The Potential for Social and Behavioural Change to Combat Natural Resource Management Corruption

Summary of key points from the Problem Analysis | June 27, 2022

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Our new Working Paper!


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
Working Paper 39

Behavioural drivers of corruption facilitating illegal wildlife trade: Problem analysis and state of the field review



















Why this study?

- Corruption enables environmental crime. It is resilient and difficult to eradicate
- Evidence has shown behavioural drivers (e.g. certain social norms) incentives and perpetuate patterns of corrupt behaviours
- Interest in developing anti-corruption social norm and behaviour change (SNBC) interventions
- However, SNBC approaches are not a silver bullet and might not always be fit for purpose
- Our working paper is one of the steps towards developing in-depth guidance for practitioners













Aims and Methods

Aims:

- Review evidence on how behavioral drivers spur corruption that facilitates illegal wildlife trade (IWT) and understand what works and what does not in fighting it.
- Identify entry points for designing social and behavioral interventions that can effectively reduce IWT-related corruption.

Methods:

- 100+ documents in Literature Review
 - Behaviour change and IWT
 - IWT and corruption
 - BC Guidance on IWT interventions
 - BC, Corruption and IWT
 - BI and Corruption
- ~35 Stakeholders and Initiatives reviewed
 - IGOs (OECD, CITES, World Bank, UNEP, UNODC, IUCN, IIED)
 - NGOs`(WWF, WCS, TI, DICE, WildAid, EIA, IFAW, AWF)
 - Other (Aspinall Foundation, Congolese Ministry of FE&SD)
- 8 In depth key expert interviews














IWT and corruption: a large and complex opportunity space

Banks' officers, border guards, customs agents, customs officers, diplomats, embassy officials, forest officers, game rangers, import/export companies, international organizations, judiciary, Internet providers, legislators, NGOs, park rangers, police, politicians, prosecutors, regulators, transportation employees, wildlife-related businesses, attorneys, lawyers, solicitors















What types of corruption matter where?

Corruption is context sensitive, a rigorous diagnosis is key.

- The first step is to identify precisely the instances, practices, risks and behaviors that are relevant and concrete enough to be amenable to the design of tailored interventions.
- The modalities and prevalence of corruption need to be carefully ascertained: concrete typologies and patterns associated to different geographies and trade types.













What are the relevant drivers?

- The second step is to understand what are the drivers behind the identified corruption practices.
- 4 categories of drivers of corruption
 - Principal-agent
 - Collective action
 - Functionality of corruption
 - Behavioral drivers
- A complicating factor is that, in real life, several types of drivers may be at play in an interdependent, mutually reinforcing manner.













Functionality of corruption
(Solving problems: avoiding detection, expediting shipments, falsifying permits, making ends meet)

Principal-agent problems
(inadequate legal frameworks, weak implementation capability)

Corruption as a collective action problem (expectation that everybody is corrupt, free rider problems)

Motivation

Behavioral drivers of corruption
(Social acceptability of corruption, peer pressure, mental models)













Assessing anti-corruption interventions

- The next step in the Problem Analysis was to understand what we know about the design and relative effectiveness of behavioural anticorruption CWT interventions.
- However, perhaps not surprisingly, the number of interventions that meet the criteria of interest in this study, namely those adopting a behavioral approach to tackle corruption that facilitates IWT, is quite limited.
- In fact, we found very few CWT interventions that purposefully addressed concrete behaviors linked to corruption













Meta analysis

- 1. Need for more nuanced and precise evidence
 - Where and how exactly does corruption arise in the form of regularized patterns of behaviors that fuel IWT?
 - It does not suffice to indicate all the points where corruption may hypothetically or anecdotally occur.
 - It also does not suffice to assume that corruption must be behind observed negative outcomes.
 - Are instances of corruption systemic (happening regularly on established patterns) or occasional and opportunistic (used only when and if required)?
- The point is about adequately prioritizing













Meta analysis

- 2. Limited evidence of what works to address IWT related corruption
- Invest in strong M&E frameworks and their implementation.
 - Robust, valid and reliable indicators are important.
- Identify other compounding factors that enable IWT and establish the relative importance of those vis-à-vis corruption.
 - Weak governance, limited state capacity may allow IWT activities to proceed undetected
 - Poverty correlates with corruption and there is evidence suggesting both are correlated with prevalence of poaching in Africa













A framework for identifying intervention entry points

- Identifying entry points for anti-corruption behavioral CWI interventions based on criteria of impact and feasibility across four key areas of the IWT chain namely:
- Source
- End-markets
- Trafficking
- Policy (which encompasses law enforcement, prevention and persuasion and cuts across the other three).













Prioritizing: Impact and Feasibility

 Impact refers to assessing each context to identify those areas, behaviors, shortcomings, or challenges where, if progress was to be achieved in addressing IWT-enabling corruption, it would have a significant effect towards advancing key outcome or impact levels goals in the fight against IWT.

• Feasibility brings in the recognition that some corruption challenges associated with IWT might be relatively easy to address while others are extremely complex, relating to deeply entrenched political and social dynamics and therefore are not feasible to address in the short to medium term but rather likely require a long-term approach.



















Low salaries, Social norms, Weak monitoring, Political capture

LOW-MEDIUM

complementing interventions targeting systemic drivers















for drivers of consumption, not clear for corruption

Thank you and over to Gayle!











