Law enforcement

Specialising in asset recovery: why this Argentinian prosecutor decided to take the leap

“When it comes to economic crime, securing a conviction is not always enough. If we do not recover the assets, we are not returning to society what was stolen from it.” This realisation marked a turning point in the career of Julio Petrucci, a prosecutor at the Attorney General’s Office of the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Driven by this mindset and by his desire to keep pace with the way crime operates today, Petrucci decided to enrol in the postgraduate programme “CAS Combating Financial Crime Through Asset Recovery” delivered by the Basel Institute on Governance together with the University of Basel. In this interview, he tells us about the challenges of his work, the issues demanding greater specialisation and the advice he has for other public servants who, like him, are striving to serve their citizens better. A prosecutor’s work requires constant adaptation. What motivates your daily work and what challenges do you face? My main motivation is to try to do good and to help repair what is broken in society when a crime is committed. In my country, as well as across the region, there are many economic difficulties and high levels of social inequality. Many people who become victims of crime rely on the Public Prosecutor's Office and other public institutions for support. As a prosecutor, I want to be able to provide these victims with answers and practical tools. Over time, I began to realise that my initial training was largely focused on crime in traditional, physical settings. However, crime scenes are often digital or have a strong financial component. That's when I identified the need to look for new tools to strengthen my investigations. It was through this search that I discovered the Basel Institute on Governance and its educational programmes. Why did you choose the Basel Institute programme to specialise in asset recovery? I was particularly interested in the specialised programme on asset recovery for three reasons: - first, because asset recovery is a highly relevant and rapidly growing field; - second, because I could not find other advanced courses offering this level of specialisation in countering financial crime; - and third, because of the international reputation of the Basel Institute on Governance and the University of Basel. What change in perspective did this programme bring to your professional career? The course marked a before and after in my career. In Argentina, asset recovery is still a developing field. Historically, we have analysed criminal cases with the aim of securing convictions. However, when it comes to economic crime, securing a conviction is not always enough. If we do not recover the assets, we are not returning to society what was stolen from it. Throughout the course, I learned not only about the different legal frameworks that exist around the world in this area, but also how to apply them to specific cases. The academic team and the online learning platforms were excellent. All this new knowledge and practical tools are already proving extremely useful in my day-to-day work. They have even contributed to my professional growth in ways that I am not yet able to comment on officially. This was also my first international experience. I got to meet people from different countries and professional backgrounds, which was very enriching. You were able to join the programme thanks to a scholarship. What did this support mean to you? I am a public official in a country facing significant economic challenges. The salaries of public officials like me, both in Argentina and across Latin America, are not particularly high. In this context, I saw that the Basel Institute offered financial support through the Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund and decided to apply for it. From the outset, the team was very receptive. After some interviews, I was awarded a partial scholarship thanks to the funds they had raised, which allowed me to take the course. To donors and benefactors, I would say that their contribution is not just individual support for a student: it is a direct investment in justice systems in our countries. Thanks to their contribution, I now have the tools to investigate complex crimes and recover assets that belong to society. Why would you recommend this training to other prosecutors or investigators in the region? When you work in public service, and especially in a role such as that of a prosecutor, it is very difficult to look beyond what you see in your daily work. But crime is changing. In fact, it has already changed, and if we do not adapt, we will not be able to do our jobs effectively or help repair what is broken in society when a crime is committed. For this reason, I encourage prosecutors and others interested in tackling financial crime to step outside their day-to-day routine and take courses like this. I highly recommend this programme to them, not only because of its academic quality but also because of the quality and dedication of the Basel Institute team. It was an incredible experience. Thank you, Julio, for sharing your story and highlighting the impact this postgraduate programme has had on your professional journey. Julio Petrucci is just one of many talented professionals who have been able to take this course thanks to the Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund. We are deeply grateful to all those who have generously contributed, and continue to contribute, to this fund, especially the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, Bonifassi Avocats, Bennett Jones, ECO Strategic Communications and Kellerhals Carrard. Learn more ::: links - Discover “Combating Financial Crime Through Asset Recovery” - Postgraduate programme delivered online in partnership with the University of Basel. - Contribute to the Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund - Help train the next generation of anti-corruption professionals. - Discover our offer of short online training courses - Practitioner-led training focused on real-world financial crime challenges. :::

What can corruption sanctions really achieve?

For victims of corruption and related human rights abuses, justice is often out of reach. Courts may be compromised, prosecutors unwilling to act and political leaders implicated in the wrongdoing. In such cases, corruption sanctions cannot deliver justice on their own. They may, however, provide something else: accountability, recognition and consequences. These questions were at the heart of a Basel Institute on Governance webinar marking the launch of the working paper Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know. Commissioned by the Basel Institute's International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR and written by Dr Anton Moiseienko, the paper examines how governments can use corruption sanctions more strategically as part of wider anti-corruption efforts. Andrew Dornbierer, Head of Policy and Research at ICAR moderated the online launch event bringing together experts with experience across sanctions policy, litigation, advocacy and victims' rights. Dr Anton Moiseienko was joined by Sir William Browder KCMG, CEO of Hermitage Capital and Head of the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign, Michael O'Kane , Senior Partner at Peters & Peters, and Lyra Nightingale , Senior Legal Advisor at REDRESS. Recognition matters Sanctions are often judged by whether they change behaviour, recover assets or deter future wrongdoing. Lyra Nightingale argued that this overlooks another form of impact. If a targeted sanction, such as a corruption sanction, can convey recognition, acknowledgement and some sense of justice for victims, it has already had an impact. Drawing on REDRESS's work with survivors of torture and other serious abuses linked to corruption, Nightingale described how sanctions can validate victims' experiences and demonstrate international solidarity when other routes to justice have failed. Examples from Iran and Angola illustrated the point. Victims and civil society groups viewed sanctions not simply as restrictions imposed on perpetrators, but as public acknowledgement that wrongdoing had occurred and that it mattered. Sanctions cannot provide a complete remedy, but they help signal that impunity is not absolute. Success means different things A recurring theme throughout the webinar was that sanctions are expected to achieve many things at once. Moiseienko argued that governments use corruption sanctions for a range of purposes: disrupting access to international financial systems, deterring future misconduct, condemning wrongdoing and supporting accountability efforts. Given this broad scope: It would be perverse to conclude that if corruption does not stop, sanctions have failed. That observation goes to the heart of the debate. Corruption sanctions are often directed at the most powerful and entrenched offenders. Eliminating corruption entirely is rarely a realistic objective. The more relevant question is whether sanctions increase pressure, restrict opportunities and support broader accountability efforts. The answer depends on what governments are trying to achieve. Do sanctions work? Here the panellists diverged. Drawing on years of experience representing sanctioned individuals, Michael O'Kane cautioned against assuming that sanctions automatically produce meaningful results. For some people, sanctions are profoundly impactful. For others, they are not particularly impactful at all. He argued that sanctions are most effective when they form part of a broader strategy that includes enforcement, asset recovery and clear incentives for behavioural change. Sir William Browder took a more forceful view. Reflecting on Russia's response to Magnitsky sanctions, he pointed to the extraordinary lengths taken to challenge and discredit the measures. So we know that we hit the Achilles' heel. For Browder, the reaction itself is evidence of effectiveness. Sanctions restrict access to assets, travel and international financial networks. They also create uncertainty among others who may fear becoming targets themselves. The disagreement was less about whether sanctions matter than about how much they can achieve on their own. Legitimacy is part of effectiveness The discussion repeatedly returned to legitimacy. Several speakers warned that sanctions derive much of their power from public confidence in their fairness and credibility. If they are perceived as arbitrary or politically motivated, their effectiveness may weaken over time. Moiseienko argued that governments should resist the temptation to use sanctions indiscriminately. The moment governments begin to look trigger-happy, indiscriminate or undisciplined in their use of sanctions, confidence in the entire system risks collapsing. Questions of transparency, evidence and due process therefore matter not only for legal reasons but also for practical ones. The legitimacy of sanctions is one of their greatest strengths. It can also be one of their greatest vulnerabilities. An evolving tool Corruption sanctions are now firmly established in the international anti-corruption landscape. Yet many of the questions surrounding them remain unresolved. - How should success be measured? - What role should sanctions play alongside criminal investigations and asset recovery efforts? - How can governments maintain public confidence while responding to evolving geopolitical pressures? As Andrew Dornbierer noted: Corruption sanctions are still a relatively new area of law and policy, and there will undoubtedly be significant developments in the years ahead. The webinar offered no single answer to these questions, but gave a sense of both the promise and the limitations of corruption sanctions. They are neither a cure-all nor a symbolic gesture. Used strategically, they can support accountability, recognise victims and increase pressure on those who have long operated with impunity. Learn more ::: links - Working Paper "Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know" - For policymakers grappling with these challenges, this Basel Institute’s Working Paper provides a valuable starting point. - Quick Guide to corruption sanctions - For an easy introduction to the concept. - Webinar recording - Watch the full webinar on YouTube. :::

Holding the corrupt to account: the promise and potential of corruption sanctions

When states fail to hold corrupt actors to account, ordinary citizens pay the price. Corruption sanctions were born from the idea that no one should be above the law, no matter where they are in the world. In a new Working Paper, Dr Anton Moiseienko explores how these tools have evolved and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use. Here we share the foreword to his paper by the Basel Institute's Andrew Dornbierer, Head of Policy and Research, International Centre for Asset Recovery. Foreword Every state has an obligation to investigate and prosecute corruption within their jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many states around the world are not willing to fulfil this responsibility. As a result, the very individuals within these states tasked with serving the public interest are instead given free rein to commit acts that not only serve themselves but also corrode the fabric of the state. And ordinary citizens have no alternative but to endure the ensuing economic and social damage. The development of sanctions tools targeting corruption stemmed from the idea that justice should be universal; that no one in any society around the world should be above the law. They are powerful tools, built on powerful principles. States introducing them understand that unchecked corruption will always suffocate a state’s ability to provide security, fairness and prosperity to its citizens. Comparatively though, corruption sanctions are still an underdeveloped concept and are far from perfect. Only a handful of states have introduced them, and those that have are not often using them to their full potential. They also spark valid concerns surrounding due process. These criticisms shouldn’t be ignored: they offer an insight on how these tools could be further developed and enhanced to ensure that they are more credibly and consistently applied. In his paper, Anton Moiseienko provides an excellent and well-researched overview of how corruption sanctions could be designed and employed to better achieve their potential. He explains how these tools have evolved over the last two decades and how they could be further refined to be more effective and achieve a wider range of impact. Critically, his paper is an indispensable resource for those looking to understand exactly how such sanctions can help states deter, disrupt and debilitate the notoriously corrupt that are unreachable through standard criminal justice tools. Learn more Read Dr Anton Moiseienko’s Working Paper “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know” for a deeper analysis of the topic and key policy recommendations. Get a brief introduction to corruption sanctions from our related Quick Guide. Register for our public webinar "Corruption sanctions – reaching those beyond the law" on 18 June 2026, marking the launch of Dr Moiseienko's Working Paper.

Advancing Malawi’s efforts against corruption and environmental crime

Malawi’s forests and wildlife are under growing pressure from illegal exploitation, driven by rising demand for natural resources and enabled by corruption and illicit financial flows. From illegal logging to wildlife trafficking, environmental crimes not only threaten biodiversity and local livelihoods, but also weaken public institutions and deprive the country of vital resources for sustainable development. Charcoal illustrates the complex challenges involved: According to Malawi’s National Charcoal Strategy 2017–2027, 97% of households rely on illegally and unsustainably sourced charcoal and firewood for cooking and heating. In response to the resulting deforestation and forest degradation, the government has tightened enforcement against illegal wood harvesting and charcoal production while promoting alternative cooking fuels. Building on several years of collaboration with government partners in Malawi, the Basel Institute on Governance is launching a new project to strengthen the country’s response to environment-related financial crime and corruption. The three-year initiative, Mainstreaming Malawi’s progress in tackling environment-related financial crime and corruption, is funded by the UK Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs DEFRA and implemented through the Basel Institute’s Green Corruption programme. Activities have commenced on the ground and will run through to June 2028. A joined-up approach: enforcement and prevention The project supports Malawi’s Department of National Parks and Wildlife, Department of Forestry and Anti-Corruption Bureau in strengthening both enforcement capacities and corruption prevention systems linked to wildlife and forestry crimes. Rather than focusing solely on individual criminal cases, the initiative takes a broader institutional approach. It combines financial investigation techniques and case-based mentoring with efforts focusing on prevention to strengthen internal controls, improve inter-agency coordination and reduce corruption vulnerabilities within environmental agencies themselves. Among the planned activities are: mentoring investigators and prosecutors working on corruption and money laundering cases linked to wildlife and forestry crime; supporting the development of digital case registration and tracking systems to strengthen case management from investigation to prosecution; helping Institutional Integrity Committees and internal auditors identify and mitigate corruption risks; and developing training, practical guidance and knowledge products to support long-term institutional capacity. Dr Amanda Cabrejo le Roux, Deputy Director of Green Corruption and the project lead, said: This project represents a significant step forward in our efforts to support environmental agencies in protecting Malawi’s wildlife and natural resources, while also reinforcing institutional integrity. By combining financial investigation techniques with robust prevention systems, we help our government partners create a sustainable framework for countering financial crime linked to the environment. Building on proven partnerships The project expands on earlier DEFRA-funded work implemented jointly by the Basel Institute and the Lilongwe Wildlife Trust, which helped strengthen anti-corruption responses to wildlife crime through a combination of enforcement support and corruption prevention measures. Through this and over a decade of engagement in Malawi, we enjoy strong working relationships with Malawi’s Anti-Corruption Bureau, Department of National Parks and Wildlife, Department of Forestry and Malawi Police Service – partnerships that now provide the foundation for broader and more ambitious work on environment-related financial crime. The initiative also connects to the Basel Institute’s wider Green Corruption programme, which supports governments and partners around the world in addressing corruption linked to environmental crime, climate change and the global energy transition. As global demand for timber, minerals and other natural resources increases, corruption risks linked to environmental exploitation are becoming more complex and transnational. Through our work in Malawi and beyond, the Basel Institute aims to strengthen the governance systems needed to protect natural resources, safeguard communities and ensure environmental policies can be effectively enforced. Learn more Find out about the Green Corruption programme. Interested in corruption and governance in the environmental space? Join the Countering Environmental Corruption Practitioners Forum, a global community of practitioners jointly led by the Basel Institute on Governance, Transparency International, WWF and TRAFFIC.

How stronger borders can create smarter corruption: lessons from one of Europe's most strategic border crossings

When Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007, many believed it would lead to more secure, transparent and less corrupt borders. New regulations, infrastructure modernisation and digitalised customs procedures all followed. European standards and money arrived together. Yet corruption did not disappear at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, the main land crossing between Bulgaria and Türkiye and one of the busiest gateways between Europe and Asia. Instead, it evolved. This is the central finding of a recent article by the Prevention, Research and Innovation team of the Basel Institute on Governance – Dr Jacopo Costa, Dr Claudia Baez Camargo, Noémi Jäger and Dr Saba Kassa – published in the Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance . The article examines how criminal networks, smugglers, businesses and corrupt officials adapted to Bulgaria’s EU integration. It illustrates how corruption behaves like an adaptive ecosystem: when regulations and border control technologies change, corruption changes with them. A border built for opportunity – legal and illegal Border spaces concentrate discretionary power in the hands of customs officers, border guards, inspectors and regulators, while bringing together also traders, transport companies, migrants, smugglers, criminal groups and political actors. Kapitan Andreevo is a particularly instructive case due to its strategic location, with thousands of trucks, travellers and goods passing through the border checkpoint daily. Before Bulgaria’s EU accession, corruption at the checkpoint was already deeply embedded. The 1990s brought economic crisis, shortages of consumer goods, weak state capacity and rapidly expanding informal markets. Smuggling became a profitable survival strategy. Border officials could be bribed to overlook undeclared goods, counterfeit products and tax evasion. Duty-free shops in the "no man's land" between Bulgaria and Türkiye became hubs for smuggling cigarettes, alcohol and petroleum products. Corruption operated at multiple levels: everyday exchanges between traders, drivers and officials, often based on long-standing personal relationships, at the lower level connections between politicians, senior civil servants, business elites and organised crime at the higher level. Smuggling routes required political protection. Profits flowed upward through patronage systems. EU accession changed the rules of the game Bulgaria’s EU accession radically transformed the legal and institutional environment. The country had to align its customs regulations, VAT rules, excise tax systems, phytosanitary standards and border procedures with EU standards – a gradual process requiring significant investment. The reforms affected almost every aspect of border governance. Customs procedures became increasingly digitalised. New systems such as the VAT Information Exchange System VIES and the Excise Movement and Control System EMCS improved cross-border monitoring. Phytosanitary and veterinary inspections became stricter. Migration controls tightened through alignment with Schengen rules and access to systems like the Schengen Information System SIS and international databases of stolen documents and vehicles. Meanwhile, new border control technologies – X-ray machines, scanners, thermal cameras and risk-analysis tools – expanded the state’s capacity to detect illicit activity. From a policy perspective, this appeared to be a modernisation success story. But criminal systems rarely remain static when the environment changes. Corruption did not decline – it adapted The most striking finding is that stronger controls often increase the strategic value of corruption. After EU accession, crossing the border illegally became more difficult, risky and expensive. Corruption became necessary not only to speed up procedures but to bypass sophisticated control and regulatory systems. In other words, modernisation transformed the function of corruption: Criminal actors began targeting specialised procedures, such as food safety inspections, VAT systems, automated license plate recognition, laboratory testing and digital customs controls. VAT fraud and the manipulation of digital systems VAT fraud illustrates this adaptation clearly. Within the EU, exports are often subject to a VAT rate of 0 zero percent, which means companies can reclaim any VAT they have already paid domestically. Criminal actors exploited this through "carousel fraud" schemes involving fictitious transactions chains. At Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, for example, corruption allegedly enabled traders to manipulate customs procedures. One method involved corrupt officials manually entering fake truck registrations into customs systems to simulate border crossings, enabling fraudulent VAT refunds for exports that never occurred. Even more revealing was the manipulation of automated license plate recognition: corrupt actors reportedly disabled automated recognition and manually entered altered plates using Cyrillic characters resembling Latin letters, allowing smugglers to bypass alerts and inspections. This illustrates a pattern seen in many modern corruption systems: digitalisation does not automatically eliminate corruption. Instead, corruption turns towards the technological systems themselves. Food safety, privatisation and rent-seeking EU food safety and phytosanitary regulations created new bottlenecks and forms of discretionary authority. The research describes two recurring manipulation strategies: selective sampling during inspections, where officials took samples only from "clean" sections of shipments; and falsification of laboratory tests to certify unsafe products as compliant. These risks increased after some border functions were outsourced to private companies. At Kapitan Andreevo, food testing, parking operations and vehicle disinfection were privatised. This reform, intended to increase efficiency, allegedly created new opportunities for rent extraction. The controversy surrounding Eurolab 2011, which reportedly obtained monopolistic control over food safety testing under questionable legal arrangements became emblematic of these tensions. The broader implication: privatisation of public functions does not necessarily reduce corruption risks. It can shift them into hybrid public-private arrangements where accountability is weaker and oversight is more fragmented. The rise of “routinised” corruption The study highlights the increased organisation of corruption itself. Today, no single official can independently guarantee a smuggling route. Procedures involve multiple agencies, overlapping inspections and layered oversight. As a result, corruption evolved towards collective coordination. Customs officers, border guards, supervisors, intermediaries and sometimes political actors participate in networks where bribes are pooled and redistributed. These schemes resemble coordinated organisational systems with revenue-sharing mechanisms, internal hierarchies and protection structures rather than isolated rogue actors. This reflects an important conceptual change: border corruption can function as an embedded institutional ecosystem sustained through cooperation, mutual dependence and political protection. Drug trafficking: when corruption becomes too risky Interestingly, corruption is not always the preferred strategy. In drug trafficking, for example, the risks are dramatically higher. Border officials caught facilitating drug trafficking could face severe criminal penalties, including organised crime charges and lengthy prison sentences. As a result, traffickers increasingly invest in sophisticated concealment methods. One example is the "twin trucks" strategy: several nearly identical trucks carrying similar cargo cross the border simultaneously during heavy traffic, with only one of them containing drugs. Since inspection capacity is limited, the probability is high that the "clean" trucks are checked while the drug shipment passes undetected. This shows that corruption and criminality do not always go hand in hand. Sometimes, stronger anti-corruption measures push criminals towards deception and concealment rather than bribery. The bigger lesson: criminal systems are adaptive The case study of the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing is not just about Bulgaria. Policymakers often assume that more technology, controls and regulation will automatically reduce corruption and illicit trade. But criminal systems and corruption adapt. Informal networks reorganise around the vulnerabilities created by reforms. Every regulatory innovation creates new incentives, bottlenecks and opportunities for exploitation. This does not mean reforms are useless. Many EU measures have clearly strengthened border management. However, reforms must be designed with an understanding of adaptive behaviour. Otherwise, states risk producing unintended consequences: stronger incentives for bribery, use of alternative trafficking routes, technological manipulation, new forms of collusion or opaque privatisation structures. I and my co-authors argue for a more integrated approach that combines anti-corruption and anti-crime strategies. We also emphasise the importance of anticipatory governance and foresight-oriented policymaking that try to predict how illicit actors will respond to institutional changes before reforms are implemented. This may be the most important lesson from Kapitan Andreevo. Borders are not static lines defended by static institutions against static threats. They are evolving ecosystems where states, markets, technologies and criminal actors constantly adapt to one another. Learn more Access the full article, “The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession”. Read our Quick Guide 38 to border corruption for a short introduction. Read our Working Paper 58, “Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam” for a related analysis.

Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions

Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know

Policy Brief 16: Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders

Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders

Working Paper 61: Saplings of hope: Addressing corruption that has an impact on the environment in line with UNCAC Resolution 8/12 and beyond