[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":563},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-corruption-violation-international-human-rights":3,"related-corruption-violation-international-human-rights":101},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":23,"link_external":24,"featured":19,"topics":28,"languages":31,"type":32,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":34,"countries":44,"tags":45,"pdf":83,"authors":84},1911,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:54:54.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:01.000Z",701,"corruption-violation-international-human-rights","Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights","States perceived to be highly corrupt are at the same time those with a poor human rights record. International institutions have therefore assumed a negative feedback loop between both social harms. They deplore that corruption undermines the enjoyment of human rights and, concomitantly, employ human rights as a normative framework to denounce and combat corruption. But the human rights-based approach has been criticized as vague and over-reaching.\n\nAddressing this controversy, this article seeks to examine the legal quality of the assumed ‘link’ between corruption and human rights more closely. It specifically asks the dual question:\n\n\n- whether and under what conditions corrupt acts or omissions can technically be qualified as an actual violation of international human rights (doctrinal analysis of the positive law);\n- whether corruption should be conceptualized as a human rights violation (normative assessment).\n\n\nThe answer is that such a reconceptualization is legally sound as a matter of positive analysis, although very difficult doctrinal problems arise. The normative assessment is ambivalent, but the practical benefits of the conceptualization seem to outweigh the risks of reinforcing the anti-Western scepticism towards the fight against corruption and of overblowing human rights.\n\nThe framing of corruption not only as a human rights issue but even as a potential human rights violation can contribute to closing the implementation gap of the international anti-corruption instruments and can usefully complement the predominant criminal law-based approach.","Peters, A. (2018). Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights. European Journal of International Law, 29(4), 1251-1287. doi:10.1093\u002Fejil\u002Fchy070","English",2018,"European Journal of International Law","2018-12-31",false,[21,22],"Asset Recovery","Public Governance",[],[25],{"url":26,"caption":27},"https:\u002F\u002Facademic.oup.com\u002Fejil\u002Farticle\u002F29\u002F4\u002F1251\u002F5320164","View article",[29,30],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement","Corruption Prevention and Public Governance",[15],[33],"Article",{"id":35,"storage":36,"filename_disk":37,"filename_download":38,"title":38,"type":39,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":40,"width":41,"height":42,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":43,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"9dcfa804-0497-41a9-98c4-98aef6b6a5eb","local","9dcfa804-0497-41a9-98c4-98aef6b6a5eb.png","europeanjournal.png","image\u002Fpng",397078,520,780,{},[],[46,67],{"id":47,"publications_id":48,"tags_id":64},3725,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":35,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":51,"link_internal":52,"link_external":53,"featured":19,"topics":55,"languages":56,"type":57,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":58,"tags":59,"pdf":61,"authors":62},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21,22],[],[54],{"url":26,"caption":27},[29,30],[15],[33],[],[47,60],4971,[],[63],2086,{"id":65,"name":66},932,"Human rights",{"id":60,"publications_id":68,"tags_id":80},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":35,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":69,"link_internal":70,"link_external":71,"featured":19,"topics":73,"languages":74,"type":75,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":76,"tags":77,"pdf":78,"authors":79},[21,22],[],[72],{"url":26,"caption":27},[29,30],[15],[33],[],[47,60],[],[63],{"id":81,"name":82},982,"Anti-corruption",[],[85],{"id":63,"publications_id":86,"authors_id":98},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":8,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":35,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":87,"link_internal":88,"link_external":89,"featured":19,"topics":91,"languages":92,"type":93,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":94,"tags":95,"pdf":96,"authors":97},[21,22],[],[90],{"url":26,"caption":27},[29,30],[15],[33],[],[47,60],[],[63],{"id":99,"name":100,"position":7,"image":7},380,"Anne Peters",[102,139,199,247,286,331,384,420,470,516],{"id":103,"slug":104,"title":105,"status":6,"nid":106,"year":107,"body":108,"external":19,"topic":109,"language":15,"type":110,"date_published":112,"image":113,"citation":114,"publisher":115,"link_internal":116,"link_external":120,"authors":121,"countries":126,"tags":127,"pdf":132,"topics":134,"featured":19,"languages":135,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":136,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":137,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":138},2367,"qg32","Quick Guide 32: Corruption and human rights",2700,2024,"The relationships between corruption and human rights are complex but cry out for exploring. Could anti-corruption benefit from a human rights perspective? How can the two communities work better together – and what are some risks and challenges?\n\nThis Quick Guide gives a brief introduction to the ideas of the Basel Institute’s Vice-President, Professor Anne Peters, and some of our initial work at the intersection of corruption and human rights.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nThis work is licensed under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[66],[111],"Quick Guide","2024-10-07","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb0e49414-bd4a-4f3d-a55b-0caf6e45bcf8?width=600&height=840","","Basel Institute on Governance",[117],{"url":118,"caption":119},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Quick%20Guide"," View all Quick Guides",[],[122],{"authors_id":123},{"id":124,"name":125},549,"Prof Anne Peters",[],[128,130],{"tags_id":129},{"id":81,"name":82},{"tags_id":131},{"id":65,"name":66},[133],2405,[66],[15],"2024-10-07T10:05:06.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:47.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg32",{"id":140,"slug":141,"title":142,"status":6,"nid":143,"year":144,"body":145,"external":19,"topic":146,"language":15,"type":147,"date_published":149,"image":150,"citation":114,"publisher":115,"link_internal":151,"link_external":160,"authors":164,"countries":169,"tags":182,"pdf":193,"topics":195,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":196,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":197,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":198},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[148],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[152,155,158],{"url":153,"caption":154},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":156,"caption":157},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":159,"caption":119},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428",[161],{"url":162,"caption":163},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[165],{"authors_id":166},{"id":167,"name":168},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[170,174,178],{"countries_id":171},{"id":172,"name":173},225,"Ukraine",{"countries_id":175},{"id":176,"name":177},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":179},{"id":180,"name":181},14,"Australia",[183,187,191],{"tags_id":184},{"id":185,"name":186},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":188},{"id":189,"name":190},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":192},{"id":81,"name":82},[194],2499,[29],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":200,"slug":201,"title":202,"status":6,"nid":203,"year":144,"body":204,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":205,"date_published":207,"image":208,"citation":209,"publisher":115,"link_internal":210,"link_external":214,"authors":215,"countries":220,"tags":233,"pdf":238,"topics":241,"featured":19,"languages":242,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":243,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":244,"main_points":7,"short_version":245,"subtitle":7,"link":246},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[206],"Working Paper","2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[211],{"url":212,"caption":213},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[216],{"authors_id":217},{"id":218,"name":219},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[221,225,229,231],{"countries_id":222},{"id":223,"name":224},228,"United States",{"countries_id":226},{"id":227,"name":228},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":230},{"id":176,"name":177},{"countries_id":232},{"id":180,"name":181},[234,236],{"tags_id":235},{"id":189,"name":190},{"tags_id":237},{"id":81,"name":82},[239,240],2490,2491,[29],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":248,"slug":249,"title":250,"status":6,"nid":251,"year":252,"body":253,"external":19,"topic":254,"language":15,"type":255,"date_published":256,"image":257,"citation":114,"publisher":115,"link_internal":258,"link_external":264,"authors":265,"countries":270,"tags":273,"pdf":278,"topics":280,"featured":281,"languages":282,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":283,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":284,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":285},2390,"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,2025,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[21],[206],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840",[259,262],{"url":260,"caption":261},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":212,"caption":263}," View all Working Papers",[],[266],{"authors_id":267},{"id":268,"name":269},560,"Sam Hickey",[271],{"countries_id":272},{"id":172,"name":173},[274,276],{"tags_id":275},{"id":81,"name":82},{"tags_id":277},{"id":189,"name":190},[279],2431,[29],true,[15],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":287,"slug":288,"title":289,"status":6,"nid":290,"year":252,"body":291,"external":19,"topic":292,"language":293,"type":294,"date_published":296,"image":297,"citation":114,"publisher":115,"link_internal":298,"link_external":305,"authors":309,"countries":314,"tags":315,"pdf":324,"topics":326,"featured":19,"languages":327,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":328,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":329,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":330},2384,"pb-14-fr","Policy Brief 14: Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs",2747,"La Directive de l’Union européenne de 2024 \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Flegal-content\u002FFR\u002FTXT\u002FHTML\u002F?uri=OJ:L_202401260\">relative au recouvrement et à la confiscation d'avoirs\u003C\u002Fa> oblige les États membres, entre autres, à adopter des mesures législatives pour permettre la confiscation de la « fortune inexpliquée ».\n\nCette Note de politique examine l’article 16 de la Directive qui énonce cette obligation, ainsi que les pouvoirs et restrictions que les États membres devront inclure dans les mesures relatives à la « fortune inexpliquée » pour garantir la conformité à la Directive.\n\nEn bref, cela démontre la grande flexibilité accordée par le texte de la Directive aux États membres pour déterminer le champ d’application de leurs propres mesures en matière de fortune inexpliquée. Au minimum, les États seront requis d’introduire des mesures susceptibles d’être utilisées pour cibler la fortune inexpliquée liée au crime organisé.\n\nCependant, les États membres peuvent toujours décider d’introduire des mesures de plus grande portée ciblant la fortune inexpliquée liée à toutes les activités criminelles, y compris la corruption.\n\n**À propos de cette Note de politique**\n\nLa présente publication fait partie de la série de Notes de politique (Policy Briefs) du Basel Institute on Governance, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>. Elle est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> Licence internationale.\n\nCitation proposée : Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. « Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs. » Note de politique 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Disponible sur: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14-fr\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14-fr\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nIl s’agit d’une publication de l’International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) au Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR reçoit un financement principal des gouvernements de Jersey, du Liechtenstein, de la Norvège, de la Suisse et du Royaume-Uni.",[21],"French",[295],"Policy Brief","2025-01-23","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F726e9035-52eb-4722-ab59-3b33bed7538f?width=600&height=840",[299,302],{"url":300,"caption":301},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14"," Version anglaise",{"url":303,"caption":304},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Policy%20Brief"," Voir tous les Policy Briefs",[306],{"url":307,"caption":308},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=65&lang=fr"," Livre (disponible gratuitement): Enrichissement illicite",[310],{"authors_id":311},{"id":312,"name":313},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[],[316,318,322],{"tags_id":317},{"id":189,"name":190},{"tags_id":319},{"id":320,"name":321},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":323},{"id":65,"name":66},[325],2420,[29],[293],"2025-01-23T17:05:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:49.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14-fr",{"id":332,"slug":333,"title":334,"status":6,"nid":335,"year":107,"body":336,"external":19,"topic":337,"language":15,"type":338,"date_published":339,"image":340,"citation":114,"publisher":115,"link_internal":341,"link_external":343,"authors":347,"countries":352,"tags":357,"pdf":378,"topics":380,"featured":281,"languages":381,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":382,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":137,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":383},2366,"wp-54","Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America",2701,"This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, *Extinción de dominio*.\n\nIt argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.\n\nThe paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54.",[21],[206],"2024-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F37616510-2f1f-4ab6-9405-845433d6fa3b?width=600&height=840",[342],{"url":212,"caption":263},[344],{"url":345,"caption":346},"route:\u003Cnolink>"," Download PDF (Spanish - forthcoming)",[348],{"authors_id":349},{"id":350,"name":351},294,"Oscar Solorzano",[353],{"countries_id":354},{"id":355,"name":356},171,"Peru",[358,360,362,366,370,374],{"tags_id":359},{"id":189,"name":190},{"tags_id":361},{"id":65,"name":66},{"tags_id":363},{"id":364,"name":365},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":367},{"id":368,"name":369},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":371},{"id":372,"name":373},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":375},{"id":376,"name":377},1215,"Illicit financial flows",[379],2404,[29],[15],"2024-10-03T16:05:11.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54",{"id":385,"slug":386,"title":387,"status":6,"nid":388,"year":107,"body":389,"external":19,"topic":390,"language":15,"type":391,"date_published":392,"image":393,"citation":114,"publisher":115,"link_internal":394,"link_external":397,"authors":401,"countries":404,"tags":405,"pdf":414,"topics":416,"featured":19,"languages":417,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":418,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":329,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":419},2383,"pb-14","Policy Brief 14: Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery",2739,"The European Union’s 2024 \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fdata.europa.eu\u002Feli\u002Fdir\u002F2024\u002F1260\u002Foj\">Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation\u003C\u002Fa> obliges Member States to, among other things, introduce legislative measures to enable the confiscation of “unexplained wealth”.\n\nThis policy paper examines this Article and the powers and restrictions that Member States will need to include in such “unexplained wealth” measures to ensure compliance with the Directive.\n\nIn brief, the Directive gives legislators in EU Member States flexibility to decide the scope of their own unexplained wealth measures. At a minimum, they must introduce measures that can be used to target unexplained wealth linked to organised crime.\n\nMember States could, however, adopt broader measures target unexplained wealth relating to all criminal activity, including corruption.\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nYou may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence. Suggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. ‘Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery.’ Policy Brief 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14\u003C\u002Fa>. \n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.",[21],[295],"2024-01-13","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9b9b6a62-6a97-4851-957f-1f36155e8f32?width=600&height=840",[395],{"url":303,"caption":396}," View all Policy Briefs",[398],{"url":399,"caption":400},"https:\u002F\u002Fillicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org\u002F"," Free book: Illicit Enrichment",[402],{"authors_id":403},{"id":312,"name":313},[],[406,408,410,412],{"tags_id":407},{"id":320,"name":321},{"tags_id":409},{"id":376,"name":377},{"tags_id":411},{"id":189,"name":190},{"tags_id":413},{"id":65,"name":66},[415],2419,[29],[15],"2025-01-13T11:05:26.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14",{"id":421,"slug":422,"title":423,"status":6,"nid":424,"year":425,"body":426,"external":19,"topic":427,"language":15,"type":428,"date_published":430,"image":431,"citation":432,"publisher":115,"link_internal":433,"link_external":437,"authors":438,"countries":447,"tags":452,"pdf":463,"topics":465,"featured":19,"languages":466,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":467,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":468,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":469},2324,"research-case-5","Research Case Study 5: Harnessing behavioural approaches against corruption",2550,2023,"Social norms and behaviour change (SNBC) approaches are a promising complement to conventional anti-corruption strategies. Adopting a context-sensitive and nuanced approach is an essential ingredient for success.\n\nWe wanted to understand if and how behavioural approaches can promote anti-corruption outcomes, as well as conditions for success.\n\nTo do this we reviewed research from 2016–2022 on the use of behavioural approaches in anti-corruption practice. We also analysed our practical experience designing and piloting an intervention to tackle social norms of reciprocity which fuel bribery in health facilities in Tanzania.",[22],[429],"Research Case Study","2023-12-05","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fa4b5e14a-9841-4feb-8411-335c9f972aba?width=600&height=840","Baez Camargo, Claudia, and Saba Kassa. 2023. ‘Harnessing behavioural approaches against corruption.’ Research Case Study 5, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgov- ernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fresearch-case-5.",[434],{"url":435,"caption":436},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Research%20Case%20Study"," View all research case studies",[],[439,443],{"authors_id":440},{"id":441,"name":442},295,"Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":444},{"id":445,"name":446},303,"Saba Kassa",[448],{"countries_id":449},{"id":450,"name":451},224,"Tanzania",[453,457,461],{"tags_id":454},{"id":455,"name":456},848,"Behavioural science",{"tags_id":458},{"id":459,"name":460},1309,"Informality",{"tags_id":462},{"id":81,"name":82},[464],2360,[30],[15],"2023-12-06T11:04:47.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:43.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fresearch-case-5",{"id":471,"slug":472,"title":473,"status":6,"nid":474,"year":144,"body":475,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":476,"date_published":477,"image":478,"citation":7,"publisher":7,"link_internal":479,"link_external":480,"authors":484,"countries":497,"tags":502,"pdf":509,"topics":511,"featured":19,"languages":513,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":50,"date_created":243,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":514,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":515},2437,"evolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession","The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession",2960,"Published in the _Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance_, this article examines how Bulgaria’s 2007 accession to the European Union transformed illegal activities and corruption at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint.\n\nWhile the introduction of stricter EU regulations and advanced surveillance technology aimed to secure the border, these measures had the effect of transforming criminal strategies and corruption. The authors detail a shift from blatant smuggling to more sophisticated financial frauds, VAT carousel schemes and the illicit privatisation of public border functions.\n\nThe article highlights that in some cases, it was the bribery schemes that evolved to bypass new standards. In other cases – particularly involving drug trafficking and the smuggling of human beings – it was the criminal strategies that transformed, including advanced concealment methods or new smuggling routes.\n\nThe study also offers a nuanced perspective on the relationship between corruption and criminal activites at border checkpoints: stronger capacity to counter criminal activities could lead to an increase in the risk of corruption, while a more coherent anti corruption framework could trigger criminal activities to evolve. Ultimately, the article argues that anti-crime and anti-corruption policies must account for this evolutionary nature.",[33],"2026-05-01","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2a662dae-21a7-4e84-971d-1c8a70f4754b?width=600&height=840",[],[481],{"url":482,"caption":483},"https:\u002F\u002Fjitfccjournal.com\u002Findex.php\u002Fjitfcc\u002Farticle\u002Fview\u002F16","View on Journal website",[485,489,491,495],{"authors_id":486},{"id":487,"name":488},304,"Jacopo Costa",{"authors_id":490},{"id":441,"name":442},{"authors_id":492},{"id":493,"name":494},584,"Noémi Jäger",{"authors_id":496},{"id":445,"name":446},[498],{"countries_id":499},{"id":500,"name":501},22,"Bulgaria",[503,507],{"tags_id":504},{"id":505,"name":506},859,"Corruption risks",{"tags_id":508},{"id":81,"name":82},[510],2492,[512],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[15],"2026-06-01T22:34:25.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fevolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession",{"id":517,"slug":518,"title":519,"status":6,"nid":520,"year":144,"body":521,"external":19,"topic":522,"language":15,"type":525,"date_published":526,"image":527,"citation":528,"publisher":529,"link_internal":530,"link_external":531,"authors":538,"countries":547,"tags":552,"pdf":557,"topics":558,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":49,"date_created":559,"user_updated":560,"date_updated":561,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":562},2435,"conceptualizing-evolution-corruption-empirical-analysis-italy","Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy",2911,"In a new peer-reviewed journal article, Jacopo Costa and Claudia Baez Camargo look into why and how corruption evolves over time, drawing on an empirical analysis from Italy. The article was published in *Trends in Organized Crime*.\n\n### Abstract\n\nCorruption evolves over time. This paper investigates why and how this evolution happens. The analysis has employed a combination of qualitative network and document analysis to explore the configuration of corruption in two moments in Italy and the changes that have happened in between them.\n\nThe findings have disclosed that a higher efficiency of the activities of the criminal-justice chain, the transformation of the critical actors and the reform of legal frameworks and governance systems have been critical in determining the evolution of corruption.\n\nThe added value of the research lies in its ability to examine these transformative mechanisms within a conceptual framework that keeps together the fact that corruption is networked and that networks evolve over time.\n",[523,524],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[33],"2026-02-03","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F8fdd73a7-79ec-4940-aa53-01a9f94922f2?width=600&height=840","Costa, J., Baez Camargo, C. Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy. *Trends Organ Crim* (2026). \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12117-025-09586-0\">https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12117-025-09586-0\u003C\u002Fa>","Springer Nature (Trends in Organized Crime)",[],[532,535],{"url":533,"caption":534},"https:\u002F\u002Frdcu.be\u002Fe1Z0q","Access full-text view-only version",{"url":536,"caption":537},"https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12117-025-09586-0"," View on publisher website",[539,543],{"authors_id":540},{"id":541,"name":542},550,"Dr Jacopo Costa",{"authors_id":544},{"id":545,"name":546},572,"Dr Claudia Baez Camargo",[548],{"countries_id":549},{"id":550,"name":551},108,"Italy",[553,555],{"tags_id":554},{"id":81,"name":82},{"tags_id":556},{"id":368,"name":369},[],[512],"2026-02-27T15:11:33.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-05-31T23:16:17.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fconceptualizing-evolution-corruption-empirical-analysis-italy",1780676566319]