[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":602},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-capacity-building-asset-recovery":3,"related-capacity-building-asset-recovery":132},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":22,"link_external":23,"featured":19,"topics":24,"languages":26,"type":27,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":29,"countries":40,"tags":41,"pdf":94,"authors":116},2137,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:57:24.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:56.000Z",181,"capacity-building-asset-recovery","Capacity Building in Asset Recovery","Corruption is one of the endemic evils in today’s world. The phenomenon has negative impacts on world poverty, democratic governance, progress and development. According to the World Bank, USD 20 to 40 billion is lost annually by developing nations because of corruption. With the adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the international community aims at setting up a comprehensive global framework to contain and ultimately lower significantly the levels of corruption worldwide. Chapter IV of the UNCAC focuses on asset recovery and provides tools for effectively fighting corruption.\n\nAsset recovery is the process whereby the proceeds of corruption are traced, frozen, confiscated and repatriated in favour of countries that become victims to corruption. Asset recovery is an effective countermeasure to corruption because it signalises to corrupt leaders that corruption no longer pays. However, many developing countries still lack the skills to collect evidence, prepare indictments, adjudicate cases and obtain convictions.\n\nThis publication demonstrates what asset recovery means, and, most importantly, how capacity building is needed to fight corruption in today’s world. Successful asset recovery can function as a powerful tool to repair the damage caused by corruption. Skilled hands can effectively use asset recovery to help bring justice to those who have suffered from the diverse consequences of corruption.","","English",2011,"Basel Institute on Governance","2011-01-01",false,[21],"Asset Recovery",[],[],[25],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[15],[28],"Guidelines",{"id":30,"storage":31,"filename_disk":32,"filename_download":33,"title":34,"type":35,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":36,"width":37,"height":38,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":39,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"2a812d4f-72a1-4609-8185-34b3c6d8df27","local","2a812d4f-72a1-4609-8185-34b3c6d8df27.jpg","Pages-from-capacity-building-in-asset-recovery.jpg","Capacity Building in Asset Recovery cover","image\u002Fjpeg",1103125,2067,2924,{},[],[42,64,79],{"id":43,"publications_id":44,"tags_id":61},4181,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":8,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":30,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":47,"link_internal":48,"link_external":49,"featured":19,"topics":50,"languages":51,"type":52,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":53,"tags":54,"pdf":57,"authors":59},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21],[],[],[25],[15],[28],[],[43,55,56],5173,5174,[58],2181,[60],2361,{"id":62,"name":63},843,"Asset recovery",{"id":55,"publications_id":65,"tags_id":76},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":8,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":30,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":66,"link_internal":67,"link_external":68,"featured":19,"topics":69,"languages":70,"type":71,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":72,"tags":73,"pdf":74,"authors":75},[21],[],[],[25],[15],[28],[],[43,55,56],[58],[60],{"id":77,"name":78},1372,"Training",{"id":56,"publications_id":80,"tags_id":91},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":8,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":30,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":81,"link_internal":82,"link_external":83,"featured":19,"topics":84,"languages":85,"type":86,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":87,"tags":88,"pdf":89,"authors":90},[21],[],[],[25],[15],[28],[],[43,55,56],[58],[60],{"id":92,"name":93},982,"Anti-corruption",[95],{"id":58,"publications_id":96,"directus_files_id":107},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":8,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":30,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":97,"link_internal":98,"link_external":99,"featured":19,"topics":100,"languages":101,"type":102,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":103,"tags":104,"pdf":105,"authors":106},[21],[],[],[25],[15],[28],[],[43,55,56],[58],[60],{"id":108,"storage":31,"filename_disk":109,"filename_download":110,"title":110,"type":111,"folder":112,"uploaded_by":45,"created_on":113,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":113,"charset":7,"filesize":114,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":115,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":113},"8aec8536-680d-475c-b84b-d4c183161fbf","8aec8536-680d-475c-b84b-d4c183161fbf.pdf","capacity-building-in-asset-recovery.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5","2022-04-27T11:57:25.000Z",5760096,"View PDF",[117],{"id":60,"publications_id":118,"authors_id":129},{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":8,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":30,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":119,"link_internal":120,"link_external":121,"featured":19,"topics":122,"languages":123,"type":124,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":125,"tags":126,"pdf":127,"authors":128},[21],[],[],[25],[15],[28],[],[43,55,56],[58],[60],{"id":130,"name":131,"position":7,"image":7},363,"International Centre for Asset Recovery",[133,192,240,279,335,402,441,476,519,570],{"id":134,"slug":135,"title":136,"status":6,"nid":137,"year":138,"body":139,"external":19,"topic":140,"language":15,"type":141,"date_published":143,"image":144,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":145,"link_external":155,"authors":159,"countries":164,"tags":177,"pdf":186,"topics":188,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":189,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":190,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":191},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[142],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[146,149,152],{"url":147,"caption":148},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":150,"caption":151},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":153,"caption":154},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[156],{"url":157,"caption":158},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[160],{"authors_id":161},{"id":162,"name":163},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[165,169,173],{"countries_id":166},{"id":167,"name":168},225,"Ukraine",{"countries_id":170},{"id":171,"name":172},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":174},{"id":175,"name":176},14,"Australia",[178,182,184],{"tags_id":179},{"id":180,"name":181},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":183},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":185},{"id":92,"name":93},[187],2499,[25],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":193,"slug":194,"title":195,"status":6,"nid":196,"year":138,"body":197,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":198,"date_published":200,"image":201,"citation":202,"publisher":17,"link_internal":203,"link_external":207,"authors":208,"countries":213,"tags":226,"pdf":231,"topics":234,"featured":19,"languages":235,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":46,"date_created":236,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":237,"main_points":7,"short_version":238,"subtitle":7,"link":239},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[199],"Working Paper","2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[204],{"url":205,"caption":206},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[209],{"authors_id":210},{"id":211,"name":212},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[214,218,222,224],{"countries_id":215},{"id":216,"name":217},228,"United States",{"countries_id":219},{"id":220,"name":221},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":223},{"id":171,"name":172},{"countries_id":225},{"id":175,"name":176},[227,229],{"tags_id":228},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":230},{"id":92,"name":93},[232,233],2490,2491,[25],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":241,"slug":242,"title":243,"status":6,"nid":244,"year":245,"body":246,"external":19,"topic":247,"language":15,"type":248,"date_published":249,"image":250,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":251,"link_external":257,"authors":258,"countries":263,"tags":266,"pdf":271,"topics":273,"featured":274,"languages":275,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":276,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":277,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":278},2390,"wp-55","Working Paper 55: Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms",2754,2025,"The UK is a global leader in its efforts to target foreign bribery. It is one of the only countries worldwide to use negotiated settlements such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve cases and extract penalties from corporations that commit corruption abroad. The UK has also laudably committed to using the proceeds of DPAs in foreign bribery cases to compensate the victims of corruption, particularly in countries that suffer its worst effects. \n\nThis paper explores why the UK’s policy of compensating the victims of foreign bribery is not achieving its intended results in practice, and proposes realistic suggestions for improvement to the extant DPA regime.  \n\nIt examines the conceptual, practical and political difficulties inherent in this undertaking, shining a light on how victim compensation operates in the UK and analysing judicial decisions on this issue. Finally, the paper proposes reform recommendations to strengthen the DPA regime to ensure appropriate compensation is made in foreign bribery settlements.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> International Licence.\n\nThe paper is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\nSuggested citation: Hickey, Sam. 2025. ‘Compensating the victims of foreign bribery: UK legislation, practice and recommended reforms.’ Working Paper 55, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55.\u003C\u002Fa>\n\nA version of this paper is also published by the *Transnational Criminal Law Review*.",[21],[199],"2025-02-17","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F4e74824b-dfc2-46f0-b2a6-55050955ba46?width=600&height=840",[252,255],{"url":253,"caption":254},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fchallenges-compensating-victims-foreign-bribery"," View related blog",{"url":205,"caption":256}," View all Working Papers",[],[259],{"authors_id":260},{"id":261,"name":262},560,"Sam Hickey",[264],{"countries_id":265},{"id":167,"name":168},[267,269],{"tags_id":268},{"id":92,"name":93},{"tags_id":270},{"id":62,"name":63},[272],2431,[25],true,[15],"2025-02-17T17:05:19.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:51.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-55",{"id":280,"slug":281,"title":282,"status":6,"nid":283,"year":138,"body":284,"external":19,"topic":285,"language":15,"type":288,"date_published":290,"image":291,"citation":14,"publisher":292,"link_internal":293,"link_external":294,"authors":298,"countries":307,"tags":312,"pdf":325,"topics":327,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":329,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":330,"user_updated":331,"date_updated":332,"main_points":333,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":334},2432,"political-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti","Political economy in the weeds: Embracing complexity in anti-corruption work – lessons learned from anti-corruption programme in Malawi",2910,"In this joint paper with Adam Smith International, authors Claudia Baez Camargo and Renee Kantelberg show how anti-corruption efforts require more than mere technical fixes, such as capacity building for civil society alone, to drive lasting change.\n\nAnti-corruption work is often embedded in complex, politically charged environments. This requires thinking and working politically. Engaging with complex social and economic systems also means recognising that change is not linear or even predictable. What to do then?\n\nOur years of anti-corruption research have demonstrated the centrality of having local stakeholders be in the driver’s seat for identifying priorities and finding solutions. This is how we have worked in Malawi in the Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) project, funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and implemented with Adam Smith International.\n\nThis publication shares practical lessons and successes in applying this approach in the MACCSS project. It illustrates our joint efforts to navigate uncertainty and ground anti-corruption efforts in trust, resilience and local leadership. The key takeaways for practitioners who design or implement anti-corruption programmes (paraphrased) are:\n\n\n- **Embrace complexity.** Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- **Local ownership matters.** When partners are in the driver’s seat, impact and sustainability improve. This is true even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- **Facilitation over funding.** Hands-on mentoring and relationship brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- **Learning by doing.** Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- **Build trust and coalitions.** Reform depends on a collective effort with credible institutions and sister anti-corruption programmes. It also requires nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than merely building the capacity of individual actors.\n- **Resilience grows from below.** Sustainable accountability takes root when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- **Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy.** Integrating gender and social inclusion (GESI) principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure and agriculture – sectors critical for women and marginalised groups – broadens both the reach and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.\n\n\nUltimately, the MACCSS experience reinforces a simple but profound insight: **anti-corruption work is not about perfect plans but about adaptive partnerships.** Change happens through relationships, experimentation and persistence. The task is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to navigate it with integrity and learning at the core. ",[286,287],"Prevention","Research and Innovation",[289],"Report","2026-01-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe9075f1f-8dbe-4009-980b-baaae82f9c49?width=600&height=840","Adam Smith International",[],[295],{"url":296,"caption":297},"https:\u002F\u002Fadamsmithinternational.com\u002Farticles\u002Fpolitical-economy-in-the-weeds-embracing-complexity-in-anti-corruption-work\u002F#resource:all"," View on Adam Smith International website",[299,303],{"authors_id":300},{"id":301,"name":302},572,"Dr Claudia Baez Camargo",{"authors_id":304},{"id":305,"name":306},580,"Renee Kantelberg",[308],{"countries_id":309},{"id":310,"name":311},153,"Malawi",[313,315,319,321],{"tags_id":314},{"id":92,"name":93},{"tags_id":316},{"id":317,"name":318},1375,"Civil society",{"tags_id":320},{"id":77,"name":78},{"tags_id":322},{"id":323,"name":324},859,"Corruption risks",[326],2488,[328],"Prevention Research and Innovation","\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE WEEDS\n\n## EMBRACING COMPLEXITY IN ANTI-CORRUPTION WORK\n\nBy Renee Kantelberg and Claudia Baez-Camargo\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe Malawi Anti-Corruption Civil Society Support (MACCSS) programme provides a powerful case for understanding how anti-corruption  (AC)  efforts  unfold  in  complex,  politically  charged  environments.  Jointly  funded  by  the  UK  Foreign, Commonwealth  and  Development  Office  (FCDO)  and  USAID,  MACCSS  (2024-2026)  combines  grants  and  technical assistance worth £1.75 million to strengthen civil society's role in promoting accountability. The initiative works through a  portfolio  of  civil  society  issue-focused  interventions  with  national  and  district  partners  across  sectors  such  as agriculture, mining, constituency development funds, justice and infrastructure.\n\nMalawi serves as both an opportunity-rich testing ground for systems-change initiatives and a cautionary case illustrating the constraints and pressure points such reforms face. This blend of promise and challenge renders Malawi pivotal for understanding governance transformations in comparable contexts. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, with corruption deeply embedded in its political and bureaucratic systems. Decades of clientelist politics, weak enforcement institutions  and  low  public-sector  pay  have  entrenched  behaviours  where  access  to  state  resources  is  viewed  as  an entitlement to extract rents for their own benefit and that of particular interests. In the wake of the September 2025 elections, these longstanding dynamics continue to shape the operating environment. Consequently, MACCSS's mandate remains unchanged: to equip committed civil-society organisations from national bodies to rural district groups with the knowledge, networks, and confidence to serve as policy-reform champions, watchdogs, and mobilisers of citizen voice and national advocacy priorities.\n\nAt first glance, the logic of working with civil society in contexts where state capacities are weak is straightforward: if CSOs are  trained  in  strategic  advocacy,  intervention  design,  operational  planning  and  media  engagement,  they  will become  effective  in  exposing  and  preventing  corruption,  thus  fulfilling  their  assumed  watchdog  function.  Yet  the experience of implementation shows that capacity alone does not guarantee influence and that change is difficult and non-linear. The real story of MACCSS lies in how its partners are learning to 'work in the weeds' - embracing uncertainty, adapting to shifting power dynamics, and building alliances that make accountability and anti-corruption transformation possible.\n\n## The Strategy: Ambition and Assumptions\n\nMACCSS's design draws from the classic anti-corruption playbook, which is reflected in the programme's strategy (Theory of  Change),  which  suggests  that  enhancing  CSO  technical  and  organisational  capacity  results  in  greater  citizen engagement and oversight and, ultimately, in reduced opportunities and incentives for corruption.\n\nConsequently, capacity building is pursued through three interdependent strands:\n\n- ∞ Financial resources - seed funding \u002F grants £10,000 - £50,000 to locally designed interventions.\n- ∞ Technical support -  training and mentoring in advocacy, media work, Political Economy Analysis, Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI), and thematic areas such as mining or procurement.\n- ∞ Organisational strengthening -  support  for  financial  management,  grant  compliance,  safeguarding,  MEL,  and other core systems essential for sustainable CSO operations.\n- ∞ Learning - facilitation and convening of peer exchanges where national and district level partners jointly reflect, share evidence and refine strategies.\n\nJust observing the above, it would be tempting to assume that technical support and trainings are enough to build stronger organisations and that the recipients of the support will automatically be able to translate skills into action and\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## ASI\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nresults.  Experience,  however,  shows  that  this  logic  fails  to  grasp  the  incremental  and  iterative  nature  of  building competencies, while also underestimating the political nature of corruption and the depth of systemic inertia. What MACCSS is revealing is that effectiveness depends less on training or resources than on learning by doing, building relationships, moving with opportunities and the capacity to adapt.\n\n## Working in the Weeds: Navigating Complexity and Adapting Practice\n\nAn overarching lesson from the MACCSS programme is that in practice, progress is messy and contested, which should not be surprising. As in many other countries, power in Malawi is acquired, shared and maintained through networks of patronage,  built  and  cemented  on  non-transparent  deals  that  cut  across  the  state,  business  and  political  parties. Corruption  trickles  down  to  the  grassroots,  where  public  service  providers  and  street  level  bureaucrats  routinely manoeuvre the prerogatives stemming from their official mandates to extract benefits and resources for themselves and their social networks.  Therefore, corruption in Malawi is woven into the political settlement itself and embedded in social norms that normalise and lend acceptability to corruption. As a result, when anti-corruption efforts begin to bite, they often provoke pushback: investigations stall, whistle-blowers face intimidation, and reform champions are side-lined or even threatened. The experience of the Zuneth Sattar case, in which high-level prosecutions led to institutional backlash, illustrates how success can generate its own resistance.\n\nCivil society faces additional constraints. Many organisations operate on shoestring budgets and remain dependent on donor funding, which is often project-based and problematises the continuity of their endeavours. Corruption fatigue also reflects public scepticism among intended beneficiaries that activism will not change anything. Legal restrictions on public-interest litigation, slow access to information, and the risk of regulatory reprisals further limit civic space. At district level, organisational inertia is strong: as one partner admitted, 'this is how we have always done things.'\n\n## From capacity building to facilitated partnership\n\nHere the lessons of MACCSS validate those of many other FCDO governance programmes in that conventional grant making  and  capacity  building  too  often  produces  donor-compliant  but  citizen-disconnected  CSOs.  Grants  managed without attention to the contextual conditions and needs can constrain flexibility, distort incentives, and monetise the engagement. MACCSS learned from this and adopted a facilitated partnership approach , deploying mixed local teams to broker relationships among civil society, media and AC institutions, and FCDO sister programmes while encouraging CSO implementing partners to be in the driver's seat in deciding priorities, providing them a safe space to innovate and to build their capacities through learning by doing. The focus shifted from funding activities to nurturing trust, reflection and adaptive learning within a cohort of champions.\n\nERROR! NO The Accountability Working Group (AWG) - made up of our core partner organisations, together with regular learning exchanges, sits at the centre of our work. MACCSS understands its role as a facilitation hub; encouraging trust building, peer exchanges and the emergence of coordinated action, decidedly moving away from focusing and insisting on preestablished  good  governance  practices  and  an  emphasis  on  procedures  and  delivery  mechanisms.  MACCSS-hosted convenings bring together partner CSOs, journalists \u002F media, communities and duty bearers to co-create interventions, share evidence and reflect on progress along with challenges. The emphasis is on brokering relationships and supporting iterative experimentation, not on enforcing rigid workplans. Mentoring and technical accompaniment are complemented by targeted and demand-led training, and small, flexible funding support is provided to pilot critical ideas whose design evolves as lessons and proof of concept emerge. Learning by doing and reflection\n\nFor MACCSS and its partners real capacity is being built iteratively, through cycles of action and reflection. The MACCSS Monitoring, Reporting, Evaluation and Learning (MREL) system promotes 'utilisation-focused' learning loops following the self-reinforcing logic of implementation, analysis, discussions and, adaptation. Quarterly Pause and Reflect meetings with the AWG provide a collective space to share not only achievements but also setbacks, echoing MACCSS core principle that mistakes are data and information that tell us something to consider . These reflection processes strengthen partners' confidence  and  sense  of  agency.    Gradually,  shifts  are  becoming  visible:  district  networks  collaborating  instead  of competing;  local  journalists  and  activists  pooling  evidence  from  civil  society  work;  civil  servants  recognising  that transparency can strengthen, not threaten, their legitimacy. These may seem like small wins, yet they build the bottomup resilience that sustains reform beyond donor and MACCSS project cycles.\n\nEmbracing uncertainty\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n## ASI\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\n\u003C!-- image -->\n\nWorking this way demands tolerance for ambiguity and deviation from plans. Anti-corruption work that matters will always provoke contestation. MACCSS is still unfolding, but it demonstrates that technically skilled support and facilitation, pace that  is  set  by  the  stakeholders  themselves,  moving  on  needs  and  emerging  gaps  as  well  as  patience  and  political awareness are all more effective than rigid top-down management. Progress depends less on control than on cultivating curiosity and responsiveness with a relational approach that puts partners always in the driving seat. MACCSS recognises that grants alone can distort incentives encouraging compliance rather than collaboration.\n\nBy combining seed funding with tailored technical mentoring and facilitation, partners gain the freedom to adapt their strategies as contexts shift, as was experienced during the September 2025 election period when political will and action waned. Yet,  partners  acted  strategically  during  that  election  period  to  influence  the  Anti-Corruption  agenda  through political manifestos, providing evidence where doors opened by politicians. An indicative example of the success achieved through these means was the fact that the AWG was able to get several key questions into the 2025 Presidential Debate that reflected on issues related to corruption in specific sectors.\n\nSetbacks and detours are expected in the process, just as opportunities are; embracing the political landscape mix (and pivoting) is what partners know and do so well.\n\n## Key Lessons Learned\n\n- 1. Embrace complexity. Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- 2. Local ownership matters. When partners are in the driver's seat, as in MACCSS's co-creation of interventions, impact and sustainability improve, even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- 3. Facilitation over funding. Hands-on mentoring and relationship-brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- 4. Learning by doing. Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- 5. Build trust and coalitions. Engagement with credible institutions such as the Ombudsman, with champions in the state and in FCDO sister programmes, and leaning on the collective experience of the AWG, altogether shows that reform depends on collective effort, on nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than on building the capacity of individual actors.\n- 6. Resilience  grows  from  below. District  alliances  illustrate  that  sustainable  accountability  takes  root  when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- 7. Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy. Integrating GESI principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure,  agriculture,  sectors  critical  for  women  and  marginalised  groups  broadens  both  the  reach  and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.\n\nERROR! NO Implications for Malawi and Beyond MACCSS demonstrates the  value  of working  politically  and  adaptively in  anti-corruption  programming  with  local stakeholders driving the agenda and the development of local approaches that work in Malawi for and by Malawians. Technical solutions and training alone cannot overcome entrenched incentives; transformation emerges from iterative learning, trust-building, and responsiveness to context. For donors, this means funding models that prioritise flexibility, process,  reflection  and  a  willingness  to  be  surprised  by  unexpected  gains  as  much  as  outputs  and  indicators.  For practitioners, it means patience, humility and a willingness to depart from the usual approaches and find out how to 'work with the grain' of local systems rather than against them.\n\nAs Malawi moves ahead of the 2025 elections result, the programme continues to focus on citizen energy with CSOs and media bringing collectively concrete accountability demands. The long-term vision is a network of capable, connected CSOs and local champions who can sustain anti-corruption momentum with decreasing external support.\n\nUltimately, the MACCSS experience reinforces a simple but profound insight: anti-corruption work is not about perfect plans but about adaptive partnerships. Change happens through relationships, experimentation and persistence. The task is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to navigate it with integrity and learning at the core.\n\n\u003C!-- image -->","2026-01-28T17:05:36.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T21:22:46.000Z","- **Embrace complexity.** Change is adaption and pivoting to reality, which is not linear. In governance programmes, unexpected developments and temporary reversals are signs that systems are shifting.\n- **Local ownership matters.** When partners are in the driver’s seat, impact and sustainability improve. This is true even if the route diverges from initial plans.\n- **Facilitation over funding.** Hands-on mentoring and relationship brokering build deeper capabilities than unidirectional training, grants and results frameworks.\n- **Learning by doing.** Regular reflection converts experience into strategy; failures become data for adaptation.\n- **Build trust and coalitions.** Reform depends on a collective effort with credible institutions and sister anti-corruption programmes. It also requires nurturing emergent anti-corruption networks, rather than merely building the capacity of individual actors.\n- **Resilience grows from below.** Sustainable accountability takes root when communities see anti-corruption as linked to livelihoods and services, not as an abstract governance agenda.\n- **Gender and inclusion strengthen legitimacy.** Integrating gender and social inclusion (GESI) principles by addressing corruption in mining, infrastructure and agriculture – sectors critical for women and marginalised groups – broadens both the reach and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpolitical-economy-weeds-embracing-complexity-anti-corruption-work-lessons-learned-anti",{"id":336,"slug":337,"title":338,"status":6,"nid":339,"year":138,"body":340,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":341,"date_published":343,"image":344,"citation":345,"publisher":17,"link_internal":346,"link_external":353,"authors":360,"countries":369,"tags":374,"pdf":393,"topics":395,"featured":19,"languages":396,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":46,"date_created":397,"user_updated":331,"date_updated":398,"main_points":399,"short_version":7,"subtitle":400,"link":401},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\n[**Download Case Study here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002FCase-Study-13_Beauty-Queen.pdf)\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\n**Main takeaways of the case:**\n\n- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[342],"Case Study","2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13).",[347,350],{"url":348,"caption":349},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716","Read related blog",{"url":351,"caption":352},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications","Read related Policy Brief 16",[354,357],{"url":355,"caption":356},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":358,"caption":359},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[361,365],{"authors_id":362},{"id":363,"name":364},294,"Oscar Solorzano",{"authors_id":366},{"id":367,"name":368},591,"Diana Cordero",[370],{"countries_id":371},{"id":372,"name":373},47,"Colombia",[375,379,383,387,391],{"tags_id":376},{"id":377,"name":378},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":380},{"id":381,"name":382},822,"International cooperation",{"tags_id":384},{"id":385,"name":386},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":388},{"id":389,"name":390},1374,"Law enforcement",{"tags_id":392},{"id":62,"name":63},[394],2495,[25],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","2026-06-02T14:22:13.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",{"id":403,"slug":404,"title":405,"status":6,"nid":406,"year":245,"body":407,"external":19,"topic":408,"language":15,"type":409,"date_published":411,"image":412,"citation":14,"publisher":413,"link_internal":414,"link_external":415,"authors":419,"countries":424,"tags":427,"pdf":436,"topics":437,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":438,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":439,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":440},2424,"back-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin","Back in Action: How the UK is reviving unexplained wealth orders (The Academy Bulletin)",2864,"In an article published in the Fall 2025 issue of the Bulletin of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Ffinancialcrimelitigators.org\u002F\">International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators\u003C\u002Fa>, Andrew Dornbierer explores the revival of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in the United Kingdom.\n\nIntroduced in 2017 as a tool to combat the abuse of UK's markets to launder criminal proceeds, the UWO mechanism suffered a severe setback in 2020. After only a handful of attempts to use it, a decision by the High Court effectively left it sprawled on the canvas.\n\nIn the last year or so, however, the mechanism has slowly started to prove itself. Most recently, the UK's Serious Fraud Office – in its first use of the UK's UWO mechanism – secured GBP 1.1 million from the sale of a property belonging to the ex-wife of a convicted fraudster.\n\nThis article offers a short history of UWOs in the UK. It examines how, after a turbulent start and subsequent amendments to the mechanism, UWOs are now back to being used by UK authorities to tackle illicit financial flows. If applied responsibly, proportionately and in harmony with established legal rights, unexplained wealth orders promise to be a powerful tool in the UK’s fight to recover criminal assets.\n\nThis is the fifth issue of The Academy's Bulletin. It has been established to transmit the work of Academy Fellows, draw attention to matters of importance to the legal community and provide high-level analysis of cutting-edge issues in global financial crime investigations and litigation. The Basel Institute on Governance acts as Secretariat to the Academy.",[21],[410],"Article","2025-11-03","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fc313d2fa-3e1c-43ab-b40e-3e418d819df1?width=600&height=840","International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[],[416],{"url":417,"caption":418},"https:\u002F\u002Fedit.financialcrimelitigators.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb401d6c9-b0e4-4ab9-ad1f-948c567c6ab3.pdf","Fall 2025 Bulletin of the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[420],{"authors_id":421},{"id":422,"name":423},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[425],{"countries_id":426},{"id":167,"name":168},[428,430,432],{"tags_id":429},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":431},{"id":385,"name":386},{"tags_id":433},{"id":434,"name":435},821,"Unexplained wealth",[],[25],"2025-11-03T11:05:50.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:01.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fback-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin",{"id":442,"slug":443,"title":444,"status":6,"nid":445,"year":245,"body":446,"external":19,"topic":447,"language":15,"type":448,"date_published":450,"image":451,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":452,"link_external":455,"authors":456,"countries":461,"tags":462,"pdf":469,"topics":472,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":473,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":474,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":475},2415,"qg41","Quick Guide 41: Managing seized and confiscated assets",2834,"This Quick Guide explains why effective, transparent and fair management of seized and confiscated assets – including assets linked to sanctions violations – is essential to successful asset recovery. It introduces key principles, standards and practical steps based on international good practice. These include legal, institutional and technical arrangements, that help countries manage seized assets in a way that preserves value, ensures accountability and supports justice.\n\nThe Guide is primarily intended for government officials working in law enforcement, justice and asset recovery. It may also be useful to policymakers and development partners seeking a better understanding of how countries can improve their asset management systems.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[449],"Quick Guide","2025-07-16","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F8b319ca1-ed7c-4d10-874e-a1583fed7ffc?width=600&height=840",[453],{"url":454,"caption":154},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Quick%20Guide",[],[457],{"authors_id":458},{"id":459,"name":460},553,"Rita Simões",[],[463,467],{"tags_id":464},{"id":465,"name":466},858,"Asset management",{"tags_id":468},{"id":62,"name":63},[470,471],2469,2470,[25],"2025-08-21T23:52:11.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:55.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg41",{"id":477,"slug":478,"title":479,"status":6,"nid":480,"year":245,"body":481,"external":19,"topic":482,"language":483,"type":484,"date_published":486,"image":487,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":488,"link_external":495,"authors":499,"countries":502,"tags":503,"pdf":512,"topics":514,"featured":19,"languages":515,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":516,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":517,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":518},2384,"pb-14-fr","Policy Brief 14: Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs",2747,"La Directive de l’Union européenne de 2024 \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Flegal-content\u002FFR\u002FTXT\u002FHTML\u002F?uri=OJ:L_202401260\">relative au recouvrement et à la confiscation d'avoirs\u003C\u002Fa> oblige les États membres, entre autres, à adopter des mesures législatives pour permettre la confiscation de la « fortune inexpliquée ».\n\nCette Note de politique examine l’article 16 de la Directive qui énonce cette obligation, ainsi que les pouvoirs et restrictions que les États membres devront inclure dans les mesures relatives à la « fortune inexpliquée » pour garantir la conformité à la Directive.\n\nEn bref, cela démontre la grande flexibilité accordée par le texte de la Directive aux États membres pour déterminer le champ d’application de leurs propres mesures en matière de fortune inexpliquée. Au minimum, les États seront requis d’introduire des mesures susceptibles d’être utilisées pour cibler la fortune inexpliquée liée au crime organisé.\n\nCependant, les États membres peuvent toujours décider d’introduire des mesures de plus grande portée ciblant la fortune inexpliquée liée à toutes les activités criminelles, y compris la corruption.\n\n**À propos de cette Note de politique**\n\nLa présente publication fait partie de la série de Notes de politique (Policy Briefs) du Basel Institute on Governance, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type[]=257\">ISSN 2624-9669\u003C\u002Fa>. Elle est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa> Licence internationale.\n\nCitation proposée : Dornbierer, Andrew. 2024. « Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs. » Note de politique 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Disponible sur: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14-fr\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14-fr\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nIl s’agit d’une publication de l’International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) au Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR reçoit un financement principal des gouvernements de Jersey, du Liechtenstein, de la Norvège, de la Suisse et du Royaume-Uni.",[21],"French",[485],"Policy Brief","2025-01-23","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F726e9035-52eb-4722-ab59-3b33bed7538f?width=600&height=840",[489,492],{"url":490,"caption":491},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpb-14"," Version anglaise",{"url":493,"caption":494},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Policy%20Brief"," Voir tous les Policy Briefs",[496],{"url":497,"caption":498},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=65&lang=fr"," Livre (disponible gratuitement): Enrichissement illicite",[500],{"authors_id":501},{"id":422,"name":423},[],[504,506,508],{"tags_id":505},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":507},{"id":434,"name":435},{"tags_id":509},{"id":510,"name":511},932,"Human rights",[513],2420,[25],[483],"2025-01-23T17:05:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:49.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-14-fr",{"id":520,"slug":521,"title":522,"status":6,"nid":523,"year":524,"body":525,"external":19,"topic":526,"language":15,"type":527,"date_published":528,"image":529,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":530,"link_external":532,"authors":536,"countries":539,"tags":544,"pdf":563,"topics":565,"featured":274,"languages":566,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":567,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":568,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":569},2366,"wp-54","Working Paper 54: Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America",2701,2024,"This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, *Extinción de dominio*.\n\nIt argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.\n\nThe paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.\n\n### About this report\n\nThe paper is based on experience gained through the Basel Institute’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR), which since 2006 has supported partner countries in investigating, prosecuting and recovering assets arising from grand corruption and other crimes.\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the Working Paper under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nSuggested citation: Solórzano, Oscar. 2024. ‘Targeting illicit wealth through non-conviction based forfeiture: Identifying human rights and other standards for Latin America.’ Working Paper 54, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54.",[21],[199],"2024-09-30","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F37616510-2f1f-4ab6-9405-845433d6fa3b?width=600&height=840",[531],{"url":205,"caption":256},[533],{"url":534,"caption":535},"route:\u003Cnolink>"," Download PDF (Spanish - forthcoming)",[537],{"authors_id":538},{"id":363,"name":364},[540],{"countries_id":541},{"id":542,"name":543},171,"Peru",[545,547,549,553,557,559],{"tags_id":546},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":548},{"id":510,"name":511},{"tags_id":550},{"id":551,"name":552},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":554},{"id":555,"name":556},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":558},{"id":377,"name":378},{"tags_id":560},{"id":561,"name":562},1215,"Illicit financial flows",[564],2404,[25],[15],"2024-10-03T16:05:11.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:47.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-54",{"id":571,"slug":572,"title":573,"status":6,"nid":574,"year":524,"body":575,"external":19,"topic":576,"language":15,"type":577,"date_published":578,"image":579,"citation":14,"publisher":580,"link_internal":581,"link_external":585,"authors":586,"countries":589,"tags":590,"pdf":595,"topics":597,"featured":19,"languages":598,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":45,"date_created":599,"user_updated":46,"date_updated":600,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":601},2347,"quick-guide-30-asset-recovery-legislation-best-practices","Quick Guide 30: Asset recovery legislation – best practices",2622,"Asset recovery tools are integral to combatting corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and other profit-motivated crimes. However, in many states, the range of asset recovery tools available to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies is limited. \n\nThis quick guide examines the established good practices in asset recovery legislation as well as less conventional, broader measures. It shows how states can widen their asset recovery toolkit and increase the potential for asset recovery success. \n\nIt is drawn from a comparative study of good practices in asset recovery legislation in selected Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) participating States, published as Working Paper 51 in March 2024 by the Basel Institute on Governance and OSCE. \n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nThis work is licensed under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[449],"2024-05-07","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fafbbcd0b-c295-4832-83bf-742d000ed004?width=600&height=840","Basel Institute on Governance ",[582],{"url":583,"caption":584},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-51"," View full Working Paper 51",[],[587],{"authors_id":588},{"id":422,"name":423},[],[591,593],{"tags_id":592},{"id":62,"name":63},{"tags_id":594},{"id":377,"name":378},[596],2386,[25],[15],"2024-05-07T10:05:12.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:45.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-30-asset-recovery-legislation-best-practices",1780676554026]