[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":702},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-pb11":3,"related-pb11":220},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":23,"link_external":27,"featured":19,"topics":28,"languages":30,"type":33,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":35,"countries":46,"tags":128,"pdf":161,"authors":202},2241,"published",null,"2022-11-15T17:04:01.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:02.000Z",2309,"pb11","Policy Brief 11: Fighting corruption in West African coastal states: how Collective Action can help","Africa is estimated to lose an unbelievable USD 88.6 billion (3.7% of Africa’s GDP) each year to illicit financial flows, of which corruption is a major component. Rooting out corruption is a collective effort, and the private sector has a major role to play in laying down the foundations for clean business environments and sustainable development.\n\nThat is why anti-corruption Collective Action  has got so much to offer Africa, and in particular West African coastal states keen to maximise their clear economic potential. As the spectrum of Collective Action initiatives is quite large, it allows for innovative measures where governments, companies and civil society organisations (CSOs) can join forces toward a common objective, despite their different perspectives. This collaborative approach therefore provides a fertile ground for constructive dialogue between like-minded stakeholders, as well as an opportunity to understand the private sector’s language and reality. \n\nCSOs have an important part to play in bringing Collective Action to the fight against corruption in West Africa. They must continue to initiate, facilitate and engage in Collective Action initiatives to help raise awareness and build bridges. Their presence can bring credibility, independent oversight and accountability to the initiatives.\n\nThis Policy Brief is based on conversations held with CSOs based in Benin (Social Watch Benin), Ghana (Ghana Integrity Initiative), Ivory Coast (Ivorian Youth Leaders’ Network) and Togo (The Togolese National Agency for Consumers and the Environment). It aims to capture their experiences, challenges and outlook on what the future for Collective Action could hold in the region.\n\nDespite their different backgrounds, they are united on one point: fighting corruption collectively by raising the voice of the private sector is an important step to pave the way for sustainable economic growth.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>, and supports the Basel Institute's work on anti-corruption \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002F\">Collective Action\u003C\u002Fa> with funding from the Siemens Integrity Initiative.\n\nIt is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>). Suggested citation: Young, Liza. 2022. “Fighting corruption in West African coastal states: how Collective Action can help.” Policy Brief 11, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-11\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-11\u003C\u002Fa>.","","English, French",2022,"Basel Institute on Governance","2022-11-15",false,[21,22],"Asset Recovery","Collective Action",[24],{"url":25,"caption":26},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Policy%20Brief"," View all Policy Briefs",[],[29,22],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[31,32],"English","French",[34],"Policy Brief",{"id":36,"storage":37,"filename_disk":38,"filename_download":39,"title":40,"type":41,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":42,"width":43,"height":44,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":45,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"6abf2611-ae87-40fa-a2fa-710aecc515b5","local","6abf2611-ae87-40fa-a2fa-710aecc515b5.jpg?itok=4BNLWqvh","Pages-from-Policy-Brief-11-final.jpg?itok=4BNLWqvh","Policy Brief 11","image\u002Fjpeg",58784,500,707,{},[47,77,96,109],{"id":48,"publications_id":49,"countries_id":71},1028,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":8,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":52,"link_internal":53,"link_external":55,"featured":19,"topics":56,"languages":57,"type":58,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":59,"tags":63,"pdf":66,"authors":69},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21,22],[54],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[29,22],[31,32],[34],[48,60,61,62],1029,1030,1031,[64,65],4412,4801,[67,68],2282,2283,[70],2466,{"id":72,"name":73,"code":74,"latitude":75,"longitude":76},212,"Togo","TG",8.61954,0.82478,{"id":60,"publications_id":78,"countries_id":90},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":8,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":79,"link_internal":80,"link_external":82,"featured":19,"topics":83,"languages":84,"type":85,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":86,"tags":87,"pdf":88,"authors":89},[21,22],[81],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[29,22],[31,32],[34],[48,60,61,62],[64,65],[67,68],[70],{"id":91,"name":92,"code":93,"latitude":94,"longitude":95},25,"Benin","BJ",9.30769,2.31583,{"id":61,"publications_id":97,"countries_id":7},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":8,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":98,"link_internal":99,"link_external":101,"featured":19,"topics":102,"languages":103,"type":104,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":105,"tags":106,"pdf":107,"authors":108},[21,22],[100],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[29,22],[31,32],[34],[48,60,61,62],[64,65],[67,68],[70],{"id":62,"publications_id":110,"countries_id":122},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":8,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":111,"link_internal":112,"link_external":114,"featured":19,"topics":115,"languages":116,"type":117,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":118,"tags":119,"pdf":120,"authors":121},[21,22],[113],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[29,22],[31,32],[34],[48,60,61,62],[64,65],[67,68],[70],{"id":123,"name":124,"code":125,"latitude":126,"longitude":127},79,"Ghana","GH",7.94653,-1.02319,[129,145],{"id":64,"publications_id":130,"tags_id":142},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":8,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":131,"link_internal":132,"link_external":134,"featured":19,"topics":135,"languages":136,"type":137,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":138,"tags":139,"pdf":140,"authors":141},[21,22],[133],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[29,22],[31,32],[34],[48,60,61,62],[64,65],[67,68],[70],{"id":143,"name":144},982,"Anti-corruption",{"id":65,"publications_id":146,"tags_id":158},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":8,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":147,"link_internal":148,"link_external":150,"featured":19,"topics":151,"languages":152,"type":153,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":154,"tags":155,"pdf":156,"authors":157},[21,22],[149],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[29,22],[31,32],[34],[48,60,61,62],[64,65],[67,68],[70],{"id":159,"name":160},1375,"Civil society",[162,183],{"id":67,"publications_id":163,"directus_files_id":175},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":8,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":164,"link_internal":165,"link_external":167,"featured":19,"topics":168,"languages":169,"type":170,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":171,"tags":172,"pdf":173,"authors":174},[21,22],[166],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[29,22],[31,32],[34],[48,60,61,62],[64,65],[67,68],[70],{"id":176,"storage":37,"filename_disk":177,"filename_download":178,"title":178,"type":179,"folder":180,"uploaded_by":50,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":181,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":182,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"884614d0-22be-474a-82af-4c24815f1f1e","884614d0-22be-474a-82af-4c24815f1f1e.pdf","Policy-Brief-11-final.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5",363910,"View 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Version française",[203],{"id":70,"publications_id":204,"authors_id":216},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":8,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":36,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":205,"link_internal":206,"link_external":208,"featured":19,"topics":209,"languages":210,"type":211,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":212,"tags":213,"pdf":214,"authors":215},[21,22],[207],{"url":25,"caption":26},[],[29,22],[31,32],[34],[48,60,61,62],[64,65],[67,68],[70],{"id":217,"name":218,"position":7,"image":219},514,"Liza Young","7fd2ccdd-c55a-4f8c-9870-25a3abad190f",[221,278,338,386,432,465,554,582,619,654],{"id":222,"slug":223,"title":224,"status":6,"nid":225,"year":226,"body":227,"external":19,"topic":228,"language":31,"type":231,"date_published":233,"image":234,"citation":14,"publisher":235,"link_internal":236,"link_external":237,"authors":241,"countries":250,"tags":255,"pdf":268,"topics":270,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":272,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":273,"user_updated":274,"date_updated":275,"main_points":276,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":277},2432,"political-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti","Political economy in the weeds: Embracing complexity in anti-corruption work – lessons learned from anti-corruption programme in Malawi",2910,2026,"In this joint paper with Adam Smith International, authors Claudia Baez Camargo and Renee Kantelberg show how anti-corruption efforts require more than mere technical fixes, such as capacity building for civil society alone, to drive lasting change.\n\nAnti-corruption work is often embedded in complex, politically charged environments. This requires thinking and working politically. Engaging with complex social and economic systems also means recognising that change is not linear or even predictable. What to do then?\n\nOur years of anti-corruption research have demonstrated the centrality of having local stakeholders be in the driver’s seat for identifying priorities and finding solutions. This is how we have worked in Malawi in the Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) project, funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and implemented with Adam Smith International.\n\nThis publication shares practical lessons and successes in applying this approach in the MACCSS project. It illustrates our joint efforts to navigate uncertainty and ground anti-corruption efforts in trust, resilience and local leadership. The key takeaways for practitioners who design or implement anti-corruption programmes (paraphrased) are:\n\n\n- **Embrace complexity.** Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- **Local ownership matters.** When partners are in the driver’s seat, impact and sustainability improve. This is true even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- **Facilitation over funding.** Hands-on mentoring and relationship brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- **Learning by doing.** Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- **Build trust and coalitions.** Reform depends on a collective effort with credible institutions and sister anti-corruption programmes. It also requires nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than merely building the capacity of individual actors.\n- **Resilience grows from below.** Sustainable accountability takes root when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- **Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy.** Integrating gender and social inclusion (GESI) principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure and agriculture – sectors critical for women and marginalised groups – broadens both the reach and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.\n\n\nUltimately, the MACCSS experience reinforces a simple but profound insight: **anti-corruption work is not about perfect plans but about adaptive partnerships.** Change happens through relationships, experimentation and persistence. The task is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to navigate it with integrity and learning at the core. ",[229,230],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[232],"Report","2026-01-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe9075f1f-8dbe-4009-980b-baaae82f9c49?width=600&height=840","Adam Smith International",[],[238],{"url":239,"caption":240},"https:\u002F\u002Fadamsmithinternational.com\u002Farticles\u002Fpolitical-economy-in-the-weeds-embracing-complexity-in-anti-corruption-work\u002F#resource:all"," View on Adam Smith International website",[242,246],{"authors_id":243},{"id":244,"name":245},572,"Dr Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":247},{"id":248,"name":249},580,"Renee Kantelberg",[251],{"countries_id":252},{"id":253,"name":254},153,"Malawi",[256,258,260,264],{"tags_id":257},{"id":143,"name":144},{"tags_id":259},{"id":159,"name":160},{"tags_id":261},{"id":262,"name":263},1372,"Training",{"tags_id":265},{"id":266,"name":267},859,"Corruption risks",[269],2488,[271],"Prevention Research and Innovation","\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE WEEDS\n\n## EMBRACING COMPLEXITY IN ANTI-CORRUPTION WORK\n\nBy Renee Kantelberg and Claudia Baez-Camargo\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) programme provides a powerful case for understanding how anti-corruption  (AC)  efforts  unfold  in  complex,  politically  charged  environments.  Jointly  funded  by  the  UK  Foreign, Commonwealth  and  Development  Office  (FCDO)  and  USAID,  MACCSS  (2024-2026)  combines  grants  and  technical assistance worth £1.75 million to strengthen civil society's role in promoting accountability. The initiative works through a  portfolio  of  civil  society  issue-focused  interventions  with  national  and  district  partners  across  sectors  such  as agriculture, mining, constituency development funds, justice and infrastructure.\n\nMalawi serves as both an opportunity-rich testing ground for systems-change initiatives and a cautionary case illustrating the constraints and pressure points such reforms face. This blend of promise and challenge renders Malawi pivotal for understanding governance transformations in comparable contexts. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, with corruption deeply embedded in its political and bureaucratic systems. Decades of clientelist politics, weak enforcement institutions  and  low  public-sector  pay  have  entrenched  behaviours  where  access  to  state  resources  is  viewed  as  an entitlement to extract rents for their own benefit and that of particular interests. In the wake of the September 2025 elections, these longstanding dynamics continue to shape the operating environment. Consequently, MACCSS's mandate remains unchanged: to equip committed civil-society organisations from national bodies to rural district groups with the knowledge, networks, and confidence to serve as policy-reform champions, watchdogs, and mobilisers of citizen voice and national advocacy priorities.\n\nAt first glance, the logic of working with civil society in contexts where state capacities are weak is straightforward: if CSOs are  trained  in  strategic  advocacy,  intervention  design,  operational  planning  and  media  engagement,  they  will become  effective  in  exposing  and  preventing  corruption,  thus  fulfilling  their  assumed  watchdog  function.  Yet  the experience of implementation shows that capacity alone does not guarantee influence and that change is difficult and non-linear. The real story of MACCSS lies in how its partners are learning to 'work in the weeds' - embracing uncertainty, adapting to shifting power dynamics, and building alliances that make accountability and anti-corruption transformation possible.\n\n## The Strategy: Ambition and Assumptions\n\nMACCSS's design draws from the classic anti-corruption playbook, which is reflected in the programme's strategy (Theory of  Change),  which  suggests  that  enhancing  CSO  technical  and  organisational  capacity  results  in  greater  citizen engagement and oversight and, ultimately, in reduced opportunities and incentives for corruption.\n\nConsequently, capacity building is pursued through three interdependent strands:\n\n- ∞ Financial resources - seed funding \u002F grants £10,000 - £50,000 to locally designed interventions.\n- ∞ Technical support -  training and mentoring in advocacy, media work, Political Economy Analysis, Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI), and thematic areas such as mining or procurement.\n- ∞ Organisational strengthening -  support  for  financial  management,  grant  compliance,  safeguarding,  MEL,  and other core systems essential for sustainable CSO operations.\n- ∞ Learning - facilitation and convening of peer exchanges where national and district level partners jointly reflect, share evidence and refine strategies.\n\nJust observing the above, it would be tempting to assume that technical support and trainings are enough to build stronger organisations and that the recipients of the support will automatically be able to translate skills into action and\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## ASI\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nresults.  Experience,  however,  shows  that  this  logic  fails  to  grasp  the  incremental  and  iterative  nature  of  building competencies, while also underestimating the political nature of corruption and the depth of systemic inertia. What MACCSS is revealing is that effectiveness depends less on training or resources than on learning by doing, building relationships, moving with opportunities and the capacity to adapt.\n\n## Working in the Weeds: Navigating Complexity and Adapting Practice\n\nAn overarching lesson from the MACCSS programme is that in practice, progress is messy and contested, which should not be surprising. As in many other countries, power in Malawi is acquired, shared and maintained through networks of patronage,  built  and  cemented  on  non-transparent  deals  that  cut  across  the  state,  business  and  political  parties. Corruption  trickles  down  to  the  grassroots,  where  public  service  providers  and  street  level  bureaucrats  routinely manoeuvre the prerogatives stemming from their official mandates to extract benefits and resources for themselves and their social networks.  Therefore, corruption in Malawi is woven into the political settlement itself and embedded in social norms that normalise and lend acceptability to corruption. As a result, when anti-corruption efforts begin to bite, they often provoke pushback: investigations stall, whistle-blowers face intimidation, and reform champions are side-lined or even threatened. The experience of the Zuneth Sattar case, in which high-level prosecutions led to institutional backlash, illustrates how success can generate its own resistance.\n\nCivil society faces additional constraints. Many organisations operate on shoestring budgets and remain dependent on donor funding, which is often project-based and problematises the continuity of their endeavours. Corruption fatigue also reflects public scepticism among intended beneficiaries that activism will not change anything. Legal restrictions on public-interest litigation, slow access to information, and the risk of regulatory reprisals further limit civic space. At district level, organisational inertia is strong: as one partner admitted, 'this is how we have always done things.'\n\n## From capacity building to facilitated partnership\n\nHere the lessons of MACCSS validate those of many other FCDO governance programmes in that conventional grant making  and  capacity  building  too  often  produces  donor-compliant  but  citizen-disconnected  CSOs.  Grants  managed without attention to the contextual conditions and needs can constrain flexibility, distort incentives, and monetise the engagement. MACCSS learned from this and adopted a facilitated partnership approach , deploying mixed local teams to broker relationships among civil society, media and AC institutions, and FCDO sister programmes while encouraging CSO implementing partners to be in the driver's seat in deciding priorities, providing them a safe space to innovate and to build their capacities through learning by doing. The focus shifted from funding activities to nurturing trust, reflection and adaptive learning within a cohort of champions.\n\nERROR! NO The Accountability Working Group (AWG) - made up of our core partner organisations, together with regular learning exchanges, sits at the centre of our work. MACCSS understands its role as a facilitation hub; encouraging trust building, peer exchanges and the emergence of coordinated action, decidedly moving away from focusing and insisting on preestablished  good  governance  practices  and  an  emphasis  on  procedures  and  delivery  mechanisms.  MACCSS-hosted convenings bring together partner CSOs, journalists \u002F media, communities and duty bearers to co-create interventions, share evidence and reflect on progress along with challenges. The emphasis is on brokering relationships and supporting iterative experimentation, not on enforcing rigid workplans. Mentoring and technical accompaniment are complemented by targeted and demand-led training, and small, flexible funding support is provided to pilot critical ideas whose design evolves as lessons and proof of concept emerge. Learning by doing and reflection\n\nFor MACCSS and its partners real capacity is being built iteratively, through cycles of action and reflection. The MACCSS Monitoring, Reporting, Evaluation and Learning (MREL) system promotes 'utilisation-focused' learning loops following the self-reinforcing logic of implementation, analysis, discussions and, adaptation. Quarterly Pause and Reflect meetings with the AWG provide a collective space to share not only achievements but also setbacks, echoing MACCSS core principle that mistakes are data and information that tell us something to consider . These reflection processes strengthen partners' confidence  and  sense  of  agency.    Gradually,  shifts  are  becoming  visible:  district  networks  collaborating  instead  of competing;  local  journalists  and  activists  pooling  evidence  from  civil  society  work;  civil  servants  recognising  that transparency can strengthen, not threaten, their legitimacy. These may seem like small wins, yet they build the bottomup resilience that sustains reform beyond donor and MACCSS project cycles.\n\nEmbracing uncertainty\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## ASI\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nWorking this way demands tolerance for ambiguity and deviation from plans. Anti-corruption work that matters will always provoke contestation. MACCSS is still unfolding, but it demonstrates that technically skilled support and facilitation, pace that  is  set  by  the  stakeholders  themselves,  moving  on  needs  and  emerging  gaps  as  well  as  patience  and  political awareness are all more effective than rigid top-down management. Progress depends less on control than on cultivating curiosity and responsiveness with a relational approach that puts partners always in the driving seat. MACCSS recognises that grants alone can distort incentives encouraging compliance rather than collaboration.\n\nBy combining seed funding with tailored technical mentoring and facilitation, partners gain the freedom to adapt their strategies as contexts shift, as was experienced during the September 2025 election period when political will and action waned. Yet,  partners  acted  strategically  during  that  election  period  to  influence  the  Anti-Corruption  agenda  through political manifestos, providing evidence where doors opened by politicians. An indicative example of the success achieved through these means was the fact that the AWG was able to get several key questions into the 2025 Presidential Debate that reflected on issues related to corruption in specific sectors.\n\nSetbacks and detours are expected in the process, just as opportunities are; embracing the political landscape mix (and pivoting) is what partners know and do so well.\n\n## Key Lessons Learned\n\n- 1. Embrace complexity. Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- 2. Local ownership matters. When partners are in the driver's seat, as in MACCSS's co-creation of interventions, impact and sustainability improve, even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- 3. Facilitation over funding. Hands-on mentoring and relationship-brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- 4. Learning by doing. Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- 5. Build trust and coalitions. Engagement with credible institutions such as the Ombudsman, with champions in the state and in FCDO sister programmes, and leaning on the collective experience of the AWG, altogether shows that reform depends on collective effort, on nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than on building the capacity of individual actors.\n- 6. Resilience  grows  from  below. District  alliances  illustrate  that  sustainable  accountability  takes  root  when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- 7. Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy. Integrating GESI principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure,  agriculture,  sectors  critical  for  women  and  marginalised  groups  broadens  both  the  reach  and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.\n\nERROR! NO Implications for Malawi and Beyond MACCSS demonstrates the  value  of working  politically  and  adaptively in  anti-corruption  programming  with  local stakeholders driving the agenda and the development of local approaches that work in Malawi for and by Malawians. Technical solutions and training alone cannot overcome entrenched incentives; transformation emerges from iterative learning, trust-building, and responsiveness to context. For donors, this means funding models that prioritise flexibility, process,  reflection  and  a  willingness  to  be  surprised  by  unexpected  gains  as  much  as  outputs  and  indicators.  For practitioners, it means patience, humility and a willingness to depart from the usual approaches and find out how to 'work with the grain' of local systems rather than against them.\n\nAs Malawi moves ahead of the 2025 elections result, the programme continues to focus on citizen energy with CSOs and media bringing collectively concrete accountability demands. The long-term vision is a network of capable, connected CSOs and local champions who can sustain anti-corruption momentum with decreasing external support.\n\nUltimately, the MACCSS experience reinforces a simple but profound insight: anti-corruption work is not about perfect plans but about adaptive partnerships. Change happens through relationships, experimentation and persistence. The task is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to navigate it with integrity and learning at the core.\n\n\u003C!-- image -->","2026-01-28T17:05:36.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T21:22:46.000Z","- **Embrace complexity.** Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- **Local ownership matters.** When partners are in the driver’s seat, impact and sustainability improve. This is true even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- **Facilitation over funding.** Hands-on mentoring and relationship brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- **Learning by doing.** Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- **Build trust and coalitions.** Reform depends on a collective effort with credible institutions and sister anti-corruption programmes. It also requires nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than merely building the capacity of individual actors.\n- **Resilience grows from below.** Sustainable accountability takes root when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- **Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy.** Integrating gender and social inclusion (GESI) principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure and agriculture – sectors critical for women and marginalised groups – broadens both the reach and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpolitical-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti",{"id":279,"slug":280,"title":281,"status":6,"nid":282,"year":226,"body":283,"external":19,"topic":284,"language":31,"type":285,"date_published":287,"image":288,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":289,"link_external":299,"authors":303,"countries":308,"tags":321,"pdf":332,"topics":334,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":335,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":336,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":337},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[286],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[290,293,296],{"url":291,"caption":292},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":294,"caption":295},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":297,"caption":298},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[300],{"url":301,"caption":302},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[304],{"authors_id":305},{"id":306,"name":307},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[309,313,317],{"countries_id":310},{"id":311,"name":312},225,"Ukraine",{"countries_id":314},{"id":315,"name":316},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":318},{"id":319,"name":320},14,"Australia",[322,326,330],{"tags_id":323},{"id":324,"name":325},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":327},{"id":328,"name":329},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":331},{"id":143,"name":144},[333],2499,[29],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":339,"slug":340,"title":341,"status":6,"nid":342,"year":226,"body":343,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":344,"date_published":346,"image":347,"citation":348,"publisher":17,"link_internal":349,"link_external":353,"authors":354,"countries":359,"tags":372,"pdf":377,"topics":380,"featured":19,"languages":381,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":382,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":383,"main_points":7,"short_version":384,"subtitle":7,"link":385},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[345],"Working Paper","2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[350],{"url":351,"caption":352},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[355],{"authors_id":356},{"id":357,"name":358},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[360,364,368,370],{"countries_id":361},{"id":362,"name":363},228,"United States",{"countries_id":365},{"id":366,"name":367},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":369},{"id":315,"name":316},{"countries_id":371},{"id":319,"name":320},[373,375],{"tags_id":374},{"id":328,"name":329},{"tags_id":376},{"id":143,"name":144},[378,379],2490,2491,[29],[31],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":387,"slug":388,"title":389,"status":6,"nid":390,"year":391,"body":392,"external":19,"topic":393,"language":31,"type":394,"date_published":395,"image":396,"citation":397,"publisher":17,"link_internal":398,"link_external":401,"authors":402,"countries":409,"tags":410,"pdf":424,"topics":427,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":428,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":429,"main_points":7,"short_version":430,"subtitle":7,"link":431},2425,"wp-60","Working Paper 60: Understanding the enemy: Insights from corrupt networks to improve anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives",2867,2025,"Corruption is not simply about individual misconduct. It is a networked phenomenon that arises from entrenched social, economic and political interactions. It is orchestrated through coordination between groups and clusters of individuals.\n\nThis Working Paper explores the networked nature of corruption and the opportunities this presents for anti-corruption efforts. The aim is to understand how shifting the unit of analysis from individuals to networks helps to understand the persistence and resilience of corruption, while opening up new anti-corruption perspectives.\n\nA meta-analysis of findings from more than 15 years of research on informal networks and corruption underpins the conceptualisation of corrupt networks. The paper argues that a focus on networks helps to shed light on the functionality of corruption – from petty bribery to large-scale public procurement fraud – and the underlying social norms that enable it.\n\nUnderstanding the structures, functions and modus operandi of the informal networks associated with corruption and applying the network logic to anti-corruption strategies can help to achieve better outcomes. The paper specifically looks at anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives, suggesting that these should emulate positive aspects of informal networks.\n\n### About this Working Paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\n",[22,229,230],[345],"2025-11-04","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F3fc6640b-79d3-481c-a74c-fc1979923c1b?width=600&height=840","Baez Camargo, Claudia, and Jacopo Costa. 2025. 'Understanding the enemy: Insights from corrupt networks to improve anticorruption Collective Action initiatives.'Working Paper 60, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60\u003C\u002Fa>.",[399],{"url":351,"caption":400}," View all Working Papers",[],[403,405],{"authors_id":404},{"id":244,"name":245},{"authors_id":406},{"id":407,"name":408},550,"Dr Jacopo Costa",[],[411,414,416,420],{"tags_id":412},{"id":413,"name":22},909,{"tags_id":415},{"id":143,"name":144},{"tags_id":417},{"id":418,"name":419},1309,"Informality",{"tags_id":421},{"id":422,"name":423},967,"Organised crime",[425,426],2480,2481,[22,271],"2025-11-04T17:05:36.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:56.000Z","This Working Paper reflects on the networked nature of corruption and the\nlessons that can be learned from studying it. Particularly, it provides insights into\nthe opportunities and challenges of designing and implementing anti-corruption\nCollective Action initiatives.\n\nThe authors consider corruption not as a series of isolated acts by individuals,\nbut as the outcome of complex, resilient informal networks embedded within\nsocio-political, economic and cultural structures. Within this framework, they\ninvestigate how shifting the unit of analysis from individuals to networks can\nimprove our understanding of the persistence of corruption and create new\nperspectives to promote better anti-corruption outcomes and impacts.\n\nDrawing on over 15 years of empirical research across diverse countries and\nregions, the authors argue that corruption must be viewed through a network\nlens. This approach reveals how informal connections facilitate rule subversion,\nproblem-solving and goal achievement where formal institutions are weak or\nineffective.\n\nThe paper contends that a focus on networks sheds light on the functionality\nof corruption and the underlying social norms enabling corrupt exchanges.\nUnderstanding the structures, functions and modus operandi of the informal\nnetworks associated with corruption can help design better anti-corruption\ninitiatives.\n\nThe Working Paper contributes to the existing literature on corruption strategies\nand anti-corruption activities.\n\n**First**, the authors explore how **informal networks rooted in trust, reciprocity\nand social norms can serve practical functions**, including accessing public\nservices, boosting business profitability and winning elections. The strength\nof informal networks lies in their adaptability, internal organisation and\nembeddedness in local cultures.\n\nThe authors identify **six core roles in informal networks** that pursue corrupt\nobjectives: seekers, doers, brokers, facilitators, intermediaries and instigators.\nThe coordination and division of tasks among these six roles make such informal\nnetworks effective in achieving their goals.\n\nIn addition, the authors unpack **the most important strategies these corrupt\ninformal networks rely on** for their functioning. These strategies are:\n\n- co-optation (recruitment and trust building);\n- control (discipline and compliance);\n- camouflage (concealment and legitimacy); and\n- coordination (task orchestration and adaptability).\n\n**Second**, the authors set out **concrete implications for anti-corruption\nactivities** based on insights on how informal networks operate. They state that\ntraditional top-down, normative approaches often fail due to the functionality\nof corruption (i.e., corruption is always a means to an end) and the social\nembeddedness of corrupt networks.\n\nThe authors propose to apply the network logic to anti-corruption strategies. This\npaper particularly focuses on **Collective Action initiatives** and suggests that\nthese should emulate positive aspects of informal networks. Collective Action\nrefers to collaborative efforts – typically involving businesses, civil society and\u002For\npublic institutions – to tackle corruption risks and shared integrity challenges that\nno single actor can resolve alone.\n\nThis means that, to be effective, these Collective Action initiatives must be\nbased on:\n\n- **Functional goals:** Set short-term, tangible goals aligned with participants’ interests.\n- **Strategic co-optation:** Recruit key stakeholders strategically, including those who are prone to corruption risks, by using trust-building mechanisms that can supply an added value to the stakeholders.\n- **Transparency and accountability:** Leverage mechanisms of peer pressure and reputation management that can ensure sustained commitment and engagement among participants and deter free-riding strategies.\n\nIn conclusion, to foster integrity in today’s fragmented and conflict-prone world,\nanti-corruption initiatives generally must shift from targeting individuals to\ntargeting the networks that sustain corruption. Sustainable change requires\nlocally rooted, trust-based collective efforts that provide functional, credible and\ncoordinated alternatives to illicit networks.\n\nIn this sense, Collective Action initiatives built on conceptualising corruption\nas a networked problem can be an effective solution for achieving\nanti-corruption goals","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60",{"id":433,"slug":434,"title":435,"status":6,"nid":436,"year":391,"body":437,"external":19,"topic":438,"language":31,"type":440,"date_published":441,"image":442,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":443,"link_external":444,"authors":448,"countries":453,"tags":454,"pdf":459,"topics":461,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":462,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":463,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":464},2418,"anti-corruption-collective-action-g20b20-process-charting-progress-2020-2024","Anti-corruption Collective Action in the G20\u002FB20 process: Charting progress 2020–2024",2845,"This report analyses the approaches of the previous five B20 presidencies to addressing anti-corruption Collective Action. It captures lessons learned and provides recommendations for future B20\u002FG20 cycles. It is primarily intended for upcoming B20\u002FG20 presidencies, B20 Integrity & Compliance Task Force members and organisations engaging with the B20\u002FG20.\n\n### About this report\n\nYou may share or republish this report under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence.\n\nSuggested citation: Scarlet Wannenwetsch. 2025. 'Anti-corruption Collective Action in the G20\u002FB20 process: Charting progress 2020–2024.' Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nThe report was funded by the Siemens Integrity Initiative, which supports organisations in the fight against corruption and fraud through Collective Action, education and training. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the position of Siemens or the Siemens Integrity Initiative.",[22,439],"Private Sector",[232],"2025-08-29","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F7f5abe00-7eca-48f7-a600-067f05b7871a?width=600&height=840",[],[445],{"url":446,"caption":447},"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fexplore\u002Fpublications\u002F1820"," Read related baseline report",[449],{"authors_id":450},{"id":451,"name":452},293,"Scarlet Wannenwetsch",[],[455,457],{"tags_id":456},{"id":143,"name":144},{"tags_id":458},{"id":413,"name":22},[460],2475,[22,439],"2025-09-08T21:17:14.000Z","2026-05-23T20:08:11.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fanti-corruption-collective-action-g20b20-process-charting-progress-2020-2024",{"id":466,"slug":467,"title":468,"status":6,"nid":469,"year":391,"body":470,"external":19,"topic":471,"language":31,"type":472,"date_published":474,"image":475,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":476,"link_external":477,"authors":514,"countries":523,"tags":524,"pdf":533,"topics":542,"featured":19,"languages":543,"summary":544,"programme":545,"area":546,"websites":548,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":550,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":551,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":552,"link":553},2407,"collective-action-practice-game-changer-business-integrity","Collective Action in practice: a game-changer for business integrity",2824,"At its core, Collective Action is a simple yet powerful concept: tackling corruption challenges together, rather than alone. Over the past two decades, anti-corruption Collective Action has grown from a niche idea to a recognised approach embedded in international standards, national strategies and corporate practices.\n\nThis book offers a comprehensive reflection on that journey and explores the growing impact of multi-stakeholder collaboration on promoting business integrity around the world. It aims to capture the living ecosystem of Collective Action as it exists today, its foundations, its progress and the possibilities it continues to offer for the future.\n\nDrawing on real-life examples, policy milestones and practical experiences from the Basel Institute on Governance and its partners, *Collective Action in practice: a game-changer for business integrity *presents how diverse actors have been working together to tackle corruption in complex environments.\n\n\n- **Part 1: Advancing the knowledge base** – presents the analytical tools and conceptual models that help us make sense of Collective Action in practice.\n- **Part 2: Mainstreaming Collective Action as a norm** – illustrates the growing recognition of Collective Action in international standards and policy frameworks. It also showcases the Institute’s International Collective Action Conference series and the Collective Action Awards.\n- **Part 3: Providing hands-on support** – focuses on the Basel Institute’s direct support to Collective Action practitioners and highlights the importance of peer learning.\n\n\n\n\n\n*Collective Action in practice: a game-changer for business integrity *was developed and published by the Basel Institute on Governance, with support from the Siemens Integrity Initiative.\n\n### About this publication\n\nThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>). Please credit the Basel Institute on Governance and link to: collective-action.com\n\nSuggested citation: Hocq, Nicolas, and Vanessa Hans. 2025. *Collective Action in practice: a game-changer for business integrity. Stories, evidence and inspiration from the Basel Institute on Governance*. Basel: Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nISBNs are as follows:\n\n\n- PDF: 978-3-9526182-0-2\n- Paperback (forthcoming): 978-3-9526182-1-9\n\n### Download or view online\nScroll down for links to download the book or specific chapters, or flick through online below:",[22],[473],"Book","2025-06-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0dd71cde-39e7-4161-a90f-c7b90ebc2415?width=600&height=840",[],[478,481,484,487,490,493,496,499,502,505,508,511],{"url":479,"caption":480},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fenrol\u002Findex.php?id=168"," eLearning course: Collective Action Against Corruption",{"url":482,"caption":483},"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002F"," Visit the B20 Collective Action Hub",{"url":485,"caption":486},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.co.uk\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.co.uk",{"url":488,"caption":489},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.com\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.com",{"url":491,"caption":492},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.ca\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.ca",{"url":494,"caption":495},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.de\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.de",{"url":497,"caption":498},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.fr\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.fr",{"url":500,"caption":501},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.es\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.es",{"url":503,"caption":504},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.it\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.it",{"url":506,"caption":507},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.nl\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.nl",{"url":509,"caption":510},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.pl\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.pl",{"url":512,"caption":513},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.amazon.se\u002Fdp\u002F3952618217","Amazon.se",[515,519],{"authors_id":516},{"id":517,"name":518},298,"Vanessa Hans",{"authors_id":520},{"id":521,"name":522},565,"Nicolas Hocq",[],[525,527,531],{"tags_id":526},{"id":143,"name":144},{"tags_id":528},{"id":529,"name":530},1236,"Compliance",{"tags_id":532},{"id":413,"name":22},[534,535,536,537,538,539,540,541,70],2458,2459,2460,2461,2462,2463,2464,2465,[22],[31],"This book offers a comprehensive reflection on that journey and explores the growing impact of multi-stakeholder collaboration on promoting business integrity around the world. It aims to capture the living ecosystem of Collective Action as it exists today, its foundations, its progress and the possibilities it continues to offer for the future.",[439],[547],"Business Integrity & Governance",[22,549],"Main page","2025-07-03T09:59:40.000Z","2026-06-02T14:16:21.000Z","Stories, evidence and inspiration from the Basel Institute on Governance","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcollective-action-practice-game-changer-business-integrity",{"id":555,"slug":556,"title":557,"status":6,"nid":558,"year":391,"body":559,"external":19,"topic":560,"language":31,"type":561,"date_published":562,"image":563,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":564,"link_external":566,"authors":567,"countries":570,"tags":571,"pdf":576,"topics":578,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":579,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":580,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":581},2397,"wp-56","Working Paper 56: Anti-corruption Collective Action: A typology for a new era",2787,"Since its first use by the World Bank in 2008, the concept of \"anti-corruption Collective Action\" has evolved into a well-established best practice to prevent corruption and strengthen business integrity.\n\nThis paper captures the specific characteristics of anti-corruption Collective Action that have emerged over time and translates them into an easy-to-grasp typology that reflects both the variety and unifying principles that make up the Collective Action ecosystem. It aims to:\n\n\n- spark new impetus for engagement;\n- open the concept to new stakeholders, topics and environments; and\n- support existing initiatives in developing their long-term visions and aims.\n\n\nIn addition to supporting practitioners, updating the typology will also help strengthen the case for Collective Action as a normative corruption prevention practice.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Wannenwetsch, Scarlet. 2025. ‘Anti-corruption Collective Action: A typology for a new era.’ Working Paper 56, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-56.",[22],[345],"2025-03-26","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff85696db-c15c-4ab1-becb-82429bfcbec8?width=600&height=840",[565],{"url":351,"caption":400},[],[568],{"authors_id":569},{"id":451,"name":452},[],[572,574],{"tags_id":573},{"id":413,"name":22},{"tags_id":575},{"id":143,"name":144},[577],2444,[22],"2025-03-26T17:05:23.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:52.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-56",{"id":583,"slug":584,"title":585,"status":6,"nid":586,"year":391,"body":587,"external":19,"topic":588,"language":31,"type":589,"date_published":590,"image":591,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":592,"link_external":597,"authors":598,"countries":603,"tags":606,"pdf":611,"topics":613,"featured":614,"languages":615,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":616,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":617,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":618},2390,"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[21],[345],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840",[593,596],{"url":594,"caption":595},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":351,"caption":400},[],[599],{"authors_id":600},{"id":601,"name":602},560,"Sam Hickey",[604],{"countries_id":605},{"id":311,"name":312},[607,609],{"tags_id":608},{"id":143,"name":144},{"tags_id":610},{"id":328,"name":329},[612],2431,[29],true,[31],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":620,"slug":621,"title":622,"status":6,"nid":623,"year":624,"body":625,"external":19,"topic":626,"language":31,"type":627,"date_published":628,"image":629,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":630,"link_external":631,"authors":635,"countries":636,"tags":637,"pdf":646,"topics":648,"featured":19,"languages":650,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":651,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":652,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":653},2377,"putting-business-integrity-global-agenda-report-5th-international-collective-action","Putting business integrity on the global agenda: Report from the 5th International Collective Action Conference",2725,2024,"The 5th International Collective Action Conference represented another significant milestone in the development of responsible and ethical business practices through anti-corruption Collective Action. \n\nThe conference, hosted by the Basel Institute with the support of the Siemens Integrity Initiative, took place on 24 and 25 June 2024 in Basel, Switzerland. This short conference report presents main insights, quotes as well as infographics and graphic recordings from the two-day event, which welcomed around 200 people from around the world and across all sectors.\n\nA key theme of this year’s conference was the importance of building local, regional and international communities of practice. These communities bring together different constellations of people and organisations interested in the Collective Action approach to improve skills, develop joint solutions and advance knowledge about how to make initiatives effective in different contexts. \n\nFive panel discussions, three interactive breakout sessions and multiple networking opportunities, including an exhibition, offered many occasions for sharing experiences and best practices in anti-corruption Collective Action and breaking down silos.\n\n### About this report and acknowledgements\n\nThe Basel Institute on Governance thanks the Siemens Integrity Initiative for supporting and providing funding for the conference’s 5th edition, as well as all speakers and breakout session facilitating organisations. The full list of presenters and sessions can be found on conference pages of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fevents\u002Ficac-2024\u002Fagenda\">B20 Collective Action Hub\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nGraphic recording illustrations: Tetyana Kalyuzhna, Basel Institute on Governance.\nPhoto and video credit: David Borter, LEO MEDIA GmbH \u002F BBM PRODUCTIONS AG.\n\nThe report is free to share or republish under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>). Please credit the Basel Institute on Governance and link to: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\">https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u003C\u002Fa>.",[22,439],[232],"2024-11-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F02044130-66da-43f7-8ee2-ef45cc33cc96?width=600&height=840",[],[632],{"url":633,"caption":634},"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fevents\u002Ficac-2024\u002F"," See Conference web page",[],[],[638,640,644],{"tags_id":639},{"id":413,"name":22},{"tags_id":641},{"id":642,"name":643},830,"Business integrity",{"tags_id":645},{"id":143,"name":144},[647],2415,[22,439,649],"Business Integrity Ethics and Compliance",[31],"2024-12-05T14:06:46.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:53.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fputting-business-integrity-global-agenda-report-5th-international-collective-action",{"id":655,"slug":656,"title":657,"status":6,"nid":658,"year":226,"body":659,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":660,"date_published":662,"image":663,"citation":7,"publisher":7,"link_internal":664,"link_external":665,"authors":669,"countries":686,"tags":691,"pdf":696,"topics":698,"featured":19,"languages":699,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":51,"date_created":382,"user_updated":51,"date_updated":700,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":701},2437,"evolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession","The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession",2960,"Published in the _Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance_, this article examines how Bulgaria’s 2007 accession to the European Union transformed illegal activities and corruption at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint.\n\nWhile the introduction of stricter EU regulations and advanced surveillance technology aimed to secure the border, these measures had the effect of transforming criminal strategies and corruption. The authors detail a shift from blatant smuggling to more sophisticated financial frauds, VAT carousel schemes and the illicit privatisation of public border functions.\n\nThe article highlights that in some cases, it was the bribery schemes that evolved to bypass new standards. In other cases – particularly involving drug trafficking and the smuggling of human beings – it was the criminal strategies that transformed, including advanced concealment methods or new smuggling routes.\n\nThe study also offers a nuanced perspective on the relationship between corruption and criminal activites at border checkpoints: stronger capacity to counter criminal activities could lead to an increase in the risk of corruption, while a more coherent anti corruption framework could trigger criminal activities to evolve. Ultimately, the article argues that anti-crime and anti-corruption policies must account for this evolutionary nature.",[661],"Article","2026-05-01","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2a662dae-21a7-4e84-971d-1c8a70f4754b?width=600&height=840",[],[666],{"url":667,"caption":668},"https:\u002F\u002Fjitfccjournal.com\u002Findex.php\u002Fjitfcc\u002Farticle\u002Fview\u002F16","View on Journal website",[670,674,678,682],{"authors_id":671},{"id":672,"name":673},304,"Jacopo Costa",{"authors_id":675},{"id":676,"name":677},295,"Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":679},{"id":680,"name":681},584,"Noémi Jäger",{"authors_id":683},{"id":684,"name":685},303,"Saba Kassa",[687],{"countries_id":688},{"id":689,"name":690},22,"Bulgaria",[692,694],{"tags_id":693},{"id":266,"name":267},{"tags_id":695},{"id":143,"name":144},[697],2492,[271],[31],"2026-06-01T22:34:25.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fevolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession",1780676586504]