[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":629},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-corruption-and-money-laundering-international-arbitration-toolkit-arbitrators":3,"related-corruption-and-money-laundering-international-arbitration-toolkit-arbitrators":154},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":22,"link_external":23,"featured":19,"topics":24,"languages":25,"type":26,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":28,"countries":39,"tags":40,"pdf":64,"authors":122},1903,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:54:49.000Z","2026-05-23T20:08:10.000Z",931,"corruption-and-money-laundering-international-arbitration-toolkit-arbitrators","Corruption and Money Laundering in International Arbitration: A Toolkit for Arbitrators","Both in investment and in commercial arbitration, arbitrators face considerable challenges if a party alleges – or the arbitrators suspect – that corruption has influenced the underlying dispute.\n\n\n- Which laws are applicable?\n- What are the requirements for the proof of corruption in arbitration proceedings?\n- What are the legal consequences of corruption in arbitration?\n- And how can arbitrators become aware of corruption in the first place? \n\n\nIt is generally understood that corruption cannot be condoned – at the same time parties should not be allowed to free themselves of their obligations easily. \n\nThis toolkit aims to help arbitrators who suspect, or are confronted with, alleged corruption or money laundering in relation to the underlying dispute, to address these issues in a systematic and comprehensive manner, and to find a solution in accordance with the applicable laws. An arbitral award having been rendered by an arbitral tribunal using the toolkit should have a greater chance of enforcement. \n\nThe toolkit was discussed by participants of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Finternational-arbitration-and-corruption-workshop-10-11-january-2019\">International Arbitration and Corruption Conference\u003C\u002Fa> in Basel, Switzerland, on 10-11 January, 2019.","","English",2019,"Competence Centre Arbitration and Crime, University of Basel and Basel Institute on Governance","2019-04-20",false,[21],"Anti-Money Laundering",[],[],[21],[15],[27],"Guidelines",{"id":29,"storage":30,"filename_disk":31,"filename_download":32,"title":33,"type":34,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":35,"width":36,"height":37,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":38,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"7f346c4c-9198-42bf-865b-f5a527b3fed7","local","7f346c4c-9198-42bf-865b-f5a527b3fed7.jpg","Pages-from-A-Toolkit-for-Arbitrators-29-05-2019-single-pages.jpg","Pages from A_Toolkit_for_Arbitrators_29_05_2019_single_pages.jpg","image\u002Fjpeg",323101,2481,3508,{},[],[41],{"id":42,"publications_id":43,"tags_id":61},4968,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":29,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":46,"link_internal":47,"link_external":48,"featured":19,"topics":49,"languages":50,"type":51,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":52,"tags":53,"pdf":54,"authors":58},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21],[],[],[21],[15],[27],[],[42],[55,56,57],1954,1955,1956,[59,60],2080,2081,{"id":62,"name":63},982,"Anti-corruption",[65,86,104],{"id":55,"publications_id":66,"directus_files_id":77},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":29,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":67,"link_internal":68,"link_external":69,"featured":19,"topics":70,"languages":71,"type":72,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":73,"tags":74,"pdf":75,"authors":76},[21],[],[],[21],[15],[27],[],[42],[55,56,57],[59,60],{"id":78,"storage":30,"filename_disk":79,"filename_download":80,"title":80,"type":81,"folder":82,"uploaded_by":44,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":83,"charset":7,"filesize":84,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":85,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"4c299ef0-0c0d-4e43-b0e5-b226c1b2a53b","4c299ef0-0c0d-4e43-b0e5-b226c1b2a53b.pdf","a-toolkit-for-arbitrators-29-05-2019-single-pages.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5","2022-04-27T11:54:50.000Z",788487,"English: Corruption and Money Laundering in International Arbitration: A Toolkit for Arbitrators",{"id":56,"publications_id":87,"directus_files_id":98},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":29,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":88,"link_internal":89,"link_external":90,"featured":19,"topics":91,"languages":92,"type":93,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":94,"tags":95,"pdf":96,"authors":97},[21],[],[],[21],[15],[27],[],[42],[55,56,57],[59,60],{"id":99,"storage":30,"filename_disk":100,"filename_download":101,"title":101,"type":81,"folder":82,"uploaded_by":44,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":83,"charset":7,"filesize":102,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":103,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"8f869604-9a3c-4d77-a398-9d313c271894","8f869604-9a3c-4d77-a398-9d313c271894.pdf","A-Toolkit-for-Arbitrators---Russian-version.pdf",848669," Russian: Коррупция и отмывание денежных средств в международном арбитраже: Инструментарий для арбитров",{"id":57,"publications_id":105,"directus_files_id":116},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":29,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":106,"link_internal":107,"link_external":108,"featured":19,"topics":109,"languages":110,"type":111,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":112,"tags":113,"pdf":114,"authors":115},[21],[],[],[21],[15],[27],[],[42],[55,56,57],[59,60],{"id":117,"storage":30,"filename_disk":118,"filename_download":119,"title":119,"type":81,"folder":82,"uploaded_by":44,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":83,"charset":7,"filesize":120,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":121,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"99e2225e-526b-4175-9445-9b12423c0d58","99e2225e-526b-4175-9445-9b12423c0d58.pdf","Toolkit-for-Arbitrators-FR.pdf",808082," French: Corruption et blanchiment d’argent dans l’arbitrage international: Boîte à outils pour les arbitres",[123,139],{"id":59,"publications_id":124,"authors_id":135},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":29,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":125,"link_internal":126,"link_external":127,"featured":19,"topics":128,"languages":129,"type":130,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":131,"tags":132,"pdf":133,"authors":134},[21],[],[],[21],[15],[27],[],[42],[55,56,57],[59,60],{"id":136,"name":137,"position":7,"image":138},302,"Mark Pieth","2f4f2174-a03c-4bd1-9cbc-848efef795c6",{"id":60,"publications_id":140,"authors_id":151},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":8,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":29,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":141,"link_internal":142,"link_external":143,"featured":19,"topics":144,"languages":145,"type":146,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":147,"tags":148,"pdf":149,"authors":150},[21],[],[],[21],[15],[27],[],[42],[55,56,57],[59,60],{"id":152,"name":153,"position":7,"image":7},352,"Kathrin Betz",[155,219,267,318,354,426,475,524,566,599],{"id":156,"slug":157,"title":158,"status":6,"nid":159,"year":160,"body":161,"external":19,"topic":162,"language":15,"type":164,"date_published":166,"image":167,"citation":14,"publisher":168,"link_internal":169,"link_external":179,"authors":183,"countries":188,"tags":201,"pdf":212,"topics":214,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":216,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":217,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":218},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[163],"Asset Recovery",[165],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840","Basel Institute on Governance",[170,173,176],{"url":171,"caption":172},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":174,"caption":175},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":177,"caption":178},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[180],{"url":181,"caption":182},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[184],{"authors_id":185},{"id":186,"name":187},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[189,193,197],{"countries_id":190},{"id":191,"name":192},225,"Ukraine",{"countries_id":194},{"id":195,"name":196},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":198},{"id":199,"name":200},14,"Australia",[202,206,210],{"tags_id":203},{"id":204,"name":205},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":207},{"id":208,"name":209},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":211},{"id":62,"name":63},[213],2499,[215],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement","2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":220,"slug":221,"title":222,"status":6,"nid":223,"year":160,"body":224,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":225,"date_published":227,"image":228,"citation":229,"publisher":168,"link_internal":230,"link_external":234,"authors":235,"countries":240,"tags":253,"pdf":258,"topics":261,"featured":19,"languages":262,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":263,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":264,"main_points":7,"short_version":265,"subtitle":7,"link":266},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[226],"Working Paper","2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[231],{"url":232,"caption":233},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[236],{"authors_id":237},{"id":238,"name":239},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[241,245,249,251],{"countries_id":242},{"id":243,"name":244},228,"United States",{"countries_id":246},{"id":247,"name":248},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":250},{"id":195,"name":196},{"countries_id":252},{"id":199,"name":200},[254,256],{"tags_id":255},{"id":208,"name":209},{"tags_id":257},{"id":62,"name":63},[259,260],2490,2491,[215],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":268,"slug":269,"title":270,"status":6,"nid":271,"year":160,"body":272,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":273,"date_published":275,"image":276,"citation":7,"publisher":7,"link_internal":277,"link_external":278,"authors":282,"countries":299,"tags":304,"pdf":311,"topics":313,"featured":19,"languages":315,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":263,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":316,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":317},2437,"evolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession","The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession",2960,"Published in the _Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance_, this article examines how Bulgaria’s 2007 accession to the European Union transformed illegal activities and corruption at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint.\n\nWhile the introduction of stricter EU regulations and advanced surveillance technology aimed to secure the border, these measures had the effect of transforming criminal strategies and corruption. The authors detail a shift from blatant smuggling to more sophisticated financial frauds, VAT carousel schemes and the illicit privatisation of public border functions.\n\nThe article highlights that in some cases, it was the bribery schemes that evolved to bypass new standards. In other cases – particularly involving drug trafficking and the smuggling of human beings – it was the criminal strategies that transformed, including advanced concealment methods or new smuggling routes.\n\nThe study also offers a nuanced perspective on the relationship between corruption and criminal activites at border checkpoints: stronger capacity to counter criminal activities could lead to an increase in the risk of corruption, while a more coherent anti corruption framework could trigger criminal activities to evolve. Ultimately, the article argues that anti-crime and anti-corruption policies must account for this evolutionary nature.",[274],"Article","2026-05-01","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2a662dae-21a7-4e84-971d-1c8a70f4754b?width=600&height=840",[],[279],{"url":280,"caption":281},"https:\u002F\u002Fjitfccjournal.com\u002Findex.php\u002Fjitfcc\u002Farticle\u002Fview\u002F16","View on Journal website",[283,287,291,295],{"authors_id":284},{"id":285,"name":286},304,"Jacopo Costa",{"authors_id":288},{"id":289,"name":290},295,"Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":292},{"id":293,"name":294},584,"Noémi Jäger",{"authors_id":296},{"id":297,"name":298},303,"Saba Kassa",[300],{"countries_id":301},{"id":302,"name":303},22,"Bulgaria",[305,309],{"tags_id":306},{"id":307,"name":308},859,"Corruption risks",{"tags_id":310},{"id":62,"name":63},[312],2492,[314],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[15],"2026-06-01T22:34:25.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fevolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession",{"id":319,"slug":320,"title":321,"status":6,"nid":322,"year":160,"body":323,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":324,"date_published":326,"image":327,"citation":7,"publisher":328,"link_internal":329,"link_external":336,"authors":340,"countries":341,"tags":342,"pdf":347,"topics":349,"featured":19,"languages":350,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":351,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":352,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":353},2444,"recommendations-combatting-border-corruption-falcon-policy-brief","Recommendations for combatting border corruption (FALCON Policy Brief)",2946,"Corruption at borders poses a significant threat to the integrity of the European Union’s external borders, undermining security, trust, and governance. And border corruption is not static — it evolves in response to new controls, technologies and enforcement strategies. This means that even well-designed measures may lose effectiveness over time.\n\nA new Policy Brief by the FALCON (Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project outlines actionable recommendations for EU policymakers and officials involved preventing and combatting border corruption.\n\nThe brief identifies four priority areas:\n\nreducing discretionary face-to-face interactions at border crossing points through digitalisation;\\\ndeveloping harmonised, risk-based digital infrastructures that can detect corruption-prone patterns;\\\nlimiting manual data handling to close opportunities for manipulation; and\\\nstrengthening the conceptual alignment between anti-trafficking and anti-corruption strategies.\n\nIt argues that effective reform requires corruption-sensitive implementation frameworks, enhanced inter-agency coordination and a shift toward anticipatory governance.\n\nThe Basel Institute on Governance is an associated partner of the FALCON project. [Jacopo Costa](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fabout-us\u002Fpeople\u002Fdr-jacopo-costa) contributed to the Policy Brief and related research.\n\n_FALCON is funded under the Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance receives funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI)._",[325],"Report","2026-03-25","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fbc5fa519-a9aa-472c-aed6-91849cddb2aa?width=600&height=840","FALCON - Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks",[330,333],{"url":331,"caption":332},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg38","Related Quick Guide to border corruption",{"url":334,"caption":335},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58","Related Working Paper on corruption at the port of Rotterdam",[337],{"url":338,"caption":339},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F2026\u002F03\u002Ffalcon-policy-brief-recommendations-for-combatting-border-corruption\u002F","Related FALCON news",[],[],[343,345],{"tags_id":344},{"id":307,"name":308},{"tags_id":346},{"id":62,"name":63},[348],2498,[314],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:58.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Frecommendations-combatting-border-corruption-falcon-policy-brief",{"id":355,"slug":356,"title":357,"status":6,"nid":358,"year":160,"body":359,"external":19,"topic":360,"language":15,"type":362,"date_published":363,"image":364,"citation":14,"publisher":365,"link_internal":366,"link_external":367,"authors":374,"countries":391,"tags":396,"pdf":419,"topics":421,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":422,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":423,"main_points":424,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":425},2433,"addressing-conflicts-interest-and-corruption-indonesias-energy-transition","Addressing conflicts of interest and corruption in Indonesia’s energy transition",2936,"This U4 Issue analyses Indonesia's ambitious energy transition and highlights how political finance, weak regulations and a \"revolving door\" of personnel between public office and the private sector create vulnerabilities. The publication was produced by U4 and the Basel Institute on Governance through its Green Corruption programme.\n\n\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-02\u002FAddressing-conflicts-of-interest-and-corruption-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition_U4-Issue.pdf\">Download publication here\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n### About the paper\n\nConflicts of interest and corruption in Indonesia's political economy pose significant risks to its energy transition, including the Just Energy Transition Partnership. Existing legal and institutional frameworks are fragmented, inconsistently applied, and often fail to address the risk of state capture by powerful political and economic actors, especially in the extractive and energy sectors.\n\nThe reliance on fossil fuel industries for political financing and the monopolistic nature of state-owned entities further complicate the shift to a low- or no-carbon system, despite the country's ambitious renewable energy targets.\n\nPotential pathways to greater anti-corruption resilience lie in improvements to beneficial ownership transparency and strengthening regulation, monitoring and sanctioning of conflict of interest violations.\n",[361],"Green Corruption",[325],"2026-02-24","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd97f2ca5-300d-45c9-9de9-33152b72f96c?width=600&height=840","U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre",[],[368,371],{"url":369,"caption":370},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.u4.no\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-conflicts-of-interest-and-corruption-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition"," View on U4 website",{"url":372,"caption":373},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.u4.no\u002Fblog\u002Fimproving-anti-corruption-resilience-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition"," Read related U4 blog",[375,379,383,387],{"authors_id":376},{"id":377,"name":378},581,"Robert Forster",{"authors_id":380},{"id":381,"name":382},582,"Aled Williams",{"authors_id":384},{"id":385,"name":386},523,"Lakso Anindito",{"authors_id":388},{"id":389,"name":390},579,"Dr Amanda Cabrejo le Roux",[392],{"countries_id":393},{"id":394,"name":395},99,"Indonesia",[397,399,403,407,411,415],{"tags_id":398},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":400},{"id":401,"name":402},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":404},{"id":405,"name":406},804,"Natural resources",{"tags_id":408},{"id":409,"name":410},1371,"Public governance",{"tags_id":412},{"id":413,"name":414},1236,"Compliance",{"tags_id":416},{"id":417,"name":418},973,"Corruption",[420],2489,[361],"2026-02-27T15:11:31.000Z","2026-05-23T20:08:18.000Z","- Corruption and conflicts of interest are embedded in the energy transition process due to the strong links between political power, private wealth (especially from extractive industries) and public office holders.\n- Existing anti-corruption regulations are often vague, fragmented across different legal instruments, and suffer from inconsistent enforcement, which creates loopholes susceptible to manipulation.\n- Progress in renewable energy uptake is slowed by the enduring influence and interests of fossil fuel incumbents who benefit from subsidies that keep coal an artificially cheap and viable energy source.\n- The Just Energy Transition Partnership is vulnerable to misallocations due to concentrated decision-making power, limited transparency in project selection and insufficient involvement of national anti-corruption bodies and civil society in its planning.\n- Improving transparency of beneficial ownership and strengthening the monitoring and sanctioning of conflict of interest violations are possible pathways to build greater anti-corruption resilience, though these institutional efforts alone are insufficient to fully address state capture dynamics.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-conflicts-interest-and-corruption-indonesias-energy-transition",{"id":427,"slug":428,"title":429,"status":6,"nid":430,"year":160,"body":431,"external":19,"topic":432,"language":15,"type":435,"date_published":436,"image":437,"citation":438,"publisher":439,"link_internal":440,"link_external":441,"authors":448,"countries":457,"tags":462,"pdf":469,"topics":470,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":471,"user_updated":472,"date_updated":473,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":474},2435,"conceptualizing-evolution-corruption-empirical-analysis-italy","Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy",2911,"In a new peer-reviewed journal article, Jacopo Costa and Claudia Baez Camargo look into why and how corruption evolves over time, drawing on an empirical analysis from Italy. The article was published in *Trends in Organized Crime*.\n\n### Abstract\n\nCorruption evolves over time. This paper investigates why and how this evolution happens. The analysis has employed a combination of qualitative network and document analysis to explore the configuration of corruption in two moments in Italy and the changes that have happened in between them.\n\nThe findings have disclosed that a higher efficiency of the activities of the criminal-justice chain, the transformation of the critical actors and the reform of legal frameworks and governance systems have been critical in determining the evolution of corruption.\n\nThe added value of the research lies in its ability to examine these transformative mechanisms within a conceptual framework that keeps together the fact that corruption is networked and that networks evolve over time.\n",[433,434],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[274],"2026-02-03","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F8fdd73a7-79ec-4940-aa53-01a9f94922f2?width=600&height=840","Costa, J., Baez Camargo, C. Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy. *Trends Organ Crim* (2026). \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12117-025-09586-0\">https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12117-025-09586-0\u003C\u002Fa>","Springer Nature (Trends in Organized Crime)",[],[442,445],{"url":443,"caption":444},"https:\u002F\u002Frdcu.be\u002Fe1Z0q","Access full-text view-only version",{"url":446,"caption":447},"https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12117-025-09586-0"," View on publisher website",[449,453],{"authors_id":450},{"id":451,"name":452},550,"Dr Jacopo Costa",{"authors_id":454},{"id":455,"name":456},572,"Dr Claudia Baez Camargo",[458],{"countries_id":459},{"id":460,"name":461},108,"Italy",[463,465],{"tags_id":464},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":466},{"id":467,"name":468},967,"Organised crime",[],[314],"2026-02-27T15:11:33.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-05-31T23:16:17.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fconceptualizing-evolution-corruption-empirical-analysis-italy",{"id":476,"slug":477,"title":478,"status":6,"nid":479,"year":160,"body":480,"external":19,"topic":481,"language":15,"type":482,"date_published":483,"image":484,"citation":14,"publisher":485,"link_internal":486,"link_external":487,"authors":491,"countries":498,"tags":503,"pdf":516,"topics":518,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":519,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":520,"user_updated":472,"date_updated":521,"main_points":522,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":523},2432,"political-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti","Political economy in the weeds: Embracing complexity in anti-corruption work – lessons learned from anti-corruption programme in Malawi",2910,"In this joint paper with Adam Smith International, authors Claudia Baez Camargo and Renee Kantelberg show how anti-corruption efforts require more than mere technical fixes, such as capacity building for civil society alone, to drive lasting change.\n\nAnti-corruption work is often embedded in complex, politically charged environments. This requires thinking and working politically. Engaging with complex social and economic systems also means recognising that change is not linear or even predictable. What to do then?\n\nOur years of anti-corruption research have demonstrated the centrality of having local stakeholders be in the driver’s seat for identifying priorities and finding solutions. This is how we have worked in Malawi in the Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) project, funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and implemented with Adam Smith International.\n\nThis publication shares practical lessons and successes in applying this approach in the MACCSS project. It illustrates our joint efforts to navigate uncertainty and ground anti-corruption efforts in trust, resilience and local leadership. The key takeaways for practitioners who design or implement anti-corruption programmes (paraphrased) are:\n\n\n- **Embrace complexity.** Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- **Local ownership matters.** When partners are in the driver’s seat, impact and sustainability improve. This is true even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- **Facilitation over funding.** Hands-on mentoring and relationship brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- **Learning by doing.** Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- **Build trust and coalitions.** Reform depends on a collective effort with credible institutions and sister anti-corruption programmes. It also requires nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than merely building the capacity of individual actors.\n- **Resilience grows from below.** Sustainable accountability takes root when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- **Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy.** Integrating gender and social inclusion (GESI) principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure and agriculture – sectors critical for women and marginalised groups – broadens both the reach and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.\n\n\nUltimately, the MACCSS experience reinforces a simple but profound insight: **anti-corruption work is not about perfect plans but about adaptive partnerships.** Change happens through relationships, experimentation and persistence. The task is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to navigate it with integrity and learning at the core. ",[433,434],[325],"2026-01-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe9075f1f-8dbe-4009-980b-baaae82f9c49?width=600&height=840","Adam Smith International",[],[488],{"url":489,"caption":490},"https:\u002F\u002Fadamsmithinternational.com\u002Farticles\u002Fpolitical-economy-in-the-weeds-embracing-complexity-in-anti-corruption-work\u002F#resource:all"," View on Adam Smith International website",[492,494],{"authors_id":493},{"id":455,"name":456},{"authors_id":495},{"id":496,"name":497},580,"Renee Kantelberg",[499],{"countries_id":500},{"id":501,"name":502},153,"Malawi",[504,506,510,514],{"tags_id":505},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":507},{"id":508,"name":509},1375,"Civil society",{"tags_id":511},{"id":512,"name":513},1372,"Training",{"tags_id":515},{"id":307,"name":308},[517],2488,[314],"\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE WEEDS\n\n## EMBRACING COMPLEXITY IN ANTI-CORRUPTION WORK\n\nBy Renee Kantelberg and Claudia Baez-Camargo\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) programme provides a powerful case for understanding how anti-corruption  (AC)  efforts  unfold  in  complex,  politically  charged  environments.  Jointly  funded  by  the  UK  Foreign, Commonwealth  and  Development  Office  (FCDO)  and  USAID,  MACCSS  (2024-2026)  combines  grants  and  technical assistance worth £1.75 million to strengthen civil society's role in promoting accountability. The initiative works through a  portfolio  of  civil  society  issue-focused  interventions  with  national  and  district  partners  across  sectors  such  as agriculture, mining, constituency development funds, justice and infrastructure.\n\nMalawi serves as both an opportunity-rich testing ground for systems-change initiatives and a cautionary case illustrating the constraints and pressure points such reforms face. This blend of promise and challenge renders Malawi pivotal for understanding governance transformations in comparable contexts. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, with corruption deeply embedded in its political and bureaucratic systems. Decades of clientelist politics, weak enforcement institutions  and  low  public-sector  pay  have  entrenched  behaviours  where  access  to  state  resources  is  viewed  as  an entitlement to extract rents for their own benefit and that of particular interests. In the wake of the September 2025 elections, these longstanding dynamics continue to shape the operating environment. Consequently, MACCSS's mandate remains unchanged: to equip committed civil-society organisations from national bodies to rural district groups with the knowledge, networks, and confidence to serve as policy-reform champions, watchdogs, and mobilisers of citizen voice and national advocacy priorities.\n\nAt first glance, the logic of working with civil society in contexts where state capacities are weak is straightforward: if CSOs are  trained  in  strategic  advocacy,  intervention  design,  operational  planning  and  media  engagement,  they  will become  effective  in  exposing  and  preventing  corruption,  thus  fulfilling  their  assumed  watchdog  function.  Yet  the experience of implementation shows that capacity alone does not guarantee influence and that change is difficult and non-linear. The real story of MACCSS lies in how its partners are learning to 'work in the weeds' - embracing uncertainty, adapting to shifting power dynamics, and building alliances that make accountability and anti-corruption transformation possible.\n\n## The Strategy: Ambition and Assumptions\n\nMACCSS's design draws from the classic anti-corruption playbook, which is reflected in the programme's strategy (Theory of  Change),  which  suggests  that  enhancing  CSO  technical  and  organisational  capacity  results  in  greater  citizen engagement and oversight and, ultimately, in reduced opportunities and incentives for corruption.\n\nConsequently, capacity building is pursued through three interdependent strands:\n\n- ∞ Financial resources - seed funding \u002F grants £10,000 - £50,000 to locally designed interventions.\n- ∞ Technical support -  training and mentoring in advocacy, media work, Political Economy Analysis, Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI), and thematic areas such as mining or procurement.\n- ∞ Organisational strengthening -  support  for  financial  management,  grant  compliance,  safeguarding,  MEL,  and other core systems essential for sustainable CSO operations.\n- ∞ Learning - facilitation and convening of peer exchanges where national and district level partners jointly reflect, share evidence and refine strategies.\n\nJust observing the above, it would be tempting to assume that technical support and trainings are enough to build stronger organisations and that the recipients of the support will automatically be able to translate skills into action and\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## ASI\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nresults.  Experience,  however,  shows  that  this  logic  fails  to  grasp  the  incremental  and  iterative  nature  of  building competencies, while also underestimating the political nature of corruption and the depth of systemic inertia. What MACCSS is revealing is that effectiveness depends less on training or resources than on learning by doing, building relationships, moving with opportunities and the capacity to adapt.\n\n## Working in the Weeds: Navigating Complexity and Adapting Practice\n\nAn overarching lesson from the MACCSS programme is that in practice, progress is messy and contested, which should not be surprising. As in many other countries, power in Malawi is acquired, shared and maintained through networks of patronage,  built  and  cemented  on  non-transparent  deals  that  cut  across  the  state,  business  and  political  parties. Corruption  trickles  down  to  the  grassroots,  where  public  service  providers  and  street  level  bureaucrats  routinely manoeuvre the prerogatives stemming from their official mandates to extract benefits and resources for themselves and their social networks.  Therefore, corruption in Malawi is woven into the political settlement itself and embedded in social norms that normalise and lend acceptability to corruption. As a result, when anti-corruption efforts begin to bite, they often provoke pushback: investigations stall, whistle-blowers face intimidation, and reform champions are side-lined or even threatened. The experience of the Zuneth Sattar case, in which high-level prosecutions led to institutional backlash, illustrates how success can generate its own resistance.\n\nCivil society faces additional constraints. Many organisations operate on shoestring budgets and remain dependent on donor funding, which is often project-based and problematises the continuity of their endeavours. Corruption fatigue also reflects public scepticism among intended beneficiaries that activism will not change anything. Legal restrictions on public-interest litigation, slow access to information, and the risk of regulatory reprisals further limit civic space. At district level, organisational inertia is strong: as one partner admitted, 'this is how we have always done things.'\n\n## From capacity building to facilitated partnership\n\nHere the lessons of MACCSS validate those of many other FCDO governance programmes in that conventional grant making  and  capacity  building  too  often  produces  donor-compliant  but  citizen-disconnected  CSOs.  Grants  managed without attention to the contextual conditions and needs can constrain flexibility, distort incentives, and monetise the engagement. MACCSS learned from this and adopted a facilitated partnership approach , deploying mixed local teams to broker relationships among civil society, media and AC institutions, and FCDO sister programmes while encouraging CSO implementing partners to be in the driver's seat in deciding priorities, providing them a safe space to innovate and to build their capacities through learning by doing. The focus shifted from funding activities to nurturing trust, reflection and adaptive learning within a cohort of champions.\n\nERROR! NO The Accountability Working Group (AWG) - made up of our core partner organisations, together with regular learning exchanges, sits at the centre of our work. MACCSS understands its role as a facilitation hub; encouraging trust building, peer exchanges and the emergence of coordinated action, decidedly moving away from focusing and insisting on preestablished  good  governance  practices  and  an  emphasis  on  procedures  and  delivery  mechanisms.  MACCSS-hosted convenings bring together partner CSOs, journalists \u002F media, communities and duty bearers to co-create interventions, share evidence and reflect on progress along with challenges. The emphasis is on brokering relationships and supporting iterative experimentation, not on enforcing rigid workplans. Mentoring and technical accompaniment are complemented by targeted and demand-led training, and small, flexible funding support is provided to pilot critical ideas whose design evolves as lessons and proof of concept emerge. Learning by doing and reflection\n\nFor MACCSS and its partners real capacity is being built iteratively, through cycles of action and reflection. The MACCSS Monitoring, Reporting, Evaluation and Learning (MREL) system promotes 'utilisation-focused' learning loops following the self-reinforcing logic of implementation, analysis, discussions and, adaptation. Quarterly Pause and Reflect meetings with the AWG provide a collective space to share not only achievements but also setbacks, echoing MACCSS core principle that mistakes are data and information that tell us something to consider . These reflection processes strengthen partners' confidence  and  sense  of  agency.    Gradually,  shifts  are  becoming  visible:  district  networks  collaborating  instead  of competing;  local  journalists  and  activists  pooling  evidence  from  civil  society  work;  civil  servants  recognising  that transparency can strengthen, not threaten, their legitimacy. These may seem like small wins, yet they build the bottomup resilience that sustains reform beyond donor and MACCSS project cycles.\n\nEmbracing uncertainty\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## ASI\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nWorking this way demands tolerance for ambiguity and deviation from plans. Anti-corruption work that matters will always provoke contestation. MACCSS is still unfolding, but it demonstrates that technically skilled support and facilitation, pace that  is  set  by  the  stakeholders  themselves,  moving  on  needs  and  emerging  gaps  as  well  as  patience  and  political awareness are all more effective than rigid top-down management. Progress depends less on control than on cultivating curiosity and responsiveness with a relational approach that puts partners always in the driving seat. MACCSS recognises that grants alone can distort incentives encouraging compliance rather than collaboration.\n\nBy combining seed funding with tailored technical mentoring and facilitation, partners gain the freedom to adapt their strategies as contexts shift, as was experienced during the September 2025 election period when political will and action waned. Yet,  partners  acted  strategically  during  that  election  period  to  influence  the  Anti-Corruption  agenda  through political manifestos, providing evidence where doors opened by politicians. An indicative example of the success achieved through these means was the fact that the AWG was able to get several key questions into the 2025 Presidential Debate that reflected on issues related to corruption in specific sectors.\n\nSetbacks and detours are expected in the process, just as opportunities are; embracing the political landscape mix (and pivoting) is what partners know and do so well.\n\n## Key Lessons Learned\n\n- 1. Embrace complexity. Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- 2. Local ownership matters. When partners are in the driver's seat, as in MACCSS's co-creation of interventions, impact and sustainability improve, even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- 3. Facilitation over funding. Hands-on mentoring and relationship-brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- 4. Learning by doing. Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- 5. Build trust and coalitions. Engagement with credible institutions such as the Ombudsman, with champions in the state and in FCDO sister programmes, and leaning on the collective experience of the AWG, altogether shows that reform depends on collective effort, on nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than on building the capacity of individual actors.\n- 6. Resilience  grows  from  below. District  alliances  illustrate  that  sustainable  accountability  takes  root  when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- 7. Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy. Integrating GESI principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure,  agriculture,  sectors  critical  for  women  and  marginalised  groups  broadens  both  the  reach  and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.\n\nERROR! NO Implications for Malawi and Beyond MACCSS demonstrates the  value  of working  politically  and  adaptively in  anti-corruption  programming  with  local stakeholders driving the agenda and the development of local approaches that work in Malawi for and by Malawians. Technical solutions and training alone cannot overcome entrenched incentives; transformation emerges from iterative learning, trust-building, and responsiveness to context. For donors, this means funding models that prioritise flexibility, process,  reflection  and  a  willingness  to  be  surprised  by  unexpected  gains  as  much  as  outputs  and  indicators.  For practitioners, it means patience, humility and a willingness to depart from the usual approaches and find out how to 'work with the grain' of local systems rather than against them.\n\nAs Malawi moves ahead of the 2025 elections result, the programme continues to focus on citizen energy with CSOs and media bringing collectively concrete accountability demands. The long-term vision is a network of capable, connected CSOs and local champions who can sustain anti-corruption momentum with decreasing external support.\n\nUltimately, the MACCSS experience reinforces a simple but profound insight: anti-corruption work is not about perfect plans but about adaptive partnerships. Change happens through relationships, experimentation and persistence. The task is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to navigate it with integrity and learning at the core.\n\n\u003C!-- image -->","2026-01-28T17:05:36.000Z","2026-06-02T21:22:46.000Z","- **Embrace complexity.** Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- **Local ownership matters.** When partners are in the driver’s seat, impact and sustainability improve. This is true even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- **Facilitation over funding.** Hands-on mentoring and relationship brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- **Learning by doing.** Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- **Build trust and coalitions.** Reform depends on a collective effort with credible institutions and sister anti-corruption programmes. It also requires nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than merely building the capacity of individual actors.\n- **Resilience grows from below.** Sustainable accountability takes root when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- **Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy.** Integrating gender and social inclusion (GESI) principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure and agriculture – sectors critical for women and marginalised groups – broadens both the reach and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpolitical-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti",{"id":525,"slug":526,"title":527,"status":6,"nid":528,"year":529,"body":530,"external":19,"topic":531,"language":15,"type":533,"date_published":534,"image":535,"citation":536,"publisher":168,"link_internal":537,"link_external":540,"authors":541,"countries":546,"tags":547,"pdf":559,"topics":561,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":562,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":563,"main_points":7,"short_version":564,"subtitle":7,"link":565},2425,"wp-60","Working Paper 60: Understanding the enemy: Insights from corrupt networks to improve anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives",2867,2025,"Corruption is not simply about individual misconduct. It is a networked phenomenon that arises from entrenched social, economic and political interactions. It is orchestrated through coordination between groups and clusters of individuals.\n\nThis Working Paper explores the networked nature of corruption and the opportunities this presents for anti-corruption efforts. The aim is to understand how shifting the unit of analysis from individuals to networks helps to understand the persistence and resilience of corruption, while opening up new anti-corruption perspectives.\n\nA meta-analysis of findings from more than 15 years of research on informal networks and corruption underpins the conceptualisation of corrupt networks. The paper argues that a focus on networks helps to shed light on the functionality of corruption – from petty bribery to large-scale public procurement fraud – and the underlying social norms that enable it.\n\nUnderstanding the structures, functions and modus operandi of the informal networks associated with corruption and applying the network logic to anti-corruption strategies can help to achieve better outcomes. The paper specifically looks at anti-corruption Collective Action initiatives, suggesting that these should emulate positive aspects of informal networks.\n\n### About this Working Paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\n",[532,433,434],"Collective Action",[226],"2025-11-04","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F3fc6640b-79d3-481c-a74c-fc1979923c1b?width=600&height=840","Baez Camargo, Claudia, and Jacopo Costa. 2025. 'Understanding the enemy: Insights from corrupt networks to improve anticorruption Collective Action initiatives.'Working Paper 60, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60\u003C\u002Fa>.",[538],{"url":232,"caption":539}," View all Working Papers",[],[542,544],{"authors_id":543},{"id":455,"name":456},{"authors_id":545},{"id":451,"name":452},[],[548,551,553,557],{"tags_id":549},{"id":550,"name":532},909,{"tags_id":552},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":554},{"id":555,"name":556},1309,"Informality",{"tags_id":558},{"id":467,"name":468},[560,36],2480,[532,314],"2025-11-04T17:05:36.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:56.000Z","This Working Paper reflects on the networked nature of corruption and the\nlessons that can be learned from studying it. Particularly, it provides insights into\nthe opportunities and challenges of designing and implementing anti-corruption\nCollective Action initiatives.\n\nThe authors consider corruption not as a series of isolated acts by individuals,\nbut as the outcome of complex, resilient informal networks embedded within\nsocio-political, economic and cultural structures. Within this framework, they\ninvestigate how shifting the unit of analysis from individuals to networks can\nimprove our understanding of the persistence of corruption and create new\nperspectives to promote better anti-corruption outcomes and impacts.\n\nDrawing on over 15 years of empirical research across diverse countries and\nregions, the authors argue that corruption must be viewed through a network\nlens. This approach reveals how informal connections facilitate rule subversion,\nproblem-solving and goal achievement where formal institutions are weak or\nineffective.\n\nThe paper contends that a focus on networks sheds light on the functionality\nof corruption and the underlying social norms enabling corrupt exchanges.\nUnderstanding the structures, functions and modus operandi of the informal\nnetworks associated with corruption can help design better anti-corruption\ninitiatives.\n\nThe Working Paper contributes to the existing literature on corruption strategies\nand anti-corruption activities.\n\n**First**, the authors explore how **informal networks rooted in trust, reciprocity\nand social norms can serve practical functions**, including accessing public\nservices, boosting business profitability and winning elections. The strength\nof informal networks lies in their adaptability, internal organisation and\nembeddedness in local cultures.\n\nThe authors identify **six core roles in informal networks** that pursue corrupt\nobjectives: seekers, doers, brokers, facilitators, intermediaries and instigators.\nThe coordination and division of tasks among these six roles make such informal\nnetworks effective in achieving their goals.\n\nIn addition, the authors unpack **the most important strategies these corrupt\ninformal networks rely on** for their functioning. These strategies are:\n\n- co-optation (recruitment and trust building);\n- control (discipline and compliance);\n- camouflage (concealment and legitimacy); and\n- coordination (task orchestration and adaptability).\n\n**Second**, the authors set out **concrete implications for anti-corruption\nactivities** based on insights on how informal networks operate. They state that\ntraditional top-down, normative approaches often fail due to the functionality\nof corruption (i.e., corruption is always a means to an end) and the social\nembeddedness of corrupt networks.\n\nThe authors propose to apply the network logic to anti-corruption strategies. This\npaper particularly focuses on **Collective Action initiatives** and suggests that\nthese should emulate positive aspects of informal networks. Collective Action\nrefers to collaborative efforts – typically involving businesses, civil society and\u002For\npublic institutions – to tackle corruption risks and shared integrity challenges that\nno single actor can resolve alone.\n\nThis means that, to be effective, these Collective Action initiatives must be\nbased on:\n\n- **Functional goals:** Set short-term, tangible goals aligned with participants’ interests.\n- **Strategic co-optation:** Recruit key stakeholders strategically, including those who are prone to corruption risks, by using trust-building mechanisms that can supply an added value to the stakeholders.\n- **Transparency and accountability:** Leverage mechanisms of peer pressure and reputation management that can ensure sustained commitment and engagement among participants and deter free-riding strategies.\n\nIn conclusion, to foster integrity in today’s fragmented and conflict-prone world,\nanti-corruption initiatives generally must shift from targeting individuals to\ntargeting the networks that sustain corruption. Sustainable change requires\nlocally rooted, trust-based collective efforts that provide functional, credible and\ncoordinated alternatives to illicit networks.\n\nIn this sense, Collective Action initiatives built on conceptualising corruption\nas a networked problem can be an effective solution for achieving\nanti-corruption goals","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-60",{"id":567,"slug":568,"title":569,"status":6,"nid":570,"year":529,"body":571,"external":19,"topic":572,"language":15,"type":574,"date_published":575,"image":576,"citation":14,"publisher":168,"link_internal":577,"link_external":578,"authors":582,"countries":587,"tags":588,"pdf":593,"topics":595,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":596,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":597,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":598},2418,"anti-corruption-collective-action-g20b20-process-charting-progress-2020-2024","Anti-corruption Collective Action in the G20\u002FB20 process: Charting progress 2020–2024",2845,"This report analyses the approaches of the previous five B20 presidencies to addressing anti-corruption Collective Action. It captures lessons learned and provides recommendations for future B20\u002FG20 cycles. It is primarily intended for upcoming B20\u002FG20 presidencies, B20 Integrity & Compliance Task Force members and organisations engaging with the B20\u002FG20.\n\n### About this report\n\nYou may share or republish this report under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence.\n\nSuggested citation: Scarlet Wannenwetsch. 2025. 'Anti-corruption Collective Action in the G20\u002FB20 process: Charting progress 2020–2024.' Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nThe report was funded by the Siemens Integrity Initiative, which supports organisations in the fight against corruption and fraud through Collective Action, education and training. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the position of Siemens or the Siemens Integrity Initiative.",[532,573],"Private Sector",[325],"2025-08-29","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F7f5abe00-7eca-48f7-a600-067f05b7871a?width=600&height=840",[],[579],{"url":580,"caption":581},"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fexplore\u002Fpublications\u002F1820"," Read related baseline report",[583],{"authors_id":584},{"id":585,"name":586},293,"Scarlet Wannenwetsch",[],[589,591],{"tags_id":590},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":592},{"id":550,"name":532},[594],2475,[532,573],"2025-09-08T21:17:14.000Z","2026-05-23T20:08:11.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fanti-corruption-collective-action-g20b20-process-charting-progress-2020-2024",{"id":600,"slug":601,"title":602,"status":6,"nid":603,"year":529,"body":604,"external":19,"topic":605,"language":15,"type":606,"date_published":607,"image":608,"citation":14,"publisher":609,"link_internal":610,"link_external":611,"authors":612,"countries":613,"tags":616,"pdf":619,"topics":622,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":623,"area":624,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":44,"date_created":626,"user_updated":45,"date_updated":627,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":628},2408,"progress-ukraines-anti-corruption-efforts-july-2025-update","Progress in Ukraine's anti-corruption efforts - July 2025 update",2831,"This document takes stock of recent progress (March to June 2025) in strengthening Ukraine’s anti-corruption ecosystem. It builds on a series of previous reports and is published ahead of the fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference, held in Rome 10–11 July 2025.\n\nThe report highlights key developments, including in the context of Ukraine's European integration, and touches on:\n\n\n- the status of the national Anti-Corruption Strategy;\n- the nascent reform of Ukraine's Asset Recovery and Management Agency;\n- the risks related to the selection of members for the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ);\n- criminal justice developments, including the first audit of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau;\n- the reform of the State Register of Corrupt Officials; and\n- considerations in the area of recovery and reconstruction.\n\n\nThis document is a joint publication of Transparency International Ukraine and the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\n*Disclaimer: This publication has been produced with the support of Switzerland. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Basel Institute on Governance and TI Ukraine and do not necessarily reflect the views of the development partner.*",[14],[325],"2025-07-10","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F62e0b2f6-7c4b-4b45-a575-227909626032?width=600&height=840","Transparency International Ukraine; Basel Institute on Governance",[],[],[],[614],{"countries_id":615},{"id":191,"name":192},[617],{"tags_id":618},{"id":62,"name":63},[620,621],2455,2456,[192],[192],[625],"Anti-Corruption & Prevention","2025-07-10T08:37:12.000Z","2026-05-23T20:08:07.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fprogress-ukraines-anti-corruption-efforts-july-2025-update",1780676562379]