[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":627},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-corruptionsurveybg2024":3,"related-corruptionsurveybg2024":105},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":21,"link_external":22,"featured":19,"topics":23,"languages":24,"type":27,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":29,"countries":40,"tags":64,"pdf":65,"authors":104},2364,"published",null,"2024-09-23T16:05:17.000Z","2026-05-23T20:07:49.000Z",2690,"corruptionsurveybg2024","Public attitudes towards corruption in Bulgaria and the anti-corruption actions of the Bulgarian Government","This report presents the results of a nationwide survey of 1,215 individuals in Bulgaria, conducted from February to early March 2024.\n\nThe survey examined how corruption is perceived in Bulgaria by different types of respondent, and what kind of behaviour is considered acceptable. It also looked at respondents’ perceptions of anti-corruption efforts and under which circumstances they would be more likely to report corruption to the authorities.\n\nThe survey is a follow-up to a survey and Working Paper published in 2023, available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-44\">https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-44\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe questionnaire was programmed in Qualtrics and designed and programmed by Dr. Maria Thürk and Prof. Dr. Stefanie Bailer at the University of Basel with the support of Global Metrics in Bulgaria. The survey was fielded in the period 22 February – 5 March 2024 among 1,215 people and analysed by the analytics of Global Metrics (Dr. Radostina Angelova, Pavel Perpeliev and Katerina Georgieva) in partnership and collaboration with Dr. Maria Thürk.\n\nYou may share or republish the paper under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence.\n\nSuggested citation: Global Metrics. 2024. 'Public attitudes towards corruption in Bulgaria and the anti-corruption actions of the Bulgarian Government: Results of a public perceptions survey 2024.' Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruptionsurveybg2024\">https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruptionsurveybg2024\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nThis research was made possible by the support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) under the Swiss-Bulgarian Cooperation Programme and of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the SDC.","","Bulgarian, English",2024,"Basel Institute on Governance","2024-09-23",false,[14],[],[],[],[25,26],"Bulgarian","English",[28],"Report",{"id":30,"storage":31,"filename_disk":32,"filename_download":33,"title":34,"type":35,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":36,"width":37,"height":38,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":39,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"38304d35-68f9-408f-8460-3e64b403e8de","local","38304d35-68f9-408f-8460-3e64b403e8de.jpg?itok=1xA6JHq4","Pages-from-240923-Bulgaria-public-perceptions-report-FINAL.jpg?itok=1xA6JHq4","Cover page of report on corruption perceptions survey 2024 Bulgaria","image\u002Fjpeg",19797,500,708,{},[41],{"id":42,"publications_id":43,"countries_id":58},1124,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":30,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":46,"link_internal":47,"link_external":48,"featured":19,"topics":49,"languages":50,"type":51,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":52,"tags":53,"pdf":54,"authors":57},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[14],[],[],[],[25,26],[28],[42],[],[55,56],2402,2403,[],{"id":59,"name":60,"code":61,"latitude":62,"longitude":63},22,"Bulgaria","BG",42.73388,25.48583,[],[66,86],{"id":55,"publications_id":67,"directus_files_id":78},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":30,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":68,"link_internal":69,"link_external":70,"featured":19,"topics":71,"languages":72,"type":73,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":74,"tags":75,"pdf":76,"authors":77},[14],[],[],[],[25,26],[28],[42],[],[55,56],[],{"id":79,"storage":31,"filename_disk":80,"filename_download":81,"title":81,"type":82,"folder":83,"uploaded_by":44,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":84,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":85,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"3a116cfe-b1f4-4a8d-9786-959759c9b613","3a116cfe-b1f4-4a8d-9786-959759c9b613.pdf","240923-Bulgaria-public-perceptions-report-FINAL.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5",634243,"Download PDF (English)",{"id":56,"publications_id":87,"directus_files_id":98},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":30,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":88,"link_internal":89,"link_external":90,"featured":19,"topics":91,"languages":92,"type":93,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":94,"tags":95,"pdf":96,"authors":97},[14],[],[],[],[25,26],[28],[42],[],[55,56],[],{"id":99,"storage":31,"filename_disk":100,"filename_download":101,"title":101,"type":82,"folder":83,"uploaded_by":44,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":102,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":103,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"eea33247-55c0-427c-bfce-7082b71176e6","eea33247-55c0-427c-bfce-7082b71176e6.pdf","240919-Bulgaria-public-perceptions-report-bg-FINAL.pdf",1099695," Download PDF (Bulgarian)",[],[106,150,221,257,328,381,413,457,517,563],{"id":107,"slug":108,"title":109,"status":6,"nid":110,"year":111,"body":112,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":113,"date_published":114,"image":115,"citation":116,"publisher":17,"link_internal":117,"link_external":121,"authors":122,"countries":131,"tags":132,"pdf":141,"topics":143,"featured":19,"languages":145,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":146,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":147,"main_points":7,"short_version":148,"subtitle":7,"link":149},2438,"how-technology-can-support-border-corruption-investigations","Tackling the complexity of border corruption: How technological tools such as the project FALCON dashboard can support investigations",2953,2026,"Corruption at land and sea borders facilitates smuggling, sanctions evasion, tax offences and the entry of counterfeit, substandard or unsafe goods into countries including EU member states. This report conceptualises border corruption as a complex system of actors, events and illicit exchanges that is difficult to detect and investigate.\n\nDrawing on research from the Horizon Europe FALCON (Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project, it explores how innovative technological tools – illustrated by the “FALCON dashboard” – can help investigators manage, visualise, interpret and report large volumes of heterogeneous data in support of more effective investigations.\n\n### About this report\n\nYou may share or republish this report under a Creative Commons [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) licence.\n\nThis report was written as part of the FALCON project. FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).\n\nThe contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.",[28],"2026-04-20","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F83e615dd-a58e-4dec-a3d3-40b0cfe4cd32?width=600&height=840","Costa, Jacopo, and Marco San Biagio. 2026. “Tackling the complexity of border corruption: How technological tools such as the project FALCON dashboard can support investigations”. Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fhow-technology-can-support-border-corruption-investigations",[118],{"url":119,"caption":120},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg38","Read Quick Guide to border corruption",[],[123,127],{"authors_id":124},{"id":125,"name":126},304,"Jacopo Costa",{"authors_id":128},{"id":129,"name":130},585,"Marco San Biagio",[],[133,137],{"tags_id":134},{"id":135,"name":136},859,"Corruption risks",{"tags_id":138},{"id":139,"name":140},1377,"Technology",[142],2493,[144],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[26],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption at land and sea borders facilitates smuggling, sanctions evasion, tax offences and\nthe entry of counterfeit, substandard or unsafe goods into countries including EU member\nstates. It is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that poses significant challenges to law\nenforcement. Based on a literature review and empirical research including interviews and\ncase studies, this report conceptualises border corruption as a dynamic system of actors,\nevents and illicit exchanges. It also assesses how new technologies and innovations can\nstrengthen investigations.\n\nBorder areas are spaces that bring together a variety of public and private actors, regulatory\nfunctions and illicit activities. Corruption is structurally embedded, making it difficult to detect\nand investigate. Investigations in this context require the integration and interpretation of large\nvolumes of heterogeneous data spanning administrative records, financial transactions,\ncorporate structures, border crossing data and information from social media.\n\nThis level of complexity can result in information overload, fragmented analysis and limited\ncapacity to extract actionable insights for planning law enforcement operations. Additionally,\nissues with reporting and information sharing can hinder collaboration between field operatives\nand their line managers and superiors, who have critical responsibilities in terms of case\nmanagement and financial planning.\n\nBuilding on research conducted within the Horizon Europe FALCON (Fight Against Largescale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project, the report presents one of the\nproject’s technological outputs as an example of how technology can be leveraged: the\nFALCON dashboard. Currently in the piloting phase, this innovative tool has been designed to\nsupport investigations into border corruption and related offences by enabling the systematic\ncollection, integration, visualisation and analysis of investigative information and evidence.\nThis report demonstrates how the FALCON dashboard can assist investigators in managing\nhybrid data sources (manual and automated), constructing and navigating evidence graphs,\nand identifying key actors and relational patterns. The tool also lets investigators track the\nevolution of their investigations over time. Particular attention is paid to the dashboard’s\ncapacity to reduce visual saturation, enable multi-level analysis and facilitate targeted queries,\nthereby enhancing sense-making and investigative prioritisation.\n\nAlthough the FALCON dashboard itself is not yet publicly available, its presentation in this\nreport provides inspiration for similar technological innovation. The report argues that tools\nsuch as the FALCON dashboard can bolster investigative capabilities by enhancing analytical\nclarity, operational efficiency and communication between investigators, supervisors,\nprosecutors and other relevant stakeholders. However, it also prompts the need for further  reflection on broader challenges relating to data quality, interoperability, institutional\ncoordination and data protection.\n\nOverall, the study provides a conceptual and practical framework for understanding how\ntechnological platforms can support evidence-based, adaptive responses to border corruption.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fhow-technology-can-support-border-corruption-investigations",{"id":151,"slug":152,"title":153,"status":6,"nid":154,"year":111,"body":155,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":156,"date_published":157,"image":158,"citation":7,"publisher":17,"link_internal":159,"link_external":166,"authors":167,"countries":188,"tags":201,"pdf":212,"topics":214,"featured":19,"languages":216,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":146,"user_updated":217,"date_updated":218,"main_points":7,"short_version":219,"subtitle":7,"link":220},2439,"corruption-risk-management-latam-timber-value-chain","Preventing corruption in the timber value chain: Risk management experiences in Latin America",2927,"Corruption in the timber value chain is a major challenge for environmental sustainability and governance in Latin America.\n\nThis report presents the application of a corruption risk management approach by environmental authorities in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, implemented through technical assistance from the Basel Institute on Governance’s [Green Corruption programme](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fgreen-corruption).\n\n[**Download the report here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-04\u002F260401_Preventing-corruption-in-the-timber-value-chain_Latam.pdf)\n\n### Key corruption risks\n\nThe report describes the main corruption risks identified in collaboration with five environmental authorities responsible for integrity in the timber value chain, covering:\n\n- The granting of forestry rights\n- The issuance and use of timber transport waybills\n- The control and supervision of authorised actors.\n\nThe main corruption risks identified involve:\n\n- Improper agreements between public servants and third parties\n- Abuse of authority\n- Undue influence or pressure from superiors\n\n### Mitigation measures\n\nPlanned mitigation measures fall into four main categories:\n\n- Regulatory improvements, including updating procedures, closing implementation gaps and improving efficiency\n- Strengthened supervision, such as file tracking systems and alerts to reduce discretion\n- Enhanced communication, including multicultural approaches for Indigenous and rural communities\n- Cross-cutting measures to promote integrity such as awareness-raising, ethical reflection and training\n\nGiven common patterns across natural resource sectors, these measures may be relevant for other environmental agencies, though they should be adapted to local contexts.\n\n### Lessons learned\n\nThe experiences in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru highlight the importance of tailoring risk management approaches to national contexts, ensuring institutional leadership and fostering inter-institutional collaboration. They also underline the value of peer learning and cross-border exchange.",[28],"2026-04-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fa4345633-502b-4784-b391-b3ca6bafb2c5?width=600&height=840",[160,163],{"url":161,"caption":162},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fprotecting-forests-through-corruption-prevention-videos-on-promising-initiatives-in-bolivia-ecuador-and-peru-2726","Learn more about protecting forests through corruption prevention",{"url":164,"caption":165},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fjoining-forces-to-protect-the-amazon-forest-and-its-communities-from-corruption-2717","Read related news",[],[168,172,176,180,184],{"authors_id":169},{"id":170,"name":171},586,"Aldo Bautista",{"authors_id":173},{"id":174,"name":175},587,"Mirtha Muniz",{"authors_id":177},{"id":178,"name":179},588,"Karla Coronado",{"authors_id":181},{"id":182,"name":183},589,"Patricia Torres",{"authors_id":185},{"id":186,"name":187},590,"Francisco Bustamante",[189,193,197],{"countries_id":190},{"id":191,"name":192},171,"Peru",{"countries_id":194},{"id":195,"name":196},28,"Bolivia",{"countries_id":198},{"id":199,"name":200},60,"Ecuador",[202,206,210],{"tags_id":203},{"id":204,"name":205},1303,"Environment",{"tags_id":207},{"id":208,"name":209},1373,"Corruption prevention",{"tags_id":211},{"id":135,"name":136},[213],2494,[215],"Green Corruption",[26],"b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T21:18:25.000Z","Corruption in the timber value chain represents a major challenge for environmental sustainability\nand governance in Latin America. This report introduces the application of a **corruption risk\nmanagement approach** by environmental authorities in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. This\napproach was implemented within the framework of technical assistance provided by the Green\nCorruption programme of the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nCorruption refers to the misuse of entrusted power for private gain, often leading to increased\ninequality, poverty and social division. The concept of “green corruption” addresses the impact of\ncorruption as a major driver of environmental devastation and increased risk of harm to the\nenvironment and natural resources. Corruption risk refers to the possibility of a corrupt act\noccurring, but does not necessarily mean that a corrupt act has taken place. Mitigation measures\n– based on identified corruption risks, their impacts and likelihoods – are typically a prioritised set\nof recommended actions to address weaknesses, allocate resources, seek external support or\noffset the impact of negative conditions.\n\nUtilising the Green Corruption programme’s corruption risk management approach,\nrepresentatives of the environmental authorities identified corruption risks within the timber value\nchain related to **three key risk contexts**:\n1. The granting of forestry rights\n2. The issuance and use of timber transport waybills\n3. The control and supervision of authorised actors.\n\n**Priority areas of concern** included documentary procedures, physical inspections and the\nadministrative sanctioning procedure.\n\n**Specific corruption risks** identified involved:\n- the potential for improper agreements between public servants and third parties;\n- abuse of authority; and\n- undue influence or other improper pressures from hierarchical superiors within organisations.\n\nThe majority of planned **mitigation measures** can be grouped into four categories:\n- **Regulatory improvement**, to be accomplished by reviewing and updating administrative procedures, closing implementation gaps and other opportunities for corruption and improving operating efficiency.\n- **Strengthened supervision** through the implementation of file tracking systems and alerts as well as the use of verification formats in the approval of forestry rights and the issuance of timber transport waybills, and other practices that reduce the discretion of operational units.\n- **Enhanced communication strategies** to support information exchange and joint action within the timber value chain. Specifically, a multicultural strategy was developed as a way of reducing the vulnerability to corruption for Indigenous and rural farming communities.\n- **Cross-cutting measures** to promote integrity through awareness-raising, ethical reflection and training for public servants and other actors in the timber value chain.\n\nThis document concludes with lessons learned and recommendations, highlighting the\nimportance of tailoring the approach to recognise the unique context of each country, its\ninstitutional leadership in risk management and the contribution of inter-institutional collaborative\nwork. The risk management experiences in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru also highlight the value of\npeer learning and the exchange of experiences, including across national borders.\n\nIn summary, this publication offers a practical approach for implementing corruption risk\nmanagement as an effective tool to reduce the likelihood of corrupt or unethical behaviour and to\nstrengthen the institutional framework for the timber value chain in Latin America.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruption-risk-management-latam-timber-value-chain",{"id":222,"slug":223,"title":224,"status":6,"nid":225,"year":111,"body":226,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":227,"date_published":228,"image":229,"citation":7,"publisher":230,"link_internal":231,"link_external":237,"authors":241,"countries":242,"tags":243,"pdf":250,"topics":252,"featured":19,"languages":253,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":254,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":255,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":256},2444,"recommendations-combatting-border-corruption-falcon-policy-brief","Recommendations for combatting border corruption (FALCON Policy Brief)",2946,"Corruption at borders poses a significant threat to the integrity of the European Union’s external borders, undermining security, trust, and governance. And border corruption is not static — it evolves in response to new controls, technologies and enforcement strategies. This means that even well-designed measures may lose effectiveness over time.\n\nA new Policy Brief by the FALCON (Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project outlines actionable recommendations for EU policymakers and officials involved preventing and combatting border corruption.\n\nThe brief identifies four priority areas:\n\nreducing discretionary face-to-face interactions at border crossing points through digitalisation;\\\ndeveloping harmonised, risk-based digital infrastructures that can detect corruption-prone patterns;\\\nlimiting manual data handling to close opportunities for manipulation; and\\\nstrengthening the conceptual alignment between anti-trafficking and anti-corruption strategies.\n\nIt argues that effective reform requires corruption-sensitive implementation frameworks, enhanced inter-agency coordination and a shift toward anticipatory governance.\n\nThe Basel Institute on Governance is an associated partner of the FALCON project. [Jacopo Costa](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fabout-us\u002Fpeople\u002Fdr-jacopo-costa) contributed to the Policy Brief and related research.\n\n_FALCON is funded under the Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance receives funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI)._",[28],"2026-03-25","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fbc5fa519-a9aa-472c-aed6-91849cddb2aa?width=600&height=840","FALCON - Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks",[232,234],{"url":119,"caption":233},"Related Quick Guide to border corruption",{"url":235,"caption":236},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58","Related Working Paper on corruption at the port of Rotterdam",[238],{"url":239,"caption":240},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F2026\u002F03\u002Ffalcon-policy-brief-recommendations-for-combatting-border-corruption\u002F","Related FALCON news",[],[],[244,246],{"tags_id":245},{"id":135,"name":136},{"tags_id":247},{"id":248,"name":249},982,"Anti-corruption",[251],2498,[144],[26],"2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:58.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Frecommendations-combatting-border-corruption-falcon-policy-brief",{"id":258,"slug":259,"title":260,"status":6,"nid":261,"year":111,"body":262,"external":19,"topic":263,"language":26,"type":264,"date_published":265,"image":266,"citation":14,"publisher":267,"link_internal":268,"link_external":269,"authors":276,"countries":293,"tags":298,"pdf":321,"topics":323,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":324,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":325,"main_points":326,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":327},2433,"addressing-conflicts-interest-and-corruption-indonesias-energy-transition","Addressing conflicts of interest and corruption in Indonesia’s energy transition",2936,"This U4 Issue analyses Indonesia's ambitious energy transition and highlights how political finance, weak regulations and a \"revolving door\" of personnel between public office and the private sector create vulnerabilities. The publication was produced by U4 and the Basel Institute on Governance through its Green Corruption programme.\n\n\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-02\u002FAddressing-conflicts-of-interest-and-corruption-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition_U4-Issue.pdf\">Download publication here\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n### About the paper\n\nConflicts of interest and corruption in Indonesia's political economy pose significant risks to its energy transition, including the Just Energy Transition Partnership. Existing legal and institutional frameworks are fragmented, inconsistently applied, and often fail to address the risk of state capture by powerful political and economic actors, especially in the extractive and energy sectors.\n\nThe reliance on fossil fuel industries for political financing and the monopolistic nature of state-owned entities further complicate the shift to a low- or no-carbon system, despite the country's ambitious renewable energy targets.\n\nPotential pathways to greater anti-corruption resilience lie in improvements to beneficial ownership transparency and strengthening regulation, monitoring and sanctioning of conflict of interest violations.\n",[215],[28],"2026-02-24","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd97f2ca5-300d-45c9-9de9-33152b72f96c?width=600&height=840","U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre",[],[270,273],{"url":271,"caption":272},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.u4.no\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-conflicts-of-interest-and-corruption-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition"," View on U4 website",{"url":274,"caption":275},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.u4.no\u002Fblog\u002Fimproving-anti-corruption-resilience-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition"," Read related U4 blog",[277,281,285,289],{"authors_id":278},{"id":279,"name":280},581,"Robert Forster",{"authors_id":282},{"id":283,"name":284},582,"Aled Williams",{"authors_id":286},{"id":287,"name":288},523,"Lakso Anindito",{"authors_id":290},{"id":291,"name":292},579,"Dr Amanda Cabrejo le Roux",[294],{"countries_id":295},{"id":296,"name":297},99,"Indonesia",[299,301,305,309,313,317],{"tags_id":300},{"id":248,"name":249},{"tags_id":302},{"id":303,"name":304},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":306},{"id":307,"name":308},804,"Natural resources",{"tags_id":310},{"id":311,"name":312},1371,"Public governance",{"tags_id":314},{"id":315,"name":316},1236,"Compliance",{"tags_id":318},{"id":319,"name":320},973,"Corruption",[322],2489,[215],"2026-02-27T15:11:31.000Z","2026-05-23T20:08:18.000Z","- Corruption and conflicts of interest are embedded in the energy transition process due to the strong links between political power, private wealth (especially from extractive industries) and public office holders.\n- Existing anti-corruption regulations are often vague, fragmented across different legal instruments, and suffer from inconsistent enforcement, which creates loopholes susceptible to manipulation.\n- Progress in renewable energy uptake is slowed by the enduring influence and interests of fossil fuel incumbents who benefit from subsidies that keep coal an artificially cheap and viable energy source.\n- The Just Energy Transition Partnership is vulnerable to misallocations due to concentrated decision-making power, limited transparency in project selection and insufficient involvement of national anti-corruption bodies and civil society in its planning.\n- Improving transparency of beneficial ownership and strengthening the monitoring and sanctioning of conflict of interest violations are possible pathways to build greater anti-corruption resilience, though these institutional efforts alone are insufficient to fully address state capture dynamics.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-conflicts-interest-and-corruption-indonesias-energy-transition",{"id":329,"slug":330,"title":331,"status":6,"nid":332,"year":111,"body":333,"external":19,"topic":334,"language":26,"type":337,"date_published":338,"image":339,"citation":14,"publisher":340,"link_internal":341,"link_external":342,"authors":346,"countries":355,"tags":360,"pdf":373,"topics":375,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":376,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":377,"user_updated":217,"date_updated":378,"main_points":379,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":380},2432,"political-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti","Political economy in the weeds: Embracing complexity in anti-corruption work – lessons learned from anti-corruption programme in Malawi",2910,"In this joint paper with Adam Smith International, authors Claudia Baez Camargo and Renee Kantelberg show how anti-corruption efforts require more than mere technical fixes, such as capacity building for civil society alone, to drive lasting change.\n\nAnti-corruption work is often embedded in complex, politically charged environments. This requires thinking and working politically. Engaging with complex social and economic systems also means recognising that change is not linear or even predictable. What to do then?\n\nOur years of anti-corruption research have demonstrated the centrality of having local stakeholders be in the driver’s seat for identifying priorities and finding solutions. This is how we have worked in Malawi in the Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) project, funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and implemented with Adam Smith International.\n\nThis publication shares practical lessons and successes in applying this approach in the MACCSS project. It illustrates our joint efforts to navigate uncertainty and ground anti-corruption efforts in trust, resilience and local leadership. The key takeaways for practitioners who design or implement anti-corruption programmes (paraphrased) are:\n\n\n- **Embrace complexity.** Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- **Local ownership matters.** When partners are in the driver’s seat, impact and sustainability improve. This is true even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- **Facilitation over funding.** Hands-on mentoring and relationship brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- **Learning by doing.** Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- **Build trust and coalitions.** Reform depends on a collective effort with credible institutions and sister anti-corruption programmes. It also requires nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than merely building the capacity of individual actors.\n- **Resilience grows from below.** Sustainable accountability takes root when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- **Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy.** Integrating gender and social inclusion (GESI) principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure and agriculture – sectors critical for women and marginalised groups – broadens both the reach and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.\n\n\nUltimately, the MACCSS experience reinforces a simple but profound insight: **anti-corruption work is not about perfect plans but about adaptive partnerships.** Change happens through relationships, experimentation and persistence. The task is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to navigate it with integrity and learning at the core. ",[335,336],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[28],"2026-01-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe9075f1f-8dbe-4009-980b-baaae82f9c49?width=600&height=840","Adam Smith International",[],[343],{"url":344,"caption":345},"https:\u002F\u002Fadamsmithinternational.com\u002Farticles\u002Fpolitical-economy-in-the-weeds-embracing-complexity-in-anti-corruption-work\u002F#resource:all"," View on Adam Smith International website",[347,351],{"authors_id":348},{"id":349,"name":350},572,"Dr Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":352},{"id":353,"name":354},580,"Renee Kantelberg",[356],{"countries_id":357},{"id":358,"name":359},153,"Malawi",[361,363,367,371],{"tags_id":362},{"id":248,"name":249},{"tags_id":364},{"id":365,"name":366},1375,"Civil society",{"tags_id":368},{"id":369,"name":370},1372,"Training",{"tags_id":372},{"id":135,"name":136},[374],2488,[144],"\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE WEEDS\n\n## EMBRACING COMPLEXITY IN ANTI-CORRUPTION WORK\n\nBy Renee Kantelberg and Claudia Baez-Camargo\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) programme provides a powerful case for understanding how anti-corruption  (AC)  efforts  unfold  in  complex,  politically  charged  environments.  Jointly  funded  by  the  UK  Foreign, Commonwealth  and  Development  Office  (FCDO)  and  USAID,  MACCSS  (2024-2026)  combines  grants  and  technical assistance worth £1.75 million to strengthen civil society's role in promoting accountability. The initiative works through a  portfolio  of  civil  society  issue-focused  interventions  with  national  and  district  partners  across  sectors  such  as agriculture, mining, constituency development funds, justice and infrastructure.\n\nMalawi serves as both an opportunity-rich testing ground for systems-change initiatives and a cautionary case illustrating the constraints and pressure points such reforms face. This blend of promise and challenge renders Malawi pivotal for understanding governance transformations in comparable contexts. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, with corruption deeply embedded in its political and bureaucratic systems. Decades of clientelist politics, weak enforcement institutions  and  low  public-sector  pay  have  entrenched  behaviours  where  access  to  state  resources  is  viewed  as  an entitlement to extract rents for their own benefit and that of particular interests. In the wake of the September 2025 elections, these longstanding dynamics continue to shape the operating environment. Consequently, MACCSS's mandate remains unchanged: to equip committed civil-society organisations from national bodies to rural district groups with the knowledge, networks, and confidence to serve as policy-reform champions, watchdogs, and mobilisers of citizen voice and national advocacy priorities.\n\nAt first glance, the logic of working with civil society in contexts where state capacities are weak is straightforward: if CSOs are  trained  in  strategic  advocacy,  intervention  design,  operational  planning  and  media  engagement,  they  will become  effective  in  exposing  and  preventing  corruption,  thus  fulfilling  their  assumed  watchdog  function.  Yet  the experience of implementation shows that capacity alone does not guarantee influence and that change is difficult and non-linear. The real story of MACCSS lies in how its partners are learning to 'work in the weeds' - embracing uncertainty, adapting to shifting power dynamics, and building alliances that make accountability and anti-corruption transformation possible.\n\n## The Strategy: Ambition and Assumptions\n\nMACCSS's design draws from the classic anti-corruption playbook, which is reflected in the programme's strategy (Theory of  Change),  which  suggests  that  enhancing  CSO  technical  and  organisational  capacity  results  in  greater  citizen engagement and oversight and, ultimately, in reduced opportunities and incentives for corruption.\n\nConsequently, capacity building is pursued through three interdependent strands:\n\n- ∞ Financial resources - seed funding \u002F grants £10,000 - £50,000 to locally designed interventions.\n- ∞ Technical support -  training and mentoring in advocacy, media work, Political Economy Analysis, Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI), and thematic areas such as mining or procurement.\n- ∞ Organisational strengthening -  support  for  financial  management,  grant  compliance,  safeguarding,  MEL,  and other core systems essential for sustainable CSO operations.\n- ∞ Learning - facilitation and convening of peer exchanges where national and district level partners jointly reflect, share evidence and refine strategies.\n\nJust observing the above, it would be tempting to assume that technical support and trainings are enough to build stronger organisations and that the recipients of the support will automatically be able to translate skills into action and\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## ASI\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nresults.  Experience,  however,  shows  that  this  logic  fails  to  grasp  the  incremental  and  iterative  nature  of  building competencies, while also underestimating the political nature of corruption and the depth of systemic inertia. What MACCSS is revealing is that effectiveness depends less on training or resources than on learning by doing, building relationships, moving with opportunities and the capacity to adapt.\n\n## Working in the Weeds: Navigating Complexity and Adapting Practice\n\nAn overarching lesson from the MACCSS programme is that in practice, progress is messy and contested, which should not be surprising. As in many other countries, power in Malawi is acquired, shared and maintained through networks of patronage,  built  and  cemented  on  non-transparent  deals  that  cut  across  the  state,  business  and  political  parties. Corruption  trickles  down  to  the  grassroots,  where  public  service  providers  and  street  level  bureaucrats  routinely manoeuvre the prerogatives stemming from their official mandates to extract benefits and resources for themselves and their social networks.  Therefore, corruption in Malawi is woven into the political settlement itself and embedded in social norms that normalise and lend acceptability to corruption. As a result, when anti-corruption efforts begin to bite, they often provoke pushback: investigations stall, whistle-blowers face intimidation, and reform champions are side-lined or even threatened. The experience of the Zuneth Sattar case, in which high-level prosecutions led to institutional backlash, illustrates how success can generate its own resistance.\n\nCivil society faces additional constraints. Many organisations operate on shoestring budgets and remain dependent on donor funding, which is often project-based and problematises the continuity of their endeavours. Corruption fatigue also reflects public scepticism among intended beneficiaries that activism will not change anything. Legal restrictions on public-interest litigation, slow access to information, and the risk of regulatory reprisals further limit civic space. At district level, organisational inertia is strong: as one partner admitted, 'this is how we have always done things.'\n\n## From capacity building to facilitated partnership\n\nHere the lessons of MACCSS validate those of many other FCDO governance programmes in that conventional grant making  and  capacity  building  too  often  produces  donor-compliant  but  citizen-disconnected  CSOs.  Grants  managed without attention to the contextual conditions and needs can constrain flexibility, distort incentives, and monetise the engagement. MACCSS learned from this and adopted a facilitated partnership approach , deploying mixed local teams to broker relationships among civil society, media and AC institutions, and FCDO sister programmes while encouraging CSO implementing partners to be in the driver's seat in deciding priorities, providing them a safe space to innovate and to build their capacities through learning by doing. The focus shifted from funding activities to nurturing trust, reflection and adaptive learning within a cohort of champions.\n\nERROR! NO The Accountability Working Group (AWG) - made up of our core partner organisations, together with regular learning exchanges, sits at the centre of our work. MACCSS understands its role as a facilitation hub; encouraging trust building, peer exchanges and the emergence of coordinated action, decidedly moving away from focusing and insisting on preestablished  good  governance  practices  and  an  emphasis  on  procedures  and  delivery  mechanisms.  MACCSS-hosted convenings bring together partner CSOs, journalists \u002F media, communities and duty bearers to co-create interventions, share evidence and reflect on progress along with challenges. The emphasis is on brokering relationships and supporting iterative experimentation, not on enforcing rigid workplans. Mentoring and technical accompaniment are complemented by targeted and demand-led training, and small, flexible funding support is provided to pilot critical ideas whose design evolves as lessons and proof of concept emerge. Learning by doing and reflection\n\nFor MACCSS and its partners real capacity is being built iteratively, through cycles of action and reflection. The MACCSS Monitoring, Reporting, Evaluation and Learning (MREL) system promotes 'utilisation-focused' learning loops following the self-reinforcing logic of implementation, analysis, discussions and, adaptation. Quarterly Pause and Reflect meetings with the AWG provide a collective space to share not only achievements but also setbacks, echoing MACCSS core principle that mistakes are data and information that tell us something to consider . These reflection processes strengthen partners' confidence  and  sense  of  agency.    Gradually,  shifts  are  becoming  visible:  district  networks  collaborating  instead  of competing;  local  journalists  and  activists  pooling  evidence  from  civil  society  work;  civil  servants  recognising  that transparency can strengthen, not threaten, their legitimacy. These may seem like small wins, yet they build the bottomup resilience that sustains reform beyond donor and MACCSS project cycles.\n\nEmbracing uncertainty\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## ASI\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nWorking this way demands tolerance for ambiguity and deviation from plans. Anti-corruption work that matters will always provoke contestation. MACCSS is still unfolding, but it demonstrates that technically skilled support and facilitation, pace that  is  set  by  the  stakeholders  themselves,  moving  on  needs  and  emerging  gaps  as  well  as  patience  and  political awareness are all more effective than rigid top-down management. Progress depends less on control than on cultivating curiosity and responsiveness with a relational approach that puts partners always in the driving seat. MACCSS recognises that grants alone can distort incentives encouraging compliance rather than collaboration.\n\nBy combining seed funding with tailored technical mentoring and facilitation, partners gain the freedom to adapt their strategies as contexts shift, as was experienced during the September 2025 election period when political will and action waned. Yet,  partners  acted  strategically  during  that  election  period  to  influence  the  Anti-Corruption  agenda  through political manifestos, providing evidence where doors opened by politicians. An indicative example of the success achieved through these means was the fact that the AWG was able to get several key questions into the 2025 Presidential Debate that reflected on issues related to corruption in specific sectors.\n\nSetbacks and detours are expected in the process, just as opportunities are; embracing the political landscape mix (and pivoting) is what partners know and do so well.\n\n## Key Lessons Learned\n\n- 1. Embrace complexity. Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- 2. Local ownership matters. When partners are in the driver's seat, as in MACCSS's co-creation of interventions, impact and sustainability improve, even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- 3. Facilitation over funding. Hands-on mentoring and relationship-brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- 4. Learning by doing. Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- 5. Build trust and coalitions. Engagement with credible institutions such as the Ombudsman, with champions in the state and in FCDO sister programmes, and leaning on the collective experience of the AWG, altogether shows that reform depends on collective effort, on nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than on building the capacity of individual actors.\n- 6. Resilience  grows  from  below. District  alliances  illustrate  that  sustainable  accountability  takes  root  when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- 7. Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy. Integrating GESI principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure,  agriculture,  sectors  critical  for  women  and  marginalised  groups  broadens  both  the  reach  and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.\n\nERROR! NO Implications for Malawi and Beyond MACCSS demonstrates the  value  of working  politically  and  adaptively in  anti-corruption  programming  with  local stakeholders driving the agenda and the development of local approaches that work in Malawi for and by Malawians. Technical solutions and training alone cannot overcome entrenched incentives; transformation emerges from iterative learning, trust-building, and responsiveness to context. For donors, this means funding models that prioritise flexibility, process,  reflection  and  a  willingness  to  be  surprised  by  unexpected  gains  as  much  as  outputs  and  indicators.  For practitioners, it means patience, humility and a willingness to depart from the usual approaches and find out how to 'work with the grain' of local systems rather than against them.\n\nAs Malawi moves ahead of the 2025 elections result, the programme continues to focus on citizen energy with CSOs and media bringing collectively concrete accountability demands. The long-term vision is a network of capable, connected CSOs and local champions who can sustain anti-corruption momentum with decreasing external support.\n\nUltimately, the MACCSS experience reinforces a simple but profound insight: anti-corruption work is not about perfect plans but about adaptive partnerships. Change happens through relationships, experimentation and persistence. The task is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to navigate it with integrity and learning at the core.\n\n\u003C!-- image -->","2026-01-28T17:05:36.000Z","2026-06-02T21:22:46.000Z","- **Embrace complexity.** Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- **Local ownership matters.** When partners are in the driver’s seat, impact and sustainability improve. This is true even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- **Facilitation over funding.** Hands-on mentoring and relationship brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- **Learning by doing.** Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- **Build trust and coalitions.** Reform depends on a collective effort with credible institutions and sister anti-corruption programmes. It also requires nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than merely building the capacity of individual actors.\n- **Resilience grows from below.** Sustainable accountability takes root when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- **Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy.** Integrating gender and social inclusion (GESI) principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure and agriculture – sectors critical for women and marginalised groups – broadens both the reach and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpolitical-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti",{"id":382,"slug":383,"title":384,"status":6,"nid":385,"year":386,"body":387,"external":19,"topic":388,"language":26,"type":391,"date_published":392,"image":393,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":394,"link_external":395,"authors":399,"countries":400,"tags":401,"pdf":406,"topics":408,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":410,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":411,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":412},2429,"basel-aml-index-2025","Basel AML Index 2025",2893,2025,"This is the 14th annual Public Edition report of the Basel AML Index, an independent, data-based ranking and risk assessment tool for money laundering and related financial crime risks around the world.\n\nThe Basel AML Index provides risk scores for jurisdictions based on data from 17 publicly accessible sources such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Transparency International and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. The risk scores cover five domains considered to contribute to a high money laundering risk:\n\n\n- Quality of AML\u002FCFT\u002FCPF framework\n- Corruption and fraud risks\n- Financial transparency and standards\n- Public transparency and accountability\n- Political and legal risks\n\n\nThe Basel AML Index is developed and maintained by the Basel Institute on Governance through its \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F25\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR). ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.",[389,390],"Anti-Money Laundering","Asset Recovery",[28],"2025-12-08","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F19665416-644c-4110-9642-07b31f849971?width=600&height=840",[],[396],{"url":397,"caption":398},"https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F"," View Basel AML Index website",[],[],[402],{"tags_id":403},{"id":404,"name":405},1346,"Basel AML Index",[407],2484,[389,409],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement","2025-12-08T11:05:33.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:02.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2025",{"id":414,"slug":415,"title":416,"status":6,"nid":417,"year":111,"body":418,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":419,"date_published":421,"image":422,"citation":7,"publisher":7,"link_internal":423,"link_external":424,"authors":428,"countries":443,"tags":446,"pdf":451,"topics":453,"featured":19,"languages":454,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":146,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":455,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":456},2437,"evolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession","The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession",2960,"Published in the _Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance_, this article examines how Bulgaria’s 2007 accession to the European Union transformed illegal activities and corruption at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint.\n\nWhile the introduction of stricter EU regulations and advanced surveillance technology aimed to secure the border, these measures had the effect of transforming criminal strategies and corruption. The authors detail a shift from blatant smuggling to more sophisticated financial frauds, VAT carousel schemes and the illicit privatisation of public border functions.\n\nThe article highlights that in some cases, it was the bribery schemes that evolved to bypass new standards. In other cases – particularly involving drug trafficking and the smuggling of human beings – it was the criminal strategies that transformed, including advanced concealment methods or new smuggling routes.\n\nThe study also offers a nuanced perspective on the relationship between corruption and criminal activites at border checkpoints: stronger capacity to counter criminal activities could lead to an increase in the risk of corruption, while a more coherent anti corruption framework could trigger criminal activities to evolve. Ultimately, the article argues that anti-crime and anti-corruption policies must account for this evolutionary nature.",[420],"Article","2026-05-01","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2a662dae-21a7-4e84-971d-1c8a70f4754b?width=600&height=840",[],[425],{"url":426,"caption":427},"https:\u002F\u002Fjitfccjournal.com\u002Findex.php\u002Fjitfcc\u002Farticle\u002Fview\u002F16","View on Journal website",[429,431,435,439],{"authors_id":430},{"id":125,"name":126},{"authors_id":432},{"id":433,"name":434},295,"Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":436},{"id":437,"name":438},584,"Noémi Jäger",{"authors_id":440},{"id":441,"name":442},303,"Saba Kassa",[444],{"countries_id":445},{"id":59,"name":60},[447,449],{"tags_id":448},{"id":135,"name":136},{"tags_id":450},{"id":248,"name":249},[452],2492,[144],[26],"2026-06-01T22:34:25.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fevolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession",{"id":458,"slug":459,"title":460,"status":6,"nid":461,"year":111,"body":462,"external":19,"topic":463,"language":26,"type":464,"date_published":466,"image":467,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":468,"link_external":478,"authors":482,"countries":487,"tags":500,"pdf":511,"topics":513,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":514,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":515,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":516},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[390],[465],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[469,472,475],{"url":470,"caption":471},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":473,"caption":474},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":476,"caption":477},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[479],{"url":480,"caption":481},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[483],{"authors_id":484},{"id":485,"name":486},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[488,492,496],{"countries_id":489},{"id":490,"name":491},225,"Ukraine",{"countries_id":493},{"id":494,"name":495},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":497},{"id":498,"name":499},14,"Australia",[501,505,509],{"tags_id":502},{"id":503,"name":504},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":506},{"id":507,"name":508},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":510},{"id":248,"name":249},[512],2499,[409],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":518,"slug":519,"title":520,"status":6,"nid":521,"year":111,"body":522,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":523,"date_published":525,"image":526,"citation":527,"publisher":17,"link_internal":528,"link_external":532,"authors":533,"countries":538,"tags":551,"pdf":556,"topics":559,"featured":19,"languages":560,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":146,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":147,"main_points":7,"short_version":561,"subtitle":7,"link":562},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[524],"Working Paper","2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[529],{"url":530,"caption":531},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[534],{"authors_id":535},{"id":536,"name":537},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[539,543,547,549],{"countries_id":540},{"id":541,"name":542},228,"United States",{"countries_id":544},{"id":545,"name":546},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":548},{"id":494,"name":495},{"countries_id":550},{"id":498,"name":499},[552,554],{"tags_id":553},{"id":507,"name":508},{"tags_id":555},{"id":248,"name":249},[557,558],2490,2491,[409],[26],"Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":564,"slug":565,"title":566,"status":6,"nid":567,"year":111,"body":568,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":569,"date_published":571,"image":572,"citation":573,"publisher":17,"link_internal":574,"link_external":581,"authors":588,"countries":597,"tags":602,"pdf":619,"topics":621,"featured":19,"languages":622,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":254,"user_updated":217,"date_updated":623,"main_points":624,"short_version":7,"subtitle":625,"link":626},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\n[**Download Case Study here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002FCase-Study-13_Beauty-Queen.pdf)\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\n**Main takeaways of the case:**\n\n- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[570],"Case Study","2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13).",[575,578],{"url":576,"caption":577},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716","Read related blog",{"url":579,"caption":580},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications","Read related Policy Brief 16",[582,585],{"url":583,"caption":584},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":586,"caption":587},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[589,593],{"authors_id":590},{"id":591,"name":592},294,"Oscar Solorzano",{"authors_id":594},{"id":595,"name":596},591,"Diana Cordero",[598],{"countries_id":599},{"id":600,"name":601},47,"Colombia",[603,607,611,613,617],{"tags_id":604},{"id":605,"name":606},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":608},{"id":609,"name":610},822,"International cooperation",{"tags_id":612},{"id":303,"name":304},{"tags_id":614},{"id":615,"name":616},1374,"Law enforcement",{"tags_id":618},{"id":507,"name":508},[620],2495,[409],[26],"2026-06-02T14:22:13.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",1780676543892]