Unexplained wealth
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Working Paper sheds fresh light on the sanctions and confiscation debate
As the war in Ukraine intensifies, calls are growing for states to confiscate Russian assets frozen under sanctions and redirect them to provide support to Ukraine. Our latest Working Paper argues that states can and should do this by enhancing the effectiveness and scope of established asset recovery measures – not by introducing new untested mechanisms that risk inviting future legal challenges, defeating the purpose of sanctions and violating the rule of law. Go straight to Working Paper 42: From sanctions to confiscation while upholding the rule of law or read the key takeaways: Executive summary In light of recent world events, political leaders around the world have questioned whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression. Some states have even sought to introduce legislative mechanisms to make it possible to confiscate an asset frozen under sanctions, purely on the basis that the asset has been made subject to a sanction. One state – Canada – has already done so. The intention behind these mechanisms is clear: assets frozen under sanctions could be confiscated and repurposed to provide assistance and compensation to the victims of the sanctioned target. In the context of the Ukraine war, for example, proponents argue that these measures will allow states to permanently confiscate Russian-linked assets under sanction and redirect them to provide support to Ukraine. The debate Should states be able to confiscate sanctioned assets\ purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned? The justifiability and legality of mechanisms such as Canada’s is currently the subject of debate. Two key issues include whether the confiscation of assets in such circumstances: is acceptable in the context of established legal rights and norms; defeats the primary purpose of sanctions as a tool of coercion. Issues of property and due process rights With regards to the first point, the lack of adequate judicial oversight included in such mechanisms, and the fact that these mechanisms aim to permanently deprive sanctioned targets of their assets, raises serious questions surrounding property and due process rights. If such a mechanism was introduced in Europe for example, it is likely to be challenged on the grounds that it violates Protocol 1 Article 1 as well as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. If such mechanisms were also applied to state-linked assets such as sanctioned assets belonging to central banks then this would also raise concerns regarding a possible infringement of domestic and international laws relating to state immunity. Undermining the purpose of sanctions With regards to the second point, permitting the confiscation of sanctioned assets arguably annuls the coercive purpose of sanctions regimes to act as a tool to persuade targets to cease their adverse behaviour. If states are permitted to confiscate sanctioned assets and make it impossible for a target to retrieve their frozen assets then this effectively removes any incentive for the target to change their behaviour. In such cases, rather than operating as tools of coercion, sanctions would instead primarily operate to punish a target and provide compensation to the victims for the harm that has been caused. Of course, some have argued that there is a greater need for these latter objectives, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine where financial assistance is required urgently. Others however argue that despite the urgency this situation presents, the long-term objective of sanctions should remain coercion, particularly if sanctioning states wish to compel the aggressing state, Russia, to contribute to post-war reconstruction efforts in the future. Other options through which to confiscate assets under sanction There are, in addition, several established avenues for seeking war reparations that should also be explored. Such established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets include: Traditional conviction-based confiscation measures, including ‘extended confiscation’ mechanisms Non-conviction based confiscation NCB measures Unexplained wealth laws These measures could be used to target: Assets that are involved in sanctions violations Sanctioned assets that are also the proceeds of crimes unrelated to the sanctions regime, such as corruption or organised crime offences Unexplained wealth Maximising effectiveness of established asset recovery mechanisms While these avenues may be limited, and can only result in the permanent confiscation of a portion of sanctioned assets, states could take various steps to maximise their effectiveness. For example legislative amendments could be considered to broaden the scope of relevant terms like ‘money laundering’ and to specifically permit confiscated assets to be redirected to the victims of state aggression. Domestic and international coordination could be improved by creating dedicated law enforcement bodies for example, or through participating in international coordination initiatives. Importantly, these avenues target established criminal activity and/or include defined judicial processes through which a targeted person can challenge any attempts to confiscate their property. Therefore they can be applied without unacceptably infringing on legal rights. Moreover, if states take measures to enhance the effectiveness and scope of established asset recovery measures, additional benefits can be derived for the broader fight against financial crime and kleptocracy. The bottom line: maintaining the rule of law Opting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law. \ The term ‘sanctioned assets’ is used as a shorthand to refer to assets of a sanctioned person or country. Learn more Download the Working Paper. Watch or read the main takeaways from a December 2022 panel discussion on asset recovery developments since the start of the war in Ukraine.
Targeting unexplained wealth in British Columbia and beyond – new analysis
“Money laundering is a significant problem requiring strong and decisive action,” concluded Honourable Austin F. Cullen in the final report of his widely discussed Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia in June 2022 . Despite the billions of dollars of illicit funds estimated to be laundered in British Columbia alone each year, the Commission’s final report found that the “value of assets seized through the asset forfeiture system in British Columbia is shockingly low.” The “failure to vigorously pursue these assets”, the report says, is “a missed opportunity to disrupt and deter the activities of organized crime groups and others involved in serious criminality.” The Report outlines 101 recommendations to reduce the amount of illicit funds flowing into British Columbia, and to more effectively seize those that do. The 101st of these outlines that the Province should: …proceed with its plan to develop an unexplained wealth order regime in British Columbia. The Commission recommends the UK’s controversial unexplained wealth order UWO as a model. If implemented, this mechanism would empower the British Columbian Civil Forfeiture Office to seek court orders that obligate a person to provide information on how they legally acquired assets suspected of being connected to criminal activity. If the person fails to comply with the order, a presumption would be made in a separate civil recovery action that the assets are criminal proceeds – potentially subjecting them to forfeiture – despite the fact that no one has been convicted of a crime. What would a UWO mean for British Columbia? As part of a collaboration between the Basel Institute on Governance and the Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, we have developed a Working Paper that analyses the feasibility of Recommendation 101. How would a UK-style UWO support efforts to investigate financial crimes and recover illicit proceeds in British Columbia – or indeed in the rest of Canada? Would this mechanism be too powerful, or not powerful enough? What models from other countries could also be emulated? And what constitutional and charter factors should legislators consider to ensure the UWO has the best chance of success? Our Working Paper explores these issues, and brings in examples from the UK and other jurisdictions that have implemented some form of unexplained wealth mechanism to date. In brief, we are doubtful that a carbon copy of the original UK UWO would result in the identification and recovery of substantial amounts of illicit funds in British Columbia, particularly given the limited success of the UK’s mechanism so far. To bolster the chances of success however, lawmakers could adapt certain elements of this model to the British Columbian context, and also consider adopting elements from other legislative models present in Australian and Ireland. … and beyond? Additionally, due to the fact that money can be laundered with ease across both provincial and international borders, we believe policy makers should couple any British Columbian initiatives to counter money laundering with wider-reaching initiatives, particularly those recommended by the Commission. Enhancing dialogue between Canada’s provinces would, for example, help to develop more consistent and coordinated approaches to both UWOs and civil forfeiture mechanisms more generally. At the federal level, it would be useful to explore the feasibility of introducing illicit wealth provisions in the criminal law, to bring the country into line with international anti-corruption treaties, or to include UWO provisions into existing legislation such as the Special Economic Measures Act or the Magnitsky Act. The findings of the Commission are clear. British Columbia – and Canada – need tools and powers to help uphold the rule of law and prevent the detrimental impacts of organised crime and money laundering on citizens. As stated in the report, “…there can be few things more destructive to a community’s sense of well-being than a governing regime that fails to resist those whose opportunities are unfairly gained at the expense of others.” It is therefore essential that government take decisive action to counter this, including through the introduction of new and stronger mechanisms to target proceeds of crime. More Download the Working Paper. The collaboration was facilitated by the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, an independent, non-partisan global centre that shapes and advances financial crime litigation practices for the future. The Academy’s co-founder Lincoln Caylor, Partner at Canadian law firm Bennett Jones, has written the foreword. Andrew Dornbierer’s open-access book Illicit Enrichment: A Guide to Laws Targeting Unexplained Wealth , was published in open-access format in 2021 by the Basel Institute on Governance and is available in English, French and Spanish. See illicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org or order the paperback via Amazon at cost price.
Enriquecimiento ilícito: libro de acceso abierto dedicado a las leyes sobre enriquecimiento ilícito, ahora disponible en español
English version here Nos complace anunciar que nuestro libro de acceso abierto, Enriquecimiento ilícito: una guía sobre las leyes que abordan los activos de procedencia inexplicable de Andrew Dornbierer, ya está disponible en español. El libro explora el rápido crecimiento de la legislación sobre enriquecimiento ilícito activos de procedencia inexplicable en todo el mundo y su uso para combatir la corrupción y recuperar activos obtenidos ilícitamente. Al igual que la versión original en inglés, se trata de una publicación revisada por pares que puede leerse, descargarse y compartirse libremente desde illicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org. Abordando los activos de procedencia inexplicable en el mundo hispanohablante Muchos países de habla hispana han redactado e introducido legislación sobre enriquecimiento ilícito para perseguir la corrupción. Esta legislación es bastante frecuente en Sudamérica y Centroamérica, donde 25 países ya han promulgado algún tipo de ley al respecto. Mientras que algunos países han tenido éxito en el uso de estas leyes –como Argentina y México–, otros parecen dubitativos en hacerlas cumplir en todos los casos. De hecho, la mayoría de estos países nunca han utilizado sus leyes. Este es un problema común en todo el mundo. ¿Por qué? Una de las razones es que no se cuenta con una cantidad significativa de comentarios y guías sobre cómo redactar, investigar, judicializar y dictar fallos en virtud de estas leyes. Esta versión en español de Enriquecimiento ilícito proporcionará una orientación muy necesaria para las agencias de orden público de habla hispana de todo el mundo. Se espera que también ofrezca conocimientos básicos para los especialistas con respecto a la investigación, el enjuiciamiento y los fallos en virtud de estas leyes. El desafío de traducir los conceptos, las leyes y la práctica La traducción de este libro de inglés a español estuvo a cargo de Pantoglot Ltda., líder en el sector de la traducción en Sudamérica, con sede en Bogotá, Colombia. Adicionalmente, la persona encargada de revisar la versión traducida fue Sandra Comesaña, miembro de Hengeler Mueller, bufete especializado en delitos económicos y empresariales, destacado a nivel internacional, con sede en Alemania. Comentando la experiencia, indicó: “La obra de Andrew Dornbierer y el Basel Institute sobre "Enriquecimiento Ilícito" supone una importante contribución al esfuerzo internacional de detectar, sancionar y, eventualmente, prevenir la corrupción, así como otros delitos financieros "yendo a por el dinero". La guía práctica que ofrece el libro sobre la recuperación de activos en más de 100 jurisdicciones constituye una herramienta inestimable para profesionales tanto del sector privado como del público, así como para académicos, que ahora por fin está disponible en español, facilitando el acceso a particulares e instituciones específicamente en el mercado español y latinoamericano. Hengeler Mueller agradece haber tenido la oportunidad de contribuir a la versión en español. Hengeler Mueller asesora regularmente a clientes internacionales en diversos asuntos que implican complejas cuestiones de recuperación de activos multi-jurisdiccionales, tanto en solitario como en colaboración, especialmente, con los miembros de su red Best Friends compuesta por los principales despachos independientes de Europa." El apoyo gratuito para la revisión de la traducción fue facilitado por The Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, un centro global independiente y no partidista que da forma y hace avanzar las prácticas de litigio de delitos financieros con miras al futuro. Acerca del libro Publicado en inglés por el Basel Institute on Governance en junio de 2021, Enriquecimiento ilícito del Senior Asset Recovery Specialist Andrew Dornbierer, presenta: Un amplio análisis de la jurisprudencia y casos de todo el mundo Cuadros, diagramas de flujo y gráficos que explican los conceptos clave Análisis de preguntas e impugnaciones comunes Contribuciones de profesionales de todo el mundo, incluido un análisis de la introducción y evolución del delito de enriquecimiento ilícito en Perú por parte del Dr. Alcides Chinchay, fiscal supremo del Ministerio Público de Perú. Anexo 1: una colección de leyes de 103 jurisdicciones, también en forma de base de datos en línea en inglés Anexo 2: una guía paso a paso de investigaciones financieras y análisis del estado de origen y aplicación de fondos para respaldar los casos de enriquecimiento ilícito en inglés El desarrollo y la publicación de este libro sobre enriquecimiento ilícito estuvo a cargo del Basel Institute on Governance a través del International Centre for Asset Recovery, con el apoyo investigativo de la NYU School of Law. Dónde encontrarlo Puede encontrar la versión en línea en: illicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org. Promovemos su reutilización e intercambio bajo una licencia Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. El libro también está disponible para imprimirse a precio de coste en Amazon en todo el mundo.
Enriquecimiento ilícito – open-access book on illicit enrichment laws now available in Spanish
Versión en español aquí. We are delighted to announce that our open-access book, Illicit Enrichment: A Guide to Laws Targeting Unexplained Wealth by Andrew Dornbierer is now available in Spanish. The book explores the rapid growth of illicit enrichment unexplained wealth legislation around the world and its use to target corruption and recover illicitly obtained assets. Like the original English version, it is a peer-reviewed publication that is freely available to read, download and share at illicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org. Targeting unexplained wealth in the Spanish-speaking world Many Spanish-speaking countries have drafted and introduced illicit enrichment legislation to target corruption. These laws are particularly prevalent in South and Central America, where 25 countries have already enacted some form of this type of law. While some countries have had success using these laws – such as Argentina and Mexico – other countries seem hesitant to consistently enforce these laws. Most of these countries have never actually used their laws at all. This is a common problem throughout the world. Why? One reason is that there isn’t a significant amount of commentary and guidance regarding how these laws can be drafted, investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated. Enriquecimiento ilícito: una guía sobre las leyes que abordan los activos de procedencia inexplicable will provide much-needed guidance to Spanish-speaking law enforcement agencies throughout the Americas region. It will also provide some foundational knowledge to practitioners regarding the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of these laws. The challenge of translating concepts, laws and practice This book was translated from English into Spanish by Pantoglot, Ltda. The translation was reviewed by Sandra Comesaña of Hengeler Mueller, a leading international corporate and white-collar law firm based in Germany. Commenting on the experience, she said: Andrew Dornbierer's and the Basel Institutes's work on Illicit Enrichment is an important contribution to the international effort of detecting, sanctioning and eventually preventing corruption and other financial crimes by "going after the money". The book's practical guidance on asset recovery in more than 100 jurisdictions is an invaluable tool for practitioners from both the private and public sectors and academics alike that is now finally available in Spanish, facilitating ready access for individuals and institutions specifically from the Spanish and Latin American markets. Hengeler Mueller is grateful for having had the opportunity to contribute to the Spanish version. Hengeler Mueller regularly advises international clients in various matters involving complex questions of multi-jurisdictional asset recovery both on its own and together especially with the members of its Best Friends network of Europe's leading independent law firms. The pro-bono support for the translation review was facilitated by The Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, an independent, non-partisan global centre that shapes and advances financial crime litigation practices for the future. About the book Published in English by the Basel Institute on Governance in June 2021, Illicit Enrichment by Senior Asset Recovery Specialist Andrew Dornbierer features: Extensive analysis of jurisprudence and cases from around the world Tables, flow charts and graphics explaining key concepts Discussion of common questions and challenges Contributions from practitioners around the world, including a discussion of the introduction and evolution of Peru’s criminal illicit enrichment offence by Dr. Alcides Chinchay, a Senior Prosecutor of the Peruvian Public Prosecutor’s Office. Annex 1: A collection of laws from 103 jurisdictions, also as an online database in English Annex II: A step-by-step guide to financial investigations and source and application analyses to support illicit enrichment cases in English Illicit Enrichment was developed and published by the Basel Institute on Governance through its International Centre for Asset Recovery, with research support from the NYU School of Law. Where to find it You can find the online version in both languages at: illicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org. Re-use and re-sharing are encouraged under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. The book is also available to print at cost price from Amazon worldwide.
The UK’s Unexplained Wealth Order: certainly much improved, but going after dirty money remains difficult
The United Kingdom’s Economic Crime Transparency and Enforcement Act received Royal Assent on 15 March 2022. This long-promised legislation was brought forward in the context of the war in Ukraine and expedited through Parliament, signalling the UK government’s declared intent to boost the powers of law enforcement agencies to target domestically located proceeds of crime that may have a connection to Putin and his inner circle. Aside from amendments made to the UK sanctions regime which are intended to enable the UK to impose sanctions against oligarchs already designated by other States and improving powers of sanctions enforcement, the Act has broader application against dirty money in the United Kingdom. It introduces a Register of Overseas Entities in relation to property and amends the Unexplained Wealth Order investigatory powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This note focuses on the amendments to the unexplained wealth order regime. As the UK government explains in this fact sheet, An unexplained wealth order UWO is an investigatory order placed on a respondent whose assets appear disproportionate to their income to explain the origins of their wealth. An Unexplained Wealth Order UWO requires a person who is a Politically Exposed Person PEP or reasonably suspected of involvement in, or of being connected to a person involved in, serious crime to explain the origin of assets minimum combined value of £50,000 that appear to be disproportionate to their known lawfully obtained income. ...A UWO is not by itself a power to recover assets. However, any response from a UWO can be used in subsequent civil recovery proceedings. A little-used power Despite the great expectations which accompanied the introduction of UWOs in 2018, they appear to have been little used. Of the five agencies with the power to apply for UWOs, only the National Crime Agency NCA has utilised this investigatory power, so far in only four cases. And even in these cases, the exercise of the powers has met with patchy success, with one UWO application being successfully challenged – leading to a reported costs order against the NCA of GBP 1.5 million. Key amendments The amendments to the Act are intended to improve the effectiveness of the UWO regime as follows: “Responsible officers” The amendments introduce “responsible officers” as a new category of people who can receive a UWO. This new provision can apply where the respondent to an UWO is not an individual, but instead for example a company. In these cases, the UWO can include the name of an individual – the “responsible officer” – who must provide the necessary information. It is anticipated that “responsible officers” will be directors, partners or managers of companies. The intended aim of this provision is to enable enforcement authorities to obtain information in cases involving complex corporate structures that have been used to hide the owner of certain assets. Broader scope of application They broaden the situations in which a UWO can be sought to include cases where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting “that the property has been obtained through unlawful conduct.” Before this amendment, the Court had to be be satisfied that “there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the respondent's lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient for the purposes of enabling the respondent to obtain the property.” This has proven difficult when property was held in complex corporate structures, as enforcement authorities struggled to establish evidence of income of the owners of the property. The amendment helps with this as it is intended to allow an application for a UWO to be made when it can be shown that the property was bought with dirty money. Extended review period Where property is subject to an interim freezing order, the law is amended to enable law enforcement agencies to apply for an extension by up to 126 days of the period of time available to review material provided under a UWO and determine whether or not to seek further asset recovery action. Protection against legal costs The amendments also aim to protect the agencies from incurring substantial legal costs in cases relating to UWOs, providing they have acted reasonably. Will they work? While the reforms will no doubt remove some of the hesitancies that have prevented enforcement authorities from seeking UWOs in the past – particularly by removing the risk of the state facing hefty legal bills in the event of failure – the jury on whether the amendments go far enough is still out. Even the UK Government’s factsheet on the proposed reforms was non-committal as to the extent to which these laws will actually encourage law enforcement agencies to actively seek more UWOs. How the UK law differs from other unexplained wealth order mechanisms When the UWO’s were first introduced in the UK, there was a widespread misconception that the order itself would enable the confiscation of assets. However, this was never the case as the UK’s UWO is an investigatory power. It does not, of itself, provide a mechanism for the actual recovery of assets. Assets can only be recovered when evidence obtained under an UWO is used to support a separate civil recovery procedure under the Proceeds of Crime Act, where the Court has to determine whether specific property has been derived from unlawful criminal conduct. The UK’s unexplained wealth mechanism differs therefore from similarly named unexplained wealth-focused mechanisms that exist around the world. These typically act as a power to identify potentially unexplainable assets and also allow for their confiscation or for a civil payment order to be made for their value against the relevant person without the need to demonstrate that the assets are derived from criminal activity. As such, while the recent amendments clearly improve the UK’s mechanism, they do not change the fact that the recovery of stolen assets still depends on a separate legal procedure and a requirement that courts be satisfied that the property in question is, more likely than not, derived from crime. While this is not wrong in itself, it is also not wrong to suggest that on top of the latest amendments, the UK could also consider additional unexplained wealth-focused mechanisms, for example like those that exist in several other common law jurisdictions and that simply require the court to be satisfied that certain assets do not have a lawful explanation before potentially confiscating them. Such tools could give the UK enforcement authorities yet another avenue to go after the dirty money that has been plaguing the London financial centre for too long. Learn more Find more information on these types of mechanisms in Illicit Enrichment: A Guide to Laws Targeting Unexplained Wealth, an open-access book published in 2021 by the Basel Institute through its International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR , with research support from the NYU School of Law. Written by Senior Asset Recovery Specialist Andrew Dornbierer, the book provides a comprehensive guide to illicit enrichment laws and their application to target unexplained wealth and recover proceeds of corruption and other crimes. It covers both criminal and civil-based laws from around the world, and is accompanied by a database of illicit enrichment/unexplained wealth legislation in 103 jurisdictions and guidance for investigators and prosecutors on conducting source and application analysis to prove such cases in court. Illicit Enrichment has recently been made available in Spanish. A French translation of the introduction and part 1 are already available here; a full version will be released in mid-2022.
Publications
Back in Action: How the UK is reviving unexplained wealth orders (The Academy Bulletin)
In an article published in the Fall 2025 issue of the Bulletin of the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, Andrew Dornbierer explores the revival of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in the United Kingdom.
Introduced in 2017 as a tool to combat the abuse of UK’s markets to launder criminal proceeds, the UWO mechanism suffered a severe setback in 2020. After only a handful of attempts to use it, a decision by the High Court effectively left it sprawled on the canvas.
In the last year or so, however, the mechanism has slowly started to prove itself. Most recently, the UK’s Serious Fraud Office – in its first use of the UK’s UWO mechanism – secured GBP 1.1 million from the sale of a property belonging to the ex-wife of a convicted fraudster.
This article offers a short history of UWOs in the UK. It examines how, after a turbulent start and subsequent amendments to the mechanism, UWOs are now back to being used by UK authorities to tackle illicit financial flows. If applied responsibly, proportionately and in harmony with established legal rights, unexplained wealth orders promise to be a powerful tool in the UK’s fight to recover criminal assets.
This is the fifth issue of The Academy’s Bulletin. It has been established to transmit the work of Academy Fellows, draw attention to matters of importance to the legal community and provide high-level analysis of cutting-edge issues in global financial crime investigations and litigation. The Basel Institute on Governance acts as Secretariat to the Academy.
Policy Brief 14: Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs
La Directive de l’Union européenne de 2024 relative au recouvrement et à la confiscation d’avoirs oblige les États membres, entre autres, à adopter des mesures législatives pour permettre la confiscation de la « fortune inexpliquée ».
Cette Note de politique examine l’article 16 de la Directive qui énonce cette obligation, ainsi que les pouvoirs et restrictions que les États membres devront inclure dans les mesures relatives à la « fortune inexpliquée » pour garantir la conformité à la Directive.
En bref, cela démontre la grande flexibilité accordée par le texte de la Directive aux États membres pour déterminer le champ d’application de leurs propres mesures en matière de fortune inexpliquée. Au minimum, les États seront requis d’introduire des mesures susceptibles d’être utilisées pour cibler la fortune inexpliquée liée au crime organisé.
Cependant, les États membres peuvent toujours décider d’introduire des mesures de plus grande portée ciblant la fortune inexpliquée liée à toutes les activités criminelles, y compris la corruption.
À propos de cette Note de politique
La présente publication fait partie de la série de Notes de politique (Policy Briefs) du Basel Institute on Governance, ISSN 2624-9669. Elle est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence internationale.
Citation proposée : Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. « Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d’avoirs. » Note de politique 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Disponible sur: baselgovernance.org/pb-14-fr.
Il s’agit d’une publication de l’International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) au Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR reçoit un financement principal des gouvernements de Jersey, du Liechtenstein, de la Norvège, de la Suisse et du Royaume-Uni.
Working Paper 51: Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States
Asset recovery tools are integral to combating corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and other profit-motivated crimes. However, in many participating States of the OSCE, the range of asset recovery tools available to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies is limited.
This Working Paper identifies legislative mechanisms in OSCE participating States that empower the state to confiscate suspected or proven proceeds of crime. The overall objective is to ascertain:
- Established good practices with regard to the design of these legislative mechanisms.
- Any unique approaches that particular countries have taken in this context that could be replicated and tested in other jurisdictions.
It covers:
- Conviction-based asset recovery mechanisms.
- Non-conviction based mechanisms including civil recovery.
- Additional mechanisms such as illicit enrichment laws and other laws that reverse the burden of proof regarding the legitimacy of assets.
- Considerations regarding the adoption of broader asset recovery laws.
- Approaches to the disposal of confiscated assets.
- Common challenges in the implementation of asset recovery mechanisms.
About this report
This comparative study was conducted and drafted by the International Centre for Asset Recovery at the Basel Institute on Governance for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The paper was commissioned under the extra-budgetary project ‘Strengthening asset recovery efforts in the OSCE region’ implemented by the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.
It is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.
Disclaimer
This Working Paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and/or substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, the OSCE and its participating States.
Policy Brief 14: Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery
The European Union’s 2024 Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation obliges Member States to, among other things, introduce legislative measures to enable the confiscation of “unexplained wealth”.
This policy paper examines this Article and the powers and restrictions that Member States will need to include in such “unexplained wealth” measures to ensure compliance with the Directive.
In brief, the Directive gives legislators in EU Member States flexibility to decide the scope of their own unexplained wealth measures. At a minimum, they must introduce measures that can be used to target unexplained wealth linked to organised crime.
Member States could, however, adopt broader measures target unexplained wealth relating to all criminal activity, including corruption.
About this Policy Brief
This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669.
You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery.’ Policy Brief 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/pb-14.
This is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.
[Forthcoming] Working Paper 42: Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law
This paper will be released on 21 February 2023.
Written in the light of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the Working Paper explores whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression.
The paper first explores the concept of sanctions and financial sanctions (asset freezes) and what they mean in practice.
Using the example of Canada, which has introduced a legislative mechanism for this purpose, the paper analyses whether states should be able to confiscate sanctioned assets purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned.
It then looks at more established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets, including:
- Traditional conviction based confiscation measures, including ‘extended confiscation’ mechanisms
- Non-conviction based confiscation (forfeiture) measures
- Unexplained wealth laws
The paper recommends ways to maximise the effectiveness of these alternative avenues for recovering assets, which are much less controversial and can arguably be applied without infringing on legal rights.
Opting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law.
About this Paper
This Working Paper was prepared by the Basel Institute on Governance.
It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2023. ‘Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law.’ Working Paper 42, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-42.
Acknowledgements
The Basel Institute would like to thank Isys Lam and the law firms of Bonifassi Avocats (France), Hengeler Mueller (Germany), Bennett Jones (Canada) and Rogério Alves & Associados (Portugal) for their support in providing research for this paper.
The Basel Institute would also like to thank Stefan Lenz, Stefan Cassella, Maria Nizzero, Nicola Bonucci and Oscar Solórzano for their support in reviewing the content of the paper and recommending amendments.