Corruption Prevention and Public Governance

This Working Paper explores the drivers and strategies of corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam, with a specific focus on cocaine trafficking. It looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive.

This document takes stock of recent progress (March to June 2025) in strengthening Ukraine’s anti-corruption ecosystem. It builds on a series of previous reports and is published ahead of the fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference, held in Rome 10–11 July 2025.

The report highlights key developments, including in the context of Ukraine’s European integration, and touches on:

• the status of the national Anti-Corruption Strategy;
• the nascent reform of Ukraine’s Asset Recovery and Management Agency;
• the risks related to the selection of members for the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ);
• criminal justice developments, including the first audit of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau;
• the reform of the State Register of Corrupt Officials; and
• considerations in the area of recovery and reconstruction.

This document is a joint publication of Transparency International Ukraine and the Basel Institute on Governance.

Disclaimer: This publication has been produced with the support of Switzerland. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Basel Institute on Governance and TI Ukraine and do not necessarily reflect the views of the development partner.

This research from the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre highlights that integrating anti-corruption measures within sustainability reporting frameworks can enhance corporate transparency and contribute to reducing corruption risks. However, inconsistent global sustainability standards and enforcement challenges limit the effectiveness of these measures.

The research presents evidence and practice from the development cooperation sector to support practitioners in navigating governance and accountability frameworks in the private sector.

This open-access, peer-reviewed journal article examines the results of a pilot behavioural intervention in Tanzania. The project tested a behavioural anti-corruption intervention to reduce bribery in a hospital. It targeted deeply ingrained social norms while also leveraging the social networks and influence of key staff members.

The research was funded by the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme of the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). It was a collaboration between the Basel Institute on Governance, the UK Behavioural Insights Team, the University of Dar es Salam and the University of Utrecht.

Abstract

Practices of bribery in the delivery of public services become entrenched when they are driven by social norms of reciprocity.

The resulting economies of favours, which are common across diverse geographical regions, are resilient to conventional anti-corruption measures because they are underpinned by strong social pressures.

This article describes the results of a behaviour change intervention to address gift-giving as a form of bribery in a Tanzanian hospital. The intervention utilised environmental cues and a peer-led network approach to deliver messages aimed at disincentivising bribery.

An exit survey of hospital users indicates a reduction of the ‘gift-offering propensity score’, capturing self-declared behaviour, from 23% before implementation of the intervention to 13% afterwards. We find similar changes in the enabling norms score.

Semi-structured interviews with hospital users and health workers further support these findings.

These results suggest that practices and norms around bribery might be changed through a multi-pronged approach that addresses both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ side of bribery.

Why do many countries still struggle with high levels of corruption, in spite of years of investment in anti-corruption programmes and even where the right laws, rules and institutions are in place?

We believe one reason is that anti-corruption laws and policies are too often focused narrowly on individuals, rather than networks of individuals.

In our research, we see repeatedly how high levels of corruption are rarely the result of individual behaviour – some isolated rotten apples transgressing the formal legal order and leading others astray. Rather, corruption more frequently springs from the social norms and group dynamics of well-articulated and resilient informal networks.

And it’s those networks that have much to lose from integrity and ethics. Their behaviour as a group entrenches corruption, and they block attempts at reforms. This quick guide takes a look at what this means and the implications for anti-corruption programming.

About this Quick Guide

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.