[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":591},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-working-paper-3-verhaltensregeln-fur-die-verwaltung-von-vorsorgeeinrichtungen":3,"related-working-paper-3-verhaltensregeln-fur-die-verwaltung-von-vorsorgeeinrichtungen":159},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":22,"link_external":26,"featured":19,"topics":27,"languages":29,"type":30,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":32,"countries":43,"tags":44,"pdf":69,"authors":91},2171,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:57:49.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:56.000Z",49,"working-paper-3-verhaltensregeln-fur-die-verwaltung-von-vorsorgeeinrichtungen","Working Paper 3: Verhaltensregeln für die Verwaltung von Vorsorgeeinrichtungen","Eine ganze Reihe von Problemfällen hat zu einer breiten Diskussion über das Verhalten der Verantwortlichen für Vorsorgeeinrichtungen geführt, insbesondere bei der internen und externen Verwaltung der Vorsorgevermögens, und aufgezeigt, dass beachtliche Defizite bestehen, vor allem wenn Vergleiche mit anderen professionellen Vermögensverwaltern, wie Banken, gezogen werden.\n\nIm Vordergrund muss der Schutz des guten Rufs der einzelnen Vorsorgeeinrichtung sowie das Vertrauen der Begünstigten in die Integrität der mit der Verwaltung dieses Sozialkapitals Betrauten stehen. Grundsätzlich sollten deshalb an Vorsorgeeinrichtungen, was den guten Ruf ihrer obersten Organe und die Gewährleistung der Ordnungsmässigkeit angeht, vergleichbare Anforderungen gestellt werden.\n\n### About this Working Paper\n\nThis paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, \u003Ca href=\"\u002Fpublications?type[]=255\">ISSN: 2624-9650\u003C\u002Fa>.","Pieth, M., Handschin, L., Bauer, Hans-Peter, Müller, A., Fenner, G. (2003). 'Verhaltensregeln für die Verwaltung von Vorsorgeeinrichtungen'. Working Paper 3, Basel Institute on Governance","German",2007,"Basel Institute on Governance","2007-01-01",false,[21],"Asset Recovery",[23],{"url":24,"caption":25},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper"," View all Working Papers",[],[28],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[15],[31],"Working Paper",{"id":33,"storage":34,"filename_disk":35,"filename_download":36,"title":37,"type":38,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":39,"width":40,"height":41,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":42,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"3b49bfe8-9cef-4ac2-b4ec-22de09c8823f","local","3b49bfe8-9cef-4ac2-b4ec-22de09c8823f.jpg","Pages-from-biog-working-paper-03.jpg","Working Paper 3","image\u002Fjpeg",210445,2480,3509,{},[],[45],{"id":46,"publications_id":47,"tags_id":66},5199,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":50,"link_internal":51,"link_external":53,"featured":19,"topics":54,"languages":55,"type":56,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":57,"tags":58,"pdf":59,"authors":61},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21],[52],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],2213,[62,63,64,65],2394,2395,2396,2397,{"id":67,"name":68},830,"Business integrity",[70],{"id":60,"publications_id":71,"directus_files_id":83},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":72,"link_internal":73,"link_external":75,"featured":19,"topics":76,"languages":77,"type":78,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":79,"tags":80,"pdf":81,"authors":82},[21],[74],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],[62,63,64,65],{"id":84,"storage":34,"filename_disk":85,"filename_download":86,"title":86,"type":87,"folder":88,"uploaded_by":48,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":89,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":90,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"9de7ac69-a8e4-432e-941c-7d34a90ec178","9de7ac69-a8e4-432e-941c-7d34a90ec178.pdf","biog-working-paper-03.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5",422284,"View PDF (German)",[92,109,125,142],{"id":62,"publications_id":93,"authors_id":105},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":94,"link_internal":95,"link_external":97,"featured":19,"topics":98,"languages":99,"type":100,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":101,"tags":102,"pdf":103,"authors":104},[21],[96],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],[62,63,64,65],{"id":106,"name":107,"position":7,"image":108},302,"Mark Pieth","2f4f2174-a03c-4bd1-9cbc-848efef795c6",{"id":63,"publications_id":110,"authors_id":122},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":111,"link_internal":112,"link_external":114,"featured":19,"topics":115,"languages":116,"type":117,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":118,"tags":119,"pdf":120,"authors":121},[21],[113],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],[62,63,64,65],{"id":123,"name":124,"position":7,"image":7},498,"Lukas Handschin",{"id":64,"publications_id":126,"authors_id":138},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":127,"link_internal":128,"link_external":130,"featured":19,"topics":131,"languages":132,"type":133,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":134,"tags":135,"pdf":136,"authors":137},[21],[129],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],[62,63,64,65],{"id":139,"name":140,"position":7,"image":141},483,"Hans-Peter Bauer","41249e41-2ec1-491c-a8ff-be04b6aaecd1",{"id":65,"publications_id":143,"authors_id":155},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":33,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":144,"link_internal":145,"link_external":147,"featured":19,"topics":148,"languages":149,"type":150,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":151,"tags":152,"pdf":153,"authors":154},[21],[146],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[],[46],[60],[62,63,64,65],{"id":156,"name":157,"position":7,"image":158},297,"Gretta Fenner","06f7143f-fe9b-45df-87a0-8c2e8f721109",[160,212,248,294,319,372,424,463,519,553],{"id":63,"slug":161,"title":162,"status":6,"nid":163,"year":164,"body":165,"external":19,"topic":166,"language":169,"type":170,"date_published":172,"image":173,"citation":174,"publisher":17,"link_internal":175,"link_external":179,"authors":180,"countries":189,"tags":190,"pdf":205,"topics":207,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":209,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":210,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":211},"quick-guide-39-business-integrity-and-ethics","Quick Guide 39: Business integrity and ethics",2785,2025,"The changing landscape of anti-corruption regulation and enforcement has triggered important discussions around the role of ethics and compliance in business strategies and in the economy as a whole. It has also given impetus to the narrative that anti-corruption compliance programmes are inevitably costly, potentially ineffective and bureaucratic. \n\nThis ignores many of the positive advances in compliance that have been made in recent years, as well as the growing body of evidence supporting the business case for compliance.\n\nThis Quick Guide covers five broad areas in which mature and well-constructed ethics and compliance systems can benefit businesses even in the face of an uncertain regulatory and enforcement framework. It is based on a roundtable convened by the Basel Institute on Governance and bilateral discussions with key figures in the business and anti-corruption community.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[167,168],"Collective Action","Private Sector","English",[171],"Quick Guide","2025-03-25","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9a75cbfc-a56c-4739-b683-d2122f94d9bc?width=600&height=840","",[176],{"url":177,"caption":178},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Quick%20Guide"," View all Quick Guides",[],[181,185],{"authors_id":182},{"id":183,"name":184},298,"Vanessa Hans",{"authors_id":186},{"id":187,"name":188},296,"Monica Guy",[],[191,193,197,201],{"tags_id":192},{"id":67,"name":68},{"tags_id":194},{"id":195,"name":196},1274,"Ethics",{"tags_id":198},{"id":199,"name":200},1380,"Sustainability",{"tags_id":202},{"id":203,"name":204},859,"Corruption risks",[206],2436,[167,168,208],"Business Integrity Ethics and Compliance","2025-03-25T17:05:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:52.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-39-business-integrity-and-ethics",{"id":213,"slug":214,"title":215,"status":6,"nid":216,"year":217,"body":218,"external":19,"topic":219,"language":169,"type":220,"date_published":222,"image":223,"citation":174,"publisher":17,"link_internal":224,"link_external":225,"authors":229,"countries":230,"tags":231,"pdf":241,"topics":243,"featured":19,"languages":244,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":245,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":246,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":247},2377,"putting-business-integrity-global-agenda-report-5th-international-collective-action","Putting business integrity on the global agenda: Report from the 5th International Collective Action Conference",2725,2024,"The 5th International Collective Action Conference represented another significant milestone in the development of responsible and ethical business practices through anti-corruption Collective Action. \n\nThe conference, hosted by the Basel Institute with the support of the Siemens Integrity Initiative, took place on 24 and 25 June 2024 in Basel, Switzerland. This short conference report presents main insights, quotes as well as infographics and graphic recordings from the two-day event, which welcomed around 200 people from around the world and across all sectors.\n\nA key theme of this year’s conference was the importance of building local, regional and international communities of practice. These communities bring together different constellations of people and organisations interested in the Collective Action approach to improve skills, develop joint solutions and advance knowledge about how to make initiatives effective in different contexts. \n\nFive panel discussions, three interactive breakout sessions and multiple networking opportunities, including an exhibition, offered many occasions for sharing experiences and best practices in anti-corruption Collective Action and breaking down silos.\n\n### About this report and acknowledgements\n\nThe Basel Institute on Governance thanks the Siemens Integrity Initiative for supporting and providing funding for the conference’s 5th edition, as well as all speakers and breakout session facilitating organisations. The full list of presenters and sessions can be found on conference pages of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fevents\u002Ficac-2024\u002Fagenda\">B20 Collective Action Hub\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nGraphic recording illustrations: Tetyana Kalyuzhna, Basel Institute on Governance.\nPhoto and video credit: David Borter, LEO MEDIA GmbH \u002F BBM PRODUCTIONS AG.\n\nThe report is free to share or republish under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>). Please credit the Basel Institute on Governance and link to: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\">https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u003C\u002Fa>.",[167,168],[221],"Report","2024-11-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F02044130-66da-43f7-8ee2-ef45cc33cc96?width=600&height=840",[],[226],{"url":227,"caption":228},"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fevents\u002Ficac-2024\u002F"," See Conference web page",[],[],[232,235,237],{"tags_id":233},{"id":234,"name":167},909,{"tags_id":236},{"id":67,"name":68},{"tags_id":238},{"id":239,"name":240},982,"Anti-corruption",[242],2415,[167,168,208],[169],"2024-12-05T14:06:46.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:53.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fputting-business-integrity-global-agenda-report-5th-international-collective-action",{"id":249,"slug":250,"title":251,"status":6,"nid":252,"year":217,"body":253,"external":19,"topic":254,"language":169,"type":255,"date_published":257,"image":258,"citation":259,"publisher":17,"link_internal":260,"link_external":264,"authors":265,"countries":272,"tags":277,"pdf":286,"topics":288,"featured":19,"languages":289,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":290,"user_updated":291,"date_updated":292,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":293},2335,"pb-13","Policy Brief 13: Catalysing the private sector for disaster response and resilience – Case study of the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation",2575,"Extreme weather events, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and epidemics cause the loss of countless lives and bring disruption to many countries. Governments and humanitarian aid agencies are expected to be at the forefront of preparing for and responding to such disasters.\n\nHowever, occasionally the scale and impact of some natural disasters are so large that additional resources beyond what governments can provide become necessary. In such cases, efforts may be perceived as insufficient and slow. Resources and efforts need to be augmented in order to provide relief and support to those who need it most.\n\nCould the private sector take a more leading role in pre- and post-disaster efforts? How could a structured, long-term engagement reduce the inevitable integrity risks in high-stress disaster situations involving numerous government, business and international actors?\n\nThis Policy Brief looks at how the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.pdrf.org\u002F\">Philippines Disaster Resilience Foundation\u003C\u002Fa> (PDRF) has emerged as a leading private-sector coordinator for disaster risk reduction and management.\n\nIt illustrates the important role that the private sector can play in responding to – and building resilience to – natural disasters and other humanitarian emergencies. It also showcases how vital it is for good governance, integrity and transparent collaboration to be at the heart of those efforts.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa> and relates to our work to promote anti-corruption \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002F\">Collective Action\u003C\u002Fa> with the private sector.\n\nYou may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>). ",[167],[256],"Policy Brief","2024-01-26","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F8803b7dc-e28d-43f1-bac1-2887ce12babb?width=600&height=840","Luz, Bill, and Vanessa Hans. 'Catalysing the private sector for disaster response and resilience: Case study of the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation.’ Policy Brief 13, Basel Institute on Governance, https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-13.",[261],{"url":262,"caption":263},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Policy%20Brief"," View all Policy Briefs",[],[266,270],{"authors_id":267},{"id":268,"name":269},535,"Bill Luz",{"authors_id":271},{"id":183,"name":184},[273],{"countries_id":274},{"id":275,"name":276},174,"Philippines",[278,280,282],{"tags_id":279},{"id":234,"name":167},{"tags_id":281},{"id":67,"name":68},{"tags_id":283},{"id":284,"name":285},1382,"Humanitarian assistance",[287],2373,[167],[169],"2024-01-29T11:04:48.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T21:16:08.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-13",{"id":295,"slug":296,"title":297,"status":6,"nid":298,"year":299,"body":300,"external":19,"topic":301,"language":169,"type":302,"date_published":303,"image":304,"citation":174,"publisher":174,"link_internal":305,"link_external":306,"authors":307,"countries":308,"tags":309,"pdf":312,"topics":314,"featured":19,"languages":315,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":316,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":317,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":318},2308,"united-nations-global-compact-communication-engagement-2023","United Nations Global Compact: Communication on Engagement 2023",2504,2023,"Our fifth Communication on Engagement to the United Nations Global Compact details our support over the last two years for the UN Global Compact and its results.\n\nNon-business participants, including the Basel Institute, submit the CoE every two years. \n\nPrepared by our \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcollective-action\">Collective Action\u003C\u002Fa> team, our 2023 submission is available on the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Funglobalcompact.org\u002Fparticipation\u002Freport\u002Fcop\u002Fdetail\u002F479920\">UN Global Compact website\u003C\u002Fa> and by following the link below.",[167,168],[221],"2023-09-05","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9084646e-d4b9-405e-8f8c-f4085cfed850?width=600&height=840",[],[],[],[],[310],{"tags_id":311},{"id":67,"name":68},[313],2344,[167,168],[169],"2023-09-05T16:04:36.000Z","2026-05-23T20:04:13.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Funited-nations-global-compact-communication-engagement-2023",{"id":320,"slug":321,"title":322,"status":6,"nid":323,"year":324,"body":325,"external":19,"topic":326,"language":327,"type":328,"date_published":329,"image":330,"citation":174,"publisher":17,"link_internal":331,"link_external":337,"authors":338,"countries":343,"tags":357,"pdf":364,"topics":366,"featured":19,"languages":367,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":369,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":370,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":371},2242,"pb11-fr","Policy Brief 11: Lutte contre la corruption dans les États côtiers d’Afrique de l’Ouest : comment l’Action Collective peut aider",2310,2022,"Chaque année, les flux financiers illicites, dont la corruption est une composante majeure, font perdre environ 88,6 milliards de dollars (3,7 % de son PIB) à l'Afrique. La lutte contre ce fléau est un effort collectif et le secteur privé a un rôle majeur à jouer dans la promotion d'un environnement économique prospère et d’un développement durable du continent.\n\nC'est pourquoi l'Action Collective  contre la corruption a tant à offrir à l'Afrique, et en particulier aux États côtiers d'Afrique de l'Ouest désireux de maximiser leur potentiel économique. Le spectre des initiatives d'Action Collective étant assez large, il permet des mesures innovantes où gouvernements, entreprises et organisations de la société civile (OSC) unissent leurs forces, malgré des intérêts parfois divergents. Cette approche collaborative constitue à la fois un terrain fertile pour un dialogue constructif, et une occasion de mieux comprendre les réalités du secteur privé. \n\nLes OSC ont également un rôle important à jouer dans la promotion de l’Action Collective en Afrique de l'Ouest. Elles doivent continuer à initier, faciliter et s'engager dans des initiatives d'Action Collective pour aider à sensibiliser et construire des ponts entre différentes parties prenantes. Leur présence apporte souvent transparence et crédibilité aux initiatives.\nLes résultats présentés dans ce Policy Brief sont issus d’échanges avec des OSC basées au Bénin (Social Watch Bénin), au Ghana (Ghana Integrity Initiative), en Côte d'Ivoire (Le Réseau des jeunes leaders pour l’intégrité) et au Togo (L’Alliance nationale des consommateurs et de l’environnement). Il vise à relater les défis et les opportunités que représente l'Action Collective dans la région. \n\nMalgré les différents contextes dans lesquels elles opèrent, ces organisations sont unies sur un point : lutter collectivement contre la corruption en faisant entendre la voix du secteur privé – élément crucial pour une croissance économique durable. \n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nCette publication fait partie de la série des *Policy Briefs* du Basel Institute on Governance, ISSN 2624-9669. Elle est publiée sous licence *Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International* (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).\n\nCitation suggérée : Young, L. 2022. « Corruption dans les États côtiers d'Afrique de l'Ouest : comment l'Action Collective peut aider ». Policy Brief 11, *Basel Institute on Governance*. Disponible sur : baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb11.\n\nLe *Policy Brief* est publié par l'équipe Secteur privé du Basel Institute on Governance. Il s'inscrit dans le cadre des efforts continus de l'équipe pour développer et promouvoir l'Action Collective anti-corruption, avec le soutien de la Siemens Integrity Initiative. ",[167],"English, French",[256],"2022-11-15","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fa592f36b-6956-4804-8ddb-713c29a75cf2?width=600&height=840",[332,335],{"url":333,"caption":334},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb11"," Version anglaise",{"url":262,"caption":336}," Voir tous les Policy Briefs",[],[339],{"authors_id":340},{"id":341,"name":342},514,"Liza Young",[344,348,352,353],{"countries_id":345},{"id":346,"name":347},212,"Togo",{"countries_id":349},{"id":350,"name":351},25,"Benin",{"countries_id":7},{"countries_id":354},{"id":355,"name":356},79,"Ghana",[358,360,362],{"tags_id":359},{"id":239,"name":240},{"tags_id":361},{"id":67,"name":68},{"tags_id":363},{"id":234,"name":167},[365],2284,[167],[169,368],"French","2022-11-16T11:04:05.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:03.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb11-fr",{"id":206,"slug":373,"title":374,"status":6,"nid":375,"year":376,"body":377,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":378,"date_published":379,"image":380,"citation":381,"publisher":17,"link_internal":382,"link_external":385,"authors":386,"countries":391,"tags":408,"pdf":415,"topics":418,"featured":19,"languages":419,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":420,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":421,"main_points":7,"short_version":422,"subtitle":7,"link":423},"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[31],"2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[383],{"url":24,"caption":384},"View all Working Papers",[],[387],{"authors_id":388},{"id":389,"name":390},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[392,396,400,404],{"countries_id":393},{"id":394,"name":395},228,"United States",{"countries_id":397},{"id":398,"name":399},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":401},{"id":402,"name":403},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":405},{"id":406,"name":407},14,"Australia",[409,413],{"tags_id":410},{"id":411,"name":412},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":414},{"id":239,"name":240},[416,417],2490,2491,[28],[169],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":425,"slug":426,"title":427,"status":6,"nid":428,"year":164,"body":429,"external":19,"topic":430,"language":169,"type":431,"date_published":432,"image":433,"citation":174,"publisher":17,"link_internal":434,"link_external":439,"authors":440,"countries":445,"tags":450,"pdf":455,"topics":457,"featured":458,"languages":459,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":460,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":461,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":462},2390,"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[21],[31],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840",[435,438],{"url":436,"caption":437},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[441],{"authors_id":442},{"id":443,"name":444},560,"Sam Hickey",[446],{"countries_id":447},{"id":448,"name":449},225,"Ukraine",[451,453],{"tags_id":452},{"id":239,"name":240},{"tags_id":454},{"id":411,"name":412},[456],2431,[28],true,[169],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":464,"slug":465,"title":466,"status":6,"nid":467,"year":217,"body":468,"external":19,"topic":469,"language":169,"type":470,"date_published":471,"image":472,"citation":174,"publisher":17,"link_internal":473,"link_external":475,"authors":479,"countries":484,"tags":489,"pdf":512,"topics":514,"featured":458,"languages":515,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":516,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":517,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":518},2366,"wp-54","Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America",2701,"This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, *Extinción de dominio*.\n\nIt argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.\n\nThe paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54.",[21],[31],"2024-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F37616510-2f1f-4ab6-9405-845433d6fa3b?width=600&height=840",[474],{"url":24,"caption":25},[476],{"url":477,"caption":478},"route:\u003Cnolink>"," Download PDF (Spanish - forthcoming)",[480],{"authors_id":481},{"id":482,"name":483},294,"Oscar Solorzano",[485],{"countries_id":486},{"id":487,"name":488},171,"Peru",[490,492,496,500,504,508],{"tags_id":491},{"id":411,"name":412},{"tags_id":493},{"id":494,"name":495},932,"Human rights",{"tags_id":497},{"id":498,"name":499},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":501},{"id":502,"name":503},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":505},{"id":506,"name":507},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":509},{"id":510,"name":511},1215,"Illicit financial flows",[513],2404,[28],[169],"2024-10-03T16:05:11.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:47.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54",{"id":520,"slug":521,"title":522,"status":6,"nid":523,"year":217,"body":524,"external":19,"topic":525,"language":169,"type":528,"date_published":529,"image":530,"citation":531,"publisher":17,"link_internal":532,"link_external":533,"authors":536,"countries":541,"tags":542,"pdf":543,"topics":545,"featured":19,"languages":547,"summary":548,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":549,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":550,"main_points":174,"short_version":551,"subtitle":7,"link":552},2355,"wp-52","Working Paper 52: Navigating the political context: Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain",2657,"Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts. This Working Paper:\n\n\n- discusses the political and governance factors that affect the performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery;\n- provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically, including through a novel Assessment and Monitoring Framework;\n- reveals how to use these assessments to develop adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain in line with changing contexts.\n\n\nIt fills an important gap by enabling the systematic assessment and monitoring of contextual factors that impact the effectiveness of justice systems in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery.\n\n### About this research\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance works with partner countries and their enforcement and judicial authorities to strengthen asset recovery capacity, practice and policy. Building on ICAR’s track record, this paper harnesses learning and experiences on *thinking and working politically *to strengthen the rule of law and deter corruption. It contributes to the global conversation on strategic anti-corruption and asset recovery reforms. Feedback is welcome as ICAR continues to develop its approach and strategies: email the author or \u003Ca href=\"mailto:info@baselgovernance.org\">info@baselgovernance.org\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nFunding for this research was provided by the ICAR core donor group: the Government of Jersey, Principality of Liechtenstein, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and UK Home Office.\n\nIt is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).\n\n",[21,526,527],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[31],"2024-07-24","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Faf9b6cfa-f1d6-4a52-985f-91304240ffc9?width=600&height=840","Kassa, Saba. 2024. ‘Navigating the political context. Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain.’ Working Paper 52, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-52.",[],[534],{"url":535,"caption":25},"entity:node\u002F12",[537],{"authors_id":538},{"id":539,"name":540},303,"Saba Kassa",[],[],[544],2393,[28,546],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[169],"Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts. This Working Paper discusses the political and governance factors that affect the performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery; provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically, including through a novel Assessment and Monitoring Framework; reveals how to use these assessments to develop adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain in line with changing contexts.","2024-07-24T16:05:05.000Z","2026-05-31T22:51:52.000Z","Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts.\nThis report discusses the political and governance factors that affect the\nperformance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset\nrecovery. It also provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically\nwith the goal of developing adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain\nin line with changing contexts. The Assessment and Monitoring Framework\npresented here is a state-of-the-art methodology to think and work politically\nto strengthen rule of law systems.\n\nIt draws on the experience and insights of ICAR staff working with\nanti-corruption institutions across the globe. It responds to a gap in the\nexisting toolbox of anti-corruption practitioners, given that existing political\neconomy methodologies have not sufficiently focused on the contextual\nfactors that impinge on the performance effectiveness of the different\nanti-corruption institutions constituting the justice chain.\n\n### Thinking politically\nThe evidence shows that there is a more conducive environment for strong\nperformance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset\nrecovery when there is:\n\na. strong political independence of the justice chain;\n\nb. strong governance within and between the anti-corruption institutions that constitute the chain; and\n\nc. strong accountability of the respective anti-corruption institutions.\n\nThere are 12 key political and governance factors in these three dimensions\nthat shape the effectiveness of the justice chain (see chapter 2). In this\necosystem, the justice chain sits at the centre, shaped top-down by\ngovernance factors related to political independence and bottom-up by\ngovernance factors related to accountability.\n\nAssessing and regularly monitoring changes in these factors helps to\nidentify opportunities and entry points for strengthening approaches to\nanti-corruption and asset recovery, and it also works to explain where and\nwhy barriers to change and risks may arise.\n\nApplying the framework demonstrates that what sounds straightforward at\nfirst glance – namely that an enabling environment will influence the justice\nchain’s performance positively – is actually much more complex:\n\n- A seemingly conducive environment for improving the performance of anti-corruption institutions often comes with challenges and resistance. Opponents of reform fight back hard and often dirty. Solid anti-corruption and asset recovery results take time, which may fuel disappointment and discontent, hence civic expectations need to be managed. And as the fight against corruption intensifies and anti-corruption institutions start making progress, things are often perceived as getting worse.\n- The flipside of this paradox is that even in an unfavourable context, when political and governance factors appear weak, opportunities to strengthen rule of law performance in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery can still be found.\n\n*Thinking politically* allows us to make sense of this puzzle and navigate\ncomplex political contexts better. It highlights the importance of\nunderstanding how complex political and governance contexts shape the\nsuccess of anti-corruption and asset recovery reforms.\n\nThe Assessment and Monitoring Framework at the heart of this paper is\nan evidence-based and practical tool that guides anti-corruption and asset\nrecovery practitioners on how to tailor and localise their efforts in line with the\npolitical economy of each specific context (see chapter 3). It comprises the 12\nidentified factors and provides an indicator for each. Additionally, indicative\ntopics help to assess these indicators. The framework allows for an in-depth\nanalysis and facilitates the development of baseline and update assessments\nin support of adaptive programming decisions.\n\n### Working politically\n\nChanges in the political space for successful anti-corruption reform often\nfollow a cyclical pattern, with windows of opportunity for deep reform opening\nand closing as the balance of power between pro- and anti-reform forces\nshifts. Understanding this cycle helps to identify how efforts to promote more\nrobust performance of the justice chain can be better aligned, and made more\nresponsive and proactive (see chapter 4).\n\n*Working politically* highlights opportunities to prepare for, promote and\ndeepen windows of opportunity to influence anti-corruption reforms. It is also\nhelpful for thinking strategically about adapting approaches to prevent and\nslow regression and using anti-corruption principles to prevent abuse.\n\nKey approaches for adapting in an agile manner to contexts where spaces for\nsuccessful anti-corruption reforms will vary include:\n\n- cultivating trust with partners and stakeholders;\n- promoting the rule of law as a collective endeavour;\n- fostering institutionalisation through policies, systems and partnerships;\n- celebrating and communicating success; and\n- leveraging international and domestic partnerships to strengthen efforts.\n\nThe lessons learnt from the frontline of practice emphasise that success\nin fighting corruption and recovering assets does not require having the\nperfect environment, institutions or people in place. Rather, adopting flexible\nengagement approaches tailored to specific contexts has proven effective.\n\nApplying the Assessment and Monitoring Framework is helpful in a variety\nof ways: to comprehend the wider political and governance situation;\nunderstand the implications of changes in the political context; monitor\nred flags that could indicate political instrumentalisation; and identify and\ndesign responses to opening or closing windows of opportunity. Overall, it\nsupports interventions that adapt to shifts in the political environment to\nachieve results.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-52",{"id":554,"slug":555,"title":556,"status":6,"nid":557,"year":217,"body":558,"external":19,"topic":559,"language":169,"type":560,"date_published":561,"image":562,"citation":563,"publisher":564,"link_internal":565,"link_external":567,"authors":568,"countries":573,"tags":574,"pdf":585,"topics":586,"featured":19,"languages":587,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":588,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":589,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":590},2340,"wp-51","Working Paper 51: Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States",2607,"Asset recovery tools are integral to combating corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and other profit-motivated crimes. However, in many participating States of the OSCE, the range of asset recovery tools available to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies is limited.\n\nThis Working Paper identifies legislative mechanisms in OSCE participating States that empower the state to confiscate suspected or proven proceeds of crime. The overall objective is to ascertain: \n\n\n- Established good practices with regard to the design of these legislative mechanisms.\n- Any unique approaches that particular countries have taken in this context that could be replicated and tested in other jurisdictions.\n\n\nIt covers:\n\n\n- Conviction-based asset recovery mechanisms.\n- Non-conviction based mechanisms including civil recovery.\n- Additional mechanisms such as illicit enrichment laws and other laws that reverse the burden of proof regarding the legitimacy of assets.\n- Considerations regarding the adoption of broader asset recovery laws.\n- Approaches to the disposal of confiscated assets.\n- Common challenges in the implementation of asset recovery mechanisms.\n\n\n### About this report\n\nThis comparative study was conducted and drafted by the International Centre for Asset Recovery at the Basel Institute on Governance for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The paper was commissioned under the extra-budgetary project ‘Strengthening asset recovery efforts in the OSCE region’ implemented by the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.\n\nIt is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.\n\n### Disclaimer\n\nThis Working Paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, the OSCE and its participating States.",[21],[31],"2024-03-25","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F874c9d29-7337-4e37-8b50-36a26d00bf28?width=600&height=840","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States.’ Working Paper 51, Basel Institute on Governance and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51","Basel Institute on Governance; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)",[566],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[569],{"authors_id":570},{"id":571,"name":572},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[],[575,579,581,583],{"tags_id":576},{"id":577,"name":578},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":580},{"id":506,"name":507},{"tags_id":582},{"id":411,"name":412},{"tags_id":584},{"id":510,"name":511},[213],[28],[169],"2024-03-25T11:04:47.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:45.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51",1780676567605]