[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":594},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-wp-64-asset-recovery-state-of-play":3,"publication-wp-64-asset-recovery-state-of-play-editions":72,"author-links-wp-64-asset-recovery-state-of-play":73,"related-wp-64-asset-recovery-state-of-play":77},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":8,"date_created":9,"user_updated":8,"date_updated":10,"nid":7,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":7,"year":7,"publisher":15,"date_published":16,"external":17,"topic":7,"link_internal":7,"link_external":7,"featured":17,"topics":18,"languages":20,"type":22,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":24,"summary":26,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":27,"subtitle":28,"countries":29,"tags":30,"pdf":47,"authors":61,"translations_publications":67,"image":68,"og_image":70},2474,"published",null,"d22c72aa-896a-43ce-acca-4154ff70a25a","2026-10-28T10:42:46.000Z","2026-11-18T14:01:31.000Z","wp-64-asset-recovery-state-of-play","Working Paper 64: Asset recovery state of play","This paper provides an overview of the state of play of global asset recovery. It explores the main challenges that hinder successful efforts to recover the proceeds of crime, both domestically and internationally, and discusses established and less-established solutions to mitigate the challenges. It also explores potential areas for innovation and presents actions states could potentially take to increase funding available to asset recovery-related law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, not only within their own jurisdictions but also globally.\n\n## About this report\nThis publication was drafted by the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance for the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). It was commissioned as a background paper in preparation for the UK’s Illicit Finance Summit 2027. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official policies.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, [ISSN: 2624-9650](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper). You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nDisclaimer: The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nGraphics and layout: Mary Streeter and Tetyana Kalyuzhna\n\n[Cover image](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.magnific.com\u002Fpremium-photo\u002Fman-untangles-tangled-thread-top-view-isolated-white-background_11076957.htm): Designed by Vladdeep – [Magnific.com](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.magnific.com) (adapted). This image is excluded from the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence applying to the rest of this Working Paper. It is included here under a premium licence for the exclusive use within this publication. The image may not be extracted, redistributed or adapted independently without third-party authorisation.","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2026. \"Asset recovery state of play: Solutions to addressing persistent and emerging challenges\". Working Paper 64, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-64-asset-recovery-state-of-play.","Basel Institute on Governance","2026-11-18",false,[19],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[21],"English",[23],"Working Paper",[25],"Main page","This paper provides an overview of the state of play of global asset recovery. It explores the main challenges that hinder successful efforts to recover the proceeds of crime, both domestically and internationally, and discusses established and less-established solutions to mitigate the challenges.","## Executive summary\n\nAsset recovery refers to the process of identifying, tracing, restraining, managing, confiscating and returning the proceeds of crime. Stripping criminals of the benefits of their crimes through this process is critical to deterring, disrupting and preventing acquisitive crimes such as fraud, trafficking and corruption.\n\nStates around the world are struggling to recover the proceeds of crime. While reliable statistics surrounding asset recovery are difficult to obtain, it is often estimated that less than 1 percent of proceeds of crime are frozen and confiscated.\n\nThis inability to effectively target and recover assets both domestically and internationally stems from the clear, and arguably widening, gap between:\n1. the low level of difficulties faced by criminals looking to move and conceal the origin of illicit funds (i.e. successfully engage in money laundering); and\n2. the high level of difficulties faced by state authorities tasked with detecting, tracing and recovering these funds.\n\nOn the one hand, criminals have an increasingly broad range of tools through which to conceal funds. Global financial centres have not adequately negated the traditional facilitators of money laundering (such as the abuse of complex ownership structures), and emerging technologies such as virtual assets are providing criminals with new avenues through which to move funds quickly, cheaply and anonymously across borders.\n\nOn the other hand, law enforcement authorities are persistently hampered in their asset recovery efforts. Many states still have inadequate legislative frameworks in this context, while those that have adequate frameworks in place struggle to implement them effectively due to a lack of monetary resources, technical capacities, unfit policies and procedures or, simply, a lack of political will. Moreover, outdated international standards and practices relating to several phases of the asset recovery process – including those governing the conduct of cross-border cooperation in international cases (i.e. mutual legal assistance) – are also inhibiting efforts globally.\n\nThere is no silver bullet solution that can be used to address this widening gap. Nonetheless, there are a number of established, less-established and innovative solutions that states can (and do) utilise to enhance their ability to recover assets.\n\nAs a starting point, introducing and implementing a comprehensive anti-money laundering framework makes it both more difficult for criminals to abuse the financial system to conceal their proceeds and much easier for law enforcement authorities to detect such abuse.\n\nAlongside this, policymakers can also significantly enhance their state’s own abilities to target illicit proceeds through:- \n- establishing a robust asset recovery legislative framework that adequately empowers the relevant law enforcement bodies to identify, trace, restrain,manage, confiscate and return the proceeds of crime (including both conviction-based and non-conviction based confiscation tools);\n- allocating these bodies sufficient resources to enable them to obtain and develop the technical capacities required to implement their asset recovery responsibilities properly;\n- establishing and supporting an independent, capable and adequately resourced judiciary; and\n- setting asset recovery as a broad, state-level policy objective.\n\nBeyond this, states can consider less-established mechanisms to mitigate challenges to asset recovery efforts, including:\n- introducing innovative legislative mechanisms that facilitate recoveries (such as “failure to prevent” offences, whistleblower reward schemes and presumption of money laundering mechanisms);\n- leveraging underutilised international cooperation methodologies (such as joint investigation teams);\n- strengthening collaboration between the public and private sectors (for example through public-private-partnership mechanisms);\n- promoting civil society participation in asset recovery; and\n- creating thematic multijurisdictional task forces and communities of practice (for example relating to the financial investigation of illicit virtual assets).\n\nOf course, the ability of a state to enhance its asset recovery capabilities through these avenues will always depend on the resources available to it. Consequently, when considering how to improve the collective global ability to target the proceeds of crime, it is also important to consider innovative solutions that will maximise the number of resources that can be committed to asset recovery efforts.\n\nFrom a domestic perspective, for instance, states can look to increase their own resources to target illicit proceeds through mechanisms that permit the reinvestment of previously recovered proceeds into asset recovery-related bodies. Given the international nature of illicit financial flows, however, states should also consider funding solutions that would ensure that foreign states facing extreme resource shortages are given adequate support to develop their own asset recovery abilities. This will not only enable them to independently recover illicit proceeds present in their own jurisdictions, but also enhance their ability to contribute to and support international asset recovery efforts.\n\nIt is an indisputable fact that the vast majority of proceeds of crime are never recovered. Unless states take significant action to enhance their asset recovery abilities, criminality will continue to be both an incredibly lucrative and damaging industry.","Solutions to addressing persistent and emerging challenges",[],[31,35,39,43],{"tags_id":32},{"id":33,"name":34},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":36},{"id":37,"name":38},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":40},{"id":41,"name":42},1215,"Illicit financial flows",{"tags_id":44},{"id":45,"name":46},1374,"Law enforcement",[48,54],{"directus_files_id":49},{"id":50,"filename_download":51,"title":52,"description":7,"modified_on":10,"uploaded_on":53},"a368fcff-2171-4436-9fe6-949f01d20030","WP64_Asset-recovery-state-of-play.pdf","Download PDF (WP 64 - Asset recovery state of play)","2026-11-18T13:10:16.000Z",{"directus_files_id":55},{"id":56,"filename_download":57,"title":58,"description":7,"modified_on":59,"uploaded_on":60},"2d5769b9-6a3b-4ad0-b65c-e77b7878c1ea","WP64_Asset-recovery-state-of-play_key-insights.pdf","View key insights of Working Paper 64","2026-11-18T14:01:32.000Z","2026-11-18T13:56:17.000Z",[62],{"authors_id":63},{"id":64,"name":65,"image":66},306,"Andrew Dornbierer","89aae58b-3e50-4375-9b9b-5b31370dab64",[],{"id":69},"142b70e8-0c4b-4f7c-86f9-aeec9bab18b6",{"id":71},"a995ac3c-402a-4cf5-aa41-f7cee948227f",[],{"306":74},{"slug":75,"image":76},"andrew-dornbierer","39eca4a9-c4da-4d85-bbc2-3ef74d461bb2",[78,140,184,224,283,329,401,442,494,555],{"id":79,"slug":80,"title":81,"status":6,"nid":82,"year":83,"body":84,"external":17,"topic":85,"language":87,"type":88,"date_published":89,"image":90,"citation":91,"publisher":15,"link_internal":92,"link_external":99,"authors":100,"countries":105,"tags":110,"pdf":129,"topics":131,"featured":132,"languages":133,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":134,"date_created":135,"user_updated":136,"date_updated":137,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"og_image":7,"translations_publications":138,"link":139},2366,"wp-54","Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America",2701,2024,"This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, *Extinción de dominio*.\n\nIt argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.\n\nThe paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s [International Centre for Asset Recovery](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery) (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, [ISSN: 2624-9650](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2024.54.61](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2024.54.61).\n\nYou may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International License.\n",[86],"Asset Recovery","en",[23],"2024-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F37616510-2f1f-4ab6-9405-845433d6fa3b?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54.",[93,96],{"url":94,"caption":95},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4b18c9e5-e24b-4cdc-901e-7b7261631542\u002FWP54.pdf?v=20241003160511000","Download PDF",{"url":97,"caption":98},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper"," View all Working Papers",[],[101],{"authors_id":102},{"id":103,"name":104},294,"Oscar Solorzano",[106],{"countries_id":107},{"id":108,"name":109},171,"Peru",[111,113,117,119,123,127],{"tags_id":112},{"id":33,"name":34},{"tags_id":114},{"id":115,"name":116},932,"Human rights",{"tags_id":118},{"id":37,"name":38},{"tags_id":120},{"id":121,"name":122},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":124},{"id":125,"name":126},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":128},{"id":41,"name":42},[130],2404,[19],true,[21],"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","2024-10-03T16:05:11.000Z","dfef11db-1bc6-47e9-a61d-93443995484b","2026-09-10T09:04:43.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54",{"id":141,"slug":142,"title":143,"status":6,"nid":144,"year":145,"body":146,"external":17,"topic":147,"language":87,"type":148,"date_published":149,"image":150,"citation":151,"publisher":15,"link_internal":152,"link_external":157,"authors":158,"countries":161,"tags":166,"pdf":175,"topics":178,"featured":17,"languages":179,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":134,"date_created":180,"user_updated":136,"date_updated":181,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"og_image":7,"translations_publications":182,"link":183},2421,"wp-59","Working Paper 59: Using corrupt proceeds to fight corruption: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery",2849,2025,"Only a handful of states have been actively pursuing the enforcement of foreign bribery. Switzerland is one of them and its efforts to crack down on this offence is commendable.\n\nBetween 2011 and 2024, Switzerland issued 14 final judicial orders at a federal level against Swiss-linked companies that engaged in foreign bribery. In these proceedings, the companies were ordered to hand over approximately CHF 730 million (combined) in illicit profits that they had obtained through their foreign bribery schemes, and an additional CHF 30 million in fines.\n\nThis paper contends that Switzerland could further leverage this success to reinforce its status as a world anti-corruption leader. It examines how Switzerland could repurpose the illicit profits obtained from companies in foreign bribery cases to benefit the countries and people most affected by these corrupt acts and to enhance global anti-corruption efforts.\n\nIt outlines arguments as to why Switzerland should consider legislative action to enable the sharing of these profits in this way and the potential methodology for doing so.\n\n### About this Working Paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, [ISSN: 2624-9650](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2025.59.1-45](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2025.59.1-45).\n\nYou may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.",[86],[23],"2025-10-15","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe7021e9e-70ea-4891-9ae3-12bb51884087?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2025. ‘Using corrupt proceeds to fight corruption: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery.’ Working Paper 59, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-59",[153,156],{"url":154,"caption":155},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-15"," View executive summary (Policy Brief 15)",{"url":97,"caption":98},[],[159],{"authors_id":160},{"id":64,"name":65},[162],{"countries_id":163},{"id":164,"name":165},41,"Switzerland",[167,171,173],{"tags_id":168},{"id":169,"name":170},982,"Anti-corruption",{"tags_id":172},{"id":45,"name":46},{"tags_id":174},{"id":41,"name":42},[176,177],2477,2527,[19],[21],"2025-10-15T10:06:38.000Z","2026-09-10T09:04:51.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-59",{"id":185,"slug":186,"title":187,"status":6,"nid":188,"year":83,"body":189,"external":17,"topic":190,"language":87,"type":191,"date_published":192,"image":193,"citation":194,"publisher":195,"link_internal":196,"link_external":200,"authors":201,"countries":204,"tags":205,"pdf":216,"topics":218,"featured":17,"languages":219,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":134,"date_created":220,"user_updated":136,"date_updated":221,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"og_image":7,"translations_publications":222,"link":223},2340,"wp-51","Working Paper 51: Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States",2607,"Asset recovery tools are integral to combating corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and other profit-motivated crimes. However, in many participating States of the OSCE, the range of asset recovery tools available to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies is limited.\n\nThis Working Paper identifies legislative mechanisms in OSCE participating States that empower the state to confiscate suspected or proven proceeds of crime. The overall objective is to ascertain: \n\n\n- Established good practices with regard to the design of these legislative mechanisms.\n- Any unique approaches that particular countries have taken in this context that could be replicated and tested in other jurisdictions.\n\n\nIt covers:\n\n\n- Conviction-based asset recovery mechanisms.\n- Non-conviction based mechanisms including civil recovery.\n- Additional mechanisms such as illicit enrichment laws and other laws that reverse the burden of proof regarding the legitimacy of assets.\n- Considerations regarding the adoption of broader asset recovery laws.\n- Approaches to the disposal of confiscated assets.\n- Common challenges in the implementation of asset recovery mechanisms.\n\n\n### About this report\n\nThis comparative study was conducted and drafted by the International Centre for Asset Recovery at the Basel Institute on Governance for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The paper was commissioned under the extra-budgetary project ‘Strengthening asset recovery efforts in the OSCE region’ implemented by the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.\n\nIt is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, [ISSN: 2624-9650](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2024.51.59](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2024.51.59).\n\nYou may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) licence.\n\n### Disclaimer\n\nThis Working Paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, the OSCE and its participating States.",[86],[23],"2024-03-25","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F874c9d29-7337-4e37-8b50-36a26d00bf28?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States.’ Working Paper 51, Basel Institute on Governance and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51","Basel Institute on Governance; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)",[197,199],{"url":198,"caption":95},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fdf7d6fc1-d381-479d-85a7-5570e3efd824\u002FWP51-final.pdf?v=20260611110723000",{"url":97,"caption":98},[],[202],{"authors_id":203},{"id":64,"name":65},[],[206,210,212,214],{"tags_id":207},{"id":208,"name":209},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":211},{"id":125,"name":126},{"tags_id":213},{"id":33,"name":34},{"tags_id":215},{"id":41,"name":42},[217],2508,[19],[21],"2024-03-25T11:04:47.000Z","2026-09-10T09:04:39.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51",{"id":225,"slug":226,"title":227,"status":6,"nid":228,"year":229,"body":230,"external":17,"topic":231,"language":87,"type":232,"date_published":233,"image":234,"citation":235,"publisher":236,"link_internal":237,"link_external":245,"authors":246,"countries":249,"tags":262,"pdf":275,"topics":277,"featured":17,"languages":278,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":134,"date_created":279,"user_updated":136,"date_updated":280,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"og_image":7,"translations_publications":281,"link":282},2266,"wp-42","Working Paper 42: From sanctions to confiscation while upholding the rule of law",2338,2023,"Written in the light of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, the Working Paper explores whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression. \n\nThe paper first explores the concept of sanctions and financial sanctions (asset freezes) and what they mean in practice.\n\nUsing the example of Canada, which has introduced a legislative mechanism for this purpose, the paper analyses whether states should be able to confiscate sanctioned assets purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned.\n\nIt then looks at more established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets, including:\n\n\n- Traditional conviction based confiscation measures, including 'extended confiscation' mechanisms\n- Non-conviction based confiscation (forfeiture) measures\n- Unexplained wealth laws\n\n\nThe paper recommends ways to maximise the effectiveness of these alternative avenues for recovering assets, which are much less controversial and can arguably be applied without infringing on legal rights. \n\nOpting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law. \n\n### About this Paper\n\nThis Working Paper was prepared by the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nIt is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, [ISSN: 2624-9650](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2023.42.41](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2023.42.41).\n\nYou may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en).\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThe Basel Institute would like to thank Isys Lam and the law firms of [Bonifassi Avocats](https:\u002F\u002Fbonifassi-avocats.com\u002Fen\u002F) (France), [Hengeler Mueller](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.hengeler.com\u002Fen) (Germany), [Bennett Jones](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bennettjones.com\u002F) (Canada) and [Rogério Alves &amp; Associados](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.raassociados.pt\u002F) (Portugal) for their support in providing research for this paper.\n\nThe Basel Institute would also like to thank Stefan Lenz, Stefan Cassella, Maria Nizzero, Nicola Bonucci and Oscar Solórzano for their support in reviewing the content of the paper and recommending amendments.",[86],[23],"2023-02-20","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Faaa4fae3-eea5-4be3-95b1-4de7e87fabb4?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2023. ‘Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law.’ Working Paper 42, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42.","Basel Institute on Governance, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)",[238,240,243],{"url":239,"caption":95},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F3af85ca3-5ed5-41ff-b5b1-2015c7b3ef54\u002F230309WorkingPaper42.pdf?v=20260611110936000",{"url":241,"caption":242},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fworking-paper-sheds-fresh-light-on-the-sanctions-and-confiscation-debate-2347","Read related blog",{"url":97,"caption":244},"View all Working Papers",[],[247],{"authors_id":248},{"id":64,"name":65},[250,254,258],{"countries_id":251},{"id":252,"name":253},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":255},{"id":256,"name":257},188,"Russia",{"countries_id":259},{"id":260,"name":261},225,"Ukraine",[263,267,269,271,273],{"tags_id":264},{"id":265,"name":266},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":268},{"id":208,"name":209},{"tags_id":270},{"id":33,"name":34},{"tags_id":272},{"id":125,"name":126},{"tags_id":274},{"id":41,"name":42},[276],2544,[19],[21],"2023-02-20T17:04:17.000Z","2026-09-10T09:04:29.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42",{"id":284,"slug":285,"title":286,"status":6,"nid":7,"year":7,"body":287,"external":17,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":288,"date_published":290,"image":291,"citation":292,"publisher":15,"link_internal":293,"link_external":7,"authors":300,"countries":301,"tags":302,"pdf":315,"topics":317,"featured":17,"languages":318,"summary":319,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":320,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":8,"date_created":321,"user_updated":8,"date_updated":322,"main_points":323,"short_version":324,"subtitle":325,"og_image":326,"translations_publications":327,"link":328},2476,"pb-18-cryptoasset-management","Policy Brief 18: Managing seized cryptoassets","In September 2026, asset management practitioners, prosecutors, police and private-sector specialists from 17 countries met in Luxembourg to discuss how to manage seized cryptoassets.\n\nCo-organised by the Luxembourg Bureau de gestion des avoirs and Basel Institute on Governance, the roundtable was held under the Chatham House rule on the sidelines of the [10th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptoassets](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fevents\u002F10th-global-conference-on-criminal-finances-and-cryptoassets-2924). This publication emerges from that roundtable.\n\nThe document is structured around eight questions, because the focus is on questions that asset management practitioners need to consider rather than one-size-fits-all answers that do not exist. Laws, institutions and resources differ, as the examples given by participants demonstrate. Technical terms are explained in the glossary at the end.\n\nThe discussions confirmed that managing cryptoassets should be framed within the lifecycle of a case, from pre-seizure planning to disposal. Decisions taken at one stage can have significant consequences at later stages.\n\nThe diagram below shows the main stages in managing a seized cryptoasset, indicating the most relevant questions for each.\n\n![](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fassets\u002Ffb14c631-3971-442c-aa86-835662e2019e)\n\n## About this publication\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Policy+Brief). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigpb.18.1-20](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigpb.18.1-20).\n\nYou may share this publication under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F) International licence.\n\nAround 50 participants from the public and private sectors, representing 17 jurisdictions, took part in the roundtable on which the publication is based. The organisers thank all participants for sharing their experience so openly during the roundtable and in consultations on the draft. \n\n**Disclaimer**: The document does not necessarily represent the views of the moderators, the organisers or participants’ institutions, or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.",[289],"Policy Brief","2026-11-09","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fad665f0c-ea7b-46c2-9905-2f7033af2301?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Basel Institute on Governance. 2026. ‘Managing seized cryptoassets’. Policy Brief 18, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-18-cryptoasset-management.\n",[294,297],{"url":295,"caption":296},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F708fcda9-2daa-4cc5-a4b9-c5fd69dc5677\u002FPolicy-Brief-18_cryptoasset-management.pdf?v=20261109104838000","Download Policy Brief 18",{"url":298,"caption":299},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg41","Read related Quick Guide to managing seized and confiscated assets",[],[],[303,305,309,313],{"tags_id":304},{"id":37,"name":38},{"tags_id":306},{"id":307,"name":308},858,"Asset management",{"tags_id":310},{"id":311,"name":312},854,"Virtual assets",{"tags_id":314},{"id":33,"name":34},[316],2579,[19],[21],"This Policy Brief outlines eight practical lessons for jurisdictions to consider when establishing a system for managing seized cryptoassets. Asset management practitioners, prosecutors, police and private-sector specialists from 17 countries contributed to these lessons at a roundtable in September 2026.",[25],"2026-11-05T10:57:46.000Z","2026-11-11T12:20:19.000Z","","## Key messages at a glance\n\n1. **The fundamental principles of asset management continue to apply.** Cryptoassets should be managed lawfully, securely, transparently and with the objective of preserving value. The particular characteristics of cryptoassets require those principles to be adapted, especially in relation to custody, control, volatility, technical expertise and timing.\n2. **Preparation and early coordination are critical.** Authorities should involve the relevant asset management expertise as early as possible and establish custody, decision-making and communication arrangements before a seizure occurs.\n3. **There is no one-size-fits-all model.** The right arrangements depend on national legislation, institutional structures, available expertise and the assets involved. They also need to evolve: a model that works immediately after seizure may not suit months or years later, so authorities should be able to adapt.\n4. **Security is a governance issue as much as a technical one.** Multi-person approval, role-based access, key protection, audit trails, business continuity, data protection and clear liability arrangements are essential safeguards.\n5. **Preserving value requires active decision-making.** Authorities need clear criteria and responsibilities for deciding whether assets should be held, converted or sold. Where interim-sale powers exist, they should be matched by the institutional capacity to monitor markets and act within the relevant timeframes.\n6. **Public authorities should retain responsibility for decisions concerning seized assets.** Private-sector providers can provide valuable technical and operational support, but outsourcing should not result in a loss of public control or accountability.\n7. **Choose the right route to sell and return.** There is no single way to sell or return a cryptoasset. The sale method should suit the asset, its liquidity and the amount at stake, and the process should be auditable. Authorities must also decide whether owners and victims receive the asset itself or its value, bearing in mind that many victims have no wallet.\n8. **Cooperation is a practical capability.** Networks of asset management offices, asset recovery offices and other practitioners can provide contacts, expertise, training and support for difficult cases. Building these networks can reduce duplication and help authorities develop solutions that are proportionate to their needs.","Practical lessons from an international roundtable","769e5ce5-e838-4e19-85ab-8eb6fc516ce0",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-18-cryptoasset-management",{"id":330,"slug":331,"title":332,"status":6,"nid":333,"year":334,"body":335,"external":17,"topic":7,"language":87,"type":336,"date_published":338,"image":339,"citation":340,"publisher":15,"link_internal":341,"link_external":349,"authors":356,"countries":363,"tags":372,"pdf":387,"topics":389,"featured":17,"languages":390,"summary":391,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":392,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":393,"date_created":394,"user_updated":8,"date_updated":395,"main_points":396,"short_version":7,"subtitle":397,"og_image":398,"translations_publications":399,"link":400},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,2026,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n## About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Case+Study). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[337],"Case Study","2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13.",[342,344,346],{"url":343,"caption":95},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe9314e72-6324-4a13-a0c3-9166983487c7\u002FCase-Study-13-Beauty-Queen.pdf?v=20260601223426000",{"url":345,"caption":242},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716",{"url":347,"caption":348},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16","Read related Policy Brief 16",[350,353],{"url":351,"caption":352},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":354,"caption":355},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[357,359],{"authors_id":358},{"id":103,"name":104},{"authors_id":360},{"id":361,"name":362},591,"Diana Cordero",[364,368],{"countries_id":365},{"id":366,"name":367},47,"Colombia",{"countries_id":369},{"id":370,"name":371},78,"Guernsey",[373,375,379,383,385],{"tags_id":374},{"id":125,"name":126},{"tags_id":376},{"id":377,"name":378},822,"International cooperation",{"tags_id":380},{"id":381,"name":382},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":384},{"id":45,"name":46},{"tags_id":386},{"id":33,"name":34},[388],2495,[19],[21],"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model Extinción de dominio.",[25],"3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6","2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","2026-10-13T11:38:56.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","4827eac2-84e4-4fca-a5f5-20c61c46d4ab",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",{"id":402,"slug":403,"title":404,"status":6,"nid":405,"year":145,"body":406,"external":17,"topic":407,"language":87,"type":408,"date_published":149,"image":409,"citation":410,"publisher":15,"link_internal":411,"link_external":417,"authors":418,"countries":421,"tags":424,"pdf":431,"topics":435,"featured":17,"languages":436,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":134,"date_created":439,"user_updated":136,"date_updated":440,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"og_image":7,"translations_publications":441,"link":154},2422,"pb-15","Policy Brief 15: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery settlements",2850,"Only a handful of states have been actively pursuing the enforcement of foreign bribery. Switzerland is one of them and its efforts to crack down on this offence is commendable.\n\nBetween 2011 and 2024, Switzerland issued 14 final judicial orders at a federal level against Swiss-linked companies that engaged in foreign bribery. In these proceedings, the companies were ordered to hand over approximately CHF 730 million (combined) in illicit profits that they had obtained through their foreign bribery schemes, and an additional CHF 30 million in fines.\n\nThis Policy Brief contends that Switzerland could further leverage this success to reinforce its status as a world anti-corruption leader. It examines how Switzerland could repurpose the illicit profits obtained from companies in foreign bribery cases to benefit the countries and people most affected by these corrupt acts and to enhance global anti-corruption efforts.\n\nIt outlines arguments as to why Switzerland should consider legislative action to enable the sharing of these profits in this way and the potential methodology for doing so.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Policy+Brief). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigpb.15.1-7](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigpb.15.1-7).\n\nYou may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F) licence.\n\nThis Policy Brief is based on the executive summary of the [Working Paper 59: ‘Using corrupt proceeds to fight corruption: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery.'](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-59) \n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.",[86],[289],"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F667a8b3c-20a2-47c2-89ea-c5aeba0c2971?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2025. ‘Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery settlements.’ Policy Brief 15, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-15",[412,414],{"url":183,"caption":413}," View related Working Paper 59",{"url":415,"caption":416},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Policy%20Brief"," View all Policy Briefs",[],[419],{"authors_id":420},{"id":64,"name":65},[422],{"countries_id":423},{"id":164,"name":165},[425,427,429],{"tags_id":426},{"id":169,"name":170},{"tags_id":428},{"id":45,"name":46},{"tags_id":430},{"id":41,"name":42},[432,433,434],2478,2529,2528,[19],[21,437,438],"French","German","2025-10-15T10:06:39.000Z","2026-09-10T09:04:52.000Z",[],{"id":443,"slug":444,"title":445,"status":6,"nid":446,"year":145,"body":447,"external":17,"topic":448,"language":87,"type":449,"date_published":450,"image":451,"citation":452,"publisher":15,"link_internal":453,"link_external":7,"authors":464,"countries":467,"tags":472,"pdf":481,"topics":483,"featured":17,"languages":484,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":134,"date_created":485,"user_updated":136,"date_updated":486,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"og_image":7,"translations_publications":487,"link":493},2383,"pb-14","Policy Brief 14: Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery",2739,"The European Union’s 2024 [Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation](http:\u002F\u002Fdata.europa.eu\u002Feli\u002Fdir\u002F2024\u002F1260\u002Foj) obliges Member States to, among other things, introduce legislative measures to enable the confiscation of “unexplained wealth”.\n\nThis policy paper examines this Article and the powers and restrictions that Member States will need to include in such “unexplained wealth” measures to ensure compliance with the Directive.\n\nIn brief, the Directive gives legislators in EU Member States flexibility to decide the scope of their own unexplained wealth measures. At a minimum, they must introduce measures that can be used to target unexplained wealth linked to organised crime.\n\nMember States could, however, adopt broader measures target unexplained wealth relating to all criminal activity, including corruption.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Policy+Brief). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigpb.14.6](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigpb.14.6).\n\nYou may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F) licence. \n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.",[86],[289],"2025-01-13","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9b9b6a62-6a97-4851-957f-1f36155e8f32?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery.’ Policy Brief 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14.",[454,457,460,461],{"url":455,"caption":456},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe20ebc55-51aa-4a44-b362-d9cc7bd57d39\u002FPB14.pdf?v=20250113110527000","Download PDF (English)",{"url":458,"caption":459},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14-fr","French version",{"url":415,"caption":416},{"url":462,"caption":463},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fecac4c40-f39a-4d16-92de-e965258bce7e\u002FIllicit-Enrichment-Main-Text-PDF.pdf?v=20220427115348000"," Free book: Illicit Enrichment",[465],{"authors_id":466},{"id":64,"name":65},[468],{"countries_id":469},{"id":470,"name":471},261,"European Union",[473,475,477,479],{"tags_id":474},{"id":208,"name":209},{"tags_id":476},{"id":41,"name":42},{"tags_id":478},{"id":33,"name":34},{"tags_id":480},{"id":115,"name":116},[482],2419,[19],[21,437],"2025-01-13T11:05:26.000Z","2026-09-10T09:04:45.000Z",[488],{"title":489,"body":490,"summary":7,"slug":491,"language":492},"Policy Brief 14: Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs","La Directive de l’Union européenne de 2024 [relative au recouvrement et à la confiscation d'avoirs](https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Flegal-content\u002FFR\u002FTXT\u002FHTML\u002F?uri=OJ:L_202401260) oblige les États membres, entre autres, à adopter des mesures législatives pour permettre la confiscation de la « fortune inexpliquée ».\n\nCette Note de politique examine l’article 16 de la Directive qui énonce cette obligation, ainsi que les pouvoirs et restrictions que les États membres devront inclure dans les mesures relatives à la « fortune inexpliquée » pour garantir la conformité à la Directive.\n\nEn bref, cela démontre la grande flexibilité accordée par le texte de la Directive aux États membres pour déterminer le champ d’application de leurs propres mesures en matière de fortune inexpliquée. Au minimum, les États seront requis d’introduire des mesures susceptibles d’être utilisées pour cibler la fortune inexpliquée liée au crime organisé.\n\nCependant, les États membres peuvent toujours décider d’introduire des mesures de plus grande portée ciblant la fortune inexpliquée liée à toutes les activités criminelles, y compris la corruption.\n\n**À propos de cette Note de politique**\n\nLa présente publication fait partie de la série de Notes de politique (Policy Briefs) du Basel Institute on Governance, [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Policy+Brief). Il s'agit d'une publication en libre accès de type « Diamond », également hébergée sur la plateforme de publication ouverte de la bibliothèque de l'université de Bâle [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) dans le cadre de notre revue « Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief Journal », avec le DOI : [10.12685\u002Fbigpb.14.6](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigpb.14.6).\n\nElle est sous licence *Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International* ([CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nIl s’agit d’une publication de l’International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) au Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR reçoit un financement principal des gouvernements de Jersey, du Liechtenstein, de la Norvège, de la Suisse et du Royaume-Uni.","pb-14-fr","fr","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14",{"id":495,"slug":496,"title":497,"status":6,"nid":498,"year":334,"body":499,"external":17,"topic":7,"language":87,"type":500,"date_published":501,"image":502,"citation":503,"publisher":15,"link_internal":504,"link_external":512,"authors":513,"countries":518,"tags":535,"pdf":542,"topics":545,"featured":17,"languages":546,"summary":547,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":548,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":393,"date_created":549,"user_updated":8,"date_updated":550,"main_points":7,"short_version":551,"subtitle":7,"og_image":552,"translations_publications":553,"link":554},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n## About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, [ISSN: 2624-9650](\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2026.62.1-57](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2026.62.1-57).\n\nYou may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[23],"2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62.",[505,508,511],{"url":506,"caption":507},"\u002Flearning\u002Fevents\u002Fwebinar-corruption-sanctions-reaching-those-beyond-the-law-2968","See related webinar",{"url":509,"caption":510},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","View related Quick Guide",{"url":97,"caption":244},[],[514],{"authors_id":515},{"id":516,"name":517},583,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[519,523,527,529,533],{"countries_id":520},{"id":521,"name":522},228,"United States",{"countries_id":524},{"id":525,"name":526},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":528},{"id":252,"name":253},{"countries_id":530},{"id":531,"name":532},14,"Australia",{"countries_id":534},{"id":470,"name":471},[536,538,540],{"tags_id":537},{"id":169,"name":170},{"tags_id":539},{"id":265,"name":266},{"tags_id":541},{"id":45,"name":46},[543,544],2554,2491,[19],[21],"How can governments respond to corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue. This Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions have evolved and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.",[25],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-10-12T12:59:03.000Z","## Executive Summary\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","aa0db86e-e6e6-4002-8ae7-970480a0ed12",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":556,"slug":557,"title":558,"status":6,"nid":559,"year":145,"body":560,"external":17,"topic":561,"language":87,"type":562,"date_published":563,"image":564,"citation":565,"publisher":15,"link_internal":566,"link_external":571,"authors":572,"countries":577,"tags":580,"pdf":585,"topics":588,"featured":132,"languages":589,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":134,"date_created":590,"user_updated":136,"date_updated":591,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"og_image":7,"translations_publications":592,"link":593},2390,"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, [ISSN: 2624-9650](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002F?type=Working+Paper). It is a Diamond Open Access publication, also hosted on the Basel University Library’s open publishing platform [eterna](https:\u002F\u002Feterna.unibas.ch\u002F) as part of our Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Journal, with DOI: [10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2025.55.42](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.12685\u002Fbigwp.2025.55.42).\n\nYou may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[86],[23],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?format=webp&quality=90&width=600&height=840","Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",[567,570],{"url":568,"caption":569},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":97,"caption":98},[],[573],{"authors_id":574},{"id":575,"name":576},560,"Sam Hickey",[578],{"countries_id":579},{"id":525,"name":526},[581,583],{"tags_id":582},{"id":169,"name":170},{"tags_id":584},{"id":33,"name":34},[586,587],2513,2431,[19],[21],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-09-10T09:04:46.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",1795010944728]