[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":599},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-case-study-10-using-full-legal-means-confiscate-illicit-assets-time-war":3,"related-case-study-10-using-full-legal-means-confiscate-illicit-assets-time-war":164},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":22,"link_external":26,"featured":19,"topics":27,"languages":29,"type":30,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":32,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":33,"countries":44,"tags":91,"pdf":124,"authors":147},2265,"published",null,"2023-02-20T17:04:16.000Z","2026-06-02T21:19:57.000Z",2390,"case-study-10-using-full-legal-means-confiscate-illicit-assets-time-war","Case Study 10: Using full legal means to confiscate illicit assets in a time of war","This case study describes how Switzerland is putting to test a rarely used but powerful law in order to confiscate assets connected to Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, with the aim of returning these to Ukraine.\n\n### Open-access licence and acknowledgements\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies\">ISSN 2813-3900\u003C\u002Fa>. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence.\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery. Many such cases are drawn from partner countries of the Basel Institute's \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nSuggested citation: International Centre for Asset Recovery. 2023. “Using full legal means to confiscate illicit assets in a time of war.\" *Case Study* 10, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies.","","English",2023,"Basel Institute on Governance","2023-02-20",false,[21],"Asset Recovery",[23],{"url":24,"caption":25},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Case%20Study"," View all Case Studies",[],[28],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[15],[31],"Case Study","- Switzerland is in the midst of administrative proceedings to confiscate around CHF 130 million in assets linked to the regime of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. \n- This case study examines the first of a series of cases concerned by these proceedings. Announced in May 2022, it involves over CHF 100 million in assets held by a close associate of the former president, Yuriy Ivanyushchenko and his family. They have been frozen in Switzerland since Yanukovych was deposed in Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity.\n- These efforts are significant as they may allow the return of assets to the people of Ukraine at a time of immense need.\n- Just as importantly though, the move demonstrates how states can proactively seek ways to use their full legal toolkit to confiscate illicit assets linked to political exposed persons and ensure they are put to good use.\n- It also demonstrates how states have opportunities to strengthen their adoption and use of established asset recovery mechanisms to interrupt the type of kleptocracies that have enabled the war in Ukraine in the first place. ",{"id":34,"storage":35,"filename_disk":36,"filename_download":37,"title":38,"type":39,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":40,"width":41,"height":42,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":43,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"bc1ae384-869c-4342-b438-53bbe4e5c6f6","local","bc1ae384-869c-4342-b438-53bbe4e5c6f6.jpg?itok=bd-PFXJy","Pages-from-220220-Case-Study-10.jpg?itok=bd-PFXJy","Case study 10 cover page","image\u002Fjpeg",47729,500,707,{},[45,72],{"id":46,"publications_id":47,"countries_id":66},1055,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":50,"link_internal":51,"link_external":53,"featured":19,"topics":54,"languages":55,"type":56,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":32,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":57,"tags":59,"pdf":62,"authors":64},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30",[21],[52],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[46,58],1056,[60,61],4437,4791,[63],2305,[65],2480,{"id":67,"name":68,"code":69,"latitude":70,"longitude":71},225,"Ukraine","UA",48.37943,31.16558,{"id":58,"publications_id":73,"countries_id":85},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":74,"link_internal":75,"link_external":77,"featured":19,"topics":78,"languages":79,"type":80,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":32,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":81,"tags":82,"pdf":83,"authors":84},[21],[76],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[46,58],[60,61],[63],[65],{"id":86,"name":87,"code":88,"latitude":89,"longitude":90},41,"Switzerland","CH",46.81819,8.22751,[92,108],{"id":60,"publications_id":93,"tags_id":105},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":94,"link_internal":95,"link_external":97,"featured":19,"topics":98,"languages":99,"type":100,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":32,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":101,"tags":102,"pdf":103,"authors":104},[21],[96],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[46,58],[60,61],[63],[65],{"id":106,"name":107},843,"Asset recovery",{"id":61,"publications_id":109,"tags_id":121},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":110,"link_internal":111,"link_external":113,"featured":19,"topics":114,"languages":115,"type":116,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":32,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":117,"tags":118,"pdf":119,"authors":120},[21],[112],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[46,58],[60,61],[63],[65],{"id":122,"name":123},822,"International cooperation",[125],{"id":63,"publications_id":126,"directus_files_id":138},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":127,"link_internal":128,"link_external":130,"featured":19,"topics":131,"languages":132,"type":133,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":32,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":134,"tags":135,"pdf":136,"authors":137},[21],[129],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[46,58],[60,61],[63],[65],{"id":139,"storage":35,"filename_disk":140,"filename_download":141,"title":141,"type":142,"folder":143,"uploaded_by":48,"created_on":144,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":144,"charset":7,"filesize":145,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":146,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":144},"c1f6b1bc-2e6a-456f-b4dc-47117f22d3b6","c1f6b1bc-2e6a-456f-b4dc-47117f22d3b6.pdf","Case-Study-10-Ivanyushchenko-0.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5","2023-02-20T17:04:17.000Z",252971,"Download PDF",[148],{"id":65,"publications_id":149,"authors_id":161},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":8,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":34,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":150,"link_internal":151,"link_external":153,"featured":19,"topics":154,"languages":155,"type":156,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":32,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":157,"tags":158,"pdf":159,"authors":160},[21],[152],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[28],[15],[31],[46,58],[60,61],[63],[65],{"id":162,"name":163,"position":7,"image":7},363,"International Centre for Asset Recovery",[165,231,273,309,346,402,439,478,519,565],{"id":166,"slug":167,"title":168,"status":6,"nid":169,"year":170,"body":171,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":172,"date_published":173,"image":174,"citation":175,"publisher":17,"link_internal":176,"link_external":183,"authors":190,"countries":199,"tags":204,"pdf":221,"topics":223,"featured":19,"languages":224,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":225,"date_created":226,"user_updated":49,"date_updated":227,"main_points":228,"short_version":7,"subtitle":229,"link":230},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,2026,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\n[**Download Case Study here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002FCase-Study-13_Beauty-Queen.pdf)\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\n**Main takeaways of the case:**\n\n- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[31],"2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13).",[177,180],{"url":178,"caption":179},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716","Read related blog",{"url":181,"caption":182},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications","Read related Policy Brief 16",[184,187],{"url":185,"caption":186},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":188,"caption":189},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[191,195],{"authors_id":192},{"id":193,"name":194},294,"Oscar Solorzano",{"authors_id":196},{"id":197,"name":198},591,"Diana Cordero",[200],{"countries_id":201},{"id":202,"name":203},47,"Colombia",[205,209,211,215,219],{"tags_id":206},{"id":207,"name":208},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":210},{"id":122,"name":123},{"tags_id":212},{"id":213,"name":214},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":216},{"id":217,"name":218},1374,"Law enforcement",{"tags_id":220},{"id":106,"name":107},[222],2495,[28],[15],"3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6","2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","2026-06-02T14:22:13.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",{"id":232,"slug":233,"title":234,"status":6,"nid":235,"year":236,"body":237,"external":19,"topic":238,"language":15,"type":239,"date_published":240,"image":241,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":242,"link_external":244,"authors":245,"countries":250,"tags":255,"pdf":266,"topics":268,"featured":19,"languages":269,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":270,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":271,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":272},2230,"case-study-8-windward-trading-charging-shelf-company-money-laundering-and-returning","Case Study 8: Windward Trading: Charging a shelf company with money laundering and returning confiscated funds to Kenyan citizens",2284,2022,"This case study describes how authorities in Kenya and Jersey worked together to unlock progress in a long-running case involving around USD 3.7 million in corruptly acquired funds.\n\nThe money was held in the bank account of the shelf company Windward Trading, which was used to channel corrupt payments relating to power generation in Kenya.\n\nThe money had been seized in Jersey since 2011 following a money laundering investigation and subsequent criminal proceedings. Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) reasonable grounds to suspect the funds were proceeds of corruption. But the case had stalled due to issues with extraditing the two suspects to Jersey to stand trial.\n\nProactive informal cooperation was key to building trust between the parties. This helped to break the deadlock, find legal solutions to recover the funds and agree their safe return for the benefit of Kenyan citizens.\n\nThe parties mutually agreed that the recovered assets should be used for medical equipment and pandemic relief in Kenya. Crown agents and Amref Health Africa are responsible for disbursing and safeguarding the funds.\n\nA framework agreement signed by the Governments of Kenya, Jersey, Switzerland and the UK was used as a basis for negotiations on the return of the funds.\n\n### Open-access licence and acknowledgements\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery. Many such cases are drawn from partner countries of the Basel Institute's \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nSuggested citation: Marsh, Simon. 2022. “Windward Trading: Charging a shelf company with money laundering and returning confiscated funds to Kenyan citizens.\" *Case Study* 8, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies.",[21],[31],"2022-09-09","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9f88325a-0128-4182-a6c9-e5ffc72165ab?width=600&height=840",[243],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[246],{"authors_id":247},{"id":248,"name":249},327,"Simon Marsh",[251],{"countries_id":252},{"id":253,"name":254},113,"Kenya",[256,260,262,264],{"tags_id":257},{"id":258,"name":259},879,"Money laundering",{"tags_id":261},{"id":122,"name":123},{"tags_id":263},{"id":213,"name":214},{"tags_id":265},{"id":106,"name":107},[267],2271,[28],[15],"2022-09-09T16:04:05.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:01.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcase-study-8-windward-trading-charging-shelf-company-money-laundering-and-returning",{"id":274,"slug":275,"title":276,"status":6,"nid":277,"year":278,"body":279,"external":19,"topic":280,"language":15,"type":281,"date_published":282,"image":283,"citation":284,"publisher":285,"link_internal":286,"link_external":288,"authors":289,"countries":290,"tags":299,"pdf":302,"topics":304,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":305,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":306,"main_points":307,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":308},2427,"cs-11","International cooperation in the Migori County corruption case",2870,2025,"This Case Study describes how Kenya obtained crucial overseas intelligence in a corruption case through the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre, leading to the recovery of USD 1.8 million in assets for the Kenyan people.\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies\">ISSN 2813-3900\u003C\u002Fa>. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nIt is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nWhile we have made reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of information provided in this Case Study, neither the authors nor the Basel Institute’s donors and partners assume any responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions.",[21],[31],"2025-11-18","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb444532c-4291-4a7f-a981-5d08183eb628?width=600&height=840","Basel Institute on Governance, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Kenya) and International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre. 2025. “International cooperation in the Migori County corruption case.” Case Study 11, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-11\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-11\u003C\u002Fa>","Basel Institute on Governance, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Kenya) and International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre",[287],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[],[291,293,297],{"countries_id":292},{"id":253,"name":254},{"countries_id":294},{"id":295,"name":296},14,"Australia",{"countries_id":298},{"id":67,"name":68},[300],{"tags_id":301},{"id":122,"name":123},[303],2482,[28],"2025-11-18T17:05:42.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:56.000Z","- Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) established that between 2013 and 2017, around KES 2 billion (USD 15.5 million) was embezzled from the County Government of Migori in southwest Kenya through unlawful and irregular procurement contracts. The money was spent on property, high-end vehicles and university tuition fees for the former County Governor’s children.\n- Through the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC), the EACC obtained crucial intelligence on the suspect’s assets, travels and purchases in several jurisdictions.\n- This enabled the EACC to prepare and submit precise mutual legal assistance requests, with the assistance of a mentor from the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR).\n- The end result was timely evidence collection and an out-of-court settlement worth KES 235.6 million (USD 1.8 million) in property and vehicles. The assets will be liquidated and ultimately returned to the Kenyan treasury.\n- The case highlights the value of the IACCC as a mechanism for efficient and coordinated international cooperation in grand corruption investigations, and the benefits of ICAR’s case-based technical assistance in complex, cross-border corruption cases.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-11",{"id":310,"slug":311,"title":312,"status":6,"nid":313,"year":236,"body":314,"external":19,"topic":315,"language":15,"type":316,"date_published":317,"image":318,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":319,"link_external":321,"authors":322,"countries":325,"tags":328,"pdf":339,"topics":341,"featured":19,"languages":342,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":343,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":344,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":345},2248,"case-study-9-kiamba-case-achieving-civil-asset-forfeiture-order-and-criminal","Case Study 9: The Kiamba case: achieving a civil asset forfeiture order and criminal prosecution",2322,"This case study describes how authorities in Kenya achieved both a civil asset forfeiture order and a criminal conviction against a former public official involved in corrupt procurement deals.\n\nThe case involves Jimmy Kiamba, the former Chief Finance Officer of Nairobi County in Kenya, who conspired with three others to defraud the county government by authorising payments for phantom office equipment. Following a financial investigation and civil proceedings under Kenya’s Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (2003), Kiamba was ordered to forfeit around USD 3 million in assets to the state. A subsequent criminal case based on the same underlying facts and investigation ultimately led to his conviction in 2022.\n\nThe case demonstrates how a “belt and braces” approach – applying both civil and criminal proceedings – can help anti-corruption agencies to confiscate the proceeds of corruption relatively quickly, even if the criminal case drags on or fails to reach the stricter standard of proof. It also highlights the impact of providing hands-on mentoring to investigators during real ongoing cases and over an extended period of time.\n\n### Open-access licence and acknowledgements\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies\">ISSN 2813-3900\u003C\u002Fa>. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> licence.\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery. Many such cases are drawn from partner countries of the Basel Institute's \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nSuggested citation: Marsh, Simon. 2022. “The Kiamba case: achieving a civil asset forfeiture order and criminal prosecution.\" *Case Study* 9, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies.",[21],[31],"2022-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F40f51cf0-5b56-4633-b29c-662ac69d7f9c?width=600&height=840",[320],{"url":24,"caption":25},[],[323],{"authors_id":324},{"id":248,"name":249},[326],{"countries_id":327},{"id":253,"name":254},[329,333,337],{"tags_id":330},{"id":331,"name":332},1193,"Financial investigations",{"tags_id":334},{"id":335,"name":336},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":338},{"id":106,"name":107},[340],2291,[28],[15],"2022-11-30T17:04:06.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:03.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcase-study-9-kiamba-case-achieving-civil-asset-forfeiture-order-and-criminal",{"id":347,"slug":348,"title":349,"status":6,"nid":350,"year":170,"body":351,"external":19,"topic":352,"language":15,"type":353,"date_published":355,"image":356,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":357,"link_external":367,"authors":371,"countries":376,"tags":385,"pdf":396,"topics":398,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":399,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":400,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":401},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[354],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[358,361,364],{"url":359,"caption":360},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":362,"caption":363},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":365,"caption":366},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[368],{"url":369,"caption":370},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[372],{"authors_id":373},{"id":374,"name":375},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[377,379,383],{"countries_id":378},{"id":67,"name":68},{"countries_id":380},{"id":381,"name":382},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":384},{"id":295,"name":296},[386,390,392],{"tags_id":387},{"id":388,"name":389},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":391},{"id":106,"name":107},{"tags_id":393},{"id":394,"name":395},982,"Anti-corruption",[397],2499,[28],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":403,"slug":404,"title":405,"status":6,"nid":406,"year":278,"body":407,"external":19,"topic":408,"language":15,"type":409,"date_published":411,"image":412,"citation":14,"publisher":413,"link_internal":414,"link_external":415,"authors":419,"countries":424,"tags":427,"pdf":434,"topics":435,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":436,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":437,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":438},2424,"back-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin","Back in Action: How the UK is reviving unexplained wealth orders (The Academy Bulletin)",2864,"In an article published in the Fall 2025 issue of the Bulletin of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Ffinancialcrimelitigators.org\u002F\">International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators\u003C\u002Fa>, Andrew Dornbierer explores the revival of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in the United Kingdom.\n\nIntroduced in 2017 as a tool to combat the abuse of UK's markets to launder criminal proceeds, the UWO mechanism suffered a severe setback in 2020. After only a handful of attempts to use it, a decision by the High Court effectively left it sprawled on the canvas.\n\nIn the last year or so, however, the mechanism has slowly started to prove itself. Most recently, the UK's Serious Fraud Office – in its first use of the UK's UWO mechanism – secured GBP 1.1 million from the sale of a property belonging to the ex-wife of a convicted fraudster.\n\nThis article offers a short history of UWOs in the UK. It examines how, after a turbulent start and subsequent amendments to the mechanism, UWOs are now back to being used by UK authorities to tackle illicit financial flows. If applied responsibly, proportionately and in harmony with established legal rights, unexplained wealth orders promise to be a powerful tool in the UK’s fight to recover criminal assets.\n\nThis is the fifth issue of The Academy's Bulletin. It has been established to transmit the work of Academy Fellows, draw attention to matters of importance to the legal community and provide high-level analysis of cutting-edge issues in global financial crime investigations and litigation. The Basel Institute on Governance acts as Secretariat to the Academy.",[21],[410],"Article","2025-11-03","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fc313d2fa-3e1c-43ab-b40e-3e418d819df1?width=600&height=840","International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[],[416],{"url":417,"caption":418},"https:\u002F\u002Fedit.financialcrimelitigators.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb401d6c9-b0e4-4ab9-ad1f-948c567c6ab3.pdf","Fall 2025 Bulletin of the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[420],{"authors_id":421},{"id":422,"name":423},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[425],{"countries_id":426},{"id":67,"name":68},[428,430,432],{"tags_id":429},{"id":106,"name":107},{"tags_id":431},{"id":213,"name":214},{"tags_id":433},{"id":335,"name":336},[],[28],"2025-11-03T11:05:50.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:01.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fback-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin",{"id":10,"slug":440,"title":441,"status":6,"nid":442,"year":278,"body":443,"external":19,"topic":444,"language":15,"type":445,"date_published":447,"image":448,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":449,"link_external":456,"authors":457,"countries":462,"tags":465,"pdf":470,"topics":472,"featured":473,"languages":474,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":475,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":476,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":477},"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[21],[446],"Working Paper","2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840",[450,453],{"url":451,"caption":452},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":454,"caption":455},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper"," View all Working Papers",[],[458],{"authors_id":459},{"id":460,"name":461},560,"Sam Hickey",[463],{"countries_id":464},{"id":67,"name":68},[466,468],{"tags_id":467},{"id":394,"name":395},{"tags_id":469},{"id":106,"name":107},[471],2431,[28],true,[15],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":479,"slug":480,"title":481,"status":6,"nid":482,"year":16,"body":483,"external":19,"topic":484,"language":15,"type":485,"date_published":18,"image":486,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":487,"link_external":488,"authors":489,"countries":492,"tags":501,"pdf":514,"topics":515,"featured":19,"languages":516,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":48,"date_created":144,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":517,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":518},2266,"wp-42","[Forthcoming] Working Paper 42: Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law",2338,"This paper will be released on 21 February 2023.\n\nWritten in the light of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, the Working Paper explores whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression. \n\nThe paper first explores the concept of sanctions and financial sanctions (asset freezes) and what they mean in practice.\n\nUsing the example of Canada, which has introduced a legislative mechanism for this purpose, the paper analyses whether states should be able to confiscate sanctioned assets purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned.\n\nIt then looks at more established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets, including:\n\n\n- Traditional conviction based confiscation measures, including 'extended confiscation' mechanisms\n- Non-conviction based confiscation (forfeiture) measures\n- Unexplained wealth laws\n\n\nThe paper recommends ways to maximise the effectiveness of these alternative avenues for recovering assets, which are much less controversial and can arguably be applied without infringing on legal rights. \n\nOpting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges. It will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law. \n\n### About this Paper\n\nThis Working Paper was prepared by the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nIt is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper Series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"mailto:https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Dornbierer, Andrew. 2023. ‘Confiscating assets frozen under sanctions without undermining the rule of law.’ Working Paper 42, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"mailto:https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThe Basel Institute would like to thank Isys Lam and the law firms of \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbonifassi-avocats.com\u002Fen\u002F\">Bonifassi Avocats\u003C\u002Fa> (France), \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.hengeler.com\u002Fen\">Hengeler Mueller\u003C\u002Fa> (Germany), \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bennettjones.com\u002F\">Bennett Jones\u003C\u002Fa> (Canada) and \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.raassociados.pt\u002F\">Rogério Alves & Associados\u003C\u002Fa> (Portugal) for their support in providing research for this paper.\n\nThe Basel Institute would also like to thank Stefan Lenz, Stefan Cassella, Maria Nizzero, Nicola Bonucci and Oscar Solórzano for their support in reviewing the content of the paper and recommending amendments.",[21],[446],"https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Faaa4fae3-eea5-4be3-95b1-4de7e87fabb4?width=600&height=840",[],[],[490],{"authors_id":491},{"id":422,"name":423},[493,495,499],{"countries_id":494},{"id":381,"name":382},{"countries_id":496},{"id":497,"name":498},188,"Russia",{"countries_id":500},{"id":67,"name":68},[502,504,506,508,510],{"tags_id":503},{"id":388,"name":389},{"tags_id":505},{"id":335,"name":336},{"tags_id":507},{"id":106,"name":107},{"tags_id":509},{"id":207,"name":208},{"tags_id":511},{"id":512,"name":513},1215,"Illicit financial flows",[],[28],[15],"2026-05-31T22:52:10.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42",{"id":520,"slug":521,"title":522,"status":6,"nid":523,"year":170,"body":524,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":525,"date_published":526,"image":527,"citation":528,"publisher":17,"link_internal":529,"link_external":532,"authors":533,"countries":538,"tags":551,"pdf":556,"topics":559,"featured":19,"languages":560,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":225,"date_created":561,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":562,"main_points":7,"short_version":563,"subtitle":7,"link":564},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[446],"2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[530],{"url":454,"caption":531},"View all Working Papers",[],[534],{"authors_id":535},{"id":536,"name":537},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[539,543,547,549],{"countries_id":540},{"id":541,"name":542},228,"United States",{"countries_id":544},{"id":545,"name":546},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":548},{"id":381,"name":382},{"countries_id":550},{"id":295,"name":296},[552,554],{"tags_id":553},{"id":106,"name":107},{"tags_id":555},{"id":394,"name":395},[557,558],2490,2491,[28],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":566,"slug":567,"title":568,"status":6,"nid":569,"year":170,"body":570,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":571,"date_published":173,"image":573,"citation":7,"publisher":17,"link_internal":574,"link_external":577,"authors":579,"countries":582,"tags":583,"pdf":592,"topics":594,"featured":19,"languages":595,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":225,"date_created":226,"user_updated":225,"date_updated":596,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":597,"link":598},2442,"pb-16","Policy Brief 16: Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders",2947,"This Policy Brief analyses emerging international standards aimed at addressing recurring challenges in judicial practice with regard to the enforcement of non-conviction based forfeiture orders issued by foreign states. It focuses in particular on the historical absence of a binding obligation on requested states to cooperate in such cases and, where cooperation is available, on the structural tension between direct and indirect enforcement models.\n\n[**Download Policy Brief here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-03\u002FPolicy-Brief-16_Enforcing-foreign-NCBF-orders.pdf)\n\nRevisions in 2023 to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 4 and 38 seek to clarify and strengthen states’ cooperation in the enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders. In this context, the recognition and execution of foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders are central components of the evolving international asset recovery framework.\n\nThrough analysis and case studies involving Latin American states and international financial centres, this Policy Brief demonstrates that the choice of procedural model for enforcing foreign forfeiture orders – direct or indirect – has significant implications, while acknowledging the competing legal and institutional interests involved.\n\nIn line with FATF Recommendation 38, the Policy Brief argues in favour of direct enforcement in the requested state, based on the facts established by the foreign authority. This promotes efficiency, legal certainty and mutual trust. Indirect enforcement models that may require domestic investigations by the requested state, on the other hand, often lead to delays, duplication and increased costs, which hinders international asset recovery efforts.\n\nThe analysis provides empirical insight into how the revised FATF standards address practical deficiencies and the implications for judicial practice in requested states. For the Latin American context, the Policy Brief suggests to go beyond technical compliance of domestic non-conviction based forfeiture regimes with the FATF standards to strengthen the effectiveness of cross-border enforcement in practice.\n\nThis Policy Brief can be read alongside [Case Study 13](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13): “The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.”\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type\\[]=257). You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F) licence.\n\nIt is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Policy Brief is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\n**Suggested citation**: Solórzano, Oscar. 2026. \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres.\" Policy Brief 16, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16).",[572],"Policy Brief","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff866220c-dddd-41b3-a45e-c2d7992d39e1?width=600&height=840",[575],{"url":181,"caption":576},"Read related Case Study 13",[578],{"url":188,"caption":189},[580],{"authors_id":581},{"id":193,"name":194},[],[584,586,588,590],{"tags_id":585},{"id":207,"name":208},{"tags_id":587},{"id":122,"name":123},{"tags_id":589},{"id":213,"name":214},{"tags_id":591},{"id":217,"name":218},[593],2496,[28],[15],"2026-06-02T14:16:22.000Z","FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16",1780676590753]