[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":618},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-working-paper-17-role-donors-recovery-stolen-assets":3,"related-working-paper-17-role-donors-recovery-stolen-assets":158},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":23,"link_external":27,"featured":19,"topics":28,"languages":30,"type":31,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":33,"countries":44,"tags":45,"pdf":86,"authors":108},2074,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:56:44.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:43.000Z",63,"working-paper-17-role-donors-recovery-stolen-assets","Working Paper 17: The role of donors in the recovery of stolen assets","Financial crimes such as corruption, fraud, and embezzlement generate significant profits, often at the expense of the public budget. These proceeds of crime are usually hidden outside of the country where the crime was originally committed, and laundered through complex financial and commercial transactions, often spanning across numerous jurisdictions.\n\n\u003Ca href=\"\u002Fnode\u002F25\">Asset recovery\u003C\u002Fa> – the process of identifying, restraining, seizing, and repatriating these assets to the countries from whence they were originally stolen – is one of the greatest challenges for the global anti-corruption movement. Asset recovery is also an essential development challenge, as it usually involves repatriating funds back to a developing country where they were stolen, and where they could be used to support development projects.\n\nAs a bridge between aid recipient and donor countries, donor agencies are uniquely positioned to support asset recovery initiatives. Interesting examples are emerging of how donors can support asset recovery by:\n\n\n- supporting international standards and initiatives;\n- providing technical assistance and capacity building (most often through third parties);\n- encouraging policy coherence at home;\n- helping build political will; and\n- providing assistance during the asset repatriation phase.\n\n\n### About this Working Paper\n\nThis paper is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, \u003Ca href=\"\u002Fpublications?type[]=255\">ISSN: 2624-9650\u003C\u002Fa>.","Fenner, G., Gomes Pereira, P., De Simone, F. (2014). 'The Role of Donors in the Recovery of Stolen Assets'. Working Paper 17, Basel Institute on Governance","English",2014,"Basel Institute on Governance","2014-12-01",false,[21,22],"Anti-Money Laundering","Asset Recovery",[24],{"url":25,"caption":26},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper"," View all Working Papers",[],[21,29],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[15],[32],"Working Paper",{"id":34,"storage":35,"filename_disk":36,"filename_download":37,"title":38,"type":39,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":40,"width":41,"height":42,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":43,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"06562d80-00e7-4561-adb5-3261f72e3330","local","06562d80-00e7-4561-adb5-3261f72e3330.jpg","Pages-from-biog-working-paper-17.jpg","Working Paper 17","image\u002Fjpeg",102142,1654,2339,{},[],[46,70],{"id":47,"publications_id":48,"tags_id":67},4059,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":51,"link_internal":52,"link_external":54,"featured":19,"topics":55,"languages":56,"type":57,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":58,"tags":59,"pdf":61,"authors":63},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21,22],[53],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[21,29],[15],[32],[],[47,60],5121,[62],2120,[64,65,66],2285,2286,2287,{"id":68,"name":69},843,"Asset recovery",{"id":60,"publications_id":71,"tags_id":83},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":72,"link_internal":73,"link_external":75,"featured":19,"topics":76,"languages":77,"type":78,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":79,"tags":80,"pdf":81,"authors":82},[21,22],[74],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[21,29],[15],[32],[],[47,60],[62],[64,65,66],{"id":84,"name":85},1299,"Development assistance",[87],{"id":62,"publications_id":88,"directus_files_id":100},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":89,"link_internal":90,"link_external":92,"featured":19,"topics":93,"languages":94,"type":95,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":96,"tags":97,"pdf":98,"authors":99},[21,22],[91],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[21,29],[15],[32],[],[47,60],[62],[64,65,66],{"id":101,"storage":35,"filename_disk":102,"filename_download":103,"title":103,"type":104,"folder":105,"uploaded_by":49,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":106,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":107,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"4eab7492-9736-4a45-993a-57b30e567143","4eab7492-9736-4a45-993a-57b30e567143.pdf","WP17-The-Role-of-Donors-in-the-Recovery-of-Stolen-Assets-0.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5",248690,"View PDF",[109,126,142],{"id":64,"publications_id":110,"authors_id":122},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":111,"link_internal":112,"link_external":114,"featured":19,"topics":115,"languages":116,"type":117,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":118,"tags":119,"pdf":120,"authors":121},[21,22],[113],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[21,29],[15],[32],[],[47,60],[62],[64,65,66],{"id":123,"name":124,"position":7,"image":125},297,"Gretta Fenner","06f7143f-fe9b-45df-87a0-8c2e8f721109",{"id":65,"publications_id":127,"authors_id":139},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":128,"link_internal":129,"link_external":131,"featured":19,"topics":132,"languages":133,"type":134,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":135,"tags":136,"pdf":137,"authors":138},[21,22],[130],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[21,29],[15],[32],[],[47,60],[62],[64,65,66],{"id":140,"name":141,"position":7,"image":7},460,"Pedro Gomes Pereira",{"id":66,"publications_id":143,"authors_id":155},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":144,"link_internal":145,"link_external":147,"featured":19,"topics":148,"languages":149,"type":150,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":151,"tags":152,"pdf":153,"authors":154},[21,22],[146],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[21,29],[15],[32],[],[47,60],[62],[64,65,66],{"id":156,"name":157,"position":7,"image":7},461,"Francesco De Simone",[159,212,253,310,349,393,443,507,542,577],{"id":160,"slug":161,"title":162,"status":6,"nid":163,"year":164,"body":165,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":166,"date_published":167,"image":168,"citation":169,"publisher":17,"link_internal":170,"link_external":173,"authors":174,"countries":179,"tags":196,"pdf":203,"topics":206,"featured":19,"languages":207,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":208,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":209,"main_points":7,"short_version":210,"subtitle":7,"link":211},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[32],"2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[171],{"url":25,"caption":172},"View all Working Papers",[],[175],{"authors_id":176},{"id":177,"name":178},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[180,184,188,192],{"countries_id":181},{"id":182,"name":183},228,"United States",{"countries_id":185},{"id":186,"name":187},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":189},{"id":190,"name":191},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":193},{"id":194,"name":195},14,"Australia",[197,199],{"tags_id":198},{"id":68,"name":69},{"tags_id":200},{"id":201,"name":202},982,"Anti-corruption",[204,205],2490,2491,[29],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":213,"slug":214,"title":215,"status":6,"nid":216,"year":217,"body":218,"external":19,"topic":219,"language":15,"type":220,"date_published":221,"image":222,"citation":223,"publisher":17,"link_internal":224,"link_external":229,"authors":230,"countries":235,"tags":240,"pdf":245,"topics":247,"featured":248,"languages":249,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":250,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":251,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":252},2390,"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,2025,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[22],[32],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840","",[225,228],{"url":226,"caption":227},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[231],{"authors_id":232},{"id":233,"name":234},560,"Sam Hickey",[236],{"countries_id":237},{"id":238,"name":239},225,"Ukraine",[241,243],{"tags_id":242},{"id":201,"name":202},{"tags_id":244},{"id":68,"name":69},[246],2431,[29],true,[15],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":254,"slug":255,"title":256,"status":6,"nid":257,"year":258,"body":259,"external":19,"topic":260,"language":15,"type":261,"date_published":262,"image":263,"citation":223,"publisher":17,"link_internal":264,"link_external":266,"authors":270,"countries":275,"tags":280,"pdf":303,"topics":305,"featured":248,"languages":306,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":307,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":308,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":309},2366,"wp-54","Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America",2701,2024,"This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, *Extinción de dominio*.\n\nIt argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.\n\nThe paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54.",[22],[32],"2024-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F37616510-2f1f-4ab6-9405-845433d6fa3b?width=600&height=840",[265],{"url":25,"caption":26},[267],{"url":268,"caption":269},"route:\u003Cnolink>"," Download PDF (Spanish - forthcoming)",[271],{"authors_id":272},{"id":273,"name":274},294,"Oscar Solorzano",[276],{"countries_id":277},{"id":278,"name":279},171,"Peru",[281,283,287,291,295,299],{"tags_id":282},{"id":68,"name":69},{"tags_id":284},{"id":285,"name":286},932,"Human rights",{"tags_id":288},{"id":289,"name":290},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":292},{"id":293,"name":294},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":296},{"id":297,"name":298},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":300},{"id":301,"name":302},1215,"Illicit financial flows",[304],2404,[29],[15],"2024-10-03T16:05:11.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:47.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54",{"id":311,"slug":312,"title":313,"status":6,"nid":314,"year":258,"body":315,"external":19,"topic":316,"language":15,"type":317,"date_published":318,"image":319,"citation":320,"publisher":321,"link_internal":322,"link_external":324,"authors":325,"countries":330,"tags":331,"pdf":342,"topics":344,"featured":19,"languages":345,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":346,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":347,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":348},2340,"wp-51","Working Paper 51: Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States",2607,"Asset recovery tools are integral to combating corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and other profit-motivated crimes. However, in many participating States of the OSCE, the range of asset recovery tools available to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies is limited.\n\nThis Working Paper identifies legislative mechanisms in OSCE participating States that empower the state to confiscate suspected or proven proceeds of crime. The overall objective is to ascertain: \n\n\n- Established good practices with regard to the design of these legislative mechanisms.\n- Any unique approaches that particular countries have taken in this context that could be replicated and tested in other jurisdictions.\n\n\nIt covers:\n\n\n- Conviction-based asset recovery mechanisms.\n- Non-conviction based mechanisms including civil recovery.\n- Additional mechanisms such as illicit enrichment laws and other laws that reverse the burden of proof regarding the legitimacy of assets.\n- Considerations regarding the adoption of broader asset recovery laws.\n- Approaches to the disposal of confiscated assets.\n- Common challenges in the implementation of asset recovery mechanisms.\n\n\n### About this report\n\nThis comparative study was conducted and drafted by the International Centre for Asset Recovery at the Basel Institute on Governance for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The paper was commissioned under the extra-budgetary project ‘Strengthening asset recovery efforts in the OSCE region’ implemented by the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.\n\nIt is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.\n\n### Disclaimer\n\nThis Working Paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, the OSCE and its participating States.",[22],[32],"2024-03-25","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F874c9d29-7337-4e37-8b50-36a26d00bf28?width=600&height=840","Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected OSCE participating States.’ Working Paper 51, Basel Institute on Governance and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51","Basel Institute on Governance; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)",[323],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[326],{"authors_id":327},{"id":328,"name":329},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[],[332,336,338,340],{"tags_id":333},{"id":334,"name":335},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":337},{"id":297,"name":298},{"tags_id":339},{"id":68,"name":69},{"tags_id":341},{"id":301,"name":302},[343],2377,[29],[15],"2024-03-25T11:04:47.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:45.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51",{"id":350,"slug":351,"title":352,"status":6,"nid":353,"year":354,"body":355,"external":19,"topic":356,"language":15,"type":357,"date_published":358,"image":359,"citation":223,"publisher":17,"link_internal":360,"link_external":361,"authors":362,"countries":365,"tags":374,"pdf":387,"topics":388,"featured":19,"languages":389,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":390,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":391,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":392},2266,"wp-42","[Forthcoming] Working Paper 42: Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law",2338,2023,"This paper will be released on 21 February 2023.\n\nWritten in the light of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, the Working Paper explores whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression. \n\nThe paper first explores the concept of sanctions and financial sanctions (asset freezes) and what they mean in practice.\n\nUsing the example of Canada, which has introduced a legislative mechanism for this purpose, the paper analyses whether states should be able to confiscate sanctioned assets purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned.\n\nIt then looks at more established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets, including:\n\n\n- Traditional conviction based confiscation measures, including 'extended confiscation' mechanisms\n- Non-conviction based confiscation (forfeiture) measures\n- Unexplained wealth laws\n\n\nThe paper recommends ways to maximise the effectiveness of these alternative avenues for recovering assets, which are much less controversial and can arguably be applied without infringing on legal rights. \n\nOpting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law. \n\n### About this Paper\n\nThis Working Paper was prepared by the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nIt is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"mailto:https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2023. ‘Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law.’ Working Paper 42, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"mailto:https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThe Basel Institute would like to thank Isys Lam and the law firms of \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbonifassi-avocats.com\u002Fen\u002F\">Bonifassi Avocats\u003C\u002Fa> (France), \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.hengeler.com\u002Fen\">Hengeler Mueller\u003C\u002Fa> (Germany), \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bennettjones.com\u002F\">Bennett Jones\u003C\u002Fa> (Canada) and \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.raassociados.pt\u002F\">Rogério Alves & Associados\u003C\u002Fa> (Portugal) for their support in providing research for this paper.\n\nThe Basel Institute would also like to thank Stefan Lenz, Stefan Cassella, Maria Nizzero, Nicola Bonucci and Oscar Solórzano for their support in reviewing the content of the paper and recommending amendments.",[22],[32],"2023-02-20","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Faaa4fae3-eea5-4be3-95b1-4de7e87fabb4?width=600&height=840",[],[],[363],{"authors_id":364},{"id":328,"name":329},[366,368,372],{"countries_id":367},{"id":190,"name":191},{"countries_id":369},{"id":370,"name":371},188,"Russia",{"countries_id":373},{"id":238,"name":239},[375,379,381,383,385],{"tags_id":376},{"id":377,"name":378},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":380},{"id":334,"name":335},{"tags_id":382},{"id":68,"name":69},{"tags_id":384},{"id":297,"name":298},{"tags_id":386},{"id":301,"name":302},[],[29],[15],"2023-02-20T17:04:17.000Z","2026-05-31T22:52:10.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42",{"id":394,"slug":395,"title":396,"status":6,"nid":397,"year":164,"body":398,"external":19,"topic":399,"language":15,"type":400,"date_published":402,"image":403,"citation":223,"publisher":17,"link_internal":404,"link_external":414,"authors":418,"countries":423,"tags":430,"pdf":437,"topics":439,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":440,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":441,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":442},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[22],[401],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[405,408,411],{"url":406,"caption":407},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":409,"caption":410},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":412,"caption":413},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[415],{"url":416,"caption":417},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[419],{"authors_id":420},{"id":421,"name":422},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[424,426,428],{"countries_id":425},{"id":238,"name":239},{"countries_id":427},{"id":190,"name":191},{"countries_id":429},{"id":194,"name":195},[431,433,435],{"tags_id":432},{"id":377,"name":378},{"tags_id":434},{"id":68,"name":69},{"tags_id":436},{"id":201,"name":202},[438],2499,[29],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":444,"slug":445,"title":446,"status":6,"nid":447,"year":164,"body":448,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":449,"date_published":451,"image":452,"citation":453,"publisher":17,"link_internal":454,"link_external":461,"authors":468,"countries":475,"tags":480,"pdf":497,"topics":499,"featured":19,"languages":500,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":501,"user_updated":502,"date_updated":503,"main_points":504,"short_version":7,"subtitle":505,"link":506},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\n[**Download Case Study here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002FCase-Study-13_Beauty-Queen.pdf)\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\n**Main takeaways of the case:**\n\n- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[450],"Case Study","2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13).",[455,458],{"url":456,"caption":457},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716","Read related blog",{"url":459,"caption":460},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications","Read related Policy Brief 16",[462,465],{"url":463,"caption":464},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":466,"caption":467},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[469,471],{"authors_id":470},{"id":273,"name":274},{"authors_id":472},{"id":473,"name":474},591,"Diana Cordero",[476],{"countries_id":477},{"id":478,"name":479},47,"Colombia",[481,483,487,491,495],{"tags_id":482},{"id":297,"name":298},{"tags_id":484},{"id":485,"name":486},822,"International cooperation",{"tags_id":488},{"id":489,"name":490},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":492},{"id":493,"name":494},1374,"Law enforcement",{"tags_id":496},{"id":68,"name":69},[498],2495,[29],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T14:22:13.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",{"id":508,"slug":509,"title":510,"status":6,"nid":511,"year":217,"body":512,"external":19,"topic":513,"language":15,"type":514,"date_published":516,"image":517,"citation":223,"publisher":518,"link_internal":519,"link_external":520,"authors":524,"countries":527,"tags":530,"pdf":537,"topics":538,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":539,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":540,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":541},2424,"back-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin","Back in Action: How the UK is reviving unexplained wealth orders (The Academy Bulletin)",2864,"In an article published in the Fall 2025 issue of the Bulletin of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Ffinancialcrimelitigators.org\u002F\">International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators\u003C\u002Fa>, Andrew Dornbierer explores the revival of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in the United Kingdom.\n\nIntroduced in 2017 as a tool to combat the abuse of UK's markets to launder criminal proceeds, the UWO mechanism suffered a severe setback in 2020. After only a handful of attempts to use it, a decision by the High Court effectively left it sprawled on the canvas.\n\nIn the last year or so, however, the mechanism has slowly started to prove itself. Most recently, the UK's Serious Fraud Office – in its first use of the UK's UWO mechanism – secured GBP 1.1 million from the sale of a property belonging to the ex-wife of a convicted fraudster.\n\nThis article offers a short history of UWOs in the UK. It examines how, after a turbulent start and subsequent amendments to the mechanism, UWOs are now back to being used by UK authorities to tackle illicit financial flows. If applied responsibly, proportionately and in harmony with established legal rights, unexplained wealth orders promise to be a powerful tool in the UK’s fight to recover criminal assets.\n\nThis is the fifth issue of The Academy's Bulletin. It has been established to transmit the work of Academy Fellows, draw attention to matters of importance to the legal community and provide high-level analysis of cutting-edge issues in global financial crime investigations and litigation. The Basel Institute on Governance acts as Secretariat to the Academy.",[22],[515],"Article","2025-11-03","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fc313d2fa-3e1c-43ab-b40e-3e418d819df1?width=600&height=840","International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[],[521],{"url":522,"caption":523},"https:\u002F\u002Fedit.financialcrimelitigators.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb401d6c9-b0e4-4ab9-ad1f-948c567c6ab3.pdf","Fall 2025 Bulletin of the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[525],{"authors_id":526},{"id":328,"name":329},[528],{"countries_id":529},{"id":238,"name":239},[531,533,535],{"tags_id":532},{"id":68,"name":69},{"tags_id":534},{"id":489,"name":490},{"tags_id":536},{"id":334,"name":335},[],[29],"2025-11-03T11:05:50.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:01.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fback-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin",{"id":543,"slug":544,"title":545,"status":6,"nid":546,"year":217,"body":547,"external":19,"topic":548,"language":15,"type":549,"date_published":551,"image":552,"citation":223,"publisher":17,"link_internal":553,"link_external":556,"authors":557,"countries":562,"tags":563,"pdf":570,"topics":573,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":574,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":575,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":576},2415,"qg41","Quick Guide 41: Managing seized and confiscated assets",2834,"This Quick Guide explains why effective, transparent and fair management of seized and confiscated assets – including assets linked to sanctions violations – is essential to successful asset recovery. It introduces key principles, standards and practical steps based on international good practice. These include legal, institutional and technical arrangements, that help countries manage seized assets in a way that preserves value, ensures accountability and supports justice.\n\nThe Guide is primarily intended for government officials working in law enforcement, justice and asset recovery. It may also be useful to policymakers and development partners seeking a better understanding of how countries can improve their asset management systems.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[22],[550],"Quick Guide","2025-07-16","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F8b319ca1-ed7c-4d10-874e-a1583fed7ffc?width=600&height=840",[554],{"url":555,"caption":413},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Quick%20Guide",[],[558],{"authors_id":559},{"id":560,"name":561},553,"Rita Simões",[],[564,568],{"tags_id":565},{"id":566,"name":567},858,"Asset management",{"tags_id":569},{"id":68,"name":69},[571,572],2469,2470,[29],"2025-08-21T23:52:11.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:55.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg41",{"id":578,"slug":579,"title":580,"status":6,"nid":581,"year":217,"body":582,"external":19,"topic":583,"language":584,"type":585,"date_published":587,"image":588,"citation":223,"publisher":17,"link_internal":589,"link_external":596,"authors":600,"countries":603,"tags":604,"pdf":611,"topics":613,"featured":19,"languages":614,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":615,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":616,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":617},2384,"pb-14-fr","Policy Brief 14: Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs",2747,"La Directive de l’Union européenne de 2024 \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Flegal-content\u002FFR\u002FTXT\u002FHTML\u002F?uri=OJ:L_202401260\">relative au recouvrement et à la confiscation d'avoirs\u003C\u002Fa> oblige les États membres, entre autres, à adopter des mesures législatives pour permettre la confiscation de la « fortune inexpliquée ».\n\nCette Note de politique examine l’article 16 de la Directive qui énonce cette obligation, ainsi que les pouvoirs et restrictions que les États membres devront inclure dans les mesures relatives à la « fortune inexpliquée » pour garantir la conformité à la Directive.\n\nEn bref, cela démontre la grande flexibilité accordée par le texte de la Directive aux États membres pour déterminer le champ d’application de leurs propres mesures en matière de fortune inexpliquée. Au minimum, les États seront requis d’introduire des mesures susceptibles d’être utilisées pour cibler la fortune inexpliquée liée au crime organisé.\n\nCependant, les États membres peuvent toujours décider d’introduire des mesures de plus grande portée ciblant la fortune inexpliquée liée à toutes les activités criminelles, y compris la corruption.\n\n**À propos de cette Note de politique**\n\nLa présente publication fait partie de la série de Notes de politique (Policy Briefs) du Basel Institute on Governance, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>. Elle est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> Licence internationale.\n\nCitation proposée : Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. « Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs. » Note de politique 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Disponible sur: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14-fr\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14-fr\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nIl s’agit d’une publication de l’International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) au Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR reçoit un financement principal des gouvernements de Jersey, du Liechtenstein, de la Norvège, de la Suisse et du Royaume-Uni.",[22],"French",[586],"Policy Brief","2025-01-23","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F726e9035-52eb-4722-ab59-3b33bed7538f?width=600&height=840",[590,593],{"url":591,"caption":592},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14"," Version anglaise",{"url":594,"caption":595},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Policy%20Brief"," Voir tous les Policy Briefs",[597],{"url":598,"caption":599},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=65&lang=fr"," Livre (disponible gratuitement): Enrichissement illicite",[601],{"authors_id":602},{"id":328,"name":329},[],[605,607,609],{"tags_id":606},{"id":68,"name":69},{"tags_id":608},{"id":334,"name":335},{"tags_id":610},{"id":285,"name":286},[612],2420,[29],[584],"2025-01-23T17:05:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:49.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14-fr",1780676532369]