[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":620},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-pb-15":3,"related-pb-15":177},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":7,"publisher":16,"date_published":7,"external":17,"topic":18,"link_internal":20,"link_external":27,"featured":17,"topics":33,"languages":7,"type":35,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":37,"countries":48,"tags":78,"pdf":133,"authors":157},2422,"published",null,"2025-10-15T10:06:39.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:55.000Z",2850,"pb-15","Policy Brief 15: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery settlements","Only a handful of states have been actively pursuing the enforcement of foreign bribery. Switzerland is one of them and its efforts to crack down on this offence is commendable.\n\nBetween 2011 and 2024, Switzerland issued 14 final judicial orders at a federal level against Swiss-linked companies that engaged in foreign bribery. In these proceedings, the companies were ordered to hand over approximately CHF 730 million (combined) in illicit profits that they had obtained through their foreign bribery schemes, and an additional CHF 30 million in fines.\n\nThis Policy Brief contends that Switzerland could further leverage this success to reinforce its status as a world anti-corruption leader. It examines how Switzerland could repurpose the illicit profits obtained from companies in foreign bribery cases to benefit the countries and people most affected by these corrupt acts and to enhance global anti-corruption efforts.\n\nIt outlines arguments as to why Switzerland should consider legislative action to enable the sharing of these profits in this way and the potential methodology for doing so.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>. You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence.\n\nSuggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2025. ‘Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery settlements.’ Policy Brief 15, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-15\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-15\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nThis Policy Brief is based on the executive summary of the Working Paper 59: ‘Using corrupt proceeds to fight corruption: Rethinking how Switzerland uses illicit profits from foreign bribery.' Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-59\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-59\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.","","English","Basel Institute on Governance",false,[19],"Asset Recovery",[21,24],{"url":22,"caption":23},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-59"," View related Working Paper 59",{"url":25,"caption":26},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Policy%20Brief"," View all Policy Briefs",[28,31],{"url":29,"caption":30},"route:\u003Cnolink>"," Version française (à paraître)",{"url":29,"caption":32}," Deutsche Version (demnächst)",[34],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[36],"Policy Brief",{"id":38,"storage":39,"filename_disk":40,"filename_download":41,"title":42,"type":43,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":44,"width":45,"height":46,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":47,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"667a8b3c-20a2-47c2-89ea-c5aeba0c2971","local","667a8b3c-20a2-47c2-89ea-c5aeba0c2971.jpg?itok=S-Z-JM0O","PB15-Foreign-bribery-cover.jpg?itok=S-Z-JM0O","Policy Brief 15_Foreign bribery_cover.jpg","image\u002Fjpeg",60506,500,707,{},[49],{"id":50,"publications_id":51,"countries_id":72},1142,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":8,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":38,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":7,"publisher":16,"date_published":7,"external":17,"topic":54,"link_internal":55,"link_external":58,"featured":17,"topics":61,"languages":7,"type":62,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":63,"tags":64,"pdf":68,"authors":70},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[19],[56,57],{"url":22,"caption":23},{"url":25,"caption":26},[59,60],{"url":29,"caption":30},{"url":29,"caption":32},[34],[36],[50],[65,66,67],4717,4718,4719,[69],2478,[71],2611,{"id":73,"name":74,"code":75,"latitude":76,"longitude":77},41,"Switzerland","CH",46.81819,8.22751,[79,97,115],{"id":65,"publications_id":80,"tags_id":94},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":8,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":38,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":7,"publisher":16,"date_published":7,"external":17,"topic":81,"link_internal":82,"link_external":85,"featured":17,"topics":88,"languages":7,"type":89,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":90,"tags":91,"pdf":92,"authors":93},[19],[83,84],{"url":22,"caption":23},{"url":25,"caption":26},[86,87],{"url":29,"caption":30},{"url":29,"caption":32},[34],[36],[50],[65,66,67],[69],[71],{"id":95,"name":96},982,"Anti-corruption",{"id":66,"publications_id":98,"tags_id":112},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":8,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":38,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":7,"publisher":16,"date_published":7,"external":17,"topic":99,"link_internal":100,"link_external":103,"featured":17,"topics":106,"languages":7,"type":107,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":108,"tags":109,"pdf":110,"authors":111},[19],[101,102],{"url":22,"caption":23},{"url":25,"caption":26},[104,105],{"url":29,"caption":30},{"url":29,"caption":32},[34],[36],[50],[65,66,67],[69],[71],{"id":113,"name":114},1374,"Law enforcement",{"id":67,"publications_id":116,"tags_id":130},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":8,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":38,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":7,"publisher":16,"date_published":7,"external":17,"topic":117,"link_internal":118,"link_external":121,"featured":17,"topics":124,"languages":7,"type":125,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":126,"tags":127,"pdf":128,"authors":129},[19],[119,120],{"url":22,"caption":23},{"url":25,"caption":26},[122,123],{"url":29,"caption":30},{"url":29,"caption":32},[34],[36],[50],[65,66,67],[69],[71],{"id":131,"name":132},1215,"Illicit financial flows",[134],{"id":69,"publications_id":135,"directus_files_id":149},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":8,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":38,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":7,"publisher":16,"date_published":7,"external":17,"topic":136,"link_internal":137,"link_external":140,"featured":17,"topics":143,"languages":7,"type":144,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":145,"tags":146,"pdf":147,"authors":148},[19],[138,139],{"url":22,"caption":23},{"url":25,"caption":26},[141,142],{"url":29,"caption":30},{"url":29,"caption":32},[34],[36],[50],[65,66,67],[69],[71],{"id":150,"storage":39,"filename_disk":151,"filename_download":152,"title":152,"type":153,"folder":154,"uploaded_by":52,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":155,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":156,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"f9b1e11c-bed5-4f2a-9daa-49333eccff89","f9b1e11c-bed5-4f2a-9daa-49333eccff89.pdf","Policy-Brief-15.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5",778706,"Download PDF",[158],{"id":71,"publications_id":159,"authors_id":173},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":8,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":38,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":7,"publisher":16,"date_published":7,"external":17,"topic":160,"link_internal":161,"link_external":164,"featured":17,"topics":167,"languages":7,"type":168,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":169,"tags":170,"pdf":171,"authors":172},[19],[162,163],{"url":22,"caption":23},{"url":25,"caption":26},[165,166],{"url":29,"caption":30},{"url":29,"caption":32},[34],[36],[50],[65,66,67],[69],[71],{"id":174,"name":175,"position":7,"image":176},306,"Andrew Dornbierer","89aae58b-3e50-4375-9b9b-5b31370dab64",[178,225,268,312,368,416,469,501,539,573],{"id":179,"slug":180,"title":181,"status":6,"nid":182,"year":183,"body":184,"external":17,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":185,"date_published":186,"image":187,"citation":7,"publisher":16,"link_internal":188,"link_external":192,"authors":196,"countries":201,"tags":202,"pdf":217,"topics":219,"featured":17,"languages":220,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":221,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":222,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":223,"link":224},2442,"pb-16","Policy Brief 16: Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders",2947,2026,"This Policy Brief analyses emerging international standards aimed at addressing recurring challenges in judicial practice with regard to the enforcement of non-conviction based forfeiture orders issued by foreign states. It focuses in particular on the historical absence of a binding obligation on requested states to cooperate in such cases and, where cooperation is available, on the structural tension between direct and indirect enforcement models.\n\n[**Download Policy Brief here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-03\u002FPolicy-Brief-16_Enforcing-foreign-NCBF-orders.pdf)\n\nRevisions in 2023 to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 4 and 38 seek to clarify and strengthen states’ cooperation in the enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders. In this context, the recognition and execution of foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders are central components of the evolving international asset recovery framework.\n\nThrough analysis and case studies involving Latin American states and international financial centres, this Policy Brief demonstrates that the choice of procedural model for enforcing foreign forfeiture orders – direct or indirect – has significant implications, while acknowledging the competing legal and institutional interests involved.\n\nIn line with FATF Recommendation 38, the Policy Brief argues in favour of direct enforcement in the requested state, based on the facts established by the foreign authority. This promotes efficiency, legal certainty and mutual trust. Indirect enforcement models that may require domestic investigations by the requested state, on the other hand, often lead to delays, duplication and increased costs, which hinders international asset recovery efforts.\n\nThe analysis provides empirical insight into how the revised FATF standards address practical deficiencies and the implications for judicial practice in requested states. For the Latin American context, the Policy Brief suggests to go beyond technical compliance of domestic non-conviction based forfeiture regimes with the FATF standards to strengthen the effectiveness of cross-border enforcement in practice.\n\nThis Policy Brief can be read alongside [Case Study 13](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13): “The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.”\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type\\[]=257). You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F) licence.\n\nIt is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Policy Brief is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\n**Suggested citation**: Solórzano, Oscar. 2026. \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres.\" Policy Brief 16, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16).",[36],"2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff866220c-dddd-41b3-a45e-c2d7992d39e1?width=600&height=840",[189],{"url":190,"caption":191},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications","Read related Case Study 13",[193],{"url":194,"caption":195},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[197],{"authors_id":198},{"id":199,"name":200},294,"Oscar Solorzano",[],[203,207,211,215],{"tags_id":204},{"id":205,"name":206},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":208},{"id":209,"name":210},822,"International cooperation",{"tags_id":212},{"id":213,"name":214},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":216},{"id":113,"name":114},[218],2496,[34],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","2026-06-02T14:16:22.000Z","FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16",{"id":226,"slug":227,"title":228,"status":6,"nid":229,"year":230,"body":231,"external":17,"topic":232,"language":15,"type":233,"date_published":234,"image":235,"citation":14,"publisher":16,"link_internal":236,"link_external":238,"authors":242,"countries":245,"tags":246,"pdf":261,"topics":263,"featured":17,"languages":264,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":265,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":266,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":267},2383,"pb-14","Policy Brief 14: Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery",2739,2024,"The European Union’s 2024 \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fdata.europa.eu\u002Feli\u002Fdir\u002F2024\u002F1260\u002Foj\">Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation\u003C\u002Fa> obliges Member States to, among other things, introduce legislative measures to enable the confiscation of “unexplained wealth”.\n\nThis policy paper examines this Article and the powers and restrictions that Member States will need to include in such “unexplained wealth” measures to ensure compliance with the Directive.\n\nIn brief, the Directive gives legislators in EU Member States flexibility to decide the scope of their own unexplained wealth measures. At a minimum, they must introduce measures that can be used to target unexplained wealth linked to organised crime.\n\nMember States could, however, adopt broader measures target unexplained wealth relating to all criminal activity, including corruption.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nYou may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence. Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery.’ Policy Brief 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14\u003C\u002Fa>. \n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.",[19],[36],"2024-01-13","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9b9b6a62-6a97-4851-957f-1f36155e8f32?width=600&height=840",[237],{"url":25,"caption":26},[239],{"url":240,"caption":241},"https:\u002F\u002Fillicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org\u002F"," Free book: Illicit Enrichment",[243],{"authors_id":244},{"id":174,"name":175},[],[247,251,253,257],{"tags_id":248},{"id":249,"name":250},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":252},{"id":131,"name":132},{"tags_id":254},{"id":255,"name":256},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":258},{"id":259,"name":260},932,"Human rights",[262],2419,[34],[15],"2025-01-13T11:05:26.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:49.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14",{"id":269,"slug":270,"title":271,"status":6,"nid":272,"year":273,"body":274,"external":17,"topic":275,"language":15,"type":277,"date_published":278,"image":279,"citation":14,"publisher":16,"link_internal":280,"link_external":282,"authors":286,"countries":291,"tags":292,"pdf":305,"topics":307,"featured":17,"languages":308,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":309,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":310,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":311},2295,"pb-12","Policy Brief 12: De-risking of Russian clients: best intentions, unintended consequences",2480,2023,"After the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the wide-reaching sanctions which ensued, many Western financial institutions began to de-risk Russian clients. Dealing with Russian clients, in many cases, has become expensive from a compliance point of view and toxic from the reputational side.\n\nHowever, the de-risking of unsanctioned Russian individuals may have a significant impact on the fight against financial crime by potentially causing:\n\n\n- an increase in the use of shadow\u002Funregulated channels of moving money;\n- a withdrawal of funds away from the European zone to sanctioned countries or non-cooperative jurisdictions;\n- severe burdens on the investigation of financial crimes (especially in relation to Russian assets and investments) and on international cooperation in criminal matters;\n- increased opportunities for enablers, such as unscrupulous lawyers and accountants, to take advantage of the situation.\n\n\nThis Policy Brief outlines the current situation and suggests how to better manage risk without having a negative impact on the fight against financial crime.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa> and relates to the Basel AML Index of money laundering risk.\n\nYou may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>). Suggested citation: Boguslavska, Kateryna. 2023. ‘De-risking of Russian clients: best intentions, unintended consequences.’ Policy Brief 12, Basel Institute on Governance, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-12\">https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-12\u003C\u002Fa>.",[276,19],"Anti-Money Laundering",[36],"2023-06-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F8013d7b0-82aa-46f8-bde7-a8790f71a59e?width=600&height=840",[281],{"url":25,"caption":26},[283],{"url":284,"caption":285},"https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F"," Visit Basel AML Index website",[287],{"authors_id":288},{"id":289,"name":290},301,"Kateryna Boguslavska",[],[293,295,299,303],{"tags_id":294},{"id":213,"name":214},{"tags_id":296},{"id":297,"name":298},1236,"Compliance",{"tags_id":300},{"id":301,"name":302},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":304},{"id":113,"name":114},[306],2333,[276,34],[15],"2023-06-30T08:38:07.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:08.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-12",{"id":313,"slug":314,"title":315,"status":6,"nid":316,"year":183,"body":317,"external":17,"topic":318,"language":15,"type":319,"date_published":321,"image":322,"citation":14,"publisher":16,"link_internal":323,"link_external":333,"authors":337,"countries":342,"tags":355,"pdf":362,"topics":364,"featured":17,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":365,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":366,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":367},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[19],[320],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[324,327,330],{"url":325,"caption":326},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":328,"caption":329},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":331,"caption":332},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[334],{"url":335,"caption":336},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[338],{"authors_id":339},{"id":340,"name":341},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[343,347,351],{"countries_id":344},{"id":345,"name":346},225,"Ukraine",{"countries_id":348},{"id":349,"name":350},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":352},{"id":353,"name":354},14,"Australia",[356,358,360],{"tags_id":357},{"id":301,"name":302},{"tags_id":359},{"id":255,"name":256},{"tags_id":361},{"id":95,"name":96},[363],2499,[34],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":369,"slug":370,"title":371,"status":6,"nid":372,"year":183,"body":373,"external":17,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":374,"date_published":376,"image":377,"citation":378,"publisher":16,"link_internal":379,"link_external":383,"authors":384,"countries":389,"tags":402,"pdf":407,"topics":410,"featured":17,"languages":411,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":412,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":413,"main_points":7,"short_version":414,"subtitle":7,"link":415},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[375],"Working Paper","2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[380],{"url":381,"caption":382},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[385],{"authors_id":386},{"id":387,"name":388},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[390,394,398,400],{"countries_id":391},{"id":392,"name":393},228,"United States",{"countries_id":395},{"id":396,"name":397},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":399},{"id":349,"name":350},{"countries_id":401},{"id":353,"name":354},[403,405],{"tags_id":404},{"id":255,"name":256},{"tags_id":406},{"id":95,"name":96},[408,409],2490,2491,[34],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":417,"slug":418,"title":419,"status":6,"nid":420,"year":183,"body":421,"external":17,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":422,"date_published":186,"image":424,"citation":425,"publisher":16,"link_internal":426,"link_external":432,"authors":437,"countries":444,"tags":449,"pdf":460,"topics":462,"featured":17,"languages":463,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":221,"user_updated":464,"date_updated":465,"main_points":466,"short_version":7,"subtitle":467,"link":468},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\n[**Download Case Study here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002FCase-Study-13_Beauty-Queen.pdf)\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\n**Main takeaways of the case:**\n\n- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[423],"Case Study","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13).",[427,430],{"url":428,"caption":429},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716","Read related blog",{"url":190,"caption":431},"Read related Policy Brief 16",[433,436],{"url":434,"caption":435},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":194,"caption":195},[438,440],{"authors_id":439},{"id":199,"name":200},{"authors_id":441},{"id":442,"name":443},591,"Diana Cordero",[445],{"countries_id":446},{"id":447,"name":448},47,"Colombia",[450,452,454,456,458],{"tags_id":451},{"id":205,"name":206},{"tags_id":453},{"id":209,"name":210},{"tags_id":455},{"id":213,"name":214},{"tags_id":457},{"id":113,"name":114},{"tags_id":459},{"id":255,"name":256},[461],2495,[34],[15],"b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T14:22:13.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",{"id":470,"slug":471,"title":472,"status":6,"nid":473,"year":474,"body":475,"external":17,"topic":476,"language":15,"type":477,"date_published":479,"image":480,"citation":14,"publisher":16,"link_internal":481,"link_external":484,"authors":485,"countries":490,"tags":491,"pdf":496,"topics":498,"featured":17,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":499,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":9,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":500},2423,"qg42","Quick Guide 42: Non-conviction based confiscation",2856,2025,"Criminals exploit legal loopholes, borders and other avenues to conceal the proceeds of their illegal activities and evade prosecution. Meanwhile, they use their illicit proceeds to buy luxury villas or increase their power and influence. Victims of crime – including communities affected by corruption – suffer the losses.\n\nOne tool to address this problem is non-conviction based confiscation: legal mechanisms that allow states to recover illicit assets even in the absence of a criminal conviction. It is also known as non-conviction based forfeiture or, in some jurisdictions, civil confiscation or civil forfeiture.\n\nThis Quick Guide outlines in simple terms how non-conviction based confiscation is used, the concerns and challenges it faces and how it can be implemented in line with established legal safeguards.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[19],[478],"Quick Guide","2025-10-16","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fa1e40d9b-26cb-4ffc-879f-d7edee80ecbb?width=600&height=840",[482],{"url":483,"caption":332},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Quick%20Guide",[],[486],{"authors_id":487},{"id":488,"name":489},553,"Rita Simões",[],[492,494],{"tags_id":493},{"id":205,"name":206},{"tags_id":495},{"id":131,"name":132},[497],2479,[34],"2025-10-16T10:05:33.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg42",{"id":502,"slug":503,"title":504,"status":6,"nid":505,"year":474,"body":506,"external":17,"topic":507,"language":15,"type":508,"date_published":509,"image":510,"citation":14,"publisher":16,"link_internal":511,"link_external":517,"authors":518,"countries":523,"tags":526,"pdf":531,"topics":533,"featured":534,"languages":535,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":536,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":537,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":538},2390,"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[19],[375],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840",[512,515],{"url":513,"caption":514},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":381,"caption":516}," View all Working Papers",[],[519],{"authors_id":520},{"id":521,"name":522},560,"Sam Hickey",[524],{"countries_id":525},{"id":345,"name":346},[527,529],{"tags_id":528},{"id":95,"name":96},{"tags_id":530},{"id":255,"name":256},[532],2431,[34],true,[15],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":540,"slug":541,"title":542,"status":6,"nid":543,"year":230,"body":544,"external":17,"topic":545,"language":15,"type":546,"date_published":547,"image":548,"citation":14,"publisher":16,"link_internal":549,"link_external":550,"authors":551,"countries":556,"tags":557,"pdf":566,"topics":568,"featured":17,"languages":569,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":570,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":571,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":572},2378,"qg34","Quick Guide 34: Public-private partnerships for financial intelligence sharing",2724,"Financial intelligence is the staple food of investigations into corruption, money laundering and other financial crimes.\n\nMuch financial intelligence is held by private-sector institutions such as banks and other financial service providers. How does that get into the hands of law enforcement, where it can trigger or inform investigations? And how can we improve the system?\n\nThis Quick Guide gives a brief introduction to public-private partnerships or platforms for financial intelligence sharing. It sets out how they work in practice, and how they can improve the sharing of targeted, useful information between law enforcement and financial institutions.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[276,19],[478],"2024-11-25","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F01dea28f-22b8-47cd-bf86-ddee24683c2b?width=600&height=840",[],[],[552],{"authors_id":553},{"id":554,"name":555},327,"Simon Marsh",[],[558,562,564],{"tags_id":559},{"id":560,"name":561},1193,"Financial investigations",{"tags_id":563},{"id":213,"name":214},{"tags_id":565},{"id":113,"name":114},[567],2416,[276,34],[15],"2024-12-05T14:06:47.000Z","2026-05-31T22:51:55.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg34",{"id":574,"slug":575,"title":576,"status":6,"nid":577,"year":230,"body":578,"external":17,"topic":579,"language":15,"type":580,"date_published":581,"image":582,"citation":14,"publisher":16,"link_internal":583,"link_external":585,"authors":588,"countries":591,"tags":596,"pdf":613,"topics":615,"featured":534,"languages":616,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":52,"date_created":617,"user_updated":53,"date_updated":618,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":619},2366,"wp-54","Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America",2701,"This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, *Extinción de dominio*.\n\nIt argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.\n\nThe paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54.",[19],[375],"2024-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F37616510-2f1f-4ab6-9405-845433d6fa3b?width=600&height=840",[584],{"url":381,"caption":516},[586],{"url":29,"caption":587}," Download PDF (Spanish - forthcoming)",[589],{"authors_id":590},{"id":199,"name":200},[592],{"countries_id":593},{"id":594,"name":595},171,"Peru",[597,599,601,605,609,611],{"tags_id":598},{"id":255,"name":256},{"tags_id":600},{"id":259,"name":260},{"tags_id":602},{"id":603,"name":604},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":606},{"id":607,"name":608},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":610},{"id":205,"name":206},{"tags_id":612},{"id":131,"name":132},[614],2404,[34],[15],"2024-10-03T16:05:11.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:47.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54",1780676566311]