local communities and society at large – as well as our planet.

How integrity risk assessments can support Indonesian SOEs in reaching their goals

Integrity risk assessments help shine a light on a significant category of threats to the operations or reputation of a private company or state-owned enterprise SOE . They enable these risks to be prioritised and mitigated in a controlled and strategic way. With this in mind, and with the support of USAID INTEGRITAS, we recently conducted a two-day training on integrity risk assessments for Indonesia's state-owned enterprises. A separate three-day training was designed specifically for Perhutani, an SOE that manages forest resources on Java and Madura islands and that is our main SOE partner in Indonesia. An innovative risk assessment methodology Our integrity risk assessment methodology was designed in-house based on our experience in different fields, such as corruption prevention, law enforcement and prosecution. In brief the methodology focuses on: mapping processes inside an organisation; analysing the degree to which they are subject to integrity risks; assessing the severity and impact of the risks by quantifying them; prioritising these risks; and developing mitigation measures to address them. Indonesia’s strategic sectors represented A total of 62 participants from 15 SOEs participated in the two parallel trainings. The SOEs in attendance represent a diverse range of Indonesia’s strategic sectors, including finance Danareksa, Indonesia Financial Group – IFG, Bank Rakyat Indonesia – BRI , energy and infrastructure Perusahaan Listrik Negara – PLN, PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur – SMI , and forestry and plantations PT Perkebunan Nusantara III – PTPN, Pupuk Indonesia, Perhutani . Two SOEs owned by provincial/city governments PT MRT Jakarta and Perumda Air Minum Kota Kupang also joined the event. The training served as an introduction to our integrity risk assessment methodology, highlighting its potential to be used across Indonesia. Feedback highlighed practical value The training received positive feedback: participants found it both engaging and informative, as well as useful for their day-to-day compliance work. It provided valuable insights into assessing and mitigating risks, ultimately contributing to corruption prevention efforts. One participant from an energy-related SOE said: The training is very useful in increasing knowledge of compliance management and also a solid platform for sharing experiences between SOEs in managing and mitigating risks. A participant from a banking SOE also praised the training, stating that it was highly beneficial for enhancing compliance and risk mitigation within her company. They also expressed interest in participating in future sessions and said they hoped to delegate more staff to attend upcoming trainings. The two trainings were made possible through the support of USAID INTEGRITAS. In his opening remarks, INTEGRITAS Agreement Officer’s Representative Ahmad Qisa'i emphasised the consortium's commitment to supporting SOEs in their efforts to prevent corruption in Indonesia. He highlighted that the integrity risk assessment methodology can help SOEs effectively identify and mitigate corruption risks that arise in vulnerable business processes. Qisa'i also reiterated USAID INTEGRITAS' openness to collaborating with a broader range of SOEs to enhance integrity measures, particularly by addressing conflict of interest issues in the hopes of achieving a corruption-free Indonesia.

The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession

Political economy in the weeds: Embracing complexity in anti-corruption work – lessons learned from anti-corruption programme in Malawi