[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":542},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-working-paper-5-poverty-and-corruption-about-poorer-and-richer-ways-life":3,"related-working-paper-5-poverty-and-corruption-about-poorer-and-richer-ways-life":105},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":22,"link_external":26,"featured":19,"topics":27,"languages":29,"type":30,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":32,"countries":43,"tags":44,"pdf":66,"authors":88},2163,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:57:44.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:55.000Z",51,"working-paper-5-poverty-and-corruption-about-poorer-and-richer-ways-life","Working Paper 5: Poverty and corruption: About poorer and richer ways of life","The Millennium Development Goals were adopted by the global community under the aegis of the UN in 2000. The first of these goals aims at halving absolute poverty of the about 1.1 billion people who live on less than 1 US dollar a day.\n\nAlthough poverty reduction has always been an important concern of development policy, the Millennium Development Goals have brought it back onto centre stage with renewed vigour, in that joint efforts to reduce poverty worldwide has become a moral as well as financial obligation of the global community. Just a glance at the global development indicators reveals how urgent the renewed efforts to fight extreme poverty, especially – and not surprisingly – in least developed countries.\n\nAccording to the UN statistics the number of persons living in extreme poverty has decreased slightly between 1990 and 2001; but it is still estimated that worldwide still approximately one billion people live on less than 1 US dollar a day.\n\n### About this Working Paper\n\nThis paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=255\">ISSN: 2624-9650\u003C\u002Fa>.","Koechlin, L. (2008). 'Poverty and Corruption: About Poorer and Richer Ways of Life'. Working Paper 5, Basel Institute on Governance","English",2008,"Basel Institute on Governance","2008-12-01",false,[21],"Asset Recovery",[23],{"url":24,"caption":25},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper"," View all Working Papers",[],[28],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[15],[31],"Working Paper",{"id":33,"storage":34,"filename_disk":35,"filename_download":36,"title":37,"type":38,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":39,"width":40,"height":41,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":42,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"d46a41f6-e6a5-49fe-be0d-f84e483e4a17","local","d46a41f6-e6a5-49fe-be0d-f84e483e4a17.jpg","Pages-from-biog-working-paper-05.jpg","Working Paper 5","image\u002Fjpeg",197724,2480,3509,{},[],[45],{"id":46,"publications_id":47,"tags_id":63},5196,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":50,"link_internal":51,"link_external":53,"featured":19,"topics":54,"languages":55,"type":56,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":57,"tags":58,"pdf":59,"authors":61},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21],[52],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],2206,[62],2390,{"id":64,"name":65},1299,"Development assistance",[67],{"id":60,"publications_id":68,"directus_files_id":80},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":69,"link_internal":70,"link_external":72,"featured":19,"topics":73,"languages":74,"type":75,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":76,"tags":77,"pdf":78,"authors":79},[21],[71],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],[62],{"id":81,"storage":34,"filename_disk":82,"filename_download":83,"title":83,"type":84,"folder":85,"uploaded_by":48,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":86,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":87,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"72c41611-526b-42e0-b909-149bcd4b405f","72c41611-526b-42e0-b909-149bcd4b405f.pdf","biog-working-paper-05.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5",326920,"View PDF",[89],{"id":62,"publications_id":90,"authors_id":102},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":91,"link_internal":92,"link_external":94,"featured":19,"topics":95,"languages":96,"type":97,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":98,"tags":99,"pdf":100,"authors":101},[21],[93],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],[62],{"id":103,"name":104,"position":7,"image":7},359,"Lucy Koechlin",[106,161,201,258,292,331,367,403,446,492],{"id":107,"slug":108,"title":109,"status":6,"nid":110,"year":111,"body":112,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":113,"date_published":114,"image":115,"citation":116,"publisher":17,"link_internal":117,"link_external":120,"authors":121,"countries":126,"tags":143,"pdf":152,"topics":155,"featured":19,"languages":156,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":157,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":158,"main_points":7,"short_version":159,"subtitle":7,"link":160},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[31],"2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[118],{"url":24,"caption":119},"View all Working Papers",[],[122],{"authors_id":123},{"id":124,"name":125},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[127,131,135,139],{"countries_id":128},{"id":129,"name":130},228,"United States",{"countries_id":132},{"id":133,"name":134},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":136},{"id":137,"name":138},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":140},{"id":141,"name":142},14,"Australia",[144,148],{"tags_id":145},{"id":146,"name":147},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":149},{"id":150,"name":151},982,"Anti-corruption",[153,154],2490,2491,[28],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":62,"slug":162,"title":163,"status":6,"nid":164,"year":165,"body":166,"external":19,"topic":167,"language":15,"type":168,"date_published":169,"image":170,"citation":171,"publisher":17,"link_internal":172,"link_external":177,"authors":178,"countries":183,"tags":188,"pdf":193,"topics":195,"featured":196,"languages":197,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":198,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":199,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":200},"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,2025,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[21],[31],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840","",[173,176],{"url":174,"caption":175},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[179],{"authors_id":180},{"id":181,"name":182},560,"Sam Hickey",[184],{"countries_id":185},{"id":186,"name":187},225,"Ukraine",[189,191],{"tags_id":190},{"id":150,"name":151},{"tags_id":192},{"id":146,"name":147},[194],2431,[28],true,[15],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":202,"slug":203,"title":204,"status":6,"nid":205,"year":206,"body":207,"external":19,"topic":208,"language":15,"type":209,"date_published":210,"image":211,"citation":171,"publisher":17,"link_internal":212,"link_external":214,"authors":218,"countries":223,"tags":228,"pdf":251,"topics":253,"featured":196,"languages":254,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":255,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":256,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":257},2366,"wp-54","Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America",2701,2024,"This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, *Extinción de dominio*.\n\nIt argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.\n\nThe paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54.",[21],[31],"2024-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F37616510-2f1f-4ab6-9405-845433d6fa3b?width=600&height=840",[213],{"url":24,"caption":25},[215],{"url":216,"caption":217},"route:\u003Cnolink>"," Download PDF (Spanish - forthcoming)",[219],{"authors_id":220},{"id":221,"name":222},294,"Oscar Solorzano",[224],{"countries_id":225},{"id":226,"name":227},171,"Peru",[229,231,235,239,243,247],{"tags_id":230},{"id":146,"name":147},{"tags_id":232},{"id":233,"name":234},932,"Human rights",{"tags_id":236},{"id":237,"name":238},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":240},{"id":241,"name":242},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":244},{"id":245,"name":246},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":248},{"id":249,"name":250},1215,"Illicit financial flows",[252],2404,[28],[15],"2024-10-03T16:05:11.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:47.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54",{"id":259,"slug":260,"title":261,"status":6,"nid":262,"year":206,"body":263,"external":19,"topic":264,"language":15,"type":267,"date_published":268,"image":269,"citation":270,"publisher":17,"link_internal":271,"link_external":272,"authors":275,"countries":280,"tags":281,"pdf":282,"topics":284,"featured":19,"languages":286,"summary":287,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":288,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":289,"main_points":171,"short_version":290,"subtitle":7,"link":291},2355,"wp-52","Working Paper 52: Navigating the political context: Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain",2657,"Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts. This Working Paper:\n\n\n- discusses the political and governance factors that affect the performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery;\n- provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically, including through a novel Assessment and Monitoring Framework;\n- reveals how to use these assessments to develop adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain in line with changing contexts.\n\n\nIt fills an important gap by enabling the systematic assessment and monitoring of contextual factors that impact the effectiveness of justice systems in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery.\n\n### About this research\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance works with partner countries and their enforcement and judicial authorities to strengthen asset recovery capacity, practice and policy. Building on ICAR’s track record, this paper harnesses learning and experiences on *thinking and working politically *to strengthen the rule of law and deter corruption. It contributes to the global conversation on strategic anti-corruption and asset recovery reforms. Feedback is welcome as ICAR continues to develop its approach and strategies: email the author or \u003Ca href=\"mailto:info@baselgovernance.org\">info@baselgovernance.org\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nFunding for this research was provided by the ICAR core donor group: the Government of Jersey, Principality of Liechtenstein, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and UK Home Office.\n\nIt is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).\n\n",[21,265,266],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[31],"2024-07-24","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Faf9b6cfa-f1d6-4a52-985f-91304240ffc9?width=600&height=840","Kassa, Saba. 2024. ‘Navigating the political context. Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain.’ Working Paper 52, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-52.",[],[273],{"url":274,"caption":25},"entity:node\u002F12",[276],{"authors_id":277},{"id":278,"name":279},303,"Saba Kassa",[],[],[283],2393,[28,285],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[15],"Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts. This Working Paper discusses the political and governance factors that affect the performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery; provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically, including through a novel Assessment and Monitoring Framework; reveals how to use these assessments to develop adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain in line with changing contexts.","2024-07-24T16:05:05.000Z","2026-05-31T22:51:52.000Z","Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts.\nThis report discusses the political and governance factors that affect the\nperformance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset\nrecovery. It also provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically\nwith the goal of developing adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain\nin line with changing contexts. The Assessment and Monitoring Framework\npresented here is a state-of-the-art methodology to think and work politically\nto strengthen rule of law systems.\n\nIt draws on the experience and insights of ICAR staff working with\nanti-corruption institutions across the globe. It responds to a gap in the\nexisting toolbox of anti-corruption practitioners, given that existing political\neconomy methodologies have not sufficiently focused on the contextual\nfactors that impinge on the performance effectiveness of the different\nanti-corruption institutions constituting the justice chain.\n\n### Thinking politically\nThe evidence shows that there is a more conducive environment for strong\nperformance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset\nrecovery when there is:\n\na. strong political independence of the justice chain;\n\nb. strong governance within and between the anti-corruption institutions that constitute the chain; and\n\nc. strong accountability of the respective anti-corruption institutions.\n\nThere are 12 key political and governance factors in these three dimensions\nthat shape the effectiveness of the justice chain (see chapter 2). In this\necosystem, the justice chain sits at the centre, shaped top-down by\ngovernance factors related to political independence and bottom-up by\ngovernance factors related to accountability.\n\nAssessing and regularly monitoring changes in these factors helps to\nidentify opportunities and entry points for strengthening approaches to\nanti-corruption and asset recovery, and it also works to explain where and\nwhy barriers to change and risks may arise.\n\nApplying the framework demonstrates that what sounds straightforward at\nfirst glance – namely that an enabling environment will influence the justice\nchain’s performance positively – is actually much more complex:\n\n- A seemingly conducive environment for improving the performance of anti-corruption institutions often comes with challenges and resistance. Opponents of reform fight back hard and often dirty. Solid anti-corruption and asset recovery results take time, which may fuel disappointment and discontent, hence civic expectations need to be managed. And as the fight against corruption intensifies and anti-corruption institutions start making progress, things are often perceived as getting worse.\n- The flipside of this paradox is that even in an unfavourable context, when political and governance factors appear weak, opportunities to strengthen rule of law performance in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery can still be found.\n\n*Thinking politically* allows us to make sense of this puzzle and navigate\ncomplex political contexts better. It highlights the importance of\nunderstanding how complex political and governance contexts shape the\nsuccess of anti-corruption and asset recovery reforms.\n\nThe Assessment and Monitoring Framework at the heart of this paper is\nan evidence-based and practical tool that guides anti-corruption and asset\nrecovery practitioners on how to tailor and localise their efforts in line with the\npolitical economy of each specific context (see chapter 3). It comprises the 12\nidentified factors and provides an indicator for each. Additionally, indicative\ntopics help to assess these indicators. The framework allows for an in-depth\nanalysis and facilitates the development of baseline and update assessments\nin support of adaptive programming decisions.\n\n### Working politically\n\nChanges in the political space for successful anti-corruption reform often\nfollow a cyclical pattern, with windows of opportunity for deep reform opening\nand closing as the balance of power between pro- and anti-reform forces\nshifts. Understanding this cycle helps to identify how efforts to promote more\nrobust performance of the justice chain can be better aligned, and made more\nresponsive and proactive (see chapter 4).\n\n*Working politically* highlights opportunities to prepare for, promote and\ndeepen windows of opportunity to influence anti-corruption reforms. It is also\nhelpful for thinking strategically about adapting approaches to prevent and\nslow regression and using anti-corruption principles to prevent abuse.\n\nKey approaches for adapting in an agile manner to contexts where spaces for\nsuccessful anti-corruption reforms will vary include:\n\n- cultivating trust with partners and stakeholders;\n- promoting the rule of law as a collective endeavour;\n- fostering institutionalisation through policies, systems and partnerships;\n- celebrating and communicating success; and\n- leveraging international and domestic partnerships to strengthen efforts.\n\nThe lessons learnt from the frontline of practice emphasise that success\nin fighting corruption and recovering assets does not require having the\nperfect environment, institutions or people in place. Rather, adopting flexible\nengagement approaches tailored to specific contexts has proven effective.\n\nApplying the Assessment and Monitoring Framework is helpful in a variety\nof ways: to comprehend the wider political and governance situation;\nunderstand the implications of changes in the political context; monitor\nred flags that could indicate political instrumentalisation; and identify and\ndesign responses to opening or closing windows of opportunity. Overall, it\nsupports interventions that adapt to shifts in the political environment to\nachieve results.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-52",{"id":293,"slug":294,"title":295,"status":6,"nid":296,"year":206,"body":297,"external":19,"topic":298,"language":15,"type":299,"date_published":300,"image":301,"citation":302,"publisher":303,"link_internal":304,"link_external":306,"authors":307,"countries":312,"tags":313,"pdf":324,"topics":326,"featured":19,"languages":327,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":328,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":329,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":330},2340,"wp-51","Working Paper 51: Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States",2607,"Asset recovery tools are integral to combating corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and other profit-motivated crimes. However, in many participating States of the OSCE, the range of asset recovery tools available to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies is limited.\n\nThis Working Paper identifies legislative mechanisms in OSCE participating States that empower the state to confiscate suspected or proven proceeds of crime. The overall objective is to ascertain: \n\n\n- Established good practices with regard to the design of these legislative mechanisms.\n- Any unique approaches that particular countries have taken in this context that could be replicated and tested in other jurisdictions.\n\n\nIt covers:\n\n\n- Conviction-based asset recovery mechanisms.\n- Non-conviction based mechanisms including civil recovery.\n- Additional mechanisms such as illicit enrichment laws and other laws that reverse the burden of proof regarding the legitimacy of assets.\n- Considerations regarding the adoption of broader asset recovery laws.\n- Approaches to the disposal of confiscated assets.\n- Common challenges in the implementation of asset recovery mechanisms.\n\n\n### About this report\n\nThis comparative study was conducted and drafted by the International Centre for Asset Recovery at the Basel Institute on Governance for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The paper was commissioned under the extra-budgetary project ‘Strengthening asset recovery efforts in the OSCE region’ implemented by the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.\n\nIt is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.\n\n### Disclaimer\n\nThis Working Paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, the OSCE and its participating States.",[21],[31],"2024-03-25","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F874c9d29-7337-4e37-8b50-36a26d00bf28?width=600&height=840","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States.’ Working Paper 51, Basel Institute on Governance and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51","Basel Institute on Governance; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)",[305],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[308],{"authors_id":309},{"id":310,"name":311},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[],[314,318,320,322],{"tags_id":315},{"id":316,"name":317},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":319},{"id":245,"name":246},{"tags_id":321},{"id":146,"name":147},{"tags_id":323},{"id":249,"name":250},[325],2377,[28],[15],"2024-03-25T11:04:47.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:45.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51",{"id":332,"slug":333,"title":334,"status":6,"nid":335,"year":336,"body":337,"external":19,"topic":338,"language":15,"type":339,"date_published":340,"image":341,"citation":171,"publisher":17,"link_internal":342,"link_external":344,"authors":345,"countries":354,"tags":359,"pdf":360,"topics":362,"featured":19,"languages":363,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":364,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":365,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":366},2282,"wp-44","Working Paper 44: Perceptions of corruption and anti-corruption efforts in Bulgaria: Results of a national survey 2023",2451,2023,"The Working Paper presents the results of a nationwide survey of 1,209 individuals in Bulgaria, conducted in February to early March 2023.\n\nThe survey examined how corruption is perceived in Bulgaria by different types of respondent, and what kind of behaviour is considered acceptable.\n\nIt also looked at respondents’ perceptions of anti-corruption efforts and under which circumstances they would be more likely to report corruption to the authorities.\n\n### About and open-access licence\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence.\n\nSuggested citation: Thürk, Maria, and Stefanie Bailer. 2023. ‘Perceptions of corruption and anti-corruption efforts in Bulgaria.’ Working Paper 44, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-44.\n\nThe study was conducted by the Basel Institute on Governance and researchers at the University of Basel with operational support from Global Metrics in Bulgaria. It was made possible by the support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) under the Swiss-Bulgarian Cooperation Programme and of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).",[21],[31],"2023-05-26","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F82fe10e2-6c3b-492e-b2e4-6b012e03adbb?width=600&height=840",[343],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[346,350],{"authors_id":347},{"id":348,"name":349},521,"Maria Thürk",{"authors_id":351},{"id":352,"name":353},522,"Stefanie Bailer",[355],{"countries_id":356},{"id":357,"name":358},22,"Bulgaria",[],[361],2317,[28],[15],"2023-05-29T22:04:24.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:06.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-44",{"id":368,"slug":369,"title":370,"status":6,"nid":371,"year":336,"body":337,"external":19,"topic":372,"language":373,"type":374,"date_published":340,"image":375,"citation":171,"publisher":17,"link_internal":376,"link_external":381,"authors":382,"countries":389,"tags":392,"pdf":393,"topics":397,"featured":19,"languages":398,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":400,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":401,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":402},2357,"working-paper-44-perceptions-corruption-and-anti-corruption-efforts-bulgaria-results","Working Paper 44: Perceptions of corruption and anti-corruption efforts in Bulgaria: Results of a national survey 2023 - Cloned",2663,[21],"Bulgarian, English",[31],"https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F615a961d-0bfe-43b8-abac-3fc12b5fabce?width=600&height=840",[377,380],{"url":378,"caption":379},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-do-bulgarians-perceive-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-efforts-results-of-a-new-study-2453"," View short summary",{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[383,385],{"authors_id":384},{"id":348,"name":349},{"authors_id":386},{"id":387,"name":388},539,"Prof Stefanie Bailer",[390],{"countries_id":391},{"id":357,"name":358},[],[394,395,396],2394,2395,2396,[28],[399,15],"Bulgarian","2024-08-12T10:05:10.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:46.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fworking-paper-44-perceptions-corruption-and-anti-corruption-efforts-bulgaria-results",{"id":404,"slug":405,"title":406,"status":6,"nid":407,"year":336,"body":408,"external":19,"topic":409,"language":15,"type":410,"date_published":411,"image":412,"citation":171,"publisher":17,"link_internal":413,"link_external":414,"authors":415,"countries":418,"tags":427,"pdf":440,"topics":441,"featured":19,"languages":442,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":443,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":444,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":445},2266,"wp-42","[Forthcoming] Working Paper 42: Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law",2338,"This paper will be released on 21 February 2023.\n\nWritten in the light of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, the Working Paper explores whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression. \n\nThe paper first explores the concept of sanctions and financial sanctions (asset freezes) and what they mean in practice.\n\nUsing the example of Canada, which has introduced a legislative mechanism for this purpose, the paper analyses whether states should be able to confiscate sanctioned assets purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned.\n\nIt then looks at more established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets, including:\n\n\n- Traditional conviction based confiscation measures, including 'extended confiscation' mechanisms\n- Non-conviction based confiscation (forfeiture) measures\n- Unexplained wealth laws\n\n\nThe paper recommends ways to maximise the effectiveness of these alternative avenues for recovering assets, which are much less controversial and can arguably be applied without infringing on legal rights. \n\nOpting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law. \n\n### About this Paper\n\nThis Working Paper was prepared by the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nIt is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"mailto:https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2023. ‘Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law.’ Working Paper 42, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"mailto:https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThe Basel Institute would like to thank Isys Lam and the law firms of \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbonifassi-avocats.com\u002Fen\u002F\">Bonifassi Avocats\u003C\u002Fa> (France), \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.hengeler.com\u002Fen\">Hengeler Mueller\u003C\u002Fa> (Germany), \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bennettjones.com\u002F\">Bennett Jones\u003C\u002Fa> (Canada) and \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.raassociados.pt\u002F\">Rogério Alves & Associados\u003C\u002Fa> (Portugal) for their support in providing research for this paper.\n\nThe Basel Institute would also like to thank Stefan Lenz, Stefan Cassella, Maria Nizzero, Nicola Bonucci and Oscar Solórzano for their support in reviewing the content of the paper and recommending amendments.",[21],[31],"2023-02-20","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Faaa4fae3-eea5-4be3-95b1-4de7e87fabb4?width=600&height=840",[],[],[416],{"authors_id":417},{"id":310,"name":311},[419,421,425],{"countries_id":420},{"id":137,"name":138},{"countries_id":422},{"id":423,"name":424},188,"Russia",{"countries_id":426},{"id":186,"name":187},[428,432,434,436,438],{"tags_id":429},{"id":430,"name":431},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":433},{"id":316,"name":317},{"tags_id":435},{"id":146,"name":147},{"tags_id":437},{"id":245,"name":246},{"tags_id":439},{"id":249,"name":250},[],[28],[15],"2023-02-20T17:04:17.000Z","2026-05-31T22:52:10.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42",{"id":447,"slug":448,"title":449,"status":6,"nid":450,"year":451,"body":452,"external":19,"topic":453,"language":15,"type":455,"date_published":456,"image":457,"citation":171,"publisher":17,"link_internal":458,"link_external":462,"authors":466,"countries":473,"tags":476,"pdf":485,"topics":487,"featured":19,"languages":488,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":489,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":490,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":491},2232,"wp-41","Working Paper 41: Targeting unexplained wealth in British Columbia",2288,2022,"The final recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia (‘the Commission’) urged the government to legislate an unexplained wealth order (‘UWO’) as part of a wider approach to counter the prevalence of money laundering and proceeds of crime in the province.\n\nThis document analyses the feasibility of this recommendation. It:\n\n\n- **briefly explains the concept of unexplained wealth** and how it can be targeted through legislative instruments;\n- **outlines the reasons** for which the Commissioner proposed a UWO for British Columbia;\n- **explains how a UK-style UWO works** and assess the probability that a mechanism of this kind would successfully recover unexplained wealth in British Columbia; \n- **addresses the constitutional issues** that may arise if a UK-style UWO was introduced, as outlined by former Supreme Court Justice, the Honourable Thomas A. Cromwell C.C., in his annexed opinion to the report;\n- **explains other legislative options** that target unexplained wealth (including those in Western Australia and Ireland) and assess their constitutional compatibility and potential effectiveness as compared to a UK-style UWO;\n- **explores the legal rights issues** that may arise if either a UK-style UWO or a traditional UWO was introduced; and\n- **outlines the legislative safeguards** that could be put in place to reduce the risk that any such mechanisms would negatively impact on established legal rights.\n\n\n### About and acknowledgements\n\nThis document has been prepared by experts working with the Basel Institute on Governance, an independent not-for-profit organisation dedicated to countering corruption and other financial crimes, and the Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, an organisation devoted to anti-corruption efforts and legislative change. The collaboration was facilitated by the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, an independent, non-partisan global centre that shapes and advances financial crime litigation practices for the future.\n\n### Open-access licence and citation\n\nThe publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. It is licensed for sharing and republishing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew, and Jeffrey Simser. 2022. “Targeting unexplained wealth in British Columbia: An analysis of Recommendation 101 of the Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia.” Working Paper 41, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-41",[454,21],"Anti-Money Laundering",[31],"2022-10-03","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fffb4289a-9a4b-434e-92bb-f85b8268c774?width=600&height=840",[459],{"url":460,"caption":461},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ftargeting-unexplained-wealth-in-british-columbia-and-beyond-new-analysis-2287"," See related blog: Targeting unexplained wealth in British Columbia and beyond – new analysis",[463],{"url":464,"caption":465},"https:\u002F\u002Fillicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org\u002F"," See Illicit Enrichment, an open-access book and database on laws to target unexplained wealth",[467,469],{"authors_id":468},{"id":310,"name":311},{"authors_id":470},{"id":471,"name":472},511,"Jeffrey Simser",[474],{"countries_id":475},{"id":137,"name":138},[477,479,483],{"tags_id":478},{"id":316,"name":317},{"tags_id":480},{"id":481,"name":482},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":484},{"id":249,"name":250},[486],2274,[454,28],[15],"2022-10-03T16:04:07.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:02.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-41",{"id":493,"slug":494,"title":495,"status":6,"nid":496,"year":111,"body":497,"external":19,"topic":498,"language":15,"type":499,"date_published":501,"image":502,"citation":171,"publisher":17,"link_internal":503,"link_external":513,"authors":517,"countries":522,"tags":529,"pdf":536,"topics":538,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":539,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":540,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":541},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[500],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[504,507,510],{"url":505,"caption":506},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":508,"caption":509},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":511,"caption":512},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[514],{"url":515,"caption":516},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[518],{"authors_id":519},{"id":520,"name":521},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[523,525,527],{"countries_id":524},{"id":186,"name":187},{"countries_id":526},{"id":137,"name":138},{"countries_id":528},{"id":141,"name":142},[530,532,534],{"tags_id":531},{"id":430,"name":431},{"tags_id":533},{"id":146,"name":147},{"tags_id":535},{"id":150,"name":151},[537],2499,[28],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",1780676563326]