[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":641},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-working-paper-20-corruption-and-human-rights":3,"related-working-paper-20-corruption-and-human-rights":163},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":24,"link_external":28,"featured":19,"topics":29,"languages":32,"type":33,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":35,"countries":46,"tags":47,"pdf":104,"authors":146},2044,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:56:24.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:08.000Z",66,"working-paper-20-corruption-and-human-rights","Working Paper 20: Corruption and human rights","It is a fact that states with a high corruption rate (or a high corruption perception) are at the same time those with a bad human rights situation. Beyond this coincidence, the paper seeks to identify a concrete legal relationship between corruption and deficient human rights protection. This seems relevant and practical terms, because the extant international norms against corruption have so far yielded only modest success; their implementation could be improved with the help of human rights arguments and instruments.\n\nThis paper therefore discusses a dual question:\n\n\n- Can corrupt behaviour be conceptualised as a human rights violation?\n- Should corrupt behaviour be categorised and sanctioned as a human rights violation?\n\n\nThe author's answer is that such a juridic reconstruction is plausible under specific conditions, especially for petty corruption, but that we should be aware of the risks of such reframing of the issue.\n\n### About this Working Paper\n\nThis paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650.","Peters, A. (2015). 'Corruption and Human Rights'. Working Paper 20, Basel Institute on Governance","English",2015,"Basel Institute on Governance","2015-03-01",false,[21,22,23],"Anti-Money Laundering","Asset Recovery","Public Governance",[25],{"url":26,"caption":27},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper"," View all Working Papers",[],[21,30,31],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement","Corruption Prevention and Public Governance",[15],[34],"Working Paper",{"id":36,"storage":37,"filename_disk":38,"filename_download":39,"title":40,"type":41,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":42,"width":43,"height":44,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":45,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"65dd1d66-13d7-4144-ac8b-5bf2898d50ae","local","65dd1d66-13d7-4144-ac8b-5bf2898d50ae.jpg","Pages-from-biog-working-paper-20-EN.jpg","Working Paper 20","image\u002Fjpeg",166341,1654,2339,{},[],[48,72,88],{"id":49,"publications_id":50,"tags_id":69},3994,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":8,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":53,"link_internal":54,"link_external":56,"featured":19,"topics":57,"languages":58,"type":59,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":60,"tags":61,"pdf":64,"authors":67},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21,22,23],[55],{"url":26,"caption":27},[],[21,30,31],[15],[34],[],[49,62,63],3995,5093,[65,66],2085,2086,[68],2254,{"id":70,"name":71},932,"Human rights",{"id":62,"publications_id":73,"tags_id":85},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":8,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":74,"link_internal":75,"link_external":77,"featured":19,"topics":78,"languages":79,"type":80,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":81,"tags":82,"pdf":83,"authors":84},[21,22,23],[76],{"url":26,"caption":27},[],[21,30,31],[15],[34],[],[49,62,63],[65,66],[68],{"id":86,"name":87},973,"Corruption",{"id":63,"publications_id":89,"tags_id":101},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":8,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":90,"link_internal":91,"link_external":93,"featured":19,"topics":94,"languages":95,"type":96,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":97,"tags":98,"pdf":99,"authors":100},[21,22,23],[92],{"url":26,"caption":27},[],[21,30,31],[15],[34],[],[49,62,63],[65,66],[68],{"id":102,"name":103},982,"Anti-corruption",[105,127],{"id":65,"publications_id":106,"directus_files_id":118},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":8,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":107,"link_internal":108,"link_external":110,"featured":19,"topics":111,"languages":112,"type":113,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":114,"tags":115,"pdf":116,"authors":117},[21,22,23],[109],{"url":26,"caption":27},[],[21,30,31],[15],[34],[],[49,62,63],[65,66],[68],{"id":119,"storage":37,"filename_disk":120,"filename_download":121,"title":121,"type":122,"folder":123,"uploaded_by":51,"created_on":124,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":124,"charset":7,"filesize":125,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":126,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":124},"16c55d77-4238-4447-9a03-1b7fa102f3b0","16c55d77-4238-4447-9a03-1b7fa102f3b0.pdf","WP20-Corruption-and-Human-Rights.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5","2022-04-27T11:56:25.000Z",263345,"View PDF (English)",{"id":66,"publications_id":128,"directus_files_id":140},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":8,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":129,"link_internal":130,"link_external":132,"featured":19,"topics":133,"languages":134,"type":135,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":136,"tags":137,"pdf":138,"authors":139},[21,22,23],[131],{"url":26,"caption":27},[],[21,30,31],[15],[34],[],[49,62,63],[65,66],[68],{"id":141,"storage":37,"filename_disk":142,"filename_download":143,"title":143,"type":122,"folder":123,"uploaded_by":51,"created_on":124,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":124,"charset":7,"filesize":144,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":145,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":124},"70ce6564-1b09-462e-abb3-98357bfc456c","70ce6564-1b09-462e-abb3-98357bfc456c.pdf","biog-working-paper-20-ES.pdf",293893," View PDF (Spanish): Corrupción y derechos humanos",[147],{"id":68,"publications_id":148,"authors_id":160},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":8,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":149,"link_internal":150,"link_external":152,"featured":19,"topics":153,"languages":154,"type":155,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":156,"tags":157,"pdf":158,"authors":159},[21,22,23],[151],{"url":26,"caption":27},[],[21,30,31],[15],[34],[],[49,62,63],[65,66],[68],{"id":161,"name":162,"position":7,"image":7},380,"Anne Peters",[164,237,292,324,376,413,464,515,560,596],{"id":165,"slug":166,"title":167,"status":6,"nid":168,"year":169,"body":170,"external":19,"topic":171,"language":15,"type":173,"date_published":175,"image":176,"citation":177,"publisher":178,"link_internal":179,"link_external":180,"authors":187,"countries":204,"tags":209,"pdf":230,"topics":232,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":233,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":234,"main_points":235,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":236},2433,"addressing-conflicts-interest-and-corruption-indonesias-energy-transition","Addressing conflicts of interest and corruption in Indonesia’s energy transition",2936,2026,"This U4 Issue analyses Indonesia's ambitious energy transition and highlights how political finance, weak regulations and a \"revolving door\" of personnel between public office and the private sector create vulnerabilities. The publication was produced by U4 and the Basel Institute on Governance through its Green Corruption programme.\n\n\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-02\u002FAddressing-conflicts-of-interest-and-corruption-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition_U4-Issue.pdf\">Download publication here\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n### About the paper\n\nConflicts of interest and corruption in Indonesia's political economy pose significant risks to its energy transition, including the Just Energy Transition Partnership. Existing legal and institutional frameworks are fragmented, inconsistently applied, and often fail to address the risk of state capture by powerful political and economic actors, especially in the extractive and energy sectors.\n\nThe reliance on fossil fuel industries for political financing and the monopolistic nature of state-owned entities further complicate the shift to a low- or no-carbon system, despite the country's ambitious renewable energy targets.\n\nPotential pathways to greater anti-corruption resilience lie in improvements to beneficial ownership transparency and strengthening regulation, monitoring and sanctioning of conflict of interest violations.\n",[172],"Green Corruption",[174],"Report","2026-02-24","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd97f2ca5-300d-45c9-9de9-33152b72f96c?width=600&height=840","","U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre",[],[181,184],{"url":182,"caption":183},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.u4.no\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-conflicts-of-interest-and-corruption-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition"," View on U4 website",{"url":185,"caption":186},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.u4.no\u002Fblog\u002Fimproving-anti-corruption-resilience-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition"," Read related U4 blog",[188,192,196,200],{"authors_id":189},{"id":190,"name":191},581,"Robert Forster",{"authors_id":193},{"id":194,"name":195},582,"Aled Williams",{"authors_id":197},{"id":198,"name":199},523,"Lakso Anindito",{"authors_id":201},{"id":202,"name":203},579,"Dr Amanda Cabrejo le Roux",[205],{"countries_id":206},{"id":207,"name":208},99,"Indonesia",[210,212,216,220,224,228],{"tags_id":211},{"id":102,"name":103},{"tags_id":213},{"id":214,"name":215},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":217},{"id":218,"name":219},804,"Natural resources",{"tags_id":221},{"id":222,"name":223},1371,"Public governance",{"tags_id":225},{"id":226,"name":227},1236,"Compliance",{"tags_id":229},{"id":86,"name":87},[231],2489,[172],"2026-02-27T15:11:31.000Z","2026-05-23T20:08:18.000Z","- Corruption and conflicts of interest are embedded in the energy transition process due to the strong links between political power, private wealth (especially from extractive industries) and public office holders.\n- Existing anti-corruption regulations are often vague, fragmented across different legal instruments, and suffer from inconsistent enforcement, which creates loopholes susceptible to manipulation.\n- Progress in renewable energy uptake is slowed by the enduring influence and interests of fossil fuel incumbents who benefit from subsidies that keep coal an artificially cheap and viable energy source.\n- The Just Energy Transition Partnership is vulnerable to misallocations due to concentrated decision-making power, limited transparency in project selection and insufficient involvement of national anti-corruption bodies and civil society in its planning.\n- Improving transparency of beneficial ownership and strengthening the monitoring and sanctioning of conflict of interest violations are possible pathways to build greater anti-corruption resilience, though these institutional efforts alone are insufficient to fully address state capture dynamics.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-conflicts-interest-and-corruption-indonesias-energy-transition",{"id":238,"slug":239,"title":240,"status":6,"nid":241,"year":242,"body":243,"external":19,"topic":244,"language":15,"type":247,"date_published":249,"image":250,"citation":177,"publisher":17,"link_internal":251,"link_external":258,"authors":259,"countries":268,"tags":269,"pdf":282,"topics":285,"featured":287,"languages":288,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":289,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":290,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":291},2389,"qg36","Quick Guide 36: Corruption and security",2756,2025,"How does corruption threaten national and international security, both directly and indirectly? Can viewing it through the lens of power offer deeper insights? And what might we achieve by framing corruption as a security concern?\n\nThis quick guide gives a short introduction to this complex issue as part of a two-part series on corruption, security and strategic corruption.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[245,246],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[248],"Quick Guide","2025-02-09","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F7b63372a-9595-47eb-8bb8-88a3df6b9912?width=600&height=840",[252,255],{"url":253,"caption":254},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg37"," View related Quick Guide to strategic corruption",{"url":256,"caption":257},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Quick%20Guide"," View all Quick Guides",[],[260,264],{"authors_id":261},{"id":262,"name":263},559,"Dr Saba Kassa",{"authors_id":265},{"id":266,"name":267},296,"Monica Guy",[],[270,272,276,280],{"tags_id":271},{"id":102,"name":103},{"tags_id":273},{"id":274,"name":275},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":277},{"id":278,"name":279},1376,"Defence and security",{"tags_id":281},{"id":86,"name":87},[283,284],2429,2430,[286],"Prevention Research and Innovation",true,[15],"2025-02-10T11:05:56.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg36",{"id":293,"slug":294,"title":295,"status":6,"nid":296,"year":297,"body":298,"external":19,"topic":299,"language":15,"type":300,"date_published":301,"image":302,"citation":177,"publisher":17,"link_internal":303,"link_external":305,"authors":306,"countries":311,"tags":312,"pdf":317,"topics":319,"featured":19,"languages":320,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":321,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":322,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":323},2367,"qg32","Quick Guide 32: Corruption and human rights",2700,2024,"The relationships between corruption and human rights are complex but cry out for exploring. Could anti-corruption benefit from a human rights perspective? How can the two communities work better together – and what are some risks and challenges?\n\nThis Quick Guide gives a brief introduction to the ideas of the Basel Institute’s Vice-President, Professor Anne Peters, and some of our initial work at the intersection of corruption and human rights.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nThis work is licensed under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[71],[248],"2024-10-07","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb0e49414-bd4a-4f3d-a55b-0caf6e45bcf8?width=600&height=840",[304],{"url":256,"caption":257},[],[307],{"authors_id":308},{"id":309,"name":310},549,"Prof Anne Peters",[],[313,315],{"tags_id":314},{"id":102,"name":103},{"tags_id":316},{"id":70,"name":71},[318],2405,[71],[15],"2024-10-07T10:05:06.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:47.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg32",{"id":325,"slug":326,"title":327,"status":6,"nid":328,"year":169,"body":329,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":330,"date_published":331,"image":332,"citation":333,"publisher":17,"link_internal":334,"link_external":337,"authors":338,"countries":343,"tags":360,"pdf":367,"topics":370,"featured":19,"languages":371,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":372,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":373,"main_points":7,"short_version":374,"subtitle":7,"link":375},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[34],"2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[335],{"url":26,"caption":336},"View all Working Papers",[],[339],{"authors_id":340},{"id":341,"name":342},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[344,348,352,356],{"countries_id":345},{"id":346,"name":347},228,"United States",{"countries_id":349},{"id":350,"name":351},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":353},{"id":354,"name":355},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":357},{"id":358,"name":359},14,"Australia",[361,365],{"tags_id":362},{"id":363,"name":364},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":366},{"id":102,"name":103},[368,369],2490,2491,[30],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":377,"slug":378,"title":379,"status":6,"nid":380,"year":242,"body":381,"external":19,"topic":382,"language":15,"type":383,"date_published":384,"image":385,"citation":177,"publisher":17,"link_internal":386,"link_external":391,"authors":392,"countries":397,"tags":402,"pdf":407,"topics":409,"featured":287,"languages":410,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":411,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":290,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":412},2390,"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[22],[34],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840",[387,390],{"url":388,"caption":389},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":26,"caption":27},[],[393],{"authors_id":394},{"id":395,"name":396},560,"Sam Hickey",[398],{"countries_id":399},{"id":400,"name":401},225,"Ukraine",[403,405],{"tags_id":404},{"id":102,"name":103},{"tags_id":406},{"id":363,"name":364},[408],2431,[30],[15],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":414,"slug":415,"title":416,"status":6,"nid":417,"year":297,"body":418,"external":19,"topic":419,"language":15,"type":420,"date_published":421,"image":422,"citation":177,"publisher":17,"link_internal":423,"link_external":425,"authors":429,"countries":434,"tags":439,"pdf":458,"topics":460,"featured":287,"languages":461,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":462,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":322,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":463},2366,"wp-54","Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America",2701,"This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, *Extinción de dominio*.\n\nIt argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.\n\nThe paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54.",[22],[34],"2024-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F37616510-2f1f-4ab6-9405-845433d6fa3b?width=600&height=840",[424],{"url":26,"caption":27},[426],{"url":427,"caption":428},"route:\u003Cnolink>"," Download PDF (Spanish - forthcoming)",[430],{"authors_id":431},{"id":432,"name":433},294,"Oscar Solorzano",[435],{"countries_id":436},{"id":437,"name":438},171,"Peru",[440,442,444,448,450,454],{"tags_id":441},{"id":363,"name":364},{"tags_id":443},{"id":70,"name":71},{"tags_id":445},{"id":446,"name":447},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":449},{"id":274,"name":275},{"tags_id":451},{"id":452,"name":453},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":455},{"id":456,"name":457},1215,"Illicit financial flows",[459],2404,[30],[15],"2024-10-03T16:05:11.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54",{"id":465,"slug":466,"title":467,"status":6,"nid":468,"year":169,"body":469,"external":19,"topic":470,"language":15,"type":471,"date_published":473,"image":474,"citation":177,"publisher":17,"link_internal":475,"link_external":484,"authors":488,"countries":493,"tags":500,"pdf":509,"topics":511,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":512,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":513,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":514},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[22],[472],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[476,479,482],{"url":477,"caption":478},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":480,"caption":481},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":483,"caption":257},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428",[485],{"url":486,"caption":487},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[489],{"authors_id":490},{"id":491,"name":492},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[494,496,498],{"countries_id":495},{"id":400,"name":401},{"countries_id":497},{"id":354,"name":355},{"countries_id":499},{"id":358,"name":359},[501,505,507],{"tags_id":502},{"id":503,"name":504},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":506},{"id":363,"name":364},{"tags_id":508},{"id":102,"name":103},[510],2499,[30],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":516,"slug":517,"title":518,"status":6,"nid":519,"year":242,"body":520,"external":19,"topic":521,"language":522,"type":523,"date_published":525,"image":526,"citation":177,"publisher":17,"link_internal":527,"link_external":534,"authors":538,"countries":543,"tags":544,"pdf":553,"topics":555,"featured":19,"languages":556,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":557,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":558,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":559},2384,"pb-14-fr","Policy Brief 14: Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs",2747,"La Directive de l’Union européenne de 2024 \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Flegal-content\u002FFR\u002FTXT\u002FHTML\u002F?uri=OJ:L_202401260\">relative au recouvrement et à la confiscation d'avoirs\u003C\u002Fa> oblige les États membres, entre autres, à adopter des mesures législatives pour permettre la confiscation de la « fortune inexpliquée ».\n\nCette Note de politique examine l’article 16 de la Directive qui énonce cette obligation, ainsi que les pouvoirs et restrictions que les États membres devront inclure dans les mesures relatives à la « fortune inexpliquée » pour garantir la conformité à la Directive.\n\nEn bref, cela démontre la grande flexibilité accordée par le texte de la Directive aux États membres pour déterminer le champ d’application de leurs propres mesures en matière de fortune inexpliquée. Au minimum, les États seront requis d’introduire des mesures susceptibles d’être utilisées pour cibler la fortune inexpliquée liée au crime organisé.\n\nCependant, les États membres peuvent toujours décider d’introduire des mesures de plus grande portée ciblant la fortune inexpliquée liée à toutes les activités criminelles, y compris la corruption.\n\n**À propos de cette Note de politique**\n\nLa présente publication fait partie de la série de Notes de politique (Policy Briefs) du Basel Institute on Governance, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>. Elle est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> Licence internationale.\n\nCitation proposée : Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. « Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs. » Note de politique 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Disponible sur: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14-fr\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14-fr\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nIl s’agit d’une publication de l’International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) au Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR reçoit un financement principal des gouvernements de Jersey, du Liechtenstein, de la Norvège, de la Suisse et du Royaume-Uni.",[22],"French",[524],"Policy Brief","2025-01-23","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F726e9035-52eb-4722-ab59-3b33bed7538f?width=600&height=840",[528,531],{"url":529,"caption":530},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14"," Version anglaise",{"url":532,"caption":533},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Policy%20Brief"," Voir tous les Policy Briefs",[535],{"url":536,"caption":537},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=65&lang=fr"," Livre (disponible gratuitement): Enrichissement illicite",[539],{"authors_id":540},{"id":541,"name":542},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[],[545,547,551],{"tags_id":546},{"id":363,"name":364},{"tags_id":548},{"id":549,"name":550},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":552},{"id":70,"name":71},[554],2420,[30],[522],"2025-01-23T17:05:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:49.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14-fr",{"id":561,"slug":562,"title":563,"status":6,"nid":564,"year":297,"body":565,"external":19,"topic":566,"language":15,"type":567,"date_published":568,"image":569,"citation":177,"publisher":17,"link_internal":570,"link_external":573,"authors":577,"countries":580,"tags":581,"pdf":590,"topics":592,"featured":19,"languages":593,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":594,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":558,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":595},2383,"pb-14","Policy Brief 14: Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery",2739,"The European Union’s 2024 \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fdata.europa.eu\u002Feli\u002Fdir\u002F2024\u002F1260\u002Foj\">Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation\u003C\u002Fa> obliges Member States to, among other things, introduce legislative measures to enable the confiscation of “unexplained wealth”.\n\nThis policy paper examines this Article and the powers and restrictions that Member States will need to include in such “unexplained wealth” measures to ensure compliance with the Directive.\n\nIn brief, the Directive gives legislators in EU Member States flexibility to decide the scope of their own unexplained wealth measures. At a minimum, they must introduce measures that can be used to target unexplained wealth linked to organised crime.\n\nMember States could, however, adopt broader measures target unexplained wealth relating to all criminal activity, including corruption.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nYou may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence. Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery.’ Policy Brief 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14\u003C\u002Fa>. \n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.",[22],[524],"2024-01-13","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9b9b6a62-6a97-4851-957f-1f36155e8f32?width=600&height=840",[571],{"url":532,"caption":572}," View all Policy Briefs",[574],{"url":575,"caption":576},"https:\u002F\u002Fillicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org\u002F"," Free book: Illicit Enrichment",[578],{"authors_id":579},{"id":541,"name":542},[],[582,584,586,588],{"tags_id":583},{"id":549,"name":550},{"tags_id":585},{"id":456,"name":457},{"tags_id":587},{"id":363,"name":364},{"tags_id":589},{"id":70,"name":71},[591],2419,[30],[15],"2025-01-13T11:05:26.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14",{"id":597,"slug":598,"title":599,"status":6,"nid":600,"year":242,"body":601,"external":19,"topic":602,"language":15,"type":604,"date_published":605,"image":606,"citation":607,"publisher":17,"link_internal":608,"link_external":610,"authors":611,"countries":620,"tags":621,"pdf":633,"topics":636,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":637,"user_updated":52,"date_updated":638,"main_points":7,"short_version":639,"subtitle":7,"link":640},2425,"wp-60","Working Paper 60: Understanding the enemy: Insights from corrupt networks to improve anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives",2867,"Corruption is not simply about individual misconduct. It is a networked phenomenon that arises from entrenched social, economic and political interactions. It is orchestrated through coordination between groups and clusters of individuals.\n\nThis Working Paper explores the networked nature of corruption and the opportunities this presents for anti-corruption efforts. The aim is to understand how shifting the unit of analysis from individuals to networks helps to understand the persistence and resilience of corruption, while opening up new anti-corruption perspectives.\n\nA meta-analysis of findings from more than 15 years of research on informal networks and corruption underpins the conceptualisation of corrupt networks. The paper argues that a focus on networks helps to shed light on the functionality of corruption – from petty bribery to large-scale public procurement fraud – and the underlying social norms that enable it.\n\nUnderstanding the structures, functions and modus operandi of the informal networks associated with corruption and applying the network logic to anti-corruption strategies can help to achieve better outcomes. The paper specifically looks at anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives, suggesting that these should emulate positive aspects of informal networks.\n\n### About this Working Paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\n",[603,245,246],"Collective Action",[34],"2025-11-04","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F3fc6640b-79d3-481c-a74c-fc1979923c1b?width=600&height=840","Baez Camargo, Claudia, and Jacopo Costa. 2025. 'Understanding the enemy: Insights from corrupt networks to improve anticorruption Collective Action initiatives.'Working Paper 60, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60\u003C\u002Fa>.",[609],{"url":26,"caption":27},[],[612,616],{"authors_id":613},{"id":614,"name":615},572,"Dr Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":617},{"id":618,"name":619},550,"Dr Jacopo Costa",[],[622,625,627,631],{"tags_id":623},{"id":624,"name":603},909,{"tags_id":626},{"id":102,"name":103},{"tags_id":628},{"id":629,"name":630},1309,"Informality",{"tags_id":632},{"id":274,"name":275},[634,635],2480,2481,[603,286],"2025-11-04T17:05:36.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:56.000Z","This Working Paper reflects on the networked nature of corruption and the\nlessons that can be learned from studying it. Particularly, it provides insights into\nthe opportunities and challenges of designing and implementing anti-corruption\nCollective Action initiatives.\n\nThe authors consider corruption not as a series of isolated acts by individuals,\nbut as the outcome of complex, resilient informal networks embedded within\nsocio-political, economic and cultural structures. Within this framework, they\ninvestigate how shifting the unit of analysis from individuals to networks can\nimprove our understanding of the persistence of corruption and create new\nperspectives to promote better anti-corruption outcomes and impacts.\n\nDrawing on over 15 years of empirical research across diverse countries and\nregions, the authors argue that corruption must be viewed through a network\nlens. This approach reveals how informal connections facilitate rule subversion,\nproblem-solving and goal achievement where formal institutions are weak or\nineffective.\n\nThe paper contends that a focus on networks sheds light on the functionality\nof corruption and the underlying social norms enabling corrupt exchanges.\nUnderstanding the structures, functions and modus operandi of the informal\nnetworks associated with corruption can help design better anti-corruption\ninitiatives.\n\nThe Working Paper contributes to the existing literature on corruption strategies\nand anti-corruption activities.\n\n**First**, the authors explore how **informal networks rooted in trust, reciprocity\nand social norms can serve practical functions**, including accessing public\nservices, boosting business profitability and winning elections. The strength\nof informal networks lies in their adaptability, internal organisation and\nembeddedness in local cultures.\n\nThe authors identify **six core roles in informal networks** that pursue corrupt\nobjectives: seekers, doers, brokers, facilitators, intermediaries and instigators.\nThe coordination and division of tasks among these six roles make such informal\nnetworks effective in achieving their goals.\n\nIn addition, the authors unpack **the most important strategies these corrupt\ninformal networks rely on** for their functioning. These strategies are:\n\n- co-optation (recruitment and trust building);\n- control (discipline and compliance);\n- camouflage (concealment and legitimacy); and\n- coordination (task orchestration and adaptability).\n\n**Second**, the authors set out **concrete implications for anti-corruption\nactivities** based on insights on how informal networks operate. They state that\ntraditional top-down, normative approaches often fail due to the functionality\nof corruption (i.e., corruption is always a means to an end) and the social\nembeddedness of corrupt networks.\n\nThe authors propose to apply the network logic to anti-corruption strategies. This\npaper particularly focuses on **Collective Action initiatives** and suggests that\nthese should emulate positive aspects of informal networks. Collective Action\nrefers to collaborative efforts – typically involving businesses, civil society and\u002For\npublic institutions – to tackle corruption risks and shared integrity challenges that\nno single actor can resolve alone.\n\nThis means that, to be effective, these Collective Action initiatives must be\nbased on:\n\n- **Functional goals:** Set short-term, tangible goals aligned with participants’ interests.\n- **Strategic co-optation:** Recruit key stakeholders strategically, including those who are prone to corruption risks, by using trust-building mechanisms that can supply an added value to the stakeholders.\n- **Transparency and accountability:** Leverage mechanisms of peer pressure and reputation management that can ensure sustained commitment and engagement among participants and deter free-riding strategies.\n\nIn conclusion, to foster integrity in today’s fragmented and conflict-prone world,\nanti-corruption initiatives generally must shift from targeting individuals to\ntargeting the networks that sustain corruption. Sustainable change requires\nlocally rooted, trust-based collective efforts that provide functional, credible and\ncoordinated alternatives to illicit networks.\n\nIn this sense, Collective Action initiatives built on conceptualising corruption\nas a networked problem can be an effective solution for achieving\nanti-corruption goals","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60",1780676605506]