[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":572},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-papering-over-cracks-or-building-stronger-systems-together-financial-crime-context":3,"related-papering-over-cracks-or-building-stronger-systems-together-financial-crime-context":76},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":26,"link_external":27,"featured":19,"topics":31,"languages":34,"type":35,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":37,"countries":48,"tags":49,"pdf":50,"authors":75},1770,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:53:24.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:13.000Z",2151,"papering-over-cracks-or-building-stronger-systems-together-financial-crime-context","Papering over cracks or building stronger systems together? Financial crime in the context of covid-19","This article is the Basel Institute’s contribution to the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fglobalforumljd.com\u002Fwhats-new\u002Fglobal-forum-law-justice-and-development-review-legal-experiences-and-global-practices\">Global Forum on Law, Justice and Development Review of Legal Experiences and Global Practices Relating to COVID-19\u003C\u002Fa>, published in December 2021. The Global Forum is an initiative of The World Bank. The contribution was submitted in July 2020; the version below contains minor updates to hyperlinks.\n\nIt explores how covid-19 has exposed cracks and flaws in the systems designed to protect communities from corruption and has accelerated existing trends in financial crime. The next systemic disruption may come from another pandemic, climate change or perhaps biological or cyber attacks. Whatever the future holds, it is clear that financial crime systems must become more resilient if they are to protect us. \n\nThe article notes that the world has an opportunity to reflect meaningfully on the problems and build stronger, more efficient and effective systems against financial crime. It covers three areas:\n\n\n- Technology, and how technology upgrades in law enforcement and criminal justice proceedings are necessary but not sufficient\n- Streamlining and speeding up procedures in cases of financial crime, such as mutual legal assistance \n- Citizen engagement in the fight against financial crime, including mobilising citizens by using recovered proceeds of corruption and crime to fund essential healthcare services.\n","","English",2021,"Basel Institute on Governance","2021-12-20",false,[21,22,23,24,25],"Asset Recovery","Collective Action","Green Corruption","Public Finance Management","Public Governance",[],[28],{"url":29,"caption":30},"https:\u002F\u002Fglobalforumljd.com\u002Fwhats-new\u002Fglobal-forum-law-justice-and-development-review-legal-experiences-and-global-practices"," View the GFLJD Review of Legal Experiences and Global Practices Relating to COVID-19",[32,22,23,24,33],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement","Corruption Prevention and Public Governance",[15],[36],"Article",{"id":38,"storage":39,"filename_disk":40,"filename_download":41,"title":42,"type":43,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":44,"width":45,"height":46,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":47,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"8e820908-5ca1-4e36-bee9-aea6fbd4b1e3","local","8e820908-5ca1-4e36-bee9-aea6fbd4b1e3.jpg","Pages-from-Papering-over-cracks-or-building-stronger-systems-together.jpg","GFLJD contribution cover page","image\u002Fjpeg",364925,1653,2339,{},[],[],[51],{"id":52,"publications_id":53,"directus_files_id":67},1791,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":8,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":38,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":56,"link_internal":57,"link_external":58,"featured":19,"topics":60,"languages":61,"type":62,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":63,"tags":64,"pdf":65,"authors":66},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21,22,23,24,25],[],[59],{"url":29,"caption":30},[32,22,23,24,33],[15],[36],[],[],[52],[],{"id":68,"storage":39,"filename_disk":69,"filename_download":70,"title":70,"type":71,"folder":72,"uploaded_by":54,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":73,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":74,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"ec710e8c-ea21-4427-a787-53f8fe264e33","ec710e8c-ea21-4427-a787-53f8fe264e33.pdf","Papering-over-cracks-or-building-stronger-systems-together.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5",186129,"Download PDF",[],[77,110,155,218,254,298,357,404,475,538],{"id":78,"slug":79,"title":80,"status":6,"nid":81,"year":82,"body":83,"external":19,"topic":84,"language":15,"type":86,"date_published":88,"image":89,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":90,"link_external":91,"authors":92,"countries":101,"tags":102,"pdf":103,"topics":105,"featured":19,"languages":106,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":107,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":108,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":109},2359,"wp-53","Working Paper 53: Good governance and the just transition: Implications for renewable energy companies",2673,2024,"There is broad agreement that ensuring a just energy transition is key for achieving the trust and support from citizens needed to succeed with the green transition and the COP28 goal of tripling renewable energy capacity by 2030.\n\nThis paper discusses the concept of a just transition, with a particular focus on the importance of achieving a transition that benefits both local communities and society at large. It examines the governance and corruption challenges that could jeopardise this goal and discusses how industry associations and companies in the renewable energy sector could step up its efforts to address these challenges to realise the ambition of a just transition.\n\nThe paper draws on lessons from the experience of tackling governance and corruption risks in the extractive sector and sets out proposals on how to accelerate collective action in the renewable energy sector. \n\n### About this report\n\nThis is a guest Working Paper of the Basel Institute on Governance, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the report under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, University of Basel or funding organisations.\n\nSuggested citation: de Vibe, Maja, and Mark Robinson. 2024. ‘Good governance and the just transition: Implications for renewable energy companies.’ Working Paper 53, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-53.",[22,23,85],"Private Sector",[87],"Working Paper","2024-09-01","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Facad9a6f-74c5-48d5-9305-a053ed97aa91?width=600&height=840",[],[],[93,97],{"authors_id":94},{"id":95,"name":96},546,"Maja de Vibe",{"authors_id":98},{"id":99,"name":100},547,"Mark Robinson",[],[],[104],2445,[22,23,85],[15],"2024-08-30T16:05:06.000Z","2026-05-31T22:51:53.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-53",{"id":111,"slug":112,"title":113,"status":6,"nid":114,"year":115,"body":116,"external":19,"topic":117,"language":15,"type":118,"date_published":119,"image":120,"citation":14,"publisher":121,"link_internal":122,"link_external":123,"authors":127,"countries":132,"tags":137,"pdf":150,"topics":151,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":152,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":153,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":154},2424,"back-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin","Back in Action: How the UK is reviving unexplained wealth orders (The Academy Bulletin)",2864,2025,"In an article published in the Fall 2025 issue of the Bulletin of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Ffinancialcrimelitigators.org\u002F\">International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators\u003C\u002Fa>, Andrew Dornbierer explores the revival of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in the United Kingdom.\n\nIntroduced in 2017 as a tool to combat the abuse of UK's markets to launder criminal proceeds, the UWO mechanism suffered a severe setback in 2020. After only a handful of attempts to use it, a decision by the High Court effectively left it sprawled on the canvas.\n\nIn the last year or so, however, the mechanism has slowly started to prove itself. Most recently, the UK's Serious Fraud Office – in its first use of the UK's UWO mechanism – secured GBP 1.1 million from the sale of a property belonging to the ex-wife of a convicted fraudster.\n\nThis article offers a short history of UWOs in the UK. It examines how, after a turbulent start and subsequent amendments to the mechanism, UWOs are now back to being used by UK authorities to tackle illicit financial flows. If applied responsibly, proportionately and in harmony with established legal rights, unexplained wealth orders promise to be a powerful tool in the UK’s fight to recover criminal assets.\n\nThis is the fifth issue of The Academy's Bulletin. It has been established to transmit the work of Academy Fellows, draw attention to matters of importance to the legal community and provide high-level analysis of cutting-edge issues in global financial crime investigations and litigation. The Basel Institute on Governance acts as Secretariat to the Academy.",[21],[36],"2025-11-03","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fc313d2fa-3e1c-43ab-b40e-3e418d819df1?width=600&height=840","International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[],[124],{"url":125,"caption":126},"https:\u002F\u002Fedit.financialcrimelitigators.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb401d6c9-b0e4-4ab9-ad1f-948c567c6ab3.pdf","Fall 2025 Bulletin of the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[128],{"authors_id":129},{"id":130,"name":131},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[133],{"countries_id":134},{"id":135,"name":136},225,"Ukraine",[138,142,146],{"tags_id":139},{"id":140,"name":141},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":143},{"id":144,"name":145},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":147},{"id":148,"name":149},821,"Unexplained wealth",[],[32],"2025-11-03T11:05:50.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:01.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fback-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin",{"id":156,"slug":157,"title":158,"status":6,"nid":159,"year":115,"body":160,"external":19,"topic":161,"language":15,"type":164,"date_published":165,"image":166,"citation":14,"publisher":167,"link_internal":168,"link_external":172,"authors":176,"countries":205,"tags":210,"pdf":211,"topics":212,"featured":19,"languages":214,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":215,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":216,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":217},2382,"addressing-bribery-and-associated-social-norms-healthcare-results-behaviour-change","Addressing Bribery and Associated Social Norms in Healthcare: Results of a Behaviour Change Intervention in Tanzania",2740,"This open-access, peer-reviewed journal article examines the results of a pilot behavioural intervention in Tanzania. The project tested a behavioural anti-corruption intervention to reduce bribery in a hospital. It targeted deeply ingrained social norms while also leveraging the social networks and influence of key staff members.\n\nThe research was funded by the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme of the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). It was a collaboration between the Basel Institute on Governance, the UK Behavioural Insights Team, the University of Dar es Salam and the University of Utrecht.\n\n### Abstract\n\nPractices of bribery in the delivery of public services become entrenched when they are driven by social norms of reciprocity.\n\nThe resulting economies of favours, which are common across diverse geographical regions, are resilient to conventional anti-corruption measures because they are underpinned by strong social pressures.\n\nThis article describes the results of a behaviour change intervention to address gift-giving as a form of bribery in a Tanzanian hospital. The intervention utilised environmental cues and a peer-led network approach to deliver messages aimed at disincentivising bribery.\n\nAn exit survey of hospital users indicates a reduction of the ‘gift-offering propensity score’, capturing self-declared behaviour, from 23% before implementation of the intervention to 13% afterwards. We find similar changes in the enabling norms score.\n\nSemi-structured interviews with hospital users and health workers further support these findings.\n\nThese results suggest that practices and norms around bribery might be changed through a multi-pronged approach that addresses both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ side of bribery.",[162,163],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[36],"2025-01-09","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fcfaba3e7-52ad-42b4-b9e1-1542534afed9?width=600&height=840","European Journal of Social Psychology",[169],{"url":170,"caption":171},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fresearch-case-1"," View project summary",[173],{"url":174,"caption":175},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1002\u002Fejsp.3140","View open-access article",[177,181,185,189,193,197,201],{"authors_id":178},{"id":179,"name":180},554,"Dr Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":182},{"id":183,"name":184},505,"Violette Gadenne",{"authors_id":186},{"id":187,"name":188},506,"Veronica Mkoji",{"authors_id":190},{"id":191,"name":192},507,"Dilhan Perera",{"authors_id":194},{"id":195,"name":196},508,"Ruth Persian",{"authors_id":198},{"id":199,"name":200},370,"Richard Sambaiga",{"authors_id":202},{"id":203,"name":204},509,"Tobias Stark",[206],{"countries_id":207},{"id":208,"name":209},224,"Tanzania",[],[],[33,213],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[15],"2025-01-10T17:05:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:49.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-bribery-and-associated-social-norms-healthcare-results-behaviour-change",{"id":219,"slug":220,"title":221,"status":6,"nid":222,"year":82,"body":223,"external":19,"topic":224,"language":15,"type":225,"date_published":226,"image":227,"citation":14,"publisher":121,"link_internal":228,"link_external":229,"authors":233,"countries":238,"tags":247,"pdf":248,"topics":249,"featured":19,"languages":250,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":251,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":252,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":253},2380,"james-stone-case-perus-fight-recover-assets-academy-bulletin","The James Stone case: Peru’s fight to recover assets (The Academy Bulletin)",2733,"In an article published in the Fall 2024 issue of the Bulletin of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Ffinancialcrimelitigators.org\u002F\">International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators\u003C\u002Fa>, Oscar Solórzano describes an asset recovery case between Peru and Luxembourg involving a businessman named James Stone.\n\nIt provides insight into some of the challenges that some States face in recovering proceeds of corruption from international financial centres, despite the binding rules and soft laws adopted in recent years. It looks at both the mutual legal assistance (MLA) process and the legal defences raised by the account holder – who admitted to the corrupt dealings and has since fled to the United States.\n\nThe case offers important lessons for States either holding or seeking to recover assets linked to historical acts of corruption.\n\nThis is the fourth issue of The Academy's Bulletin. It has been established to transmit the work of Academy Fellows, draw attention to matters of importance to the legal community and provide high-level analysis of cutting-edge issues in global financial crime investigations and litigation. The Basel Institute on Governance acts as Secretariat to the Academy.",[21],[36],"2024-12-11","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Faab741bb-d811-44ec-bb32-83c1123d75d3?width=600&height=840",[],[230],{"url":231,"caption":232},"https:\u002F\u002Fedit.financialcrimelitigators.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F5d055679-91be-4304-aec7-cf88c8226ada.pdf","Fall 2024 Bulletin of the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[234],{"authors_id":235},{"id":236,"name":237},294,"Oscar Solorzano",[239,243],{"countries_id":240},{"id":241,"name":242},171,"Peru",{"countries_id":244},{"id":245,"name":246},132,"Luxembourg",[],[],[32],[15],"2024-12-11T17:05:23.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:53.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fjames-stone-case-perus-fight-recover-assets-academy-bulletin",{"id":255,"slug":256,"title":257,"status":6,"nid":258,"year":82,"body":259,"external":19,"topic":260,"language":261,"type":262,"date_published":263,"image":264,"citation":14,"publisher":265,"link_internal":266,"link_external":267,"authors":268,"countries":287,"tags":290,"pdf":291,"topics":293,"featured":19,"languages":294,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":295,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":296,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":297},2358,"la-extincion-del-dominio-de-bienes-instrumentalizados","La extinción del dominio de bienes instrumentalizados",2666,"This publication (in Spanish) focuses on the use of non-conviction based forfeiture legislation in Peru (Extinción de Dominio) to recover instrumentalities of crime. It is a collaborative effort of asset recovery experts of the Basel Institute on Governance under the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gfpsubnacional.pe\u002F\">Programa GFP Subnacional\u003C\u002Fa> or Subnational Public Finance Management Strengthening Programme in Peru, funded by the Swiss SECO Cooperation.\n\n### Introducción\n\nEl Programa de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión de Finanzas Públicas a nivel Subnacional en el Perú (2024-2028) busca fortalecer las capacidades de los funcionarios encargados del cumplimiento de la ley, especialmente aquellos que participan en los procesos de recuperación de activos en los niveles central y subnacional.\n\nEn los últimos años, la recuperación de activos ha ocupado un importante lugar en la política criminal peruana, especialmente mediante la dación del Decreto Legislativo 1373 - Decreto Legislativo sobre Extinción de Dominio, que incorpora al ordenamiento jurídico peruano un poderoso instrumento para contrarrestar el patrimonio criminal. La consolidación de esta herramienta precisa de conocimientos especializados en la materia, así como la correcta interpretación de las categorías y presupuestos de la extinción de dominio, en armonía con los principios del Estado Constitucional de Derecho que la alberga.\n\nCon miras a la consecución de este objetivo, el Programa GFP Subnacional reconoce el importante rol de la doctrina jurídica como fuente mediata para aliviar los cuestionamientos que surgen en la aplicación de las leyes, y para orientar el conocimiento hacia la correcta adopción de decisiones. Por ello, esta publicación académica es un producto de conocimiento creado con la finalidad de servir como insumo teórico y práctico en la aplicación de la extinción de dominio.\n\nEn su primer número, con el fin de coadyuvar en el proceso de especialización de los operadores de justicia, esta publicación aborda diversas cuestiones jurídicas acerca de la recuperación, a través de la extinción de dominio, de los instrumentos empleados en la comisión de actividades ilícitas, dada su disposición para la lesión de bienes jurídicos protegidos por nuestro ordenamiento.",[21],"Spanish",[36],"2024-05-24","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F69c174c1-5ac4-423c-a873-194194f45033?width=600&height=840","Basel Institute on Governance; Programa GPF Subnacional",[],[],[269,271,275,279,283],{"authors_id":270},{"id":236,"name":237},{"authors_id":272},{"id":273,"name":274},542,"Walther Delgado",{"authors_id":276},{"id":277,"name":278},543,"Dr Erick Guimaray",{"authors_id":280},{"id":281,"name":282},544,"Sergio Jiménez",{"authors_id":284},{"id":285,"name":286},545,"Sergio Rodriguez",[288],{"countries_id":289},{"id":241,"name":242},[],[292],2397,[32],[261],"2024-08-20T16:05:02.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:50.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fla-extincion-del-dominio-de-bienes-instrumentalizados",{"id":299,"slug":300,"title":301,"status":6,"nid":302,"year":303,"body":304,"external":19,"topic":305,"language":15,"type":306,"date_published":308,"image":309,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":310,"link_external":320,"authors":324,"countries":329,"tags":340,"pdf":351,"topics":353,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":354,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":355,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":356},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[307],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[311,314,317],{"url":312,"caption":313},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":315,"caption":316},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":318,"caption":319},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[321],{"url":322,"caption":323},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[325],{"authors_id":326},{"id":327,"name":328},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[330,332,336],{"countries_id":331},{"id":135,"name":136},{"countries_id":333},{"id":334,"name":335},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":337},{"id":338,"name":339},14,"Australia",[341,345,347],{"tags_id":342},{"id":343,"name":344},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":346},{"id":140,"name":141},{"tags_id":348},{"id":349,"name":350},982,"Anti-corruption",[352],2499,[32],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":358,"slug":359,"title":360,"status":6,"nid":361,"year":303,"body":362,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":363,"date_published":364,"image":365,"citation":366,"publisher":17,"link_internal":367,"link_external":371,"authors":372,"countries":377,"tags":390,"pdf":395,"topics":398,"featured":19,"languages":399,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":55,"date_created":400,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":401,"main_points":7,"short_version":402,"subtitle":7,"link":403},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[87],"2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[368],{"url":369,"caption":370},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[373],{"authors_id":374},{"id":375,"name":376},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[378,382,386,388],{"countries_id":379},{"id":380,"name":381},228,"United States",{"countries_id":383},{"id":384,"name":385},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":387},{"id":334,"name":335},{"countries_id":389},{"id":338,"name":339},[391,393],{"tags_id":392},{"id":140,"name":141},{"tags_id":394},{"id":349,"name":350},[396,397],2490,2491,[32],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":405,"slug":406,"title":407,"status":6,"nid":408,"year":303,"body":409,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":410,"date_published":412,"image":413,"citation":7,"publisher":17,"link_internal":414,"link_external":421,"authors":422,"countries":443,"tags":454,"pdf":467,"topics":469,"featured":19,"languages":470,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":55,"date_created":400,"user_updated":471,"date_updated":472,"main_points":7,"short_version":473,"subtitle":7,"link":474},2439,"corruption-risk-management-latam-timber-value-chain","Preventing corruption in the timber value chain: Risk management experiences in Latin America",2927,"Corruption in the timber value chain is a major challenge for environmental sustainability and governance in Latin America.\n\nThis report presents the application of a corruption risk management approach by environmental authorities in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, implemented through technical assistance from the Basel Institute on Governance’s [Green Corruption programme](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fgreen-corruption).\n\n[**Download the report here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-04\u002F260401_Preventing-corruption-in-the-timber-value-chain_Latam.pdf)\n\n### Key corruption risks\n\nThe report describes the main corruption risks identified in collaboration with five environmental authorities responsible for integrity in the timber value chain, covering:\n\n- The granting of forestry rights\n- The issuance and use of timber transport waybills\n- The control and supervision of authorised actors.\n\nThe main corruption risks identified involve:\n\n- Improper agreements between public servants and third parties\n- Abuse of authority\n- Undue influence or pressure from superiors\n\n### Mitigation measures\n\nPlanned mitigation measures fall into four main categories:\n\n- Regulatory improvements, including updating procedures, closing implementation gaps and improving efficiency\n- Strengthened supervision, such as file tracking systems and alerts to reduce discretion\n- Enhanced communication, including multicultural approaches for Indigenous and rural communities\n- Cross-cutting measures to promote integrity such as awareness-raising, ethical reflection and training\n\nGiven common patterns across natural resource sectors, these measures may be relevant for other environmental agencies, though they should be adapted to local contexts.\n\n### Lessons learned\n\nThe experiences in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru highlight the importance of tailoring risk management approaches to national contexts, ensuring institutional leadership and fostering inter-institutional collaboration. They also underline the value of peer learning and cross-border exchange.",[411],"Report","2026-04-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fa4345633-502b-4784-b391-b3ca6bafb2c5?width=600&height=840",[415,418],{"url":416,"caption":417},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fprotecting-forests-through-corruption-prevention-videos-on-promising-initiatives-in-bolivia-ecuador-and-peru-2726","Learn more about protecting forests through corruption prevention",{"url":419,"caption":420},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fjoining-forces-to-protect-the-amazon-forest-and-its-communities-from-corruption-2717","Read related news",[],[423,427,431,435,439],{"authors_id":424},{"id":425,"name":426},586,"Aldo Bautista",{"authors_id":428},{"id":429,"name":430},587,"Mirtha Muniz",{"authors_id":432},{"id":433,"name":434},588,"Karla Coronado",{"authors_id":436},{"id":437,"name":438},589,"Patricia Torres",{"authors_id":440},{"id":441,"name":442},590,"Francisco Bustamante",[444,446,450],{"countries_id":445},{"id":241,"name":242},{"countries_id":447},{"id":448,"name":449},28,"Bolivia",{"countries_id":451},{"id":452,"name":453},60,"Ecuador",[455,459,463],{"tags_id":456},{"id":457,"name":458},1303,"Environment",{"tags_id":460},{"id":461,"name":462},1373,"Corruption prevention",{"tags_id":464},{"id":465,"name":466},859,"Corruption risks",[468],2494,[23],[15],"b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T21:18:25.000Z","Corruption in the timber value chain represents a major challenge for environmental sustainability\nand governance in Latin America. This report introduces the application of a **corruption risk\nmanagement approach** by environmental authorities in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. This\napproach was implemented within the framework of technical assistance provided by the Green\nCorruption programme of the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nCorruption refers to the misuse of entrusted power for private gain, often leading to increased\ninequality, poverty and social division. The concept of “green corruption” addresses the impact of\ncorruption as a major driver of environmental devastation and increased risk of harm to the\nenvironment and natural resources. Corruption risk refers to the possibility of a corrupt act\noccurring, but does not necessarily mean that a corrupt act has taken place. Mitigation measures\n– based on identified corruption risks, their impacts and likelihoods – are typically a prioritised set\nof recommended actions to address weaknesses, allocate resources, seek external support or\noffset the impact of negative conditions.\n\nUtilising the Green Corruption programme’s corruption risk management approach,\nrepresentatives of the environmental authorities identified corruption risks within the timber value\nchain related to **three key risk contexts**:\n1. The granting of forestry rights\n2. The issuance and use of timber transport waybills\n3. The control and supervision of authorised actors.\n\n**Priority areas of concern** included documentary procedures, physical inspections and the\nadministrative sanctioning procedure.\n\n**Specific corruption risks** identified involved:\n- the potential for improper agreements between public servants and third parties;\n- abuse of authority; and\n- undue influence or other improper pressures from hierarchical superiors within organisations.\n\nThe majority of planned **mitigation measures** can be grouped into four categories:\n- **Regulatory improvement**, to be accomplished by reviewing and updating administrative procedures, closing implementation gaps and other opportunities for corruption and improving operating efficiency.\n- **Strengthened supervision** through the implementation of file tracking systems and alerts as well as the use of verification formats in the approval of forestry rights and the issuance of timber transport waybills, and other practices that reduce the discretion of operational units.\n- **Enhanced communication strategies** to support information exchange and joint action within the timber value chain. Specifically, a multicultural strategy was developed as a way of reducing the vulnerability to corruption for Indigenous and rural farming communities.\n- **Cross-cutting measures** to promote integrity through awareness-raising, ethical reflection and training for public servants and other actors in the timber value chain.\n\nThis document concludes with lessons learned and recommendations, highlighting the\nimportance of tailoring the approach to recognise the unique context of each country, its\ninstitutional leadership in risk management and the contribution of inter-institutional collaborative\nwork. The risk management experiences in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru also highlight the value of\npeer learning and the exchange of experiences, including across national borders.\n\nIn summary, this publication offers a practical approach for implementing corruption risk\nmanagement as an effective tool to reduce the likelihood of corrupt or unethical behaviour and to\nstrengthen the institutional framework for the timber value chain in Latin America.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruption-risk-management-latam-timber-value-chain",{"id":476,"slug":477,"title":478,"status":6,"nid":479,"year":303,"body":480,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":481,"date_published":483,"image":484,"citation":485,"publisher":17,"link_internal":486,"link_external":493,"authors":500,"countries":507,"tags":512,"pdf":529,"topics":531,"featured":19,"languages":532,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":55,"date_created":533,"user_updated":471,"date_updated":534,"main_points":535,"short_version":7,"subtitle":536,"link":537},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\n[**Download Case Study here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002FCase-Study-13_Beauty-Queen.pdf)\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\n**Main takeaways of the case:**\n\n- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[482],"Case Study","2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13).",[487,490],{"url":488,"caption":489},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716","Read related blog",{"url":491,"caption":492},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications","Read related Policy Brief 16",[494,497],{"url":495,"caption":496},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":498,"caption":499},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[501,503],{"authors_id":502},{"id":236,"name":237},{"authors_id":504},{"id":505,"name":506},591,"Diana Cordero",[508],{"countries_id":509},{"id":510,"name":511},47,"Colombia",[513,517,521,523,527],{"tags_id":514},{"id":515,"name":516},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":518},{"id":519,"name":520},822,"International cooperation",{"tags_id":522},{"id":144,"name":145},{"tags_id":524},{"id":525,"name":526},1374,"Law enforcement",{"tags_id":528},{"id":140,"name":141},[530],2495,[32],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","2026-06-02T14:22:13.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",{"id":539,"slug":540,"title":541,"status":6,"nid":542,"year":303,"body":543,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":544,"date_published":483,"image":546,"citation":7,"publisher":17,"link_internal":547,"link_external":550,"authors":552,"countries":555,"tags":556,"pdf":565,"topics":567,"featured":19,"languages":568,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":55,"date_created":533,"user_updated":55,"date_updated":569,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":570,"link":571},2442,"pb-16","Policy Brief 16: Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders",2947,"This Policy Brief analyses emerging international standards aimed at addressing recurring challenges in judicial practice with regard to the enforcement of non-conviction based forfeiture orders issued by foreign states. It focuses in particular on the historical absence of a binding obligation on requested states to cooperate in such cases and, where cooperation is available, on the structural tension between direct and indirect enforcement models.\n\n[**Download Policy Brief here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-03\u002FPolicy-Brief-16_Enforcing-foreign-NCBF-orders.pdf)\n\nRevisions in 2023 to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 4 and 38 seek to clarify and strengthen states’ cooperation in the enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders. In this context, the recognition and execution of foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders are central components of the evolving international asset recovery framework.\n\nThrough analysis and case studies involving Latin American states and international financial centres, this Policy Brief demonstrates that the choice of procedural model for enforcing foreign forfeiture orders – direct or indirect – has significant implications, while acknowledging the competing legal and institutional interests involved.\n\nIn line with FATF Recommendation 38, the Policy Brief argues in favour of direct enforcement in the requested state, based on the facts established by the foreign authority. This promotes efficiency, legal certainty and mutual trust. Indirect enforcement models that may require domestic investigations by the requested state, on the other hand, often lead to delays, duplication and increased costs, which hinders international asset recovery efforts.\n\nThe analysis provides empirical insight into how the revised FATF standards address practical deficiencies and the implications for judicial practice in requested states. For the Latin American context, the Policy Brief suggests to go beyond technical compliance of domestic non-conviction based forfeiture regimes with the FATF standards to strengthen the effectiveness of cross-border enforcement in practice.\n\nThis Policy Brief can be read alongside [Case Study 13](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13): “The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.”\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type\\[]=257). You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F) licence.\n\nIt is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Policy Brief is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\n**Suggested citation**: Solórzano, Oscar. 2026. \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres.\" Policy Brief 16, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16).",[545],"Policy Brief","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff866220c-dddd-41b3-a45e-c2d7992d39e1?width=600&height=840",[548],{"url":491,"caption":549},"Read related Case Study 13",[551],{"url":498,"caption":499},[553],{"authors_id":554},{"id":236,"name":237},[],[557,559,561,563],{"tags_id":558},{"id":515,"name":516},{"tags_id":560},{"id":519,"name":520},{"tags_id":562},{"id":144,"name":145},{"tags_id":564},{"id":525,"name":526},[566],2496,[32],[15],"2026-06-02T14:16:22.000Z","FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16",1780676597902]