[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":1703},["ShallowReactive",2],{"topics-index":3,"topic-events-corruption-prevention-and-public-governance-1":109,"topic-news-corruption-prevention-and-public-governance-1":209,"topic-stories-corruption-prevention-and-public-governance-1":620,"topic-publications-corruption-prevention-and-public-governance-1":971,"topic-links":1696},[4,14,27,32,41,49,61,70,76,80,86,92,99,105],{"slug":5,"name":6,"label":6,"parent":7,"total":8,"stories":9,"storyIds":10,"news":11,"publications":12,"events":13},"anti-money-laundering","Anti-Money Laundering",null,246,0,[],152,73,21,{"slug":15,"name":16,"label":16,"parent":7,"total":17,"stories":18,"storyIds":19,"news":24,"publications":25,"events":26},"asset-recovery-and-enforcement","Asset Recovery and Enforcement",677,5,[20,18,21,22,23],4,7,8,10,475,143,54,{"slug":28,"name":29,"label":29,"parent":7,"total":30,"stories":9,"storyIds":31,"news":30,"publications":9,"events":9},"basel-aml-index","Basel AML Index",37,[],{"slug":33,"name":34,"label":35,"parent":7,"total":36,"stories":9,"storyIds":37,"news":38,"publications":39,"events":40},"business-integrity-ethics-and-compliance","Business Integrity Ethics and Compliance","Business Integrity, Ethics and Compliance",443,[],324,85,34,{"slug":42,"name":43,"label":43,"parent":7,"total":44,"stories":9,"storyIds":45,"news":46,"publications":47,"events":48},"collective-action","Collective Action",568,[],265,287,16,{"slug":50,"name":51,"label":51,"parent":7,"total":52,"stories":53,"storyIds":54,"news":58,"publications":59,"events":60},"corruption-prevention-and-public-governance","Corruption Prevention and Public Governance",127,3,[55,56,57],6,9,11,12,110,2,{"slug":62,"name":63,"label":63,"parent":7,"total":64,"stories":65,"storyIds":66,"news":67,"publications":68,"events":69},"green-corruption","Green Corruption",235,1,[23],115,62,57,{"slug":71,"name":72,"label":72,"parent":43,"total":73,"stories":9,"storyIds":74,"news":75,"publications":58,"events":9},"hlrm","HLRM",36,[],24,{"slug":77,"name":78,"label":78,"parent":43,"total":48,"stories":9,"storyIds":79,"news":56,"publications":21,"events":9},"human-rights","Human rights",[],{"slug":81,"name":82,"label":82,"parent":43,"total":83,"stories":9,"storyIds":84,"news":23,"publications":85,"events":9},"integrity-pacts","Integrity Pacts",48,[],38,{"slug":87,"name":88,"label":88,"parent":7,"total":89,"stories":65,"storyIds":90,"news":91,"publications":9,"events":9},"learning-and-training","Learning and training",225,[20],224,{"slug":93,"name":94,"label":95,"parent":7,"total":96,"stories":9,"storyIds":97,"news":98,"publications":13,"events":56},"prevention-research-and-innovation","Prevention Research and Innovation","Prevention, Research and Innovation",155,[],125,{"slug":100,"name":101,"label":101,"parent":7,"total":12,"stories":65,"storyIds":102,"news":103,"publications":104,"events":53},"public-finance-management","Public Finance Management",[58],47,22,{"slug":106,"name":107,"label":107,"parent":7,"total":58,"stories":65,"storyIds":108,"news":18,"publications":55,"events":9},"ukraine","Ukraine",[55],{"items":110,"total":60},[111,154],{"id":38,"title":112,"body":113,"date_start":114,"date_end":114,"organiser":115,"type":116,"topics":117,"nid":7,"links":118,"slug":122,"summary":7,"time":123,"location":124,"registration_link":7,"registration_link_text":7,"status":125,"image":126,"tags":139,"countries":140},"International Anti-Corruption Day Conference 2026","International Anti-Corruption Day is a chance to celebrate the people working against corruption – and to show what their efforts mean in practice for people’s lives, public services, the environment, economies and institutions.\n\nOn **9 December 2026**, UNODC, the OSCE and the Basel Institute on Governance will bring together diplomats, policymakers, practitioners and experts in Vienna and online. The conference will highlight anti-corruption work across different fields and explore how it can contribute to tackling wider governance and security challenges, from climate and environmental crime to technological change, public finance and business integrity.\n\nThrough a series of short, cross-disciplinary discussions, the event will seek to build bridges between the anti-corruption community and those working in other fields. It will bring different perspectives into conversation, showcase practical approaches from different regions and sectors and identify opportunities for stronger cooperation.\n\n### Key details\n\n- **Date:** 9 December 2026\n- **Time:** 09:30–17:30\n- **Location:** Vienna International Centre (UNODC headquarters), Vienna, Austria\n- **Format:** Hybrid – in person and online\n- **In-person participation:** By invitation only\n- **Online participation:** Registration details to follow\n- **Notifications:** To receive updates on the conference, including when registration opens, submit [this form](https:\u002F\u002Fforms.gle\u002F4HKHcWfj1SaxGDmd8).\n\n","2026-12-09","UNODC, OSCE and Basel Institute on Governance","Event",[63,101,16,51,34,43],[119],{"url":120,"caption":121},"https:\u002F\u002Fforms.gle\u002F4HKHcWfj1SaxGDmd8","Sign up to receive email notifications about this event","international-anti-corruption-day-conference-2026-2967","09:30–17:30","Vienna International Centre (UNODC headquarters), Vienna, Austria","published",{"id":127,"storage":128,"filename_disk":129,"filename_download":130,"title":131,"type":132,"created_on":133,"modified_on":134,"charset":7,"filesize":135,"width":136,"height":137,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":138,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":134},"a5f30270-7a0e-417b-9a0a-cf6664b593c7","local","a5f30270-7a0e-417b-9a0a-cf6664b593c7.jpg","Save the date! International Anti-Corruption Day Conference 9 December 2026 Vienna International Centre, Austria.jpg","Save the Date! International Anti Corruption Day Conference 9 December 2026 Vienna International Centre, Austria","image\u002Fjpeg","2026-08-14T10:00:40.000Z","2026-08-14T10:00:42.000Z",685506,1200,800,{},[],[141],{"id":21,"events_id":142,"countries_id":148},{"id":38,"title":112,"image":127,"body":113,"date_start":114,"date_end":114,"organiser":115,"type":116,"topics":143,"nid":7,"links":144,"slug":122,"summary":7,"time":123,"location":124,"registration_link":7,"registration_link_text":7,"status":125,"tags":146,"countries":147},[63,101,16,51,34,43],[145],{"url":120,"caption":121},[],[21],{"id":149,"name":150,"code":151,"latitude":152,"longitude":153},13,"Austria","AT",47.51623,14.55007,{"id":155,"title":156,"body":157,"date_start":158,"date_end":158,"organiser":159,"type":116,"topics":160,"nid":161,"links":162,"slug":169,"summary":7,"time":7,"location":7,"registration_link":7,"registration_link_text":7,"status":125,"image":170,"tags":179,"countries":180},320,"Anti-Corruption Café: A Swiss-Moldovan exchange on youth, technology and anti-corruption","\u003Cp>Bringing together students, practitioners and experts – including a delegation of youth anti-corruption volunteers from the National Anticorruption Center of Moldova – the event will explore how technology can strengthen transparency and accountability, and how young people can act as agents of change.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The event is an initiative of the OSCE and Basel Institute on Governance, on the sidelines of the 6th International Collective Action Conference in Basel on 9–10 June. It is open to everyone and can be attended either in person or online. We particularly encourage students from the University of Basel to join us in person for the opportunity to engage directly with speakers and participants in an informal and interactive setting.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n### Agenda\n\n\u003Cp>13:30–14:15: Welcome\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>The University of Basel as a democratic space – Til Hänggi, Chair, skuba (Student Union of the University of Basel)\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Introduction to the Anti-Corruption Volunteers Programme, National Anticorruption Center, Republic of Moldova\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\n\u003Cp>14:15–15:00: Technology and transparency\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>Presentation: *Digital dependencies and state capture: sovereignty, democracy and accountability in the digital age* by Dorotea Avedisian, MLaw, PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Basel; Co-Head Basel, foraus – Swiss Forum on Foreign Policy\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Discussion: Moderated discussion led by Erlin Agich, Associate Anti-Corruption Officer, OSCE\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\n\u003Cp>15:00–16:00: Young people as agents of change\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>Discussion on promoting integrity in the education sector led by Eva Moldovanyi, Programme Manager, Fondation Botnar\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\n### Details\n\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>Date: 8 June 2026\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Time: 13:30–16:00 (CEST)\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Location: Seminar Room 103, Kollegienhaus, Petersplatz 1, 4051 Basel\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003Cli>Format: Hybrid (in person and online)\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>","2026-06-08","Basel Institute on Governance and OSCE",[51],2976,[163,166],{"url":164,"caption":165},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.zoom.us\u002Fj\u002F86233702879?pwd=PtS0ZSSF80rg8GymMdftqVyZ9qM2Yh.1","Link to live stream",{"url":167,"caption":168},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-06\u002FAnti-Corruption%20Cafe%CC%81%20agenda_updated.pdf","Download agenda","anti-corruption-cafe-a-swiss-moldovan-exchange-on-youth-technology-and-anti-corruption-2976",{"id":171,"storage":128,"filename_disk":172,"filename_download":173,"title":156,"type":174,"created_on":175,"modified_on":175,"charset":7,"filesize":176,"width":137,"height":177,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":178,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":175},"7fdc4be9-154f-4630-ad55-59ce37381c23","7fdc4be9-154f-4630-ad55-59ce37381c23.webp","tmp.webp","image\u002Fwebp","2026-06-04T21:19:09.000Z",45444,533,{},[],[181,195],{"id":53,"events_id":182,"countries_id":189},{"id":155,"title":156,"image":171,"body":157,"date_start":158,"date_end":158,"organiser":159,"type":116,"topics":183,"nid":161,"links":184,"slug":169,"summary":7,"time":7,"location":7,"registration_link":7,"registration_link_text":7,"status":125,"tags":187,"countries":188},[51],[185,186],{"url":164,"caption":165},{"url":167,"caption":168},[],[53,20],{"id":190,"name":191,"code":192,"latitude":193,"longitude":194},137,"Moldova","MD",47.41163,28.36988,{"id":20,"events_id":196,"countries_id":203},{"id":155,"title":156,"image":171,"body":157,"date_start":158,"date_end":158,"organiser":159,"type":116,"topics":197,"nid":161,"links":198,"slug":169,"summary":7,"time":7,"location":7,"registration_link":7,"registration_link_text":7,"status":125,"tags":201,"countries":202},[51],[199,200],{"url":164,"caption":165},{"url":167,"caption":168},[],[53,20],{"id":204,"name":205,"code":206,"latitude":207,"longitude":208},41,"Switzerland","CH",46.81819,8.22751,{"items":210,"total":58},[211,308,364,451,564],{"id":212,"status":125,"date_created":213,"date_updated":214,"title":215,"type":216,"body":217,"date":218,"topic":7,"slug":219,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":220,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":221,"language":223,"image":224,"translation_of":7,"countries":235,"tags":236,"authors":237,"images":304,"translations":305,"content":306,"translations_news":307},10652,"2026-09-01T11:20:37.000Z","2026-09-01T11:42:15.000Z","Why it’s worth investing in international anti-corruption research – three cheers for the FALCON project","Blog","For three years, the Basel Institute's Prevention, Research and Innovation team worked with 24 other research partners from across Europe on the ambitious Horizon Europe [FALCON](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F) (Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project.\n\nOur consortium brought together expertise in social science and research, technology development and law enforcement. We worked closely together to innovate the fight against corruption and organised crime by designing data-driven risk indicators and AI-enhanced solutions.\n\nThis massive research project generated many useful “deliverables” – corruption intelligence, risk indicators, practical tools, policy guidance – that anti-corruption and counter-crime practitioners can directly apply in their work.\n\nPerhaps more importantly, the research and interactions have helped us all understand corruption better – and provided the evidence we need to innovate anti-corruption methods.\n\nThis is bringing real benefits to our technical assistance to governments and organisations seeking to find smarter ways to prevent and combat corrupt and criminal networks, in Europe and beyond. It’s an example of why international, multidisciplinary anti-corruption research projects are worth the investment even in times of tightened belts and budget cuts.\n\nAs the project winds down, here are four lessons we’d like to share with others. We also offer our warm thanks to the consortium leaders and partners, and to the EU institutions and individuals who continue to promote deep research into corruption and crime.\n\n## Lesson 1: Understanding how corruption evolves helps anti-corruption practitioners keep up\n\nFALCON provided clear examples of how – and how quickly – corruption and crime adapt and evolve.\n\nTraditional understandings of corruption focus on a fairly static list of behaviours like bribery or embezzlement. In fact, FALCON research demonstrated how corruption occurs in complex systems, playing out through resilient networks of actors, institutions and incentives that evolve within equally complex political, economic and social contexts.\n\nEach new enforcement measure, detection tool or regulation changes the behaviour of those trying to circumvent it. When challenged, criminal actors adapt, prompting authorities to respond with further reforms.\n\nIt's a never-ending dance of push and shove that we observed in a range of different settings. For example, in our research for the FALCON project, we have seen that criminal actors:\n\n-   **adapt their corruption and criminal strategies** in response to strengthened enforcement (see our articles on [the evolution of corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fconceptualizing-evolution-corruption-empirical-analysis-italy) and on [corruption and crime at the Kapitan Andreevo border](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fevolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession));\n-   **relocate their illicit activities elsewhere** (see our [Working Paper 58](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58) on corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam); and\n-   **apply counter strategies**, such as undermining reform efforts and dismantling or weakening anti-corruption institutions and policies; or even\n-   **weaponise the anti-corruption apparatus** against rivals (look out for our forthcoming report on backlashes to anti-corruption reforms).\n\nHow to keep up?\n\nOur approach, which we refined during the FALCON project, is to always base anti-corruption and counter-crime interventions on a strong understanding of underlying criminal dynamics.\n\nMap the stakeholders and their relationships, interests and incentives. Identify risks and problems that could arise.\n\nFrom there, legal reforms, grassroots initiatives, technology and everything else can function best as a flexible anti-corruption toolbox. We assemble and revisit tools as the context shifts and our knowledge advances.\n\n## Lesson 2. Use AI, but understand its limitations\n\nA key point often forgotten amongst the technology optimism is to treat tech tools, including the ones built as part of the FALCON project, as _inputs_ to expert human judgement, not as substitutes for it.\n\nA risk indicator or dashboard score can flag suspicious activities that require a closer look, but it can't tell you why an anomalous pattern exists or what to do about it. We must check an AI model's output against contextual knowledge and other evidence, and keep in mind what it was and wasn’t calibrated to detect.\n\nThe same caution applies to AI. AI tools can be useful for analysing huge quantities of data and detecting patterns that point to corruption. But an AI could just as easily facilitate corruption as help you to tackle it, so make sure human judgement stays in the driving seat.\n\n## Lesson 3. Reach beyond the bubble to identify synergies or unintended consequences\n\nIt can be tempting for anti-corruption researchers to work only within the anti-corruption community, and may seem more efficient.\n\nBut the truly multidisciplinary FALCON research consortium showed how closely crimes and corruption are interlinked. Look at them separately and you miss the true picture. Intervene to prevent one problem, and you might have unintended impacts on another.\n\nAn example from our research at the border between Türkiye and Bulgaria:\n\n-   Beefing up border control capacity against trafficking can result in criminals relying _even more_ on corruption to avoid detection.\n-   Conversely, stronger enforcement against corruption can lead to traffickers using more sophisticated criminal strategies to get illicit goods safely across the border.\n\nBefore designing any intervention, we should assess how increased pressure in one policy area may affect others, including through the displacing of risks.\n\nAnti-corruption programmes are more effective when we ask these questions from the outset and coordinate more meaningfully with those working on related issues like organised crime and security.\n\n## Lesson 4. Use strategic foresight – systematically anticipate new risks and changed contexts\n\nOur work on [foresight and anticipatory governance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-63-anticipatory-governance\u002F) has enhanced how we approach political economy assessments, including in projects unrelated to FALCON.\n\nWe have long found it important to consider what could shift the terrain – a new law, technology, conflict or other – and what this would mean for a planned anti-corruption intervention. Now we have found tools and systems to do this systematically and periodically.\n\nThe approach helps our partners to revisit anti-corruption frameworks, track emerging risks and anticipate unintended consequences. That’s key to mitigating them and adapting in good time.\n\nIt also tangibly improves monitoring and evaluation frameworks, as we are not only reporting on what happened in the past, but adapting to what is up ahead.\n\n## What’s next?\n\nThe FALCON research project provided not only the practical guidance and reports it promised, but also a far more detailed understanding of how corruption and crime interlink and smarter tools to act on them both.\n\nAs the project closes, we are grateful for the partnership, energised by what we've learned and ready to expand and apply them in our technical assistance to governments and development partners worldwide.\n\n_The FALCON project was funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute’s involvement in the project was funded by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI). Views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI._","2026-08-31","falcon-end-project",[51,94],[222],"Main page","English",{"id":225,"storage":128,"filename_disk":226,"filename_download":227,"title":228,"type":132,"created_on":229,"modified_on":230,"charset":7,"filesize":231,"width":232,"height":233,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":234,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":229},"9c82ba33-9bd7-4b4e-9db4-c38fb3324739","9c82ba33-9bd7-4b4e-9db4-c38fb3324739.jpg","FALCON project end 1.jpg","FALCON consortium members at the closing event in Vilnius, Lithuania in July 2026. Photo: FALCON project.","2026-09-01T11:41:40.000Z","2026-09-01T11:42:09.000Z",1064088,1336,833,{},[],[],[238,259,274,289],{"id":239,"news_id":240,"authors_id":254},1392,{"id":212,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":213,"user_updated":241,"date_updated":214,"title":215,"type":216,"body":217,"image":225,"date":218,"topic":7,"slug":219,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":242,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":243,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":244,"tags":245,"authors":246,"images":250,"translations":251,"content":252,"translations_news":253},"545a204d-e41b-4882-afda-481ecf3fd971",[51,94],[222],[],[],[239,247,248,249],1393,1394,1395,[],[],[],[],{"id":255,"name":256,"position":257,"image":258},304,"Dr Jacopo Costa","Senior Specialist, Prevention, Research and Innovation","90469998-3598-471d-9499-48b19f557c7d",{"id":247,"news_id":260,"authors_id":270},{"id":212,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":213,"user_updated":241,"date_updated":214,"title":215,"type":216,"body":217,"image":225,"date":218,"topic":7,"slug":219,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":261,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":262,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":263,"tags":264,"authors":265,"images":266,"translations":267,"content":268,"translations_news":269},[51,94],[222],[],[],[239,247,248,249],[],[],[],[],{"id":271,"name":272,"position":7,"image":273},303,"Dr Saba Kassa","f6382220-0a46-438a-bead-7dc8f4e2abe5",{"id":248,"news_id":275,"authors_id":285},{"id":212,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":213,"user_updated":241,"date_updated":214,"title":215,"type":216,"body":217,"image":225,"date":218,"topic":7,"slug":219,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":276,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":277,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":278,"tags":279,"authors":280,"images":281,"translations":282,"content":283,"translations_news":284},[51,94],[222],[],[],[239,247,248,249],[],[],[],[],{"id":286,"name":287,"position":7,"image":288},584,"Noémi Jäger","65c7f55d-6b03-4b42-a5cc-4c546c9f4873",{"id":249,"news_id":290,"authors_id":300},{"id":212,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":213,"user_updated":241,"date_updated":214,"title":215,"type":216,"body":217,"image":225,"date":218,"topic":7,"slug":219,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":291,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":292,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":293,"tags":294,"authors":295,"images":296,"translations":297,"content":298,"translations_news":299},[51,94],[222],[],[],[239,247,248,249],[],[],[],[],{"id":301,"name":302,"position":7,"image":303},295,"Dr Claudia Baez Camargo","708c19be-70e9-46d4-b42d-fe7bbc667225",[],[],[],[],{"id":309,"status":125,"date_created":310,"date_updated":311,"title":312,"type":216,"body":313,"date":314,"topic":7,"slug":315,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":316,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":317,"language":223,"image":318,"translation_of":7,"countries":328,"tags":329,"authors":359,"images":360,"translations":361,"content":362,"translations_news":363},10644,"2026-07-16T06:54:18.000Z","2026-07-17T06:28:58.000Z","Four priorities for an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy","With good governance norms under growing pressure, the EU has an opportunity to show decisive leadership in the fight against corruption.\n\nThe European Commission’s [first EU-wide Anti-Corruption Strategy](https:\u002F\u002Fcommission.europa.eu\u002Fnews-and-media\u002Fnews\u002Fcommission-seeks-views-eu-anti-corruption-strategy-2026-05-11_en), building on the recently adopted EU Anti-Corruption Directive, is a chance to strengthen coordination across Member States and realise the promise of the Directive for the EU’s 450+ million inhabitants.\n\nDone well, it will reinforce the security, economic prosperity and political stability that underpin Europe’s long-term competitiveness.\n\nThe Basel Institute on Governance has responded to the Commission’s call for evidence with recommendations drawn from more than two decades of research and hands-on work with governments, law enforcement agencies, businesses and civil society. Our submission highlights four areas that we believe should be central to the new Strategy. These are briefly summarised below, and included in full in the [submission](https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F580b64a2-b6bc-44de-9cc7-5525cea37391).\n\n## Promote a whole-of-society approach\n\nGovernments cannot tackle complex corruption risks alone. Businesses, civil society, researchers and affected communities all have a role to play.\n\nThe Strategy should therefore explicitly endorse [Anti-Corruption Collective Action](https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002F). This approach brings stakeholders together to identify shared risks, agree standards and develop practical mechanisms for compliance and accountability.\n\nIt has been used to address money laundering risks in the financial services sector, bribery and extortion in ports, corruption in public procurement and integrity challenges in the defence sector. It is widely endorsed by organisations including the OECD, UNODC and UN Global Compact, and already included in many national anti-corruption strategies.\n\n## Harness data and technology responsibly\n\nArtificial intelligence, big data analytics, open-source intelligence and automated risk indicators can help identify suspicious procurement patterns, conflicts of interest, illicit financial flows and hidden relationships.\n\nResearch through the [EU-funded FALCON project,](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F) of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member, shows that effective anti-corruption systems increasingly depend on the ability to collect, connect and analyse large volumes of information.\n\nThe Strategy should support responsible testing of new tools, including through regulatory sandboxes, while also investing in the foundations they require: digitisation, interoperable systems, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and secure cross-border data sharing.\n\n## Focus on priority risks and high-risk activities\n\nBeyond these approaches, our submission highlights four high-risk areas requiring particular attention.\n\n-   **Foreign bribery:** Enforcement remains uneven and settlements often fail to address the harm suffered by affected countries and communities. The Strategy should promote stronger enforcement and fairer approaches to compensation and the use of recovered proceeds.\n\n-   **Public procurement:** Risks are rising as Europe increases investment in defence, infrastructure, energy security and strategic technologies. Priorities should include stronger transparency, better oversight and data-driven risk assessment.\n\n-   **Borders and customs:** Corruption at borders can facilitate smuggling, trafficking, sanctions evasion and tax fraud. Greater automation, data integration and consistent procedures can strengthen prevention and detection.\n\n-   **Financial infrastructure:** Shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and virtual assets can help conceal corrupt proceeds. The Strategy should strengthen links between anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and asset recovery, including through the EU’s new Anti-Money Laundering Authority.\n\n## Build in an ongoing research, innovation and learning agenda\n\nCorruption constantly evolves as actors adapt to new laws, technologies and enforcement practices. Anti-corruption policy must evolve too.\n\nResearch also shows that anti-corruption laws alone do not change corrupt behaviour. Social norms, political incentives and institutional cultures can sustain corruption even where formal rules are strong.\n\nThe Strategy should support sustained applied research and create stronger channels for researchers, policymakers, law enforcement, businesses and civil society to exchange evidence and lessons. It should also use differences between national systems as opportunities to test approaches, evaluate results and improve policy across the Union.\n\n# Learn more\n\n-   Download the [Basel Institute on Governance’s full submission](https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F580b64a2-b6bc-44de-9cc7-5525cea37391) to the European Commission’s call for evidence on the EU Anti-Corruption Strategy.\n-   See complementary perspectives on the EU Anti-Corruption Directive on how it might affect [anti-corruption enforcement](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Feu-directive-enforcement) from a legal and institutional perspective, and on what the Directive reveals about [how corruption is evolving in the EU and beyond](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Feu-directive-political-lens).","2026-07-16","eu-anti-corruption-strategy",[51],[222],{"id":319,"storage":128,"filename_disk":320,"filename_download":321,"title":322,"type":132,"created_on":323,"modified_on":310,"charset":7,"filesize":324,"width":325,"height":326,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":322,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":327,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":323},"b062a775-61d9-4afd-8181-af06fb6169ef","b062a775-61d9-4afd-8181-af06fb6169ef.jpg","IMG-20251015-WA0020.jpg","Elizabeth Andersen speaking at a meeting of the EU Network Against Corruption, which is engaged in consultations around the Anti-Corruption Strategy","2026-07-16T06:51:41.000Z",115459,1555,1037,{},[],[330,346],{"id":331,"news_id":332,"tags_id":343},6068,{"id":309,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":310,"user_updated":241,"date_updated":311,"title":312,"type":216,"body":313,"image":319,"date":314,"topic":7,"slug":315,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":333,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":334,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":335,"tags":336,"authors":338,"images":339,"translations":340,"content":341,"translations_news":342},[51],[222],[],[331,337],6069,[],[],[],[],[],{"id":344,"name":345},982,"Anti-corruption",{"id":337,"news_id":347,"tags_id":357},{"id":309,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":310,"user_updated":241,"date_updated":311,"title":312,"type":216,"body":313,"image":319,"date":314,"topic":7,"slug":315,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":348,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":349,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":350,"tags":351,"authors":352,"images":353,"translations":354,"content":355,"translations_news":356},[51],[222],[],[331,337],[],[],[],[],[],{"id":358,"name":43},909,[],[],[],[],[],{"id":365,"status":125,"date_created":366,"date_updated":367,"title":368,"type":216,"body":369,"date":370,"topic":7,"slug":371,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":372,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":373,"language":223,"image":374,"translation_of":7,"countries":385,"tags":386,"authors":446,"images":447,"translations":448,"content":449,"translations_news":450},10640,"2026-06-24T15:49:48.000Z","2026-07-02T09:26:36.000Z","There’s a gap between what laws say and what people do. How is that useful for anti-corruption work?","In episode 37 of the podcast [Sophie au pays des possibles](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sophieaupaysdespossibles.com\u002F), host and anti-corruption expert Sophie Lemaître conversed with [Claudia Baez Camargo](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fabout\u002Fteam\u002Fdr-claudia-baez-camargo\u002F), Director of Prevention, Research and Innovation at the Basel Institute on Governance. \n\nClaudia leads a specialised team of researchers who leverage behavioural science, political economy analysis and field research to design context-sensitive anti-corruption strategies. Among others, they advance approaches based on understanding and targeting social norms.\n\nThis Q&A is an edited extract of their discussion on why top-down laws often fail against local realities and how practical, bottom-up solutions can empower citizens to drive real change. \n\n**Sophie Lemaître: What are social norms, and why is it essential to consider them when addressing corruption?**\n\nClaudia Baez Camargo: Essentially, social norms are what we perceive as typical, expected or socially accepted behaviour in a given context. \n\nFor example, if a traffic officer stops you in Mexico – where I was born and grew up – most would offer a bribe to get out of the predicament. Or when accessing healthcare services, people might give a “gift” or bribe before receiving care. If they don't, they fear they won't receive the service or the correct medicine. \n\nEven if they are personally against corruption and know the law forbids it, the social expectation can push them to do it anyway.\n\nUnderstanding these expectations is key to designing effective anti-corruption interventions.\n\n**Sophie: I've heard statements like \"Corruption is part of the culture of this country.\" Can we say some cultures or countries are more corrupt than others?**\n\nClaudia: I've often been told, across Africa, Latin America, the Balkans or Asia, \"Oh, Claudia, it's in our culture. What are we going to do?\" \n\nBut these regions have such vastly different cultures that I doubt culture is the defining factor. In my view, the real drivers are structural. \n\n- First, there are resource constraints: living in poverty and unmet need drives corruption. \n- Second, there are weak state institutions. When the state fails to deliver, it generates incentives to bypass the law just to solve problems, make money or access services. \n\nCulture simply adapts around these realities, absorbing corrupt practices through local names and jokes.\n\nSocial norms apply to concrete, narrow situations – they dictate what we're expected to do. \n\nCulture is something we all have an emotional stake in, so calling a culture corrupt is self-degrading and ignores how rich cultures are. \n\nI prefer to focus on social norms because they provide a concrete entry point where we can actually act and change things.\n\n**Sophie: Have you noticed people saying that addressing corruption is a Western thing?**\n\nClaudia: Government and anti-corruption officials across the board have assimilated the language of good governance, largely because their laws follow UN Conventions. At that level, a Westernised view definitely prevails.\n\nAt the grassroots, it's completely different. In research in Uganda and Tanzania, we used fictional \"vignettes\" to ask citizens about their perceptions of public officials, presenting two characters: \n\n- One who strictly abides by the law and refuses bribes.\n- Another who uses their authority to extract resources, but distributes them to their family and community. Stealing in order to share, like Robin Hood.\n\nAlmost without exception, people said the one stealing and sharing was great, loved and respected, while the law-abiding official was called a traitor who ignored his community responsibilities. \n\nFrom this view, the \"corrupt\" ones are those who fail to use power to look after their network. \n\nUltimately, there is vast room for interpretation regarding what corruption is, depending entirely on social norms, cultural environments and practical needs.\n\n**Sophie: How can we induce behaviour change to create a culture of integrity when the situation involves so many social norms, informal practices and other drivers?**\n\nClaudia: A lot of anti-corruption projects and investments are still very prescriptive. Focusing purely on top-down \"best practices\" and laws creates an \"implementation gap\": countries with excellent laws on paper but terrible results in practice.\n\nTo achieve sustainable change, we must go bottom-up. \n\nWorking at the subnational or municipal level shows a lot of promise, because it allows local governments to engage directly with constituents, jointly identify priorities and co-design solutions. \n\nAs scholar Yuen Yuen Ang argues in her work on [adaptive political economy](https:\u002F\u002Fmuse.jhu.edu\u002Farticle\u002F954433), you cannot expect context-defying behaviours to emerge just because you pass a law. We need to use what is already there – local practices, social networks and community groups – to solve problems sustainably without corruption. \n\nIt does not have to be a textbook Western \"best practice\", as long as it works.\n\n**Sophie: Do you have a success story or promising initiative you could share?**\n\nClaudia: On success stories, once I worked on a project on a remote island in the Philippines where the mayor was a true champion for his community. He even gave his personal mobile number to every citizen. \n\nIt was a very poor community, but because things were decided collectively, their few resources were visibly used in the best interest of everyone.\n\nOn promising initiatives, I'm currently supporting a Swiss-funded project in Moldova that takes this bottom-up approach seriously: its first year is dedicated purely to building trust among local stakeholders. Without trust, people can't collaborate or identify joint priorities. \n\nInvesting in trust, then letting the community take the driver's seat, is essential for sustainability. Otherwise, once funding dries up, everything regresses.\n\n**Sophie: Anti-corruption progress is slow, and we’re experiencing a global backlash. What keeps you motivated?**\n\nClaudia: What I love about my job is going to different countries and speaking with mayors, citizen groups, civil society organisations and the private sector – the real people on the ground whose lives would be transformed if there were less corruption.\n\nThat's what motivates me. Corruption remains a devastating barrier to development and poverty reduction. We often hear we need to \"raise awareness\", but that isn't true; in almost every context, people already know what's corrupt, suffer from it and dislike it.\n\nWe simply cannot give up. The climate can be demotivating, but if we're passive spectators, we can say goodbye to the institutions we've fought for. With our actions, we can intervene and change the course of events.\n\n**Sophie: One final question: how can we as individual citizens play a role in fighting corruption?**\n\nClaudia: First, by understanding our duties. Good governance is fundamentally linked to democracy, and whether you live in an established or fragile democracy, the legal framework almost always gives citizens instruments to engage with their representatives.\n\nIf we normalise using these tools to question authority and demand accountability, we strengthen the rule of law and put corrupt actors under scrutiny. If enough people do this, a lot can change.\n\n## Learn more\n\n::: links\n\n- [Quick Guide: Social norms and corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-10-social-norms-and-corruption\u002F)\n-  [Research Case Study: Harnessing behavioural approaches against corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fresearch-case-5\u002F)\n- [Blog – Bridging the gap: How behavioural science can strengthen anti-corruption and crime prevention](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fbridging-the-gap-how-behavioural-science-can-strengthen-anti-corruption-and-crime-prevention-2809\u002F)\n- [Article – Corruption and Social Norms: A New Arrow in the Quiver](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruption-and-social-norms-new-arrow-quiver\u002F)\n- [Episode 37 of *Sophie au pays des possibles*](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sophieaupaysdespossibles.com\u002F37-normes-sociales-corruption)\n:::\n","2026-07-02","podcast-interview-sophie-lemaitre-social-norms",[51,94],[222],{"id":375,"storage":128,"filename_disk":376,"filename_download":377,"title":378,"type":379,"created_on":380,"modified_on":381,"charset":7,"filesize":382,"width":383,"height":136,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":384,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":381},"3920eb09-db0e-48e7-8a49-8b841e448232","3920eb09-db0e-48e7-8a49-8b841e448232.png","Social norms Q&A website thumbnail.png","Social Norms Q&a Website Thumbnail","image\u002Fpng","2026-07-02T07:33:44.000Z","2026-07-02T07:33:45.000Z",4080191,2000,{},[],[387,406,418,432],{"id":388,"news_id":389,"tags_id":403},6054,{"id":365,"status":125,"user_created":390,"date_created":366,"user_updated":390,"date_updated":367,"title":368,"type":216,"body":369,"image":375,"date":370,"topic":7,"slug":371,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":391,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":392,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":393,"tags":394,"authors":398,"images":399,"translations":400,"content":401,"translations_news":402},"115250da-6c1d-42e7-888a-fbbe909fc524",[51,94],[222],[],[388,395,396,397],6055,6056,6057,[],[],[],[],[],{"id":404,"name":405},848,"Behavioural science",{"id":395,"news_id":407,"tags_id":417},{"id":365,"status":125,"user_created":390,"date_created":366,"user_updated":390,"date_updated":367,"title":368,"type":216,"body":369,"image":375,"date":370,"topic":7,"slug":371,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":408,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":409,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":410,"tags":411,"authors":412,"images":413,"translations":414,"content":415,"translations_news":416},[51,94],[222],[],[388,395,396,397],[],[],[],[],[],{"id":344,"name":345},{"id":396,"news_id":419,"tags_id":429},{"id":365,"status":125,"user_created":390,"date_created":366,"user_updated":390,"date_updated":367,"title":368,"type":216,"body":369,"image":375,"date":370,"topic":7,"slug":371,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":420,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":421,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":422,"tags":423,"authors":424,"images":425,"translations":426,"content":427,"translations_news":428},[51,94],[222],[],[388,395,396,397],[],[],[],[],[],{"id":430,"name":431},1373,"Corruption prevention",{"id":397,"news_id":433,"tags_id":443},{"id":365,"status":125,"user_created":390,"date_created":366,"user_updated":390,"date_updated":367,"title":368,"type":216,"body":369,"image":375,"date":370,"topic":7,"slug":371,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":434,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":435,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":436,"tags":437,"authors":438,"images":439,"translations":440,"content":441,"translations_news":442},[51,94],[222],[],[388,395,396,397],[],[],[],[],[],{"id":444,"name":445},1309,"Informality",[],[],[],[],[],{"id":452,"status":125,"date_created":453,"date_updated":454,"title":455,"type":216,"body":456,"date":457,"topic":7,"slug":458,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":459,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":460,"language":223,"image":461,"translation_of":7,"countries":472,"tags":473,"authors":547,"images":560,"translations":561,"content":562,"translations_news":563},10633,"2026-06-06T14:25:32.000Z","2026-07-02T09:50:06.000Z","Corruption in the age of networks, data and influence – does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive rise to the challenge?","_This article by [Dr Jacopo Costa](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fabout\u002Fteam\u002Fdr-jacopo-costa\u002F) is one of two Basel Institute commentaries on the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive._\n\n_While the [companion piece by Rita Simões](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Feu-directive-enforcement) examines the directive's legal and institutional implications, this article takes a political economy perspective. It considers what the directive reveals about changing understandings of corruption, how corruption risks are evolving in an increasingly interconnected and technology-driven environment, and where future EU anti-corruption efforts may need to focus._\n\n_The key message is that the directive represents an important advance in legal harmonisation, but that effective anti-corruption policy will also require stronger strategic thinking, greater use of data and technology, and closer attention to emerging corruption risks linked to procurement, border security and financial infrastructure._\n\nApril 2026, the European Union formally adopted [Directive 2026\u002F1021](https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Feli\u002Fdir\u002F2026\u002F1021\u002Foj\u002Feng) on combatting corruption. Following years of negotiations, political disagreements and institutional bargaining, the EU now has a comprehensive anti-corruption framework establishing common definitions, offences, sanctions and preventive measures across its member states.\n\nThis is a landmark achievement. But it would be a mistake to view the directive as the culmination of the European anti-corruption journey.\n\nIn fact, its adoption marks the beginning of a much larger challenge: turning a legal framework into an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy that can address the evolving forms of corruption emerging in an increasingly complex geopolitical and technological landscape.\n\n## Why the directive matters\n\nFor years, the EU lacked a coherent anti-corruption framework. Although member states had their own legislation, there were significant differences in how corruption offences were defined, investigated and punished.\n\nThese discrepancies created loopholes that could be exploited by corrupt individuals and hindered cross-border cooperation between national authorities.\n\nThe new directive aims to address these issues by introducing common minimum standards across the EU. In particular, it:\n\n-   harmonises the definitions of bribery in the public and private sectors, trading in influence, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment and the concealment of criminal proceeds;\n-   introduces common standards for criminal sanctions, corporate liability, statutes of limitation, whistleblower protection, anti-corruption strategies and specialised anti-corruption bodies; and\n-   broadens the definition of public officials to encompass not only national officeholders, but also senior EU officials and individuals performing public duties on behalf of public institutions. This reflects the reality of contemporary governance, where public services are increasingly delivered through hybrid public–private arrangements.\n\nIt is the most ambitious attempt yet to establish a shared European anti-corruption framework.\n\n## A more modern understanding of corruption\n\nOne of the directive's most significant strengths is its recognition that corruption is not confined to the traditional notion of an envelope stuffed with cash being exchanged.\n\nWe welcome this change in perspective greatly, because our research demonstrates clearly that contemporary [corruption is increasingly networked, sophisticated and relational](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fcorruption-complex-adaptive-network). It often relies on intermediaries, influence brokers, hidden financial channels, luxury gifts, preferential treatment, future career opportunities and informal exchanges of favours.\n\nIncluding offences such as trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealing criminal proceeds and aiding or abetting corruption schemes shows an understanding of how corruption operates in modern societies.\n\nThis evolution is important because anti-corruption frameworks often struggle to keep up with the evolving nature of corruption. The directive is a valuable attempt to address this issue and close the resulting gap.\n\n## The price of political compromise\n\nLegislation is never produced in isolation from politics. Significant disagreements emerged among EU institutions and member states during the adoption process. Several governments expressed concerns about subsidiarity and the potential consequences of criminalising particular behaviours.\n\nSo, the final directive is less ambitious than the original proposal.\n\nOne example concerns the offence previously known as “abuse of office”. Following intense political resistance, particularly from countries such as Germany and Italy, the final text replaced it with the more cautious formulation of “unlawful exercise of public functions”. The compromise facilitated agreement, but introduced ambiguity that could hinder enforcement.\n\nSimilarly, criminal sanctions and limitation periods were reduced during negotiations. Maximum prison sentences were reduced, and statutes of limitation were scaled back considerably compared to earlier drafts.\n\nThese compromises highlight a recurring dilemma in policymaking not only in Europe but everywhere: achieving consensus often necessitates compromising on ambition. The result is a directive that establishes a common baseline, yet leaves considerable room for interpretation among member states.\n\n## The missing security lens\n\nPerhaps the most significant limitation of the directive is its relatively little guidance on what anti-corruption efforts should look like in today's rapidly changing security environment.\n\nThis is because corruption is increasingly also a geopolitical and security issue. Foreign influence operations, sanctions evasion schemes, strategic corruption, illicit financial networks, organised crime infiltration and the manipulation of critical supply chains all represent corruption-related risks affecting European security and resilience.\n\nYet these challenges remain largely outside the directive's core focus. There is a risk that anti-corruption efforts will continue to focus on traditional forms of misconduct while underestimating emerging threats linked to geopolitical competition and hybrid forms of influence.\n\n## The technology gap\n\nConsidering the hype around artificial intelligence in society generally, the most striking omission in the directive is the limited attention devoted to technological innovation. Over the past decade, governments, international organisations and researchers have been exploring how artificial intelligence, big data analytics, risk indicators, predictive modelling and open-source intelligence can bolster anti-corruption initiatives.\n\nTechnology is now essential for identifying suspicious procurement patterns, pinpointing conflicts of interest, tracing illicit financial flows and exposing corruption networks. Yet the directive contains almost no strategic vision regarding the role of technology in anti-corruption governance, which is surprising.\n\nResearch conducted under the EU-funded [FALCON project](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F) – of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member – demonstrates that effective anti-corruption systems are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures capable of collecting, integrating, analysing and cross-referencing large volumes of information. Without these capabilities, many corruption risks remain invisible until significant damage has already occurred.\n\nIt’s important to stress that adopting new technologies – purchasing software, etc. – is the easy part. EU states also need to create the institutional and data infrastructures that allow these technologies to function effectively. Digitisation, interoperability, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and cross-border information sharing are all prerequisites for the next generation of anti-corruption systems.\n\n## Three areas that deserve greater attention\n\nFrom our research in the following areas, we can say for sure that they deserve particular attention in the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy and future initiatives:\n\n**1\\. Public procurement**\n\nPublic procurement remains one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. This issue is exacerbated by [Europe's increased investment in defence](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Foperational-credibility-is-a-strategic-asset-in-the-defence-industry-what-does-that-mean-for-ukraine-and-its-partners-2965\u002F), critical infrastructure, energy security, technological innovation and strategic industrial policies.\n\n[Central priorities](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fhigh-level-corruption-analysis-schemes-costs-and-policy-recommendations) should include strengthening transparency, reducing direct awards, improving oversight of sub-threshold contracts, and introducing AI-based risk assessment tools.\n\n**2\\. Border governance**\n\nManaging borders and customs procedures is another critical challenge, as research at the [Port of Rotterdam](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-corruption-helps-drug-traffickers-adapt-to-strengthened-border-enforcement-2848\u002F) and the [Kapitan Andreevo crossing](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-stronger-borders-can-create-smarter-corruption-lessons-from-one-of-europes-most-strategic-border-crossings-2972\u002F) demonstrates. Corruption at the border facilitates a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, evasion of sanctions, tax fraud and the movement of illicit goods.\n\nGreater automation, data integration and harmonisation of [border management systems](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Frecommendations-combatting-border-corruption-falcon-policy-brief) across member states could significantly reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the EU's capacity to detect emerging threats.\n\n**3\\. Financial infrastructures**\n\nModern corruption relies heavily on [financial infrastructure](https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10610-024-09591-z). Complex financial networks, shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and, increasingly, cryptoassets can facilitate the movement and concealment of illicit funds.\n\nThe future of anti-corruption policy hinges on strengthening the links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks, and on developing new approaches that can address digital financial ecosystems.\n\n## Will the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy help put the directive into action?\n\nThe adoption of Directive 2026\u002F1021 sends an important message that corruption remains a priority issue for the European Union. The directive establishes a much-needed common foundation and introduces valuable innovations to improve both prevention and enforcement. It provides a stronger legal framework than the fragmented system that existed previously.\n\nBut legal harmonisation alone will not be enough. The directive's effectiveness will ultimately depend on how member states implement its provisions, and on whether the European Union can develop a broader strategic vision capable of addressing emerging corruption risks.\n\nThis is where the forthcoming EU Anti-Corruption Strategy could play a decisive role. To be effective and not just a paper exercise, it must be adaptive, technology-driven and security-conscious. This strategy must respond to current corruption and anticipate its potential evolution.\n\nAnd it needs to be based on a participative process that considers the valuable research and perspectives of civil society organisations, academics and others outside of government.\n\nIf the directive provides the legal architecture, the strategy can provide the direction. Together, they could form the basis of a more adaptive and forward-looking European anti-corruption framework – one that is able to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.","2026-06-07","eu-directive-political-lens",[51,94],[222],{"id":462,"storage":128,"filename_disk":463,"filename_download":464,"title":465,"type":174,"created_on":466,"modified_on":467,"charset":7,"filesize":468,"width":469,"height":470,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":465,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":471,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":467},"daa620e4-883a-414b-9422-156b0bf16c2b","daa620e4-883a-414b-9422-156b0bf16c2b.webp","EU border crossing_Jacopo blog.webp","The EU's borders are vulnerable to corruption, and deserve a prominent place in the EU's Anti-Corruption Strategy.","2026-06-06T14:30:40.000Z","2026-06-08T11:45:34.000Z",387454,1536,1024,{},[],[474,495,509,521,535],{"id":475,"news_id":476,"tags_id":492},6012,{"id":452,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":453,"user_updated":477,"date_updated":454,"title":455,"type":216,"body":456,"image":462,"date":457,"topic":7,"slug":458,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":478,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":479,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":480,"tags":481,"authors":486,"images":488,"translations":489,"content":490,"translations_news":491},"d22c72aa-896a-43ce-acca-4154ff70a25a",[51,94],[222],[],[475,482,483,484,485],6013,6015,6016,6019,[487],1381,[],[],[],[],{"id":493,"name":494},879,"Money laundering",{"id":482,"news_id":496,"tags_id":506},{"id":452,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":453,"user_updated":477,"date_updated":454,"title":455,"type":216,"body":456,"image":462,"date":457,"topic":7,"slug":458,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":497,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":498,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":499,"tags":500,"authors":501,"images":502,"translations":503,"content":504,"translations_news":505},[51,94],[222],[],[475,482,483,484,485],[487],[],[],[],[],{"id":507,"name":508},967,"Organised crime",{"id":483,"news_id":510,"tags_id":520},{"id":452,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":453,"user_updated":477,"date_updated":454,"title":455,"type":216,"body":456,"image":462,"date":457,"topic":7,"slug":458,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":511,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":512,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":513,"tags":514,"authors":515,"images":516,"translations":517,"content":518,"translations_news":519},[51,94],[222],[],[475,482,483,484,485],[487],[],[],[],[],{"id":344,"name":345},{"id":484,"news_id":522,"tags_id":532},{"id":452,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":453,"user_updated":477,"date_updated":454,"title":455,"type":216,"body":456,"image":462,"date":457,"topic":7,"slug":458,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":523,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":524,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":525,"tags":526,"authors":527,"images":528,"translations":529,"content":530,"translations_news":531},[51,94],[222],[],[475,482,483,484,485],[487],[],[],[],[],{"id":533,"name":534},1215,"Illicit financial flows",{"id":485,"news_id":536,"tags_id":546},{"id":452,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":453,"user_updated":477,"date_updated":454,"title":455,"type":216,"body":456,"image":462,"date":457,"topic":7,"slug":458,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":537,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":538,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":539,"tags":540,"authors":541,"images":542,"translations":543,"content":544,"translations_news":545},[51,94],[222],[],[475,482,483,484,485],[487],[],[],[],[],{"id":430,"name":431},[548],{"id":487,"news_id":549,"authors_id":559},{"id":452,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":453,"user_updated":477,"date_updated":454,"title":455,"type":216,"body":456,"image":462,"date":457,"topic":7,"slug":458,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":550,"activities":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":551,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":552,"tags":553,"authors":554,"images":555,"translations":556,"content":557,"translations_news":558},[51,94],[222],[],[475,482,483,484,485],[487],[],[],[],[],{"id":255,"name":256,"position":257,"image":258},[],[],[],[],{"id":565,"status":125,"date_created":566,"date_updated":567,"title":568,"type":216,"body":569,"date":570,"topic":7,"slug":571,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":572,"activities":573,"programme":575,"area":577,"websites":580,"language":223,"image":581,"translation_of":7,"countries":592,"tags":593,"authors":594,"images":616,"translations":617,"content":618,"translations_news":619},10590,"2025-12-05T11:43:36.000Z","2026-06-24T13:41:09.000Z","Assessing national risks related to virtual assets","This feature appears in the 2025 Basel AML Index Public Edition report. \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fdownloads\">Download the full report and related resources\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n\u003Cblockquote>\n\u003Ch2>Key takeaways\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Understanding national risks linked to virtual assets is now essential\u003C\u002Fstrong>, as their use has moved from niche to mainstream and is increasingly exploited for financial crime. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Risk assessments are inherently challenging \u003C\u002Fstrong>as (a) virtual assets are borderless by design, (b) large parts of the ecosystem fall outside regulation and (c) reliable national-level data remains limited. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Illicit activity involving virtual assets does not take place in isolation\u003C\u002Fstrong>: offenders exploit the same weaknesses – corruption, fraud, weak supervision and poor enforcement – that already undermine the wider financial system. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>The Basel AML Index provides valuable indicators to assess both a jurisdiction’s structural vulnerabilities and its capacity to counter threats \u003C\u002Fstrong>related to financial crimes in general, including those related to virtual assets, even though it does not include a dedicated virtual assets risk indicator. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003C\u002Fblockquote>\n\n\u003Cem>Note: in this article we use the term virtual assets in line with the FATF’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Ftopics\u002Fvirtual-assets.html\">definition\u003C\u002Fa> of “any digital representation of value that can be digitally traded, transferred or used for payment”. The terms crypto, cryptoassets, digital assets, digital currencies, etc. form part of this loose family, though they are often defined differently in different contexts – a factor that also complicates risk assessments and data analysis.\u003C\u002Fem>\n\n\u003Ch2>\u003Cstrong>Why assessing risks related to virtual assets matters \u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\nGovernments and private firms alike are under growing pressure to understand the risks associated with virtual assets. What was once a niche is becoming a mainstream part of financial markets and a common feature in all forms of financial crime.\n\nAs the virtual assets industry continues to mature, national authorities that lack a clear understanding of the risks find themselves on the back foot when drafting legislation, supervising market participants or countering financial crime.\n\nFor financial institutions, a clear picture of jurisdiction-level risk is essential for customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, calibrating controls and taking strategic decisions about where or where not to operate. Financial institutions that misjudge these risks leave themselves exposed to illicit finance, reputational harm and potential regulatory action.\n\n\u003Ch2>Why jurisdiction-level risk assessments are difficult\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\n\u003Ch3>1. A borderless system by design\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\nUnlike bank accounts or trust funds, virtual asset wallets or addresses do not have a meaningful jurisdictional location. There is no crypto equivalent of “a bank account in Switzerland”. A wallet can be accessed anywhere and may be controlled by a person or entity whose location is unknown or easily obscured. Large parts of the virtual asset ecosystem also fall outside the boundaries of traditional financial regulation. Self-hosted wallets, peer-to-peer transfers, decentralised finance (DeFi) protocols and informal over-the-counter (OTC) brokers create pockets of activity that are largely invisible. Any jurisdiction-level assessment will inevitably be incomplete.\n\nThe activities of virtual asset service providers (VASPs) further complicate matters. A VASP may be established in one jurisdiction while primarily serving customers in another. In the absence of harmonised legislation or cooperation among supervisors, many operate across numerous markets with minimal physical presence or regulatory engagement.\n\n\u003Ch3>2. Data is limited, patchy and uncertain\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\nReliable quantitative data on financial crime risks related to virtual assets at the national level is scarce. In addition to the issue of contrasting definitions and the technology’s borderless nature, several factors contribute to this lack.\n\nFirst, commercial blockchain analytics providers publish broad indicators of virtual asset adoption and estimates of illicit usage. These can be helpful for spotting trends but require careful interpretation. They rely on estimates and proxies, including web traffic to exchanges or intermediaries, and do not provide precise amounts or reliably distinguish licit from illicit activity.\n\nSecond, it is reasonable to assume that where adoption rises, illicit activity will also increase, simply because criminals use the same infrastructure as legitimate users. However, such relationships cannot be measured with confidence.\n\nThird, at the government level, many jurisdictions still lack a coordinated approach across authorities to collect, share and analyse statistics on money laundering and related financial crimes. In many jurisdictions, data on virtual assets is either not gathered consistently or not collected at all.\n\nWithout reliable data on virtual assets usage and risks, national risk assessments may become detached from real-world threats. The result: regulation and supervision that is either insufficient or unnecessarily burdensome.\n\n## How the Basel AML Index can be used\n\nFor the above reasons, the Basel AML Index does not offer a dedicated indicator for virtual assets. Nevertheless, the Index data is still useful because illicit activity involving virtual assets typically exploits the same underlying weaknesses that enable money laundering, corruption, fraud and other financial crimes in the traditional financial system. Where protections against fraud are weak, for example, where supervision is lacking or where enforcement of regulations is inconsistent or politically compromised, opportunities to misuse virtual assets for illegal purposes tend to expand.\n\n\u003Cblockquote>\n\u003Cstrong>Two components of risk \u003C\u002Fstrong>\n\nIn line with the holistic methodology of the Basel AML Index and most AML\u002FCFT risk assessment frameworks, evaluating jurisdiction-level risk related to virtual assets centres on two elements:\n\n\u003Cp>a) \u003Cem>vulnerability \u003C\u002Fem>to the illicit use of virtual assets; and b) \u003Cem>capacity to mitigate \u003C\u002Fem>and respond to these threats. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003C\u002Fblockquote>\n\n## Relevant indicators\n\nThe following graphic highlights indicators of the Basel AML Index that are relevant for assessing either \u003Cem>structural vulnerabilities \u003C\u002Fem>that illicit actors may exploit, or a jurisdiction’s \u003Cem>capacity to counter \u003C\u002Fem>threats. These can be viewed individually in the Expert Edition.\n\n![](https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F7f446525-136f-4018-a322-8a4e8872f23b) *Indicators visible in the Basel AML Index Edition that are particularly relevant to assessing national risks relating to virtual assets.*\n\n\n### FATF data\n\nUsing the Expert Edition Plus subscription and its quantitative analysis of the latest FATF mutual evaluation and follow-up reports, Basel AML Index users can gain rapid insights into whether a jurisdiction’s AML\u002FCFT framework provides it with the capacity to \u003Cem>counter threats \u003C\u002Fem>related to financial crimes generally, including those involving virtual assets. FATF Recommendations that may be highly relevant for this include:\n\n- R.15 (new technologies)\n- R.16 (payment transparency)\n- R.26 & 27 (regulation and supervision)\n- R.29–31 (law enforcement)\n- R.36–40 (international cooperation)\n\nAn additional useful source of information for jurisdiction-level risk assessments is the FATF’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFatfrecommendations\u002Ftargeted-update-virtual-assets-vasps-2025.html\">\u003Cem>2025 Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fa>. This report summarises progress in implementing FATF Recommendation 15 by FATF members and additional jurisdictions with materially important global virtual asset activity. “Materially important” refers to the presence of large VASPs (accounting for more than 0.25 percent of global trading) and\u002For a large virtual asset user base.\n\n## Where to start\n\nFor jurisdictions at an early stage of assessing national risks related to virtual assets, the World Bank’s \u003Cem>\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fopenknowledge.worldbank.org\u002Fentities\u002Fpublication\u002Fbb5a7475-ac52-4697-afdc-5f618a550623\">AML\u002FCFT National Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers: Guidance Manual\u003C\u002Fa> \u003C\u002Fem>(published in October 2025) is a strong starting point. It covers both threats and vulnerabilities, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation measures.\n\nAdditional useful resources include:\n- \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002F9crc-crypto-regulation\">\u003Cstrong>Practical recommendations from regulators and supervisors\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fa>, developed at the 9th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptoassets, on understanding financial crime risks linked to virtual assets and designing effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks.\n- \u003Cstrong>Structured public–private partnerships\u003C\u002Fstrong>, such as the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fefippp.eu\u002F\">Europol Financial Intelligence Sharing Public Private Partnership\u003C\u002Fa>, which offer opportunities to learn from peers and obtain early insights into emerging threats and financial crime typologies involving virtual assets.\n","2025-12-08","assessing-national-risks-related-to-virtual-assets",[6,16,34,51,29],[29,574],"Research",[576],"International Centre for Asset Recovery",[578,579],"Asset Recovery & Enforcement","Business Integrity & Governance",[29],{"id":582,"storage":128,"filename_disk":583,"filename_download":584,"title":585,"type":379,"created_on":586,"modified_on":587,"charset":7,"filesize":588,"width":589,"height":590,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":585,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":591,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":586},"78f8a1ec-bf8d-469a-ab92-228e79ddd8f2","78f8a1ec-bf8d-469a-ab92-228e79ddd8f2.png","Indicators for virtual assets.png","Indicators for Virtual Assets","2025-12-05T11:54:54.000Z","2025-12-06T21:13:00.000Z",133953,888,583,{},[],[],[595],{"id":596,"news_id":597,"authors_id":611},1365,{"id":565,"status":125,"user_created":241,"date_created":566,"user_updated":598,"date_updated":567,"title":568,"type":216,"body":569,"image":582,"date":570,"topic":7,"slug":571,"activity":7,"nid":7,"topics":599,"activities":600,"programme":601,"area":602,"websites":603,"translation_of":7,"language":223,"countries":604,"tags":605,"authors":606,"images":607,"translations":608,"content":609,"translations_news":610},"dfef11db-1bc6-47e9-a61d-93443995484b",[6,16,34,51,29],[29,574],[576],[578,579],[29],[],[],[596],[],[],[],[],{"id":612,"name":613,"position":614,"image":615},556,"Dr Kateryna Boguslavska","Head of Financial Crime Risk","1a304c66-8f40-4954-9bae-37fc556a7789",[],[],[],[],{"items":621,"total":53},[622,751,870],{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":627,"area":629,"image":630,"content":639,"tags":700,"countries":739},"Anti-corruption support to Ukraine during wartime","How we support Ukraine to safeguard reconstruction, strengthen anti-corruption systems, build defensive strength with integrity, and advance asset recovery even under wartime conditions. A snapshot of our diverse efforts.","anti-corruption-ukraine","- **Strengthened anti-corruption frameworks** across infrastructure, transport, forestry, medical procurement and the private sector, adapted to wartime conditions.\n- **Produced the first joint strategic corruption risk assessment** of Ukraine’s civil infrastructure recovery, in partnership with the National Agency for Corruption Prevention (NACP) and the State Audit Service.\n- **Provided ongoing support to Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions** at a critical juncture, amid increasing political pressure and risks to institutional independence. The programme delivered advanced training to more than 93 prosecutors, investigators and judges, with training now expanding to the Specialised Environmental Prosecutor’s Office to address environmental crime risks.\n- **Enabled progress on international asset recovery**, including execution of six mutual legal assistance requests by Switzerland and expert support on frozen Yanukovych-era assets.\n- **Assessed corruption risks** in 336 restoration grants worth UAH 61.8 billion, with our recommendations formally endorsed by the Ministry of Communities and Territories Development.\n",[628],"Europe",[51,107],{"id":631,"storage":128,"filename_disk":632,"filename_download":633,"title":107,"type":174,"created_on":634,"modified_on":634,"charset":7,"filesize":635,"width":636,"height":637,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":638,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":634},"2a10135b-52e1-4f71-9c4c-0df4c05a82a8","2a10135b-52e1-4f71-9c4c-0df4c05a82a8.webp","ukraine.webp","2026-02-28T23:26:34.000Z",298332,1600,1093,{},[640,658,669,679,690],{"id":641,"collection":642,"sort":65,"stories_id":643,"item":654},19,"text",{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":644,"area":645,"content":646,"tags":649,"countries":653},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],20,23,[650,651,40,652],32,33,35,[60],{"id":655,"text":656,"class":7,"title":657,"anchor":7},44,"Anti-corruption is essential in Ukraine, especially during wartime. As Ukraine defends itself against aggression, it also plays a pivotal role in preserving the rule of law and contributing to the security and stability of Europe as a whole.\n \nWartime conditions create severe challenges for anti-corruption work. Yet public demand for accountability remains exceptionally strong, reflecting an unusually low tolerance for corruption even under pressure. With scarce resources and immense reconstruction needs, preventing corruption is central to Ukraine’s resilience and to its commitment to building back better.","The situation",{"id":647,"collection":642,"sort":60,"stories_id":659,"item":665},{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":660,"area":661,"content":662,"tags":663,"countries":664},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":666,"text":667,"class":7,"title":668,"anchor":7},45,"Despite the security and financial challenges, we reinforced support to the Government of Ukraine, state-owned enterprises and civil society to strengthen transparency, oversight and enforcement. Much of this work was made possible through long-standing support from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), with additional funding from Norway, Liechtenstein, the EBRD, Swedfund, NEFCO and USAID.\n \nOur approach combines hands-on corruption risk assessments, the development of mitigation measures and practical guidance on strengthening anti-corruption frameworks, adapted to volatile wartime conditions.","What we did",{"id":648,"collection":670,"sort":53,"stories_id":671,"item":677},"image",{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":672,"area":673,"content":674,"tags":675,"countries":676},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":55,"image":678,"caption":7},"0cf2e2dd-e0dc-4800-ae2f-6f96bfc5f285",{"id":13,"collection":642,"sort":20,"stories_id":680,"item":686},{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":681,"area":682,"content":683,"tags":684,"countries":685},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":687,"text":688,"class":7,"title":689,"anchor":7},46,"### Safeguarding restoration and infrastructure\nUkraine’s restoration costs are already in the hundreds of billions of dollars – and reconstruction is ongoing even as the war rages. In 2024, working with the Ministry of Communities and Territories Development, we assessed corruption risks in 336 restoration grants worth UAH 61.8 billion. We identified regulatory weaknesses and provided detailed recommendations, which were formally endorsed by the Ministry, strengthening safeguards for future projects.\n \nWe also supported the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development to develop policies on whistleblowing, internal investigations, handling corruption reports, transparent recruitment and a Code of Ethics, complemented by targeted training and a monthly anti-corruption newsletter.\n\n### Strengthening integrity in state-owned enterprises\nUkrainian Railways (UZ), a strategically vital state-owned enterprise, faces heightened corruption risks due to its size and wartime role. Building on long-standing cooperation, in 2024 we helped adapt its corruption risk assessment methodology to wartime realities and strengthened its compliance framework with a new Anti-Corruption Programme, Code of Ethics and related policies, followed by training to support implementation. We also advised UZ on the reform of its sizable procurement system, reducing one of the long-standing corruption risks.\n\n### Protecting Ukraine's forests from corruption\nTogether with the National Agency for Corruption Prevention, WWF Ukraine and the Specialised Environmental Prosecutor’s Office, we published an in-depth study on corruption risks related to forests and the timber sector. We continue to work with partners to strengthen the regulatory framework and reduce corruption risks in this sector.\n \nIn parallel, we collaborate with the state-owned enterprise Forests of Ukraine to strengthen its anti-corruption framework, helping to protect forests and support a sustainable and profitable timber trade.\n\n### Recovering assets from abroad\nBuilding sustainable capacity in financial investigations and asset recovery is essential to Ukraine’s ability to uncover and prosecute corruption and related financial crimes and to recover vital public funds.\n \nIn 2025, five practitioners from the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the High Anti-Corruption Court were certified as national trainers in financial investigations and asset recovery after completing the International Centre for Asset Recovery’s Train-the-Trainer programme. This milestone helps embed practitioner-led training across key anti-corruption institutions. As experienced investigators and prosecutors, the certified trainers are also well placed to apply and promote innovative approaches to asset recovery within their own organisations.\n \nAlongside capacity building, ICAR experts facilitated a meeting in Switzerland between the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Swiss Federal Office of Justice, resulting in the execution of six mutual legal assistance requests. We also provided expert opinions in seven cases linked to frozen Yanukovych-era assets.\n","The impact",{"id":104,"collection":642,"sort":18,"stories_id":691,"item":697},{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":692,"area":693,"content":694,"tags":695,"countries":696},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":103,"text":698,"class":7,"title":699,"anchor":7},"We have been working in Ukraine for over a decade. A significantly increased team of 10 experts in Kyiv delivers the vast majority of our programming, with headquarters support.\n \nIn 2025 and 2026 the effort continues, with an additional three-year project funded by the Government of Norway to promote transparency and accountability in three strategically vital sectors:\n \n- **Natural resources**: Tackling corruption risks in forestry and the critical minerals sector.\n- **Energy**: Supporting transparency and accountability in energy-related enterprises, starting with a collaboration with the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine to establish a comprehensive anti-corruption compliance system.\n- **Defence industries**: Strengthening compliance and integrity systems in defence manufacturers as they produce vital materiel for Ukraine’s defence and integrate with Europe’s broader security architecture. This builds on our ongoing partnership with Ukraine Defense Industries (UkrOboronProm or UOP).\n \nIn addition, multi-year support from the Principality of Liechtenstein is allowing us to build a dedicated programme focused on reducing corruption risks in renewable energy. As Ukraine shifts away from centralised fossil fuel-based generation capacity, both for security and decarbonisation purposes, ensuring that the energy transition is not undermined through corruption is doubly crucial. \n","Wider context",[701,711,721,731],{"id":650,"stories_id":702,"tags_id":708},{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":703,"area":704,"content":705,"tags":706,"countries":707},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":709,"name":710},1306,"Governance",{"id":651,"stories_id":712,"tags_id":718},{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":713,"area":714,"content":715,"tags":716,"countries":717},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":719,"name":720},830,"Business integrity",{"id":40,"stories_id":722,"tags_id":728},{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":723,"area":724,"content":725,"tags":726,"countries":727},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":729,"name":730},843,"Asset recovery",{"id":652,"stories_id":732,"tags_id":738},{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":733,"area":734,"content":735,"tags":736,"countries":737},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":344,"name":345},[740],{"id":60,"stories_id":741,"countries_id":747},{"id":55,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":623,"image":631,"description":624,"slug":625,"highlights":626,"region":742,"area":743,"content":744,"tags":745,"countries":746},[628],[51,107],[641,647,648,13,104],[650,651,40,652],[60],{"id":89,"name":107,"code":748,"latitude":749,"longitude":750},"UA",48.37943,31.16558,{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":756,"area":758,"image":759,"content":771,"tags":813,"countries":857},"Applying behavioural insights to reduce corruption in a Tanzanian hospital","How a behavioural anti-corruption pilot in a Dar es Salaam hospital reduced gift-giving and generated evidence on how social norms interventions can tackle corruption in public services.","tz-hospital","- **Direct impact:** Reduced gift-giving intentions, attitudes and positive beliefs among hospital users by 14–44 percent within eight weeks.\n- **Behaviour change mechanism:** Trained peer champions, visible leadership support and workplace messaging shifted social norms around gift acceptance among health workers.\n- **Systemic impact:** Generated practical evidence showing that social norms and behaviour change interventions can complement traditional anti-corruption controls in frontline public services.",[757],"Africa",[51],{"id":760,"storage":128,"filename_disk":761,"filename_download":762,"title":763,"type":174,"created_on":764,"modified_on":765,"charset":7,"filesize":766,"width":767,"height":469,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":768,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":769,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":770},"3db2e132-5c95-4e29-87ef-141047e12dc0","3db2e132-5c95-4e29-87ef-141047e12dc0.webp","Gemini_Generated_Image_prumrlprumrlprum.webp","Gemini Generated Image Prumrlprumrlprum","2026-05-22T13:46:54.000Z","2026-05-29T21:37:53.000Z",114158,2752,"Anti-gift giving poster as part of a pilot anti-corruption intervention in a public hospital in Tanzania.",{},"2026-05-22T13:46:55.000Z",[772,783,793,803],{"id":652,"collection":642,"sort":65,"stories_id":773,"item":781},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":774,"area":775,"content":776,"tags":777,"countries":780},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],14,15,[22],{"id":12,"text":782,"class":7,"title":657,"anchor":7},"In many public service settings, including health facilities, users offer unofficial “gifts” to frontline staff to build social relationships and secure better treatment. Rooted in social norms of reciprocity, this practice can fuel petty corruption, entrench inequality and distort access to essential services like healthcare. Traditional anti-corruption measures like training or controls are often insufficient in such contexts, but approaches that target social norms and behaviour change show promise.",{"id":73,"collection":642,"sort":60,"stories_id":784,"item":790},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":785,"area":786,"content":787,"tags":788,"countries":789},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":791,"text":792,"class":7,"title":668,"anchor":7},74,"We piloted a behavioural anti-corruption intervention in a public hospital in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in collaboration with the UK Behavioural Insights Team, the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Utrecht. The intervention targeted social norms underpinning gift-giving and leveraged the social networks of health workers.\n\nUsing a peer-driven model, we recruited and trained anti-corruption champions from multiple professional groups. These champions shared messages discouraging gift acceptance in staff meetings and personal conversations. \n\nPosters and desk signs reinforced the messages, stating that staff do not accept bribes. Desk signs also provided guidance on tactfully refusing gifts and appealed to professional ethics, with endorsement from hospital management and the national medical association.",{"id":30,"collection":642,"sort":53,"stories_id":794,"item":800},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":795,"area":796,"content":797,"tags":798,"countries":799},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":801,"text":802,"class":7,"title":689,"anchor":7},75,"**Direct impact: measurable behaviour change**\nWithin eight weeks, the pilot recorded a 14–44 percent reduction in gift-giving intentions, attitudes and positive beliefs among hospital users. Posters and peer messaging proved more effective than written guidance on how to refuse gifts. Some beliefs – particularly around gifts given as “gratitude” after services – were more resistant to change.\n\n**Indirect impact: evidence and models for wider reform**\nBeyond the measurable results, the pilot generated practical insights for tackling corruption rooted in social norms. It demonstrated the importance of clearly communicating that all forms of gift-giving constitute corruption, highlighting the negative consequences and using trusted peer networks and visible leadership support to reinforce behaviour change.\n\nThe intervention also showed the value of locally adapted, participatory approaches that complement traditional compliance measures. These lessons provide a foundation for applying similar social norms interventions in other hospitals and adapting the approach to address corruption risks in other public service sectors.",{"id":85,"collection":642,"sort":20,"stories_id":804,"item":810},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":805,"area":806,"content":807,"tags":808,"countries":809},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":811,"text":812,"class":7,"title":699,"anchor":7},76,"The Tanzania hospital pilot reflects the Basel Institute’s broader approach of linking research with practical anti-corruption action. Our Prevention, Research and Innovation team examines how corruption is shaped by social norms, informal practices and political realities, recognising that behaviour change is central to sustainable reform.\n\nBy piloting innovative interventions in real-world settings, we generate evidence on what works in practice. These insights inform anti-corruption strategies used by governments, development partners and civil society organisations, and support the design of behaviour-focused interventions alongside traditional compliance and enforcement measures.",[814,822,832,840,848],{"id":58,"stories_id":815,"tags_id":821},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":816,"area":817,"content":818,"tags":819,"countries":820},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":404,"name":405},{"id":149,"stories_id":823,"tags_id":829},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":824,"area":825,"content":826,"tags":827,"countries":828},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":830,"name":831},859,"Corruption risks",{"id":778,"stories_id":833,"tags_id":839},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":834,"area":835,"content":836,"tags":837,"countries":838},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":344,"name":345},{"id":779,"stories_id":841,"tags_id":847},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":842,"area":843,"content":844,"tags":845,"countries":846},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":444,"name":445},{"id":48,"stories_id":849,"tags_id":855},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":850,"area":851,"content":852,"tags":853,"countries":854},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":487,"name":856},"Health",[858],{"id":22,"stories_id":859,"countries_id":865},{"id":56,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":752,"image":760,"description":753,"slug":754,"highlights":755,"region":860,"area":861,"content":862,"tags":863,"countries":864},[757],[51],[652,73,30,85],[58,149,778,779,48],[22],{"id":91,"name":866,"code":867,"latitude":868,"longitude":869},"Tanzania","TZ",-6.36903,34.88882,{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":875,"area":876,"image":877,"content":888,"tags":930,"countries":957},"Accountability in Malawi: local actors in the driving seat","How experience from the Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support project showed that stronger accountability grows from local leadership, trust and learning by doing.","maccs","- **Building stronger accountability networks:** Civil society groups, journalists and accountability actors are collaborating more closely, pooling evidence and building coalitions rather than competing for influence.\n- **Putting local partners in the lead:** Through the Accountability Working Group, partners identify priorities, shape interventions and adapt strategies to changing realities on the ground.\n- **Influencing national debate:** Civil society organisations supported through the programme pushed priority corruption issues onto the agenda of Malawi’s 2025 Presidential Debate.\n",[757],[51],{"id":878,"storage":128,"filename_disk":879,"filename_download":880,"title":881,"type":132,"created_on":882,"modified_on":883,"charset":7,"filesize":884,"width":636,"height":136,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":885,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":886,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":887},"c98836fd-ec9c-48e9-af02-547cfbbff474","c98836fd-ec9c-48e9-af02-547cfbbff474.jpg","19 Malawi - governance behaviour change.jpg","19 Malawi   Governance Behaviour Change","2026-05-25T18:19:14.000Z","2026-05-29T21:41:22.000Z",154777,"At a workshop of the Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support project.",{},"2026-05-25T18:19:16.000Z",[889,901,911,921],{"id":655,"collection":642,"sort":65,"stories_id":890,"item":898},{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"image":878,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":891,"area":892,"content":893,"tags":894,"countries":897},[757],[51],[655,666,687,103],[895,896,204],39,40,[58],{"id":899,"text":900,"class":7,"title":657,"anchor":7},82,"Many anti-corruption and accountability programmes assume that training, funding and technical tools will be enough to strengthen civil society and drive reform.\n\nYet in many countries – including Malawi, where the programme was implemented – corruption is deeply embedded in political systems and social norms. Citizens and organisations working to strengthen accountability face limited resources, shifting political realities and shrinking civic space. Technical solutions alone are rarely enough to sustain change.",{"id":666,"collection":642,"sort":60,"stories_id":902,"item":908},{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"image":878,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":903,"area":904,"content":905,"tags":906,"countries":907},[757],[51],[655,666,687,103],[895,896,204],[58],{"id":909,"text":910,"class":7,"title":668,"anchor":7},83,"Through the Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) project, implemented jointly with Adam Smith International, the Basel Institute worked with civil society, media and private-sector partners to strengthen accountability and anti-corruption efforts.\n\nThe programme moved away from predefined solutions towards a more adaptive approach centred on local ownership and learning by doing.\n\nAt its core was an Accountability Working Group that created space for peer learning, relationship building and experimentation. Partners analysed power dynamics, tested new approaches and refined strategies as contexts changed.\n\nWe also supported partners to design interventions targeting the behaviours and social norms that sustain corruption. With the Malawi Health Equity Network, for example, this included work to tackle bribery in health facilities by understanding and shifting intentions and beliefs.",{"id":687,"collection":642,"sort":53,"stories_id":912,"item":918},{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"image":878,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":913,"area":914,"content":915,"tags":916,"countries":917},[757],[51],[655,666,687,103],[895,896,204],[58],{"id":919,"text":920,"class":7,"title":689,"anchor":7},84,"The changes emerging through MACCSS are practical as well as institutional.\n\nCivil society organisations are collaborating more closely across sectors and geographies. Journalists and activists are pooling evidence. Civil servants are engaging more constructively on transparency and accountability issues. \n\nThe programme also helped strengthen the collective voice of accountability actors. Through the Accountability Working Group, partners pushed corruption priorities onto the agenda of Malawi’s 2025 Presidential Debate.",{"id":103,"collection":642,"sort":20,"stories_id":922,"item":928},{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"image":878,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":923,"area":924,"content":925,"tags":926,"countries":927},[757],[51],[655,666,687,103],[895,896,204],[58],{"id":39,"text":929,"class":7,"title":699,"anchor":7},"The Malawi experience is helping shape broader thinking on how accountability programmes can become more effective and locally owned.\n\nIn a joint [publication](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpolitical-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti) with Adam Smith International, the Basel Institute programme lead drew lessons from MACCSS to show why anti-corruption efforts need more than technical fixes alone. Lasting progress depends on trust, adaptive approaches and local stakeholders driving priorities and solutions.\n\nThe long-term goal extends beyond individual projects: building capable, connected networks that can sustain accountability efforts even with decreasing external support.",[931,941,949],{"id":895,"stories_id":932,"tags_id":938},{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"image":878,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":933,"area":934,"content":935,"tags":936,"countries":937},[757],[51],[655,666,687,103],[895,896,204],[58],{"id":939,"name":940},1375,"Civil society",{"id":896,"stories_id":942,"tags_id":948},{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"image":878,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":943,"area":944,"content":945,"tags":946,"countries":947},[757],[51],[655,666,687,103],[895,896,204],[58],{"id":404,"name":405},{"id":204,"stories_id":950,"tags_id":956},{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"image":878,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":951,"area":952,"content":953,"tags":954,"countries":955},[757],[51],[655,666,687,103],[895,896,204],[58],{"id":344,"name":345},[958],{"id":58,"stories_id":959,"countries_id":965},{"id":57,"status":125,"sort":7,"title":871,"image":878,"description":872,"slug":873,"highlights":874,"region":960,"area":961,"content":962,"tags":963,"countries":964},[757],[51],[655,666,687,103],[895,896,204],[58],{"id":966,"name":967,"code":968,"latitude":969,"longitude":970},153,"Malawi","MW",-13.25431,34.30152,{"items":972,"total":59},[973,1200,1313,1364,1539],{"id":974,"status":125,"sort":7,"date_created":975,"date_updated":976,"nid":977,"slug":978,"title":979,"body":980,"citation":981,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":983,"date_published":984,"external":985,"topic":986,"link_internal":989,"link_external":999,"featured":985,"topics":1000,"languages":1001,"type":1002,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":1004,"summary":1005,"pdf_text":1006,"main_points":1007,"short_version":1008,"subtitle":1009,"image":1010,"og_image":1019,"countries":1029,"tags":1062,"pdf":1116,"authors":1165},2419,"2025-09-11T10:05:18.000Z","2026-08-13T07:17:08.000Z",2847,"wp-58","Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam","This Working Paper explores the drivers and strategies of corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam, with a specific focus on cocaine trafficking. Through in-depth interviews with stakeholders, a review of judicial cases and desk research, it aims to:\n\n- deepen understanding of the systems and mechanisms of corruption that enable drug trafficking;\n- show how trafficking and corruption strategies are changing in response to increased enforcement pressure; and\n- provide practical insights on how to further strengthen port resilience.\n\nIt contributes to the growing body of work that looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive. This research supports efforts to develop more robust and foresight-focused approaches to combat corruption and drug trafficking.\n\n### About this Working Paper\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, [ISSN: 2624-9650](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2025.58.1-43](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2025.58.1-43).\n\nYou may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis Working Paper was written as part of the FALCON (Fight Against Largescale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project. FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).\n\nThe contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.\n","Kassa, Saba and Jacopo Costa. 2025. ‘Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam: Drivers, strategies and implications.’ Working Paper 58, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58.",2025,"Basel Institute on Governance","2025-09-11",false,[987,988],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[990,993,996],{"url":991,"caption":992},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-corruption-helps-drug-traffickers-adapt-to-strengthened-border-enforcement-2848","View related blog",{"url":994,"caption":995},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2844"," View related workshop \"Red flags at the frontier\"",{"url":997,"caption":998},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[94,51],[223],[1003],"Working Paper",[222],"This Working Paper explores the drivers and strategies of corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam, with a specific focus on cocaine trafficking. It looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive.","\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam\n\n## Drivers, strategies and implications\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## About this Working Paper\n\nThis Working Paper explores the drivers and strategies of corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam, with a specific focus on cocaine trafficking. Through in-depth interviews with stakeholders, a review of judicial cases and desk research, it aims to:\n\n- · deepen understanding of the systems and mechanisms of corruption that enable drug trafficking;\n- · show how trafficking and corruption strategies are changing in response to increased enforcement pressure; and\n- · provide practical insights on how to further strengthen port resilience.\n\nIt contributes to the growing body of work that looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive. This research supports efforts to develop more robust and foresight-focused approaches to combat corruption and drug trafficking.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 International Licence.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Kassa, Saba and Jacopo Costa. 2025. 'Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam: Drivers, strategies and implications.' Working Paper 58, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58.\n\n## About the authors\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## Saba Kassa\n\nSenior Specialist and Deputy Director, Prevention, Research and Innovation.\n\nDr Saba Kassa is a public governance expert with over 10 years of experience in promoting democratic governance. She leads the implementation of the research, technical assistance and capacity-building activities of the Basel Institute's Prevention, Research and Innovation team.\n\nSaba holds a PhD in International Development Studies from the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, a Master's in International Development Studies from the University of Amsterdam, as well as a Master's in Public Administration from Erasmus University Rotterdam.\n\nEmail: saba.kassa@baselgovernance.org\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## Jacopo Costa\n\nSenior Specialist Prevention, Research and Innovation\n\nDr Jacopo Costa is Senior Specialist, Prevention, Research and Innovation at the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nHis research has been published in renowned academic journals in the field of criminology and political science. Topics include for example the nature of informal networks, the corrupt exchange in the public works and football industry, illegal wildlife trade between East Africa and Southeast Asia, and the nexus between corruption and money laundering.\n\nHe holds a PhD in Sociology and Political Studies from the University of Turin, a Master's from the University of Florence and a Bachelor's in Culture and Human Rights from the University of Bologna.\n\nEmail: jacopo.costa@baselgovernance.org\n\n## Acknowledgements and funding\n\nThis Working Paper was written as part of the FALCON (Fight Against Largescale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project. FALCON is funded under the European Union's Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).\n\nThe contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## Project funded by\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nSchweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Confédération suisse Confederazione Svizzera Confederaziun svizra\n\nSwiss Confederation\n\nFederal Department of Economic Affairs. Education and Research EAER State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI\n\n## Executive summary\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption facilitates drug trafficking (specifically cocaine) through the port of Rotterdam, looking at the underlying drivers and strategies involved. Legal trade routes and commercial ports are especially attractive because of the high volumes of cargo, which make it possible to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. The spatial complexity of the port of Rotterdam also makes it difficult to fully secure it against criminal activity.\n\nDigging deeper into the facilitating factors of trafficking, the paper finds that, paradoxically, a main driver of rising border corruption is the increased political attention on and resources dedicated to fighting trafficking. Desk research and stakeholder interviews highlight that as authorities deploy new technology to improve detection, traffickers face more obstacles to operating effectively. Having someone on the inside then becomes increasingly important (Staring et al., 2019). So, an unintended but important consequence of the strengthened fight against drug trafficking is that corruption becomes even more essential for the operational success of organised crime networks.\n\nThis study focuses specifically on the role of customs. Tasked with monitoring the import and export of goods, customs officers are important actors in the fight against drug trafficking. However, their role also makes them vulnerable: they have crucial knowledge on processes and procedures, access to systems and discretionary power that can be exploited by criminals (KPMG, 2021).\n\nThe desk research shows that corruption is used strategically to circumvent two important bottlenecks: the container screening and security as cargo enters the port, and the exit of drugs from the port (Staring et al., 2019). Traffickers may seek to obtain key information or direct assistance from customs officers.\n\nThese corrupt relationships and the emerging networks between members of crime groups and the customs officials are diverse. Some relationships can be characterised by collusion, where customs officials offer their services or are persuaded to cooperate. This collusion may be opportunistic or targeted. Other relationships can be characterised by coercion. Customs officials may be lured by financial reward, but this is accompanied by intimidation or the threat of violence to ensure that the officer cooperates and continues to cooperate. Our research highlights that the boundary between collusion and coercion is often blurred.\n\nBeyond collusion and coercion, we also see infiltration, which crosses the boundaries between the criminal, public and private. What emerges is less a matter of individual corruption and more akin to regulatory capture, where the public office position is held by a member of the criminal network.\n\nThe review of the judicial cases shows that bribes involved in these schemes can amount to millions. To hide and use the illicit gains, traffickers rely on money laundering, disguising its source as legitimate. They often enlist the help of family and friends, a trusted inner circle or professional specialists. They may also hide cash at home or invest it in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad.\n\nA key finding of our research is that the criminal and corruption strategies used to facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive. The underlying driver of this adaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and high profitability of the crime. This pushes traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in supplying the demand.\n\nCorruption strategies adapt in response to new enforcement measures. When control systems are changed and\u002For strengthened, corruption strategies evolve alongside them. This research identifies some key patterns:\n\n- · Stronger detection efforts increase the incentives for corruption.\n- · Evolving systems encourage a similar shift in corruption strategies.\n- · Anti-corruption and anti-trafficking measures may change the profile of those most vulnerable to being co-opted.\n- · The characteristics of corruption can also evolve, from collusion to coercion, to full infiltration of institutions and systems - with blurred lines in between.\n\nTrafficking strategies are similarly adaptive. There have been increased efforts by the port to combat trafficking through enhanced detection and technology. This was initially reflected by increased drug seizures. But since 2024, drugs seizures have declined. The research findings provide an explanation for this: As detection strengthens, more drug seizures are made. But what may happen, too, is a response to these new measures. As the risk of detection increases, criminals may adapt their trafficking strategies to overcome the additional hurdles, including:\n\n- · changing concealment strategies; and\n- · changing modes of transport and trafficking routes, including to ports outside of the Netherlands.\n\nThese developments highlight the complexity in understanding the impact of stronger anti-trafficking measures on both corruption and trafficking strategies. Trafficking and corruption are typically measured by detection, for example, by changes in the volume of drug seizures or the number of public officials caught engaging in corruption. But the elephant in the room is that increasingly sophisticated criminal strategies can hide what is really happening. This underscores the need to continuously strengthen our ability to recognise 'red flags' of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools and refined risk indicators are critical for understanding how crime and corruption strategies are changing.\n\nThe evolving nature of criminal strategies is often likened to a game of chess: enforcement makes a move, and criminal networks adapt. But what now seems to be emerging is more troubling. When barriers to drug trafficking increase while demand remains unchanged, crime and corruption strategies adapt in ways that can deepen their impact on society, leading for example to the hardening of crime and associated violence.\n\nThis makes anticipating how crime may adapt to changing anti-corruption and anti-trafficking strategies critical. Improved foresight and scenario-building capacities will be vital in order to develop more robust enforcement efforts against drug trafficking and mitigate the negative impact on society.\n\nA holistic approach is essential. Addressing corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking requires a broad view of crime that focuses on understanding vulnerabilities, leveraging data and harnessing collaboration. The risk of trafficking routes changing are high, therefore, we must use every tool at our disposal to ensure effective and sustainable enforcement efforts.\n\nTable of contents\n\n| 1                                                                                                                                                                                     | Introduction ......................................................................................................... 8                                                              | Introduction ......................................................................................................... 8   |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2  Facilitating factors of drug trafficking and drivers of  border corruption ............................................................................................... 9       | 2  Facilitating factors of drug trafficking and drivers of  border corruption ............................................................................................... 9       |                                                                                                                            |\n| 2.1                                                                                                                                                                                   | Facilitating factors of trafficking through the port of Rotterdam                                                                                                                     | 9                                                                                                                          |\n| 2.2                                                                                                                                                                                   | Drivers of border corruption                                                                                                                                                          | 10                                                                                                                         |\n| 2.3                                                                                                                                                                                   | More obstacles create greater need for corruption                                                                                                                                     | 10                                                                                                                         |\n| Strategies of border corruption  ......................................................................12                                                                             | Strategies of border corruption  ......................................................................12                                                                             |                                                                                                                            |\n| 3.1                                                                                                                                                                                   | Involvement of organised crime networks                                                                                                                                               | 12                                                                                                                         |\n| 3.2                                                                                                                                                                                   | Crime networks and evolving corruption practices                                                                                                                                      | 13                                                                                                                         |\n| Corruption networks: collusion, coercion and infiltration  ........................17                                                                                                 | Corruption networks: collusion, coercion and infiltration  ........................17                                                                                                 | Corruption networks: collusion, coercion and infiltration  ........................17                                      |\n| 4.1                                                                                                                                                                                   | Building corruption networks                                                                                                                                                          | 17                                                                                                                         |\n| 4.2                                                                                                                                                                                   | Collusion                                                                                                                                                                             | 17                                                                                                                         |\n| 4.3                                                                                                                                                                                   | Coercion                                                                                                                                                                              | 18                                                                                                                         |\n| 4.4                                                                                                                                                                                   | Infiltration                                                                                                                                                                          | 19                                                                                                                         |\n| Bribery and money laundering .......................................................................21                                                                                | Bribery and money laundering .......................................................................21                                                                                | Bribery and money laundering .......................................................................21                     |\n| 5.1                                                                                                                                                                                   | Bribe payments in line with the high profits of drug trafficking                                                                                                                      | 21                                                                                                                         |\n| 5.2                                                                                                                                                                                   | Social and financial strategies for money laundering                                                                                                                                  | 22                                                                                                                         |\n| 6  Adaptive criminal and corruption strategies to facilitate  drug trafficking  .................................................................................................. 25 | 6  Adaptive criminal and corruption strategies to facilitate  drug trafficking  .................................................................................................. 25 |                                                                                                                            |\n| 6.1                                                                                                                                                                                   | Trafficking and corruption strategies follow the path of  least resistance                                                                                                            | 25                                                                                                                         |\n| 6.2                                                                                                                                                                                   | Corruption strategies are adaptive                                                                                                                                                    | 25                                                                                                                         |\n| 6.3                                                                                                                                                                                   | Trafficking strategies are equally adaptive                                                                                                                                           | 28                                                                                                                         |\n| 6.4                                                                                                                                                                                   | The problem with understanding hidden and complex                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                            |\n| 6.5                                                                                                                                                                                   | corruption and crime strategies   Practitioner insights on how to deal with the adaptive  nature of crime                                                                             | 30 32                                                                                                                      |\n| Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 34                                                               | Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 34                                                               |                                                                                                                            |\n| Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 35                                                          | Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 35                                                          |                                                                                                                            |\n| Annex ........................................................................................................................ 43                                                     | Annex ........................................................................................................................ 43                                                     |                                                                                                                            |\n\n## 1 Introduction\n\nRotterdam is the largest port in Europe. While efficiency and safety are top priorities for the port, as an important logistical hub it becomes inadvertently attractive for drug trafficking, especially of cocaine (Staring et al., 2019). The head of the Seaport Police Rotterdam laments that 'the biggest battle against traffickers is their ability to corrupt ports with money and intimidation' (May and Holcova, 2023). This corruption at the border comprises an illegal exchange of resources between border officials (the bribe takers) and private actors (the bribe givers) (Jancsics, 2019, 2020, 2021).\n\nFighting border corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking has become an important priority for the Dutch government, with increased attention and resources devoted to it (Staring et al., 2019; Zürcher et al., 2024; Government of the Netherlands, 2021). This is because the illicit drug trade and the corruption that facilitates it come at a high cost to society and the rule of law, impacting health, security and governance (Nistotskaya et al., 2024).\n\nThe problem faced by the port of Rotterdam is not unique. Organised crime networks use corruption to facilitate trafficking into, through and out of ports across Europe. Ports in France (Marseille), Germany (Hamburg), Belgium (Antwerp), Italy (Gioia Tauro) and Spain (Valencia) face similar risks. It is an important problem that the Horizon Europe project FALCON (Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) aims to address. Law enforcement practitioners, social scientists and data analysis experts join forces in this project to innovate the fight against corruption by leveraging digital tools. This Working Paper is based on research that is part of and contributes towards the FALCON project.\n\nThe scale of the problem is significant. Half of Europe's criminal networks are involved in drug trafficking, either alone or as part of other criminal activities. Crucially, over 70 percent of criminal networks use corruption to facilitate their illegal activities (Europol, 2024). A close examination of this phenomenon in the port of Rotterdam can provide some critical insights into:\n\n- · the drivers and aims of border corruption, giving attention to characterising the manner in which corruption deals are carried out and the goals that are pursued by engaging in them; and\n- · the adaptive nature of corruption in response to innovations aimed at enhancing efficiency and security at the borders.\n\nThis paper highlights the drivers and strategies of corruption (with a focus on public officials and specifically customs officials) as a facilitator of drug trafficking (with a focus on cocaine) in the Port of Rotterdam. It further considers the key challenges, opportunities and risks in efforts to address drug trafficking and border corruption. The analysis is based on a desk review, a review of drug-related corruption court cases and five interviews with key experts from academia and law enforcement (see Annex).\n\n## 2 Facilitating factors of drug trafficking and drivers of border corruption\n\n## 2.1 Facilitating factors of trafficking through the port of Rotterdam\n\n## 2.1.1 Modern infrastructure and high cargo volumes at ports\n\nThe Port of Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe. It aims to become the world's safest, most efficient and most sustainable port (Port of Rotterdam Authority, n.d.-a). This is reflected in a modern logistical and digital infrastructure, allowing fast processing of cargo containers (Staring et al., 2019; Zürcher et al., 2024).\n\nAn important point is that trafficking takes place on the back of legal trade routes (Staring et al., 2019; Zürcher et al., 2024; Staring et al., 2023). Commercial ports are especially attractive because of the high cargo volumes they process and the possibility to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. It is more difficult to detect trafficking in the case of high transport volumes (Zaitch, 2002 as referenced in Eski and Buijt, 2017), and Rotterdam has deep water channels that allow large ships with many containers to dock (Zürcher et al., 2024).\n\n## 2.1.2 Spatial and operational complexity of ports\n\nThe spatial and operational complexity of ports makes security a challenge.\n\nThe large physical size of the port of Rotterdam (over 12,500 ha), volume of goods (the cargo throughput is approximately 436 million tonnes of freight a year) and number of people working on its premises (approximately 1,400 employees work for the Port Authority alone) contribute to its vulnerability (Zürcher et al., 2024; Port of Rotterdam Authority, n.d.-b). The sheer size of the Rotterdam harbour means that it will never be totally secure (Staring et al., 2019).\n\nThis is further complicated by the fact that tensions may arise between security objectives and economic objectives in port operations - acting on suspicions of illicit activity may undermine efficiency (Costa et al., 2024). It is important to find a balance between these goals, which at times can be contradictory (Eski, 2019; Staring et al., 2019). This is especially the case in a port environment with many stakeholders and where promoting security is a shared responsibility (Staring et al., 2019). In this context, good partnerships, information sharing and robust investigation and enforcement capacity are critical but at the same time challenging (Government of the Netherlands, 2024; Spapens et al., 2021).\n\n9\n\n## 2.2 Drivers of border corruption\n\nThe Port's enforcement efforts have been bolstered by more political attention and resources, prompting criminal networks to increasingly target public officials in order to override more stringent detection measures.\n\nSince the mid-1990s, the fight against organised crime and drug production\u002F trafficking has been an important political topic in the Netherlands. More recently, there has been an important shift, as the hardening of crime is seen as having an increasingly negative impact on the rule of law and the democratic state (Government of the Netherlands, 2021). This is linked to an increased perception of the negative impact of drug-related crime (Spapens et al., 2021).\n\nIn 2021, the then government (Cabinet Rutte III) announced an extra EUR 524 million for tackling subversive crime (Government of the Netherlands, 2021). In 2024, the new government (Cabinet Schoof I) emphasised that security remains an important issue and that it would step up the fight against subversive crime by strengthening laws, detection, punishment, information exchange, the police and intelligence services, and tackling international criminal activity and related corruption (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-a).\n\nStronger political prioritisation and resources have resulted in the ability of the port of Rotterdam to strengthen its efforts to prevent and curb trafficking. A focus has been on improving technology, digitisation and automation of processes (including the robotisation of container transport). Security is promoted through the use of modern technologies, such as 'port keys' , 'digital safety passports' and 'cargocards' , which store biometric data of key players in the logistics chain, information on commercial vessels, containers and the companies that are behind the delivery and logistics (Oosting, 2016 as referenced in Staring et al., 2019).\n\nEnforcement has been similarly strengthened. A key initiative is the Hit and Run Cargo (HARC) team, a partnership between Dutch Customs, the Public Prosecution Service, the Seaport Police and the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD). The HARC team specialises in investigating and prosecuting drug smuggling and criminal networks and their activities in and around the port of Rotterdam. It was set up over 25 years ago specifically to combat drug trafficking in Rotterdam through joint intelligence gathering (Customs Administration of the Netherlands, n.d.-a; Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, n.d.). The HARC team is responsible for most of the drug seizures in the port (Staring et al., 2019).\n\n## 2.3 More obstacles create greater need for corruption\n\nAs increased obstacles make trafficking more difficult, an increased need for corruption emerges.\n\nWhereas previously the likelihood of drugs being detected was perceived as relatively low (Staring et al., 2019), this seems to have changed. The ability\n\nto detect drugs has been strengthened through increased risk analysis and surveillance (Nelen and Kolthoff, 2017). For instance, in 1994, 0.1 percent of cargo was checked. By 2019, this had increased to 0.5 percent (Staring et al., 2019). This approach is paying off. In an interview in 2021, the head of the Seaport Police noted that intensified efforts were leading to more drug seizures (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2021). Mid-2023 saw the largest drug seizure ever made (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 2023).\n\nNow, the combined force of political prioritisation and strengthened detection and automation has increased the potential to disrupt drug trafficking. An unintended consequence is that from the perspective of the drug traffickers, having accomplices embedded inside the port operations has become increasingly important, if not indispensable. This has been recognised by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service and other sources (Roks et al., 2021; Sergi, 2020; KPMG, 2021; Staring et al., 2019, 2023; Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 2025).\n\n'If everything works as it should, it is impossible to traffic drugs through the port. To do this, you need some inside help. There is always a corrupt insider who facilitates trafficking.'\n\nInterview with a law enforcement stakeholder, 16 July 2024\n\nFacilitating factors of trafficking\n\n- ·  Illegal trade latches onto legal trade\n- ·  Complexity of port makes security challenging\n\nDrivers of border corruption\n\n- ·  Fighting drug trafficking as a political priority\n- ·  Strengthening detection and automatisation to prevent crime\n\nFigure 1: Intensified efforts to fight drug trafficking can lead to a rise in corruption risks.\n\nCollusion\n\nCoercion\n\nInfiltration\n\nIncreased potential for disruption of drug trafficking\n\nIncreased need for insider help: corruption increases\u002Fadapts\n\n## 3 Strategies of border corruption\n\n## 3.1 Involvement of organised crime networks\n\nOrganised crime networks are involved in the illicit drug trade. A key modus operandi is that cocaine is trafficked by sea from Latin America (i.e. Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia) to Europe via the port of Rotterdam. The Netherlands is predominantly a transit country. A common strategy is that the drugs latch onto fruit transports, which require swift processing (Staring et al., 2019; Trimbos Instituut, 2025).\n\nThe crime networks are ethnically heterogeneous and have 'a small core and informal, flexible structures' (Staring et al., 2019). They have been likened to logistics companies in that they are organised as professional organisations which focus on security, transport and development. For specialised tasks, they can call on specific people or involve people with specific skills, such as money laundering (Staring et al., 2019, 2023).\n\nBuilding trust and ensuring loyalty is important, so social ties such as family and friends can be a way of bringing people into the network. Robust and solid social connections can also form through shared social spaces, as well as through professional ties such as working together in the port (Staring et al., 2019, 2023). One example of this dynamic is that social ties between groups in the Netherlands and Latin America may help organised crime groups to connect across large geographical areas (Burt, 1992 as referenced in Madarie and Kruisbergen, 2019).\n\nA researcher interviewed for this study suggests that there is no overarching criminal organisation that facilitates access to the port. Instead, different criminal networks have to find their way into and through the port by cultivating relevant relationships through bribery (interview of 5 April 2024). Research shows that several transnational criminal groups - including Italian, British, Albanian and Dutch groups - have cocaine distribution lines through the Netherlands to various countries (Dirksen et al., 2021). Even if their interests and goals differ, criminal networks cooperate (Costa, 2022).\n\nThe multidimensionality and fluidity of the cocaine trafficking networks make efforts at eliminating them inherently difficult, as illustrated by the case discussed in the box below.\n\n## The case of Ridouan Taghi\n\nRidouan Taghi, the leader of the largest drug cartel in the Netherlands, is a key figure in what is arguably the biggest drug trafficking operation in Europe. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Netherlands'\n\nMarengo trial, which was the country's most prominent mass trial involving his criminal organisation.\n\nAt his peak, Taghi imported an estimated third of all the cocaine entering the Netherlands through Rotterdam's port. He worked with some of Europe's largest trafficking networks, including the Italian Camorra mafia and the Irish Kinahan crime group, and each group benefitted from the others' contacts. Taghi's deputy lived in Colombia and organised the export of cocaine to Europe, allegedly by buying it from the Gaitanistas (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia).\n\nSeveral other members of Taghi's network were arrested in Latin America, the Caribbean and in Suriname. Despite the arrest of the leader and others, the network and infrastructure established continued to allow the importation of cocaine. A former associate of Taghi, Leijdekkers, is said to have taken over the network and was found guilty in absentia of international cocaine trafficking and ordering an assassination.\n\n(Sources: Held, 2024; Holligan, 2024; Booty and Bamford, 2025; NL Times, 2024a)\n\n## 3.2 Crime networks and evolving corruption practices\n\nCriminals use a variety of methods to move drugs into and through the port with the aim of ensuring that they will not be detected or confiscated. There are two major bottlenecks in the transit of drugs: getting the drugs into and out of the port. It is at these two points that trafficking most heavily relies on corruption to evade detection and monitoring (Staring, 2021; Madarie and Kruisbergen, 2019).\n\n## 3.2.1 Aim of corruption: evading monitoring and surveillance\n\nFor organised crime networks to overcome bottlenecks in drug trafficking, to pass surveillance and get drugs out of the container and out of the port, they need information on logistical processes in the port.\n\nWhile several public agencies are involved in fighting crime, 1  the role of customs stands out as they are tasked with monitoring the import and export of goods, making them crucial stakeholders in the fight against drug trafficking (Staring et al., 2019). The customs authority carries out a wide range of monitoring,\n\nsignalling and investigative tasks (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2022).  Of the 7.5 million containers that pass through the port each year, 40,000 are scanned and 6,500 are opened, with checks based on risk profiles (Staring et al., 2019).\n\nAs detection activities are strengthened, the need for inside help increases, as do the risks for corrupt engagement of customs officers (KPMG, 2021). Customs officers become vulnerable to corruption because, by virtue of their position, they have important knowledge about processes and procedures, access to systems and discretionary power. Customs officers in strategic positions become a particular focus of attention: personnel with knowledge and authorisation to perform risk analyses, and those carrying out checks, such as scan analysts and sniffer dog handlers. As automation means that information is increasingly stored in databases, customs officers with access to these equally become key (KPMG, 2021).\n\n## 3.2.2  Corruption to get drugs into the port\n\nTo ensure drug shipments can get into the port and pass locations of surveillance, criminal actors use corruption to circumvent or avoid control. They bribe staff for knowledge about the logistics and monitoring process. This includes information about pre-arrival risk analyses, scheduled container checks and container locations, and confidential customs information regarding modus operandi of screenings and general weaknesses in the monitoring system. Bribery is similarly used to co-opt public officials who can help evade controls completely, for example by transferring drugs into safe containers that have already been checked or concealing discoveries (Staring et al., 2019).\n\nThe most infamous and illustrative corruption case involving drug trafficking through the port of Rotterdam involves a customs officer working as a selector in the pre-arrival section of customs. The official decided which containers would be checked and how. In return for bribes amounting to millions of euros, he would provide criminal groups involved in drug trafficking with information on the location and status of particular containers, and would ensure that certain containers were not checked. One way he did this was by marking a container as cleared, stating that the bill of lading had been requested and checked. The officer also provided information on risk profiles used in the selection process. In 2017, the official was sentenced to 14 years in prison (Roks et al., 2021; Staring et al., 2019; Sonnemans, 2017).\n\nIn another example, a customs official was bribed to provide information regarding confidential customs information, including modus operandi regarding the import and the screening of the sending and receiving companies (Judicial case 2019:1103).\n\nOther examples of past corrupt acts by customs officers to evade monitoring and surveillance (see KPMG, 2021) include:\n\n- · falsely clearing containers for import without inspection;\n- · facilitating drugs to be moved to a container that has already been inspected;\n- · failing to (fully) inspect containers marked as high risk;\n- · designating many containers for inspection, thereby ensuring that there is not enough capacity to inspect a container containing drugs.\n\n## 3.2.3  Corruption to get drugs out of the port\n\nCorruption also facilitates the exit of drugs from the port. Officers can be bribed to provide information on container location, allow access to the port or the premises where the container is located, move containers to a place where drugs can be more easily extracted, or extract the drugs from the container themselves (Staring et al., 2019; KPMG, 2021).\n\nThis relates to two specific methods to remove drugs from containers:\n\n- · the 'rip-off method' , where the drugs are removed from the container and out of the port before an inspection; and\n- · the 'switch method' where the drugs are switched out to a container that has already passed inspection or is not planned for inspection.\n\nAs an example, in one case a customs official was accused of accepting a bribe to divert the physical shipment of a consignment outside the customs territory to the warehouse of the forwarding company involved in the shipment. In this case, 26 kilos of drugs were later found in the container (Judicial case 2019:1103).\n\n## 3.2.4  Typology of corruption aims at border spaces\n\nAcross the above examples and cases, a typology of corruption aims at border spaces emerges. Corruption, and bribery in particular, permits criminal actors to obtain key information or direct assistance needed to pass through the two main bottlenecks in the port, the container screening and security as cargo enters the port, and the extraction of drugs from the port.\n\nThe key difference between information and direct assistance is the degree of active involvement of the customs official:\n\n- · Providing information - e.g. about the logistics and monitoring process - is a more indirect, passive involvement. It can help criminal networks prepare and conceal illicit cargo so it's not detected.\n\n- · Direct help in avoiding detection or moving goods - e.g. clearing a container as compliant without inspection or opening the gate to provide access to port premises containing containers with hidden drugs requires a more active collaboration.\n\nFigure 2: Typology of corruption aims at border spaces.\n\n|                               | Getting drugs into the port and past  screenings and security                                                                                                                                   | Getting drugs safely out   of the port                                                                                                                                        |\n|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Obtaining  information        | Corruption to obtain information from  customs officials, e.g. on the criteria  and red flags used by customs for  cargo screening, and on how to hide  drugs in containers to avoid detection. | Corruption to obtain information from  customs officials, e.g. about the location  of containers marked for full inspection  to ensure that drugs can be removed  beforehand. |\n| Obtaining  direct  assistance | Corruption to get direct help from  customs officials to avoid detection of  the drugs. E.g. Official ensures a specific container                                                              | Corruption to get customs officials to  facilitate the extraction of the drugs. E.g. Official provides illegal access to   port premises so criminals can secure              |\n\n## 4 Corruption networks: collusion, coercion and infiltration\n\n## 4.1 Building corruption networks\n\nA key theme in this research is the networked nature of crime. Criminal networks often exploit social networks - i.e. networks within the informal and social spheres - to cut across the public and private divide. These social networks are primarily strategic - they are built to facilitate trafficking. Trust and loyalty are crucial, so criminal networks may turn to family and friends where possible. But even without such pre-existing personal ties, officials can be co-opted, and sociality then built up, for example through the reciprocal and repeated exchange of bribes. The ultimate goal is to build a relationship that includes the social elements of expectation of reciprocity, obligation to the group and loyalty (Basel Institute on Governance, 2024; Jancsics and Costa, 2024; Baez-Camargo et al., 2023; Costa, 2022).\n\nOn the basis of the conceptual model by David Jancsics, we can broadly characterise the corrupt relationships that emerge between officials and criminal organisations as either collusive or coercive. In collusive relationships, the engagement between the public official and the criminal organisation is framed as mutually beneficial (offering\u002Fselling information or providing direct help). In contrast, coercive relationships involve pressure or threats, where the public official is forced to cooperate and provide information or help (Jancsics, 2019; Abdou et al., 2024).\n\n## 4.2 Collusion\n\nCustoms officials may offer their services or be lured into collusion by criminals. Motivations are complex. Customs officials in financial difficulty are more likely to become involved with organised crime groups, but corrupt behaviour may also be driven by a desire for a more adventurous or luxurious lifestyle (KPMG, 2021; Nelen and Kolthoff, 2017).\n\nCollusion can be opportunistic or targeted. Because trust is so important in an illicit arrangement, a key modus operandi is to enlist accomplices opportunistically from existing social networks, for example via family connections, involvement in sports clubs or having attended the same schools. A more targeted approach may involve identifying customs officials, establishing contact with them outside the work environment and attempting to to co-opt them into the criminal network through bribery (KPMG, 2021).\n\nBecause criminals employ and proactively build their social networks, it is common for criminals and customs officials to know each other. Strong bonds within family and friendship networks and norms of solidarity may in turn exert\n\ninformal pressure on the official to help and remain loyal, thus reinforcing incentives for the abuse of power (KPMG, 2021; Nelen and Kolthoff, 2017).\n\nIn relation to the port of Rotterdam, Staring et al. (2023) highlight that family and friendship ties are important factors that facilitate co-optation, but the most important factor is access to and knowledge of the port and control systems. The mixing of professional embeddedness and social networks, and opportunistic and targeted co-optation is highlighted in some recent corruption cases involving customs officials and drug trafficking:\n\nIn one case, a customs officer was approached by two men involved in large-scale drug smuggling through his wife's brother. During a meeting at a petrol station on the motorway, the two men told the customs official that they wanted to work together (van Gestel, 2019). Another case involved a trafficker approaching the son of a customs official to provide information on containers, who in turn sought the information from his mother (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 2024a). This shows that vulnerability to corruption can extend beyond the public official to their family and friends.\n\nIt is expected that the use of social networks of family and friends or online platforms such as social media to establish connection with officials will increase. Criminal networks analyse publicly available information on officials' work and private lives to assess potential targets. In response, a key measure of the Rotterdam port's anti-corruption approach is to advise officials not to post work-related photos on social media, as this can make them a target for criminal organisations (Rotterdamse Haven Veilige Haven, n.d.).\n\nAnother tactic is to target and develop ties with multiple officers simultaneously, in order to spread opportunities and risks. A case involving a customs official illustrates this strategic targeting: the official provided a criminal organisation with a list of the names and contact details of fellow customs officials working on scanning containers (Judicial case 2020:12597).\n\n## 4.3 Coercion\n\nCustoms officials can also be coerced into corrupt activity. They may be initially lured with a financial reward but intimidation and the threat of violence can ensure continued cooperation (KPMG, 2021; Sergi, 2020; Europol, 2023). In this regard, Rotterdam's head of the Seaport Police discussed the threat of violence and intimidation to provide information to criminal networks, saying: 'If you don't say yes the first time, when you're in the shop doing your shopping, they'll throw it into your cart again and maybe try a third time to offer you the money.\n\nThere are [also] cases, of course, [where] then they tell people, 'We know where your kids are going to school.'' (May and Holcova, 2023).\n\nCoercion is a dynamic issue. On the one hand, Staring et al. (2023) highlight in their analysis of 10 drug-related cases in the port that excessive violence is 'less emphatically and naturally present' . On the other, research also shows that organised crime has hardened over the years, increasingly using violence and intimidating public officials (Nelen and Kolthoff, 2017).\n\nIntimidation is achieved through blackmail, threat of violence against the officer or their family or creating financial pressures by offering attractive loans (KPMG, 2021). For example, in one case, an official working for the tax agency provided sensitive personal information to members of a crime group involved in drug trafficking who could then use this information to put the targeted person under pressure to comply (Judicial case 2020:1295).\n\nIt is important to recognise that the actual boundaries between collusion and coercion are blurred. Rather than seeing collusion and coercion as separate phenomena, it is better to see them on a continuum, with at one extreme the public official offering and selling information and at the other extreme the criminal actor extorting cooperation through the use of force. Within this continuum, there are various degrees of collusion and coercion. What remains constant is the power imbalance, the exchange of resources for assistance and the relationship's longevity.\n\n## 4.4 Infiltration\n\nInfiltration takes the dynamics of collusion and coercion a step further by completely erasing the boundary between public and private power. It occurs when an individual closely associated with or directly involved in illicit activities proactively acquires the formal position of a public official. Criminals may attempt to infiltrate public and private offices in the port area and embed themselves into the community of personnel through formal employment processes. This provides an opportunity to obtain and share relevant information, establish links with others in the port and, if promoted to a higher position, ensure that other members of the criminal network join the organisation.\n\nThere are documented examples of people associated with criminal groups being sent to police or customs training programmes with the specific aim of making a career in these organisations (KPMG, 2021; Europol, 2023). Through long-term strategies such as these, criminal networks can enlarge and conceal their reach into public office by leveraging social capital (Costa, 2017).\n\nIn one interview, a researcher suggested that infiltration is the most worrying form of corruption because it is more structural and invisible, and it reduces\n\nthe risk of being caught. It transgresses the boundaries between the criminal, public and private. In the long term and in its more extreme and structural forms, infiltration may look less like corruption and more like regulatory capture, where the public office position is held by a member of the criminal network. This means that a system is created or manipulated to work every single time, without the need of bribery or other forms of influence, but through the legal channels (interview of 5 April 2024).\n\nAnother researcher noted that infiltration is still poorly understood because it is mistakenly assumed that it occurs only in settings with weak governance. It is essential to gain a deeper understanding of this kind of long-term and strategic investment - which differs greatly from one-off and opportunistic engagement if efforts to understand and curb border corruption are to succeed (interview of 12 April 2024).\n\nIncreased potential\n\nfor disruption of drug\n\ntrafficking\n\nA court case (Judicial case 2020:12597) involving an intercepted conversation between a customs official and a member of a criminal organisation illustrates how infiltration can unfold. The customs officer had previously worked in the pre-arrival department, which is responsible for organising maritime inspections of incoming cargo traffic, but no longer held that function. The member of the criminal network explained that he had organised every aspect of a drug import, except how to bypass the container scan. He suggested that the customs officer should try to resume work in this department, find a relevant connection there, or even apply for other positions relevant to container scanning. If she succeeded, he said, she would have 'gold' in her hands, promising EUR 1 million for each successful job. It was found that the customs official did potentially try to assist, as a printed list of the names of officials working in the scanning section was found at her home. Drivers of border corruption ·  Fighting drug trafficking as a political priority ·  Strengthening detection and automatisation to prevent crime Facilitating factors of trafficking ·  Illegal trade latches onto legal trade ·  Complexity of port makes security challenging\n\nThis example shows how collusion, coercion and infiltration cutting across the public-private divide can blend together in practice. The criminal entices the official with the promise of money, while at the same time pressuring her to explore ways to rejoin the scanning team. In doing this, he attempts to strategically position her to help the criminal network to avoid inspections, or to provide information on who might be involved in the container scanning position. The lure of financial gain is key, but other forms of pressure are not excluded. The overarching observation is that networked corruption is multifaceted and adaptive. Moreover, once cooperation is established, the corrupt relationships are long-lasting.\n\nFigure 3: The lines between collusion, coercion and infiltration are often blurred.\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nIncreased\n\nfor insider\n\ncorrupti\n\nincreases\u002Fa\n\n## 5 Bribery and money laundering\n\nThis section focuses on understanding the private gains associated with border corruption. The guiding question was simple: how do public officials receive a bribe and how do they launder the proceeds? To gain clarity on this question, an analysis was conducted of judicial cases (published online at rechtspraak.nl, the website of the courts, appeal courts and special courts in the Netherlands). The focus was on ongoing or completed cases involving bribery of public officials working in the port, including both acquittals and sanctions. The following search terms were used to identify relevant cases:\n\n- · An all-fields search with the keywords 'corruption Rotterdam harbour' and 'customs' combined with a content indication search for 'money laundering' resulted in 13 cases. 2\n- · A search with the keywords 'corruption' and 'customs' in the content indication field alone resulted in two additional cases. 3\n\nThe analysis aimed to provide insights into the dynamics of bribery and the money laundering strategies involved, with a focus on bribes made to the public officials, and how that money is hidden and used. Often, the flows and strategies overlap (Abdou et al., 2024). Research shows that, in contexts where criminal networks are pervasive, earning a good salary is not sufficient to discourage corrupt behaviour (Baryal, Patang and Sharaf, 2022; Chalendard et al., 2023; Chêne, 2018; McLinden and Durrani, 2013).\n\n## 5.1 Bribe payments in line with the high profits of drug trafficking\n\nThe large profit involved in drug trafficking means that bribes can be very high, too. A report from Europol (2023) shows that bribes are often hundreds of thousands of euros, with the highest amounts paid to those in critical roles either in kind with a part of the cargo load or as a percentage of the drug value.\n\nIn the port of Rotterdam, similar patterns are observed. In fact, the bribes may be even higher, reaching into the millions. Public officials are promised or given a financial gift (private gain) with the understanding that they will abuse their power, by providing information, doing something or failing to act. Bribes are given in various forms, one of which is money.\n\nFor example, in one case a customs official working as a selector in the pre-arrival department of customs allegedly supported a criminal network to traffic drugs through the port. The official is accused of accepting gifts ranging from half a million to almost a million euro, promises of future gifts amounting to EUR 3 million, or a sum equal to 7.5 percent of the value of cocaine in containers (Judicial case 2017:5125).\n\nIn another case involving a member of a criminal network trafficking drugs through the port, the defendant stated that the payments amount to 'two million for the strepen [custom officials] and half a million for the business, logistics and 'the guys who unload the stuff, the stashes'' (Judicial case 2020:1295). Bribes can also be paid in different forms, such as in drugs or assets (Judicial case 2023:15351).\n\n## 5.2 Social and financial strategies for money laundering\n\nRegardless of the form a bribe is paid in, the proceeds must be integrated into the financial system without attracting attention. This is where money laundering strategies become essential. Cash is king and a necessity. Criminal money is linked to cash, not only because bribes are commonly paid in cash, but because using cash helps to avoid detection in a context of increasing banking surveillance. In the Netherlands, giro accounts are closely monitored. There was even an initiative - ultimately rejected - to monitor all transactions of over EUR 100 (Bolsius, 2022). This surveillance pushes corrupt actors to adapt by prioritising physical cash or employing elaborate strategies to launder their proceeds.\n\nMoney laundering is about obscuring the illicit origin of money with intent. For example, in one case, a customs official in Rotterdam was accused of habitual money laundering of various sums totalling almost EUR 700,000 (Judicial case 2019:1103).\n\nThe cases reviewed illustrate three important strategies in money laundering:\n\n- 1. The illicit origin of the money is disguised by making it appear to come from a licit source.\n- 2. The money is hidden with the help of family and friends or the inner circle, and\u002For by enlisting the help of professional specialists.\n- 3. The money is hidden at home in cash or invested in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad.\n\nThe first strategy is to make it seem as if the bribe money has a legal origin . The cases reviewed show that, when money laundering suspects are found with unexplained funds, they are asked to explain the money's source - regardless of whether the exact amount of the bribe is known. There are two main responses:\n\neither suspects refuse to answer or they provide explanation for all or part of the money, which can lead to other charges such as tax evasion.\n\nFor example, in a case involving a corrupt customs agent working at the port of Rotterdam, the accused claimed that the excess money came from various sources: his mother, online second-hand sales, casino or lottery winnings (in the order of a few thousand euros), and regular gifts from his father - a one-off donation, and cash money that was spent on domestic help and food payments (Judicial case 2019:1103).\n\nIn another case the accused explained the money's origin as having come from: winning the lottery, business activities (cafes or thrift shops) and paid work (Judical case 2022:5588).\n\nThe second strategy is to hide bribe money with the help of trusted networks and\u002For professional specialists . Both cash and bank-based funds can be hidden with family members, friends or those who are part of the criminal network. These individuals 'keep' the money for the public official (Judicial case 2020:1295).\n\nMore elaborate concealment may involve enlisting the support of professional enablers to move money out of the Netherlands. Lawyers or financial specialists can play an important role in facilitating money laundering.\n\nFor example, a recent case reported by Dutch media shows how an underworld banker used 'encrypted communications to manage a courier network in the Netherlands, moving nearly a quarter of a billion euros in cash for criminals between June 2020 and March 2021' (NL Times, 2024b).\n\nInterviews with stakeholders confirm that money is moved out of the Netherlands using networks of underground banking and\u002For money mules (interviews of 4 April 2024, 5 April 2024, 12 April 2024 and 16 July 2024).\n\nThe third strategy is to hide cash or convert cash into assets . Cash may be hidden at home or in safes, exchanged for other currencies or invested in assets and businesses (Judicial case 2020:918).\n\n## Examples include:\n\n- · Buying luxury items such as expensive watches. In 2023 the Hit and Run Cargo (HARC) team seized more value in luxury designer clothes and accessories than cash (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 2024b).\n- · Investing in high-value assets such as (vacation) houses, cars and boats, in the Netherlands or abroad. In 2024, HARC confiscated over half a million euros in cars and boats (as well as over EUR 400,000 in cash) (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 2025).\n- · Investing in businesses in the Netherlands or abroad, which may involve complex financial structures, or purchasing cryptocurrencies. Financial advisers may assist in establishing business structures that allow money from illegal and legal sources to be mixed (Unger et al., 2018; Pol, 2016).\n\nCash purchases are restricted in the Netherlands. For example, one cannot buy a house with cash, and transactions above EUR 10,000 should trigger a client investigation (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). To tigthen the rules even further, a new law is in the making to lower the maximum allowed cash payment to EUR 3,000 (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2022). Nevertheless, Unger et al. (2018) find that high-value goods can still be acquired with cash by paying an additional 10-20 percent of the value to avoid the purchase being reported.\n\nCriminals find ways to creatively avoid the rules. This not only undermines the intent of the legislation but also enables a steady stream of illicit money to infiltrate the Dutch economy. The impact is significant: of EUR 13 billion in laundered money generated in the Netherlands in 2014, 53 percent, or EUR 6.9 billion, remains in the Netherlands. These funds are then laundered into the formal economy, frequently with the assistance of financial advisors (Unger, et al. 2018). Beyond the economic impact, the key point of concern is that crime money can be used to finance further crime and, by extension, undermines the rule of law and the democratic state.\n\n## 6 Adaptive criminal and corruption strategies to facilitate drug trafficking\n\n## 6.1 Trafficking and corruption strategies follow the path of least resistance\n\nTrafficking and corruption strategies are not static. An important insight from this study is that criminal and corrupt strategies used to facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive, multifaceted and change quickly in response to increased enforcement efforts (Interview of 5 April 2024). Critically, criminal activity will follow the path of least resistance (Costa et al., 2023). This means that when met with obstacles, illicit and corrupt activities will:\n\n- · move to different spaces and use different routes (Augustova and Suber 2023);\n- · become more creative and more difficult to detect (Ortiz 2021); and\u002For\n- · involve new actors and functions via corruption and bribes (Europol, 2023).\n\nThe underlying driver of this adaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and the high profitability of the crime. This incentivises traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in supplying the demand. In one interview, a law enforcement stakeholder noted that both drug production and demand are rising, and with them, the profits to be made (interview of 16 July 2024). The falling price of cocaine is another signal of its ready availability (NL Times, 2025).\n\n## 6.2 Corruption strategies are adaptive\n\nAt the port of Rotterdam, increased political attention and resources to combat trafficking have led to enhanced detection systems and technology. These efforts have raised the risk of detection for traffickers, making the co-optation of public officials to override the stricter controls more appealing.\n\n## 6.2.1 Stronger detection systems increase the incentives for and risk of corruption\n\nThe unintended consequence of strengthened controls is that criminals become more reliant on inside help to facilitate trafficking (Staring et al., 2019). This is complex to measure. A study testing whether more effective detection and enforcement actors are more susceptible to corruption was unable to robustly confirm the hypothesis (Rovers and Moors, 2019). In addition, comparing the number of cases of corruption that facilitated drug trafficking over time can be misleading as not all cases are detected. Moreover, in an interview, one\n\nresearcher also highlighted that our knowledge of corruption comes from criminal investigation reports. Consequently, corruption that goes undetected remains a blind spot (interview of 12 April 2024).\n\nThe prevailing consensus nevertheless is that corruption risks in relation to drug trafficking are increasing. On the one hand, as the desk research highlights, this is because strengthened enforcement makes having an accomplice on the inside necessary. On the other hand, as one of stakeholder interview suggests, if everything works as it should, it is impossible to traffic drugs through the port.  Conversely, when seizures are made, it indicates that corruption has played a part somewhere in the process. In line with this, Zürcher et al. (2024) identify bribery of law enforcement officers as the most significant drug-related corruption risk at the port. The FALCON project's examination of 19 border-corruption cases further highlights that corrupt actors are primarily motivated by the desire to secure illicit advantage or to conceal illegal activity (Paternoster et al., 2024).\n\n## 6.2.2  Corruption adapts to the adoption of new systems and processes\n\nWhile corruption may increase, it can also change: when systems become more efficient or digitised, criminal actors are also incentivised to change their corruption strategies. According to one law enforcement stakeholder, corruption has not increased, rather we are only now seeing the true extent of the problem, with corruption changing (interview of 4 April 2024). The person explained that border corruption used to mean bribing a single guard at a border crossing. Today, increasing efficiency, automation and digitalisation make that one person at the barrier irrelevant. In a port like Rotterdam, where everything is automated, corruption must evolve to target other officials, such as those with access to systems or information. 'If you make the process more complex, corruption changes' , and generates new vulnerabilities.\n\n## 6.2.3  Corruption risks profiles adapt to new control measures and shift among public officials\n\nTo overcome the bottlenecks in the port and facilitate the movement of drugs, criminal actors depend on insider knowledge of the logistical processes in the port. As controls are strengthened, including through automation, the corruption risk profiles of border staff also change. Criminal networks adapt by targeting officials with strategic knowledge and access. Customs officials are particularly important, as they monitor the import and export of goods and are key players in the fight against drug trafficking. As enforcement efforts increase, these officials become more vulnerable to corruption.\n\nIncreased awareness of this risk, partly due to reports of corruption cases, has prompted more efforts to protect customs officials from the influence of criminal organisations. For example, in 2013, a programme called Integere Haven brought the municipality, public prosecutor, police, customs, Deltalinqs\n\n(the port entrepreneurs' association) and the port authority together to promote integrity and professional behaviour in the port, amongst other things (Staring et al., 2019).\n\nAuthorities have developed stronger anti-corruption measures and reduced the discretionary power of those in high-risk positions, such as customs officials. As a result, bribing and co-opting people in these positions becomes less attractive to criminal networks (KPMG, 2021). But when barriers increase in one area, corruption risks may once again shift to a new group.\n\n## 6.2.4  Corruption morphs, blurring the lines between collusion, coercion and infiltration\n\nCorruption is functional and strategic - it helps criminal actors to solve problems and get things done. The nature of these corrupt engagements can take various forms, such as collusion, coercion and\u002For infiltration. Our research has found that as increased enforcement efforts raise incentives for corruption to facilitate trafficking, and given the relative power of criminal networks, the line between collusion and coercion can become blurred. If the promise of riches is ineffective in luring public officials, then threats and coercion can be used to increase pressure.\n\nCoercion puts officials in a lose-lose situation. If they refuse to cooperate, they may face threats from criminal networks; and if they comply with the criminal demands, they could be punished by the legal system for engaging in corruption. At the same time, officials can plausibly claim coercion even if they colluded willingly, which can complicate enforcement.\n\nThe issue is further complicated by infiltration, which collapses the boundary between public office and the criminal network. Collusion and coercion can result in public officials being co-opted. Infiltration takes this to a next level by planting members of the criminal network into public office positions.\n\nFigure 4: Corruption adapts in the face of changing enforcement.\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## 6.3 Trafficking strategies are equally adaptive\n\n## 6.3.1 Strengthened detection has impacted the number of drug seizures\n\nEfforts to combat drug trafficking at the port of Rotterdam have been intensified through enhanced detection and advanced technology. Now, for example, all shipping containers from Latin America are checked. Initially, stronger measures to counter drug trafficking led to more drug seizures (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2021). However, in 2024 and 2025 the number of seizures dropped. Authorities equally attribute the decline to strengthened enforcement measures against drug trafficking. Similar patterns are emerging in the larger north-west European seaports (Customs Administration of the Netherlands, 2024; Appleby, 2024; European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, 2024; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024).\n\nAt first glace, one might think that the strengthened enforcement measures were successful in reducing drug trafficking. This could potentially be the case, but it may also be a premature conclusion. With consistently high demand for drugs on the market, drug trafficking is unlikely to decrease.\n\nAnother explanation may be that, as the risk of detection increased, criminal networks have adapted their trafficking strategies in response to the increased hurdles, resulting in fewer numbers of seizures with time.\n\nThere are two broad ways in which criminals may have adapted their strategies:\n\n- · Changing concealment strategies\n- · Changing modes of transport and switching trafficking routes altogether\n\n'The criminals always find the weakest spot.'\n\nInterview with a law enforcement stakeholder , 16 July 2024\n\n## 6.3.2  Changing concealment strategies\n\n## Evolving concealment methods\n\nConcealment strategies are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Recent drug seizures have seen cocaine uncovered in places more original than fruit shipments, for example, in shipments of scrap metal, wooden beams, engines, furniture, batches of spirits or timber. More intricate strategies have also been seen, including hiding drugs in the flaps of boxes of bananas, or embedding kilos of cocaine in thousands of individual boxes in a telescopic crane from South America (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 2025; Rotterdamse Haven Veilige Haven 2024).\n\nOne interviewer also spoke about cocaine being washed into clothes or mixed with coal or oil (interview of 16 July 2024). In a recent online interview, the head of the Seaport Police explains that liquid cocaine is especially difficult to detect:\n\nit cannot be identified by x-ray scanners or sniffer dogs, and confirming its presence can take up to two weeks in a lab (Dalby, 2024).\n\n## Spreading the risks with smaller but more shipments\n\nAlthough the total amount of cocaine seized has decreased at the port of Rotterdam, interestingly, the number of shipments intercepted has actually increased slightly. A possible explanation hints at another change in concealment strategies: trafficking networks are spreading the risk by smuggling smaller quantities in more shipments, in a strategy known as 'shrinkage' (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 2025; Minchin, 2025).\n\n## 6.3.3  Changing modes of transport and trafficking routes\n\n## Shifting modes of transport to avoid detection\n\nA new initiative at the port of Rotterdam seeks to make it more difficult for criminal networks to obtain the container reference codes needed to pick up containers (Europol, 2023). This initiative called the 'Chain of Trust' was developed by both government and industry actors to improve digital security of port logistics and reduce opportunities for fraud, particularly for truck-based transport (Vertrouwensketen, n.d.). 4  The aim is to ensure that the process of picking up import containers and transferring them onto trucks will be more closely monitored, so that only the authorised person is picking up the container.\n\nHowever pick-up via truck is not the only way that containers are collected and transported out of the port. One stakeholder suggested that, as truck transport is more closely monitored, traffickers potentially shift to trains. This is supported by an increase in the number of broken seals found around railway tracks (interview of 4 April 2024).\n\n## Rerouting trafficking to other Dutch ports\n\nAn increase in drug seizures at smaller ports in the Netherlands suggests the possibility that trafficking is being rerouted. It is unclear whether this links directly to increased enforcement measures in Rotterdam or is a separate phenomenon (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 2025; Van der Wiele, 2024).\n\n## International displacement of trafficking routes\n\nThe most significant adaptive strategy appears to be diverting drug trafficking to ports and transit points in other countries. As barriers increase in the northern ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg making these ports less attractive, trafficking routes are shifting towards southern points in France, Spain and Portugal, where drug seizures are increasing (Cavalari et al., 2025; Fernández, 2024).\n\ncoercion and\n\ninfiltration)\n\nCorruption\n\naims and\n\ntargets shift\n\nSimilarly, transit routes are shifting, with drugs destined for Europe being transported from Latin America through transit ports in North and West Africa (Cavalari et al., 2025).\n\nThis adaptation strategy underscores the importance of international cooperation on security and fighting crime (Staring et al., 2023).\n\nFigure 5: Strengthened enforcement also changes trafficking strategies.\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## 6.4 The problem with understanding hidden and complex corruption and crime strategies\n\nThe research highlights that drug trafficking is driven by supply and demand. As long as demand is not addressed, supply remains highly profitable. The consequences are significant. Increased barriers to drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam have increased the need for inside help to facilitate trafficking (Staring et al., 2019). The dynamics of this corruption are complex: corruption risks rise, corruption goals and targets may change, and corruption practices may morph from collusion to coercion to infiltration. Meanwhile, traffickers adapt their strategies in terms of concealment methods and trafficking routes.\n\nThere are two overarching considerations. First, understanding the impact of stronger anti-trafficking measures on corruption and crime strategies is very complex . A discussion with a law enforcement stakeholder highlights the challenge of interpreting what it means when drug seizures are down: it could be a temporary drop, it could mean that fewer drugs are being shipped through the port of Rotterdam or that concealment methods have changed (interview of 16 July 2024). Fluctuations in the drug seizure figure alone are not an indicator of the scale of the drug trafficking problem, nor of the success of stronger enforcement efforts, as there may be many explanations at play (Staring et al., 2023). The same challenge applies when measuring corruption: the number of reported corruption cases does not accurately reflect the actual prevalence of corruption.\n\nStronger\n\nanti-corruption\n\nmeasures are\n\ndeveloped\n\nBoth drug trafficking and corruption are measured by detection, for instance, through changes in the number of drug seizures or public officials caught engaging in corruption. But the elephant in the room is that increasingly sophisticated criminal strategies can hide the real picture.\n\nIs a drop in seizure figures an indicator that trafficking has been rerouted? Or is the same volume still passing through the port with more sophisticated concealment and corruption strategies? Are adaptive strategies mutually exclusive or layered? Are they used in parallel, or is one activated only when the other has not proven feasible? Are trafficking routes really this elastic?\n\nThese questions underscore the need to continuously strengthen our ability to detect the 'red flags' of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools to characterise risk indicators are critical to understanding how crime and corruption strategies may be adapting (Abdou et al., 2024; Cascone et al., n.d.).\n\nThe second consideration is that both trafficking and corruption strategies are constantly evolving . This is often likened to a chess game: enforcement makes a move, the criminal networks adapt. But what seems to be emerging is more troubling. The unintended consequence of increasing barriers to drug trafficking - in a context where demand remains unchanged - is that it fuels increasingly sophisticated crime and corruption strategies that may have a greater negative impact on society. This is reflected in several key developments:\n\n- 1. The recent fall in the price of cocaine, attributed to a flooding of European markets. Seizures are increasingly considered as a cost of doing business - as pre-calculated loss (O'Keeffe, 2023).\n- 2. The hardening of crime and increasing violence associated with drug trafficking (Halsema, 2024).\n- 3. A shift in corruption practices, where the need to secure inside help can now incentivise coercion or deeper infiltration.\n- 4. The growing role of legitimate businesses and services in helping criminals evade detection and launder the proceeds of crime (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-a).\n\nThese developments underscore the need for strategic foresight. Anticipating how crime may adapt in unexpected ways to changing anticorruption and anti-trafficking strategies is critical to the development of more robust enforcement efforts and the mitigation of negative impacts on society.\n\n## 6.5 Practitioner insights on how to deal with the adaptive nature of crime\n\nA key topic of discussion in stakeholder interviews was how best to respond to the adaptive nature of crime. These were the main ideas, complemented by further insights from desk research:\n\n- · The need for a holistic view of crime. As crime and corruption adapt, it is important to have a broad understanding of the problem. This includes recognising how smuggling can shift to other ports, utilise other modes of transport, or involve different actors. It also means a broader perception and understanding of corruption (interview of 26 March 2024).\n- · A focus on vulnerabilities. It is important to understand present and future vulnerabilities in logistics processes and strategic positions to increase port resilience rather than reacting to specific incidents. This can also improve efficiency and security (interviews of 4 April and 16 July 2024).\n- · Using data smartly. Understanding the flow of goods and profiling it in a way that can highlight anomalies is critical (interviews of 4 April, 5 April and 12 April 2024). At the same time, a focus on big data should not come at the expense of intuition, practical experience and evaluating past successes and failures (interview of 12 April 2024).\n- · Building partnerships. Cooperation, collaboration and information sharing among all public and private stakeholders and enforcement actors is crucial. Strengthening resilience to crime must be a shared goal. The complexity of the port means that security can only be achieved with multi-stakeholder partnerships, characterised by trust, communication and shared commitment to pursuing port-centric efforts (interviews of 4 April, 12 April and 16 July 2024).\n- · Strengthening strategic foresight. Technology is a double-edged sword - by the time it is adopted, it may already be outdated (interview of 5 April 2024). It is also important to look ahead and see that as one area of operations becomes more secure through enhanced processes, criminals may shift the target for corruption (interview of 4 April 2024).\n\n- · The need for robust IT security\u002Fcybersecurity. An additional issue to keep in mind is that technology and automation create new vulnerabilities, for example, through cybercrime (Staring et al., 2023). A recent case highlights the challenge. Drug traffickers hired a hacker to infiltrate the port IT network in Rotterdam and Antwerp to identify the optimal shipping containers for hiding contraband and their exact location (May and Holcova, 2023).\n\n## 7 Conclusion\n\nThis report examines the drivers and strategies of corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking (with a focus on cocaine) in the port of Rotterdam. It shows that in the context of stronger anti-trafficking measures and unchanged demand for drugs, crime and corruption strategies follow the path of least resistance.\n\nCorruption is both strategic and functional. Social networks are built and nurtured strategically to facilitate corrupt exchanges. These networks are instrumental because trust and loyalty are important in hiding illegal behaviour. Corruption is diverse and complex, ranging from bribery and coercion to infiltration. Once established, corrupt relationships are long-lasting.\n\nA network view of corruption is critical to understanding the evolution of corrupt practices and strategies adopted to bribe public officials and launder the proceeds of crime. The money involved in these drug trafficking schemes is in the millions, so the strategies for laundering the proceeds are sophisticated. Strengthening financial investigations in drug trafficking investigations is therefore critical, as is the introduction of innovative measures such as nonconviction-based confiscation (Zürcher et al., 2024).\n\nOur research shows that both corruption and trafficking strategies are not static but rather adaptive. Increasing the barriers to drug trafficking can intensify corruption risks, change the aims and targets of corruption, and cause the characteristics of corruption to morph from collusion, to coercion or infiltration. Similarly, trafficking strategies adapt, from changing concealment strategies to changing modes of transport and using alternative trafficking routes. These in turn can increase corruption risks in other ports.\n\nConsequently, continuously strengthening a system of red flags with refined data to better characterise risk indicators is critical to enhancing efforts to curb drug trafficking. So too is leveraging anticipatory governance through strategic foresight and scenario building. Thinking about future risks helps us to implement more robust countermeasures today.\n\nThis is vital, as understanding how trafficking and corruption strategies adapt in response to increased enforcement efforts is complex, and the effects of adaptive crime strategies place ever-increasing costs to society.\n\n## Bibliography\n\nAbdou, Aly, Eszter Katona, Daniel Kofran, Viktoriia Poltoratskaya, Bence Toth, Dorina Vajda, Jacopo Costa, et al. 2024. 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October 21, 2022. https:\u002F\u002Fwww.tweedekamer.nl\u002Fkamerstukken\u002Fwetsvoorstellen\u002F detail?cfg=wetsvoorsteldetails&qry=wetsvoorstel%3A36228.\n\nUnger, Brigitte, Joras Ferwerda, Bojken Gjoleka, Alexander van Saase, Brigitte Slot and Linette de Swart. 2018. 'Aard en omvang van criminele bestedingen: Eindrapportage.' WODC. https:\u002F\u002Fbrigitteunger.nl\u002Fwp-content\u002F uploads\u002F2019\u002F06\u002FAard-en-omvang-van-criminele-bestedingen.pdf.\n\nVan der Wiele, Door. 2024. ''Zo ziet het eruit, zo ruikt het en zo is het verstopt' .' entrum voor Criminaliteitspreventie (blog). 11 December 2024. https:\u002F\u002Fccvsecondant.nl\u002Fplatform\u002Farticle\u002Fzo-ziet-het-eruit-zo-ruikt-het-en-zo-is-hetverstopt.\n\nVan Gestel, Barbra. 2019. 'Boekrecensie: Drugssmokkelaars en de deur in de haven.' In Criminaliteit En Veiligheid in Mainports , 45:91-97. 2019. WODC. https:\u002F\u002F repository.wodc.nl\u002Fhandle\u002F20.500.12832\u002F814.\n\nVertrouwensketen. n.d. 'Samen maken we onze logistiek veiliger.' Accessed 17 June 2025. https:\u002F\u002Fvertrouwensketen.nl\u002F.\n\nZürcher, Emma, Mafalda Pardal, Iris Leussink and Stijn Hoorens. 2024. 'Drugsgerelateerde corruptive op Schiphol en in de Rotterdamse haven [Drugrelated corruption at Schiphol Airport and the Port of Rotterdam].' RAND Europe. https:\u002F\u002Fwww.rand.org\u002Fpubs\u002Fresearch\\_reports\u002FRRA2870-1.html.\n\n## Judicial cases\n\n|            | Judgment of the Rotterdam District Court in Case number ROT 10\u002F750163-14, 4 July  2017.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |\n|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2017:5125  | Summary:  A customs officer in the port of Rotterdam is accused of accepting bribes  that facilitated the import of large quantities of cocaine, as well as laundering the  money earned from this.  https:\u002F\u002Fuitspraken.rechtspraak.nl\u002Fdetails?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5125&showbut-                                                                                                                         |\n| 2019:1103  | 2019. Summary: A customs official is accused of accepting bribes to facilitate drugs traffick- ing and associated money laundering and was sentenced to two years in prison. https:\u002F\u002Fuitspraken.rechtspraak.nl\u002Fdetails?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2019:1103&showbut-                                                                                                                                                 |\n| 2020:918   | Summary: The defendant was convicted of, among other things, bribing a customs  official, conspiracy to import narcotics and preparatory acts in that regard, as well as  laundering large sums of money, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. https:\u002F\u002Fuitspraken.rechtspraak.nl\u002Fdetails?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2020:918&showbut- ton=true&keyword=corruptie%2Brotterdam%2Bhaven,douane,witwassen&idx=10 |\n| 2020:12597 | Summary: Customs official convicted of accepting bribes, breaching official secrecy  and money laundering in connection with drug trafficking. https:\u002F\u002Fuitspraken.rechtspraak.nl\u002Fdetails?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2020:12597&showbut- ton=true&keyword=corruptie%2Brotterdam%2Bhaven,douane,witwassen&idx=9                                                                                                        |\n| 2020:1295  | Summary: The defendant (working for the tax office) was convicted for participating in  a criminal organisation that was involved in importing cocaine via the port of Rotter- dam and related offences such as extortion, money laundering and bribery, and was  sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. https:\u002F\u002Fuitspraken.rechtspraak.nl\u002Fdetails?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2020:1295&showbut-                     |\n|            | Judgment of the Rotterdam District Court in Case number 10\u002F750306-18, 21 June 2022. Summary: Customs official is convicted of money laundering. https:\u002F\u002Fuitspraken.rechtspraak.nl\u002Fdetails?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2022:5588&showbut-                                                                                                                                                                              |\n| 2022:5588  | ton=true&keyword=corruptie%2Brotterdam%2Bhaven,douane,witwassen&idx=8                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |\n\n## Annex: Overview of stakeholder interviews\n\n|   # | Type of stakeholder   | Date          |\n|-----|-----------------------|---------------|\n|   1 | Academia\u002Fresearcher   | 26 March 2024 |\n|   2 | Law enforcement       | 4 April 2024  |\n|   3 | Academia\u002Fresearcher   | 5 April 2024  |\n|   4 | Academia\u002Fresearcher   | 12 April 2024 |\n|   5 | Law enforcement       | 12 July 2024  |","","### Executive summary\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption facilitates drug trafficking\n(specifically cocaine) through the port of Rotterdam, looking at the underlying\ndrivers and strategies involved. Legal trade routes and commercial ports are\nespecially attractive because of the high volumes of cargo, which make it\npossible to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. The spatial complexity of the\nport of Rotterdam also makes it difficult to fully secure it against criminal activity.\n\nDigging deeper into the facilitating factors of trafficking, the paper finds that,\nparadoxically, a main driver of rising border corruption is the increased political\nattention on and resources dedicated to fighting trafficking. Desk research and\nstakeholder interviews highlight that as authorities deploy new technology\nto improve detection, traffickers face more obstacles to operating effectively.\nHaving someone on the inside then becomes increasingly important (Staring\net al., 2019). So, an unintended but important consequence of the strengthened\nfight against drug trafficking is that corruption becomes even more essential for\nthe operational success of organised crime networks.\n\nThis study focuses specifically on the role of customs. Tasked with monitoring\nthe import and export of goods, customs officers are important actors in the\nfight against drug trafficking. However, their role also makes them vulnerable:\nthey have crucial knowledge on processes and procedures, access to systems\nand discretionary power that can be exploited by criminals (KPMG, 2021).\n\nThe desk research shows that corruption is used strategically to circumvent two\nimportant bottlenecks: the container screening and security as cargo enters the\nport, and the exit of drugs from the port (Staring et al., 2019). Traffickers may\nseek to obtain key information or direct assistance from customs officers.\n\nThese corrupt relationships and the emerging networks between members of\ncrime groups and the customs officials are diverse. Some relationships can be\ncharacterised by collusion, where customs officials offer their services or are\npersuaded to cooperate. This collusion may be opportunistic or targeted. Other\nrelationships can be characterised by coercion. Customs officials may be lured\nby financial reward, but this is accompanied by intimidation or the threat of\nviolence to ensure that the officer cooperates and continues to cooperate.\nOur research highlights that the boundary between collusion and coercion is\noften blurred.\n\nBeyond collusion and coercion, we also see infiltration, which crosses the\nboundaries between the criminal, public and private. What emerges is less a\nmatter of individual corruption and more akin to regulatory capture, where the\npublic office position is held by a member of the criminal network.\n\nThe review of the judicial cases shows that bribes involved in these schemes\ncan amount to millions. To hide and use the illicit gains, traffickers rely on money\nlaundering, disguising its source as legitimate. They often enlist the help of family\nand friends, a trusted inner circle or professional specialists. They may also hide\ncash at home or invest it in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad.\n\nA key finding of our research is that the criminal and corruption strategies used\nto facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive. The underlying driver of this\nadaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and high profitability of the\ncrime. This pushes traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in\nsupplying the demand.\n\nCorruption strategies adapt in response to new enforcement measures. When\ncontrol systems are changed and\u002For strengthened, corruption strategies evolve\nalongside them. This research identifies some key patterns:\n\n- Stronger detection efforts increase the incentives for corruption.\n- Evolving systems encourage a similar shift in corruption strategies.\n- Anti-corruption and anti-trafficking measures may change the profile of those most vulnerable to being co-opted.\n- The characteristics of corruption can also evolve, from collusion to coercion, to full infiltration of institutions and systems – with blurred lines in between.\n\nTrafficking strategies are similarly adaptive. There have been increased efforts\nby the port to combat trafficking through enhanced detection and technology.\nThis was initially reflected by increased drug seizures. But since 2024, drugs\nseizures have declined. The research findings provide an explanation for this:\nAs detection strengthens, more drug seizures are made. But what may happen,\ntoo, is a response to these new measures. As the risk of detection increases,\ncriminals may adapt their trafficking strategies to overcome the additional\nhurdles, including:\n\n- changing concealment strategies; and\n- changing modes of transport and trafficking routes, including to ports outside of the Netherlands.\n\nThese developments highlight the complexity in understanding the impact of\nstronger anti-trafficking measures on both corruption and trafficking strategies.\nTrafficking and corruption are typically measured by detection, for example,\nby changes in the volume of drug seizures or the number of public officials\ncaught engaging in corruption. But the elephant in the room is that increasingly\nsophisticated criminal strategies can hide what is really happening. This\nunderscores the need to continuously strengthen our ability to recognise “red\nflags” of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools and refined risk indicators\nare critical for understanding how crime and corruption strategies are changing.\n\nThe evolving nature of criminal strategies is often likened to a game of chess:\nenforcement makes a move, and criminal networks adapt. But what now seems\nto be emerging is more troubling. When barriers to drug trafficking increase\nwhile demand remains unchanged, crime and corruption strategies adapt\nin ways that can deepen their impact on society, leading for example to the\nhardening of crime and associated violence.\n\nThis makes anticipating how crime may adapt to changing anti-corruption and\nanti-trafficking strategies critical. Improved foresight and scenario-building\ncapacities will be vital in order to develop more robust enforcement efforts\nagainst drug trafficking and mitigate the negative impact on society.\n\nA holistic approach is essential. Addressing corruption as a facilitator of drug\ntrafficking requires a broad view of crime that focuses on understanding\nvulnerabilities, leveraging data and harnessing collaboration. The risk of\ntrafficking routes changing are high, therefore, we must use every tool at our\ndisposal to ensure effective and sustainable enforcement efforts.","Drivers, strategies and implications",{"id":1011,"storage":128,"filename_disk":1012,"filename_download":1013,"title":1014,"type":132,"created_on":975,"modified_on":975,"charset":7,"filesize":1015,"width":1016,"height":1017,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":1018,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":975},"f2bc171a-166b-4939-9829-788720a33c29","f2bc171a-166b-4939-9829-788720a33c29.jpg?itok=QcimxPdT","WP-58-Corruption-at-port-of-Rotterdam-cover.jpg?itok=QcimxPdT","WP 58_Corruption at port of Rotterdam_cover",36220,500,707,{},{"id":1020,"storage":128,"filename_disk":1021,"filename_download":1022,"title":1023,"type":379,"created_on":1024,"modified_on":1025,"charset":7,"filesize":1026,"width":136,"height":1027,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":1028,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":1025},"b0adf53d-38e6-426e-b1e2-bf789a9a5790","b0adf53d-38e6-426e-b1e2-bf789a9a5790.png","Rotterdam-border-corruption_preview-cover-image.png","Rotterdam Border Corruption Preview Cover Image","2026-08-06T08:33:30.000Z","2026-08-06T08:33:31.000Z",921575,630,{},[1030],{"id":1031,"publications_id":1032,"countries_id":1056},1151,{"id":974,"status":125,"sort":7,"user_created":1033,"date_created":975,"user_updated":1034,"date_updated":976,"nid":977,"slug":978,"image":1011,"title":979,"body":980,"citation":981,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":983,"date_published":984,"external":985,"topic":1035,"link_internal":1036,"link_external":1040,"featured":985,"topics":1041,"languages":1042,"type":1043,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":1044,"summary":1005,"pdf_text":1006,"main_points":1007,"short_version":1008,"subtitle":1009,"og_image":1020,"countries":1045,"tags":1046,"pdf":1050,"authors":1053},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","97125d77-553b-478d-8c59-7064ee23cd96",[987,988],[1037,1038,1039],{"url":991,"caption":992},{"url":994,"caption":995},{"url":997,"caption":998},[],[94,51],[223],[1003],[222],[1031],[1047,1048,1049],4646,4720,4721,[1051,1052],2476,2526,[1054,1055],2608,2609,{"id":1057,"name":1058,"code":1059,"latitude":1060,"longitude":1061},163,"Netherlands","NL",52.13263,5.29127,[1063,1080,1097],{"id":1047,"publications_id":1064,"tags_id":1079},{"id":974,"status":125,"sort":7,"user_created":1033,"date_created":975,"user_updated":1034,"date_updated":976,"nid":977,"slug":978,"image":1011,"title":979,"body":980,"citation":981,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":983,"date_published":984,"external":985,"topic":1065,"link_internal":1066,"link_external":1070,"featured":985,"topics":1071,"languages":1072,"type":1073,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":1074,"summary":1005,"pdf_text":1006,"main_points":1007,"short_version":1008,"subtitle":1009,"og_image":1020,"countries":1075,"tags":1076,"pdf":1077,"authors":1078},[987,988],[1067,1068,1069],{"url":991,"caption":992},{"url":994,"caption":995},{"url":997,"caption":998},[],[94,51],[223],[1003],[222],[1031],[1047,1048,1049],[1051,1052],[1054,1055],{"id":507,"name":508},{"id":1048,"publications_id":1081,"tags_id":1096},{"id":974,"status":125,"sort":7,"user_created":1033,"date_created":975,"user_updated":1034,"date_updated":976,"nid":977,"slug":978,"image":1011,"title":979,"body":980,"citation":981,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":983,"date_published":984,"external":985,"topic":1082,"link_internal":1083,"link_external":1087,"featured":985,"topics":1088,"languages":1089,"type":1090,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":1091,"summary":1005,"pdf_text":1006,"main_points":1007,"short_version":1008,"subtitle":1009,"og_image":1020,"countries":1092,"tags":1093,"pdf":1094,"authors":1095},[987,988],[1084,1085,1086],{"url":991,"caption":992},{"url":994,"caption":995},{"url":997,"caption":998},[],[94,51],[223],[1003],[222],[1031],[1047,1048,1049],[1051,1052],[1054,1055],{"id":830,"name":831},{"id":1049,"publications_id":1098,"tags_id":1113},{"id":974,"status":125,"sort":7,"user_created":1033,"date_created":975,"user_updated":1034,"date_updated":976,"nid":977,"slug":978,"image":1011,"title":979,"body":980,"citation":981,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":983,"date_published":984,"external":985,"topic":1099,"link_internal":1100,"link_external":1104,"featured":985,"topics":1105,"languages":1106,"type":1107,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":1108,"summary":1005,"pdf_text":1006,"main_points":1007,"short_version":1008,"subtitle":1009,"og_image":1020,"countries":1109,"tags":1110,"pdf":1111,"authors":1112},[987,988],[1101,1102,1103],{"url":991,"caption":992},{"url":994,"caption":995},{"url":997,"caption":998},[],[94,51],[223],[1003],[222],[1031],[1047,1048,1049],[1051,1052],[1054,1055],{"id":1114,"name":1115},1374,"Law 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through key insights","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6","2026-06-11T11:09:26.000Z",4908387,[1166,1183],{"id":1054,"publications_id":1167,"authors_id":1182},{"id":974,"status":125,"sort":7,"user_created":1033,"date_created":975,"user_updated":1034,"date_updated":976,"nid":977,"slug":978,"image":1011,"title":979,"body":980,"citation":981,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":983,"date_published":984,"external":985,"topic":1168,"link_internal":1169,"link_external":1173,"featured":985,"topics":1174,"languages":1175,"type":1176,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":1177,"summary":1005,"pdf_text":1006,"main_points":1007,"short_version":1008,"subtitle":1009,"og_image":1020,"countries":1178,"tags":1179,"pdf":1180,"authors":1181},[987,988],[1170,1171,1172],{"url":991,"caption":992},{"url":994,"caption":995},{"url":997,"caption":998},[],[94,51],[223],[1003],[222],[1031],[1047,1048,1049],[1051,1052],[1054,1055],{"id":271,"name":272,"position":7,"image":273},{"id":1055,"publications_id":1184,"authors_id":1199},{"id":974,"status":125,"sort":7,"user_created":1033,"date_created":975,"user_updated":1034,"date_updated":976,"nid":977,"slug":978,"image":1011,"title":979,"body":980,"citation":981,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":983,"date_published":984,"external":985,"topic":1185,"link_internal":1186,"link_external":1190,"featured":985,"topics":1191,"languages":1192,"type":1193,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":1194,"summary":1005,"pdf_text":1006,"main_points":1007,"short_version":1008,"subtitle":1009,"og_image":1020,"countries":1195,"tags":1196,"pdf":1197,"authors":1198},[987,988],[1187,1188,1189],{"url":991,"caption":992},{"url":994,"caption":995},{"url":997,"caption":998},[],[94,51],[223],[1003],[222],[1031],[1047,1048,1049],[1051,1052],[1054,1055],{"id":255,"name":256,"position":257,"image":258},{"id":1201,"status":125,"sort":7,"date_created":1202,"date_updated":1203,"nid":1204,"slug":1205,"title":1206,"body":1207,"citation":1007,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":1208,"date_published":1209,"external":985,"topic":1210,"link_internal":1211,"link_external":1212,"featured":985,"topics":1216,"languages":1217,"type":1219,"area":1221,"programme":1223,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":1224,"og_image":7,"countries":1231,"tags":1252,"pdf":1269,"authors":1312},2408,"2025-07-10T08:37:12.000Z","2026-08-12T09:01:26.000Z",2831,"progress-ukraines-anti-corruption-efforts-july-2025-update","Progress in Ukraine's anti-corruption efforts - July 2025 update","This document takes stock of recent progress (March to June 2025) in strengthening Ukraine’s anti-corruption ecosystem. It builds on a series of previous reports and is published ahead of the fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference, held in Rome 10–11 July 2025.\n\nThe report highlights key developments, including in the context of Ukraine's European integration, and touches on:\n\n\n- the status of the national Anti-Corruption Strategy;\n- the nascent reform of Ukraine's Asset Recovery and Management Agency;\n- the risks related to the selection of members for the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ);\n- criminal justice developments, including the first audit of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau;\n- the reform of the State Register of Corrupt Officials; and\n- considerations in the area of recovery and reconstruction.\n\n\nThis document is a joint publication of Transparency International Ukraine and the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\n*Disclaimer: This publication has been produced with the support of Switzerland. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Basel Institute on Governance and TI Ukraine and do not necessarily reflect the views of the development partner.*","Transparency International Ukraine; Basel Institute on Governance","2025-07-10",[1007],[],[1213],{"url":1214,"caption":1215},"https:\u002F\u002Fti-ukraine.org\u002Fen\u002Fresearch\u002Fprogress-in-ukraine-s-anti-corruption-efforts-july-2025-update\u002F","Summary on TI-Ukraine website",[51,107],[223,1218],"Ukrainian",[1220],"Report",[1222],"Anti-Corruption & 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transparency and contribute to reducing corruption risks. However, inconsistent global sustainability standards and enforcement challenges limit the effectiveness of these measures.\n\nThe research presents evidence and practice from the development cooperation sector to support practitioners in navigating governance and accountability frameworks in the private sector.","U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre","2025-01-15",true,[43],[],[],[43,51],[223],[1330],"Guidelines",[43],{"id":1333,"storage":128,"filename_disk":1334,"filename_download":1335,"title":1336,"type":379,"created_on":1315,"modified_on":1315,"charset":7,"filesize":1337,"width":1016,"height":1338,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":1339,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":1315},"adba8327-c85b-45ab-ae7a-b7342fbe8537","adba8327-c85b-45ab-ae7a-b7342fbe8537.png?itok=fzm04da7","Screenshot-2025-02-26-at-14.28.37.png?itok=fzm04da7","Sustainability reporting and anticorruption provisions: unlocking the potential for impact.png",333445,708,{},[],[],[1343],{"id":1344,"sort":7,"publications_id":1345,"directus_files_id":1357},2433,{"id":1314,"status":125,"sort":7,"user_created":1033,"date_created":1315,"user_updated":1162,"date_updated":1316,"nid":1317,"slug":1318,"image":1333,"title":1319,"body":1320,"citation":1007,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":1321,"date_published":1322,"external":1323,"topic":1346,"link_internal":1347,"link_external":1348,"featured":985,"topics":1349,"languages":1350,"type":1351,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":1352,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"og_image":7,"countries":1353,"tags":1354,"pdf":1355,"authors":1356},[43],[],[],[43,51],[223],[1330],[43],[],[],[1344],[],{"id":1358,"storage":128,"filename_disk":1359,"filename_download":1360,"title":1360,"type":1137,"folder":1138,"uploaded_by":1033,"created_on":1315,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":1315,"charset":7,"filesize":1361,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":1362,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":1315},"a54aaa8c-bc8b-43b5-a560-65063c5d612b","a54aaa8c-bc8b-43b5-a560-65063c5d612b.pdf","Sustainability-reporting-and-anticorruption-provisions--unlocking-the-potential-for-impact.pdf",437093,"See PDF",[],{"id":1365,"status":125,"sort":7,"date_created":1366,"date_updated":1367,"nid":1368,"slug":1369,"title":1370,"body":1371,"citation":1007,"language":223,"year":982,"publisher":1372,"date_published":1373,"external":985,"topic":1374,"link_internal":1375,"link_external":1379,"featured":985,"topics":1383,"languages":1384,"type":1385,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":1387,"og_image":7,"countries":1395,"tags":1419,"pdf":1420,"authors":1421},2382,"2025-01-10T17:05:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:49.000Z",2740,"addressing-bribery-and-associated-social-norms-healthcare-results-behaviour-change","Addressing Bribery and Associated Social Norms in Healthcare: Results of a Behaviour Change Intervention in Tanzania","This open-access, peer-reviewed journal article examines the results of a pilot behavioural intervention in Tanzania. The project tested a behavioural anti-corruption intervention to reduce bribery in a hospital. It targeted deeply ingrained social norms while also leveraging the social networks and influence of key staff members.\n\nThe research was funded by the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme of the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). It was a collaboration between the Basel Institute on Governance, the UK Behavioural Insights Team, the University of Dar es Salam and the University of Utrecht.\n\n### Abstract\n\nPractices of bribery in the delivery of public services become entrenched when they are driven by social norms of reciprocity.\n\nThe resulting economies of favours, which are common across diverse geographical regions, are resilient to conventional anti-corruption measures because they are underpinned by strong social pressures.\n\nThis article describes the results of a behaviour change intervention to address gift-giving as a form of bribery in a Tanzanian hospital. The intervention utilised environmental cues and a peer-led network approach to deliver messages aimed at disincentivising bribery.\n\nAn exit survey of hospital users indicates a reduction of the ‘gift-offering propensity score’, capturing self-declared behaviour, from 23% before implementation of the intervention to 13% afterwards. We find similar changes in the enabling norms score.\n\nSemi-structured interviews with hospital users and health workers further support these findings.\n\nThese results suggest that practices and norms around bribery might be changed through a multi-pronged approach that addresses both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ side of bribery.","European Journal of Social Psychology","2025-01-09",[987,988],[1376],{"url":1377,"caption":1378},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fresearch-case-1"," View project summary",[1380],{"url":1381,"caption":1382},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1002\u002Fejsp.3140","View open-access 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on individuals, rather than *networks* of individuals.\n\nIn our research, we see repeatedly how high levels of corruption are rarely the result of individual behaviour – some isolated rotten apples transgressing the formal legal order and leading others astray. Rather, corruption more frequently springs from the social norms and group dynamics of well-articulated and resilient informal networks.\n\nAnd it’s those networks that have much to lose from integrity and ethics. Their behaviour as a group entrenches corruption, and they block attempts at reforms. This quick guide takes a look at what this means and the implications for anti-corruption programming.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nThis work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F). 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