[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":473},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-asset-recovery-handbook-guide-practitioners":3,"related-asset-recovery-handbook-guide-practitioners":53},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":22,"link_external":23,"featured":30,"topics":31,"languages":33,"type":34,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":36,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":38,"countries":49,"tags":50,"pdf":51,"authors":52},1821,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:53:58.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:45.000Z",1941,"asset-recovery-handbook-guide-practitioners","Asset Recovery Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners","This practical handbook by the Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative of The World Bank and UNODC seeks to guide practitioners in the complex process of recovering stolen assets that have been hidden abroad. It covers strategic, organisational, investigative, and legal challenges of recovering assets. The Handbook also \"provides common approaches to recovering stolen assets located in foreign jurisdictions, identifies the challenges that practitioners are likely to encounter, and introduces good practices\".\n\nThis is the 2nd edition, updating the 1st edition previously published in 2011.","","English",2020,"International Bank for Reconstruction and Development \u002F The World Bank","2020-12-07",true,[21],"Asset Recovery",[],[24,27],{"url":25,"caption":26},"https:\u002F\u002Fstar.worldbank.org\u002Fpublication\u002Fasset-recovery-handbook-guide-practitioners-second-edition","View 2nd edition (English)",{"url":28,"caption":29},"https:\u002F\u002Fstar.worldbank.org\u002Fpublication\u002Fasset-recovery-handbook"," View 1st edition (Thai, French, English, Korean, Spanish, Russian, Arabic)",false,[32],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[15],[35],"Guidelines",[37],"Collective Action",{"id":39,"storage":40,"filename_disk":41,"filename_download":42,"title":43,"type":44,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":45,"width":46,"height":47,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":48,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"9bc75352-33e9-405d-9635-2bd7ec6e5f2a","local","9bc75352-33e9-405d-9635-2bd7ec6e5f2a.jpg","Pages-from-Asset-Recovery-Handbook-Updated-2020-%281%29.jpg","Pages from Asset Recovery Handbook Updated 2020 (1).jpg","image\u002Fjpeg",807428,2492,3790,{},[],[],[],[],[54,88,122,156,219,267,333,367,398,435],{"id":55,"slug":56,"title":57,"status":6,"nid":58,"year":59,"body":60,"external":30,"topic":61,"language":62,"type":63,"date_published":64,"image":65,"citation":14,"publisher":66,"link_internal":67,"link_external":68,"authors":69,"countries":74,"tags":79,"pdf":80,"topics":82,"featured":30,"languages":83,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":84,"date_created":85,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":9,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":87},2333,"guia-de-boas-praticas-na-investigacao-criminal-em-mocambique","Guia de Boas Práticas na Investigação Criminal em Moçambique",2572,2023,"O presente *Guia de Boas Práticas na Investigação Criminal em Moçambique* constitui uma ferramenta essencial no trabalho dos investigadores do Serviço Nacional de Investigação Criminal (SERNIC) e acreditamos ser de elevada utilidade prática para o exercício das actividades funcionais do dia-a-dia deste serviço. Vem acompanhado pelas Leis Orgânicas do Serviço Nacional de Investigação Criminal e do Ministério Público, a Lei n.º 2\u002F2017, de 9 de Janeiro, e a Lei n.º 1\u002F2022, de 12 de Janeiro, respectivamente.\n\nDesenvolvido com o contributo do Departamento Especializado para a Área Criminal da Procuradoria-Geral da República, órgão a quem compete, entre outras, o exercício da direcção técnica da intervenção processual dos órgãos subordinados do Ministério Público, realça a importância da existência de uma estreita articulação entre o SERNIC e o Ministério Público.\n\nO Guia de Boas Práticas na Investigação Criminal em Moçambique abarca diversas temáticas essenciais para o exercício das funções dos investigadores criminais e começa por descrever os crimes de competência de investigação do SERNIC; os prazos em que devem ser realizados determinados actos processuais; a notícia do crime; o tratamento que deve ser dado à denúncia; a diferenciação entre a denúncia, participação e queixa. \n\nFoi produzido pela equipa do International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) do Basel Institute on Governance em Moçambique em colaboração com a Procuradoria-Geral da República no contexto do Programa Anticorrupção e Responsabilização, um programa de assistência técnica implementado pelo ICAR, com financiamento da Agência Suíça para o Desenvolvimento e Cooperação (SDC) (Moçambique).\n\n### English\n\nThis *Guide to Good Practices in Criminal Investigation in Mozambique *is an essential and practical tool for investigators from the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC) in their day-to-day work. It is in line with the Statutory Laws of the National Criminal Investigation Service and the Public Prosecutor's Office, namely Law n.º 2\u002F2017, of 9 January, and Law n.º 1\u002F2022, of 12 January.\n\nIt was developed with the contribution of the Specialised Department for Criminal Affairs of the Attorney General's Office of Mozambique. This Department is responsible, among other things, for technical oversight over the procedural activities of the subordinate bodies of the Public Prosecutor's Office. It highlights the importance of close coordination between SERNIC and the Public Prosecutor's Office.\n\nThe Guide to Good Practices in Criminal Investigation covers several topics that are essential for criminal investigators to carry out their duties. It begins by describing the crimes that SERNIC is responsible for investigating; the time limits within which certain procedural acts must be carried out; the crime report; the treatment that must be given to the complaint; and differentiating between the complaint and the report.\n\nIt was produced by the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) of the Basel Institute on Governance in Mozambique, with the collaboration of the Attorney General's Office. The development of the guide took place in the context of the Anti-Corruption and Accountability Programme, a technical assistance programme implemented by ICAR with funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in Mozambique.",[21],"Portuguese",[35],"2023-11-01","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F411f8e20-8da9-4f81-92fe-339763caae32?width=600&height=840","Basel Institute on Governance",[],[],[70],{"authors_id":71},{"id":72,"name":73},534,"Carlos Costa",[75],{"countries_id":76},{"id":77,"name":78},156,"Mozambique",[],[81],2369,[32],[62],"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","2024-01-24T11:04:47.000Z","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fguia-de-boas-praticas-na-investigacao-criminal-em-mocambique",{"id":89,"slug":90,"title":91,"status":6,"nid":92,"year":59,"body":93,"external":30,"topic":94,"language":15,"type":95,"date_published":97,"image":98,"citation":14,"publisher":99,"link_internal":100,"link_external":104,"authors":108,"countries":109,"tags":114,"pdf":115,"topics":117,"featured":30,"languages":118,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":84,"date_created":119,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":120,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":121},2274,"action-agenda-anti-corruption-policies-cohort-summit-democracy","Action Agenda of the Anti-Corruption Policies Cohort of the Summit for Democracy",2421,"The Action Agenda published by the Summit for Democracy’s Cohort on Anti-Corruption Policies is a joint commitment between participating governments and civil society organisations for continued cooperation on anti-corruption.\n\nFocus areas:\n\n\n- **Monitoring systemic corruption** – through reporting, open government initiatives, better use of existing mechanisms and closer collaboration between government, civil society and the private sector.\n- **Preventing corruption** – through better implementation of anti-corruption policies, rigorous assessments and warning systems.\n- **Thwarting strategic corruption** – by flagging the use of financial investments to undermine the economies and institutions of democratic nations and by mitigating foreign influence operations such as hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns.\n- **Building sustainable communication channels and robust partnerships across stakeholders groups** - by ensuring broad participation in the development of legislation and policies, promoting regional cooperation and enhancing transparency and access to relevant information.\n\n\nThe Cohort is a cooperation between the Government and Ministry of Justice of Bulgaria, the Basel Institute on Governance and the Center for the Study of Democracy under the Summit for Democracy initiative of US President Biden.\n\nThe Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI), the Regional Good Governance Public-Private Partnership Platform (R2G4P), and the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI) will serve as resource structures of the Cohort in view of their expertise and capacity.",[21],[96,35],"Article","2023-03-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F96972736-e46e-4f6f-abec-dc9c63d3d62a?width=600&height=840","Ministry of Justice of Bulgaria, Basel Institute on Governance, Center for the Study of Democracy",[101],{"url":102,"caption":103},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fanti-corruption-at-centre-stage-of-the-summit-for-democracy-2407"," Learn more about anti-corruption under the Summit for Democracy initiative",[105],{"url":106,"caption":107},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.youtube.com\u002Fwatch?v=8x-quSAziwE"," Watch video featuring Cohort leaders",[],[110],{"countries_id":111},{"id":112,"name":113},22,"Bulgaria",[],[116],2310,[32],[15],"2023-03-28T16:04:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:05.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Faction-agenda-anti-corruption-policies-cohort-summit-democracy",{"id":123,"slug":124,"title":125,"status":6,"nid":126,"year":59,"body":127,"external":30,"topic":128,"language":15,"type":129,"date_published":130,"image":131,"citation":14,"publisher":132,"link_internal":133,"link_external":137,"authors":138,"countries":139,"tags":144,"pdf":149,"topics":151,"featured":30,"languages":152,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":84,"date_created":153,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":154,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":155},2272,"recommendations-international-cooperation-anti-corruption-cohort-summit-democracy","Recommendations of the International Cooperation for Anti-Corruption Cohort of the Summit for Democracy",2419,"These recommendations by the Summit for Democracy’s International Cooperation for Anti-Corruption Cohort outline how to build on progress in international cooperation made over the last 10–15 years. They seek particularly to overcome challenges related to:\n\n\n- **Non-cooperative territories** that continue to offer secret hiding places for illicit money.\n- **Mutual legal assistance (MLA)**, widely acknowledged as still too slow, bureaucratic and underfunded in most states.\n- **Political will** to change the status quo.\n- **Corruption fighting back**, through disinformation campaigns and malicious lawsuits against prosecutors, judges and journalists.\n\n\nThe Cohort is a cooperation between the Government of Moldova, Basel Institute on Governance and Transparency International under the Summit for Democracy initiative of US President Biden.\n\n***\n\n**Participating countries:** Albania; Armenia; Austria; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Chile; Costa Rica; France; Germany; Iraq; Ireland; Korea (Republic of); Kosovo; Malta; Moldova; Nigeria; Norway; Senegal; Slovenia; Spain; Switzerland; UK; Ukraine; USA.\n\n**Participating civil society organisations:** African Center for Governance, Asset Recovery and Sustainable Development, Nigeria; Basel Institute on Governance and International Centre for Asset Recovery, Switzerland; Brookings Institution, US; Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria; German Marshall Fund of the US; Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE), Moldova; International Bar Association – Asset Recovery Committee; Legal Resources Institute, Moldova; Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP); Transparency International; Transparency International France; Transparency International Kazakhstan; Transparency International Moldova; Transparency International Portugal; UNCAC Coalition.\n\n**Participating intergovernmental organisations:** European Commission; Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI), UNODC",[21],[96,35],"2023-03-27","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe45ff571-4d6f-40d0-9dd5-7cb696575fb3?width=600&height=840","Government of Moldova, Basel Institute on Governance, Transparency International",[134],{"url":135,"caption":136},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Faction-on-international-cooperation-for-anti-corruption-summit-for-democracy-recommendations-2418"," View summary",[],[],[140],{"countries_id":141},{"id":142,"name":143},137,"Moldova",[145],{"tags_id":146},{"id":147,"name":148},822,"International cooperation",[150],2309,[32],[15],"2023-03-27T16:04:23.000Z","2026-06-02T14:09:04.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Frecommendations-international-cooperation-anti-corruption-cohort-summit-democracy",{"id":157,"slug":158,"title":159,"status":6,"nid":160,"year":161,"body":162,"external":30,"topic":163,"language":15,"type":164,"date_published":166,"image":167,"citation":14,"publisher":66,"link_internal":168,"link_external":178,"authors":182,"countries":187,"tags":200,"pdf":213,"topics":215,"featured":30,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":84,"date_created":216,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":217,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":218},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[165],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[169,172,175],{"url":170,"caption":171},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":173,"caption":174},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":176,"caption":177},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428"," View all Quick Guides",[179],{"url":180,"caption":181},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[183],{"authors_id":184},{"id":185,"name":186},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[188,192,196],{"countries_id":189},{"id":190,"name":191},225,"Ukraine",{"countries_id":193},{"id":194,"name":195},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":197},{"id":198,"name":199},14,"Australia",[201,205,209],{"tags_id":202},{"id":203,"name":204},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":206},{"id":207,"name":208},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":210},{"id":211,"name":212},982,"Anti-corruption",[214],2499,[32],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":220,"slug":221,"title":222,"status":6,"nid":223,"year":161,"body":224,"external":30,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":225,"date_published":227,"image":228,"citation":229,"publisher":66,"link_internal":230,"link_external":234,"authors":235,"countries":240,"tags":253,"pdf":258,"topics":261,"featured":30,"languages":262,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":86,"date_created":263,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":264,"main_points":7,"short_version":265,"subtitle":7,"link":266},2436,"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[226],"Working Paper","2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[231],{"url":232,"caption":233},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[236],{"authors_id":237},{"id":238,"name":239},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[241,245,249,251],{"countries_id":242},{"id":243,"name":244},228,"United States",{"countries_id":246},{"id":247,"name":248},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":250},{"id":194,"name":195},{"countries_id":252},{"id":198,"name":199},[254,256],{"tags_id":255},{"id":207,"name":208},{"tags_id":257},{"id":211,"name":212},[259,260],2490,2491,[32],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":268,"slug":269,"title":270,"status":6,"nid":271,"year":161,"body":272,"external":30,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":273,"date_published":275,"image":276,"citation":277,"publisher":66,"link_internal":278,"link_external":285,"authors":292,"countries":301,"tags":306,"pdf":323,"topics":325,"featured":30,"languages":326,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":86,"date_created":327,"user_updated":328,"date_updated":329,"main_points":330,"short_version":7,"subtitle":331,"link":332},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\n[**Download Case Study here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002FCase-Study-13_Beauty-Queen.pdf)\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\n**Main takeaways of the case:**\n\n- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[274],"Case Study","2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13).",[279,282],{"url":280,"caption":281},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716","Read related blog",{"url":283,"caption":284},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications","Read related Policy Brief 16",[286,289],{"url":287,"caption":288},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":290,"caption":291},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[293,297],{"authors_id":294},{"id":295,"name":296},294,"Oscar Solorzano",{"authors_id":298},{"id":299,"name":300},591,"Diana Cordero",[302],{"countries_id":303},{"id":304,"name":305},47,"Colombia",[307,311,313,317,321],{"tags_id":308},{"id":309,"name":310},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":312},{"id":147,"name":148},{"tags_id":314},{"id":315,"name":316},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":318},{"id":319,"name":320},1374,"Law enforcement",{"tags_id":322},{"id":207,"name":208},[324],2495,[32],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T14:22:13.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",{"id":334,"slug":335,"title":336,"status":6,"nid":337,"year":161,"body":338,"external":30,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":339,"date_published":275,"image":341,"citation":7,"publisher":66,"link_internal":342,"link_external":345,"authors":347,"countries":350,"tags":351,"pdf":360,"topics":362,"featured":30,"languages":363,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":86,"date_created":327,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":364,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":365,"link":366},2442,"pb-16","Policy Brief 16: Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders",2947,"This Policy Brief analyses emerging international standards aimed at addressing recurring challenges in judicial practice with regard to the enforcement of non-conviction based forfeiture orders issued by foreign states. It focuses in particular on the historical absence of a binding obligation on requested states to cooperate in such cases and, where cooperation is available, on the structural tension between direct and indirect enforcement models.\n\n[**Download Policy Brief here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-03\u002FPolicy-Brief-16_Enforcing-foreign-NCBF-orders.pdf)\n\nRevisions in 2023 to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 4 and 38 seek to clarify and strengthen states’ cooperation in the enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders. In this context, the recognition and execution of foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders are central components of the evolving international asset recovery framework.\n\nThrough analysis and case studies involving Latin American states and international financial centres, this Policy Brief demonstrates that the choice of procedural model for enforcing foreign forfeiture orders – direct or indirect – has significant implications, while acknowledging the competing legal and institutional interests involved.\n\nIn line with FATF Recommendation 38, the Policy Brief argues in favour of direct enforcement in the requested state, based on the facts established by the foreign authority. This promotes efficiency, legal certainty and mutual trust. Indirect enforcement models that may require domestic investigations by the requested state, on the other hand, often lead to delays, duplication and increased costs, which hinders international asset recovery efforts.\n\nThe analysis provides empirical insight into how the revised FATF standards address practical deficiencies and the implications for judicial practice in requested states. For the Latin American context, the Policy Brief suggests to go beyond technical compliance of domestic non-conviction based forfeiture regimes with the FATF standards to strengthen the effectiveness of cross-border enforcement in practice.\n\nThis Policy Brief can be read alongside [Case Study 13](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13): “The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.”\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type\\[]=257). You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F) licence.\n\nIt is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Policy Brief is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\n**Suggested citation**: Solórzano, Oscar. 2026. \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres.\" Policy Brief 16, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16).",[340],"Policy Brief","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff866220c-dddd-41b3-a45e-c2d7992d39e1?width=600&height=840",[343],{"url":283,"caption":344},"Read related Case Study 13",[346],{"url":290,"caption":291},[348],{"authors_id":349},{"id":295,"name":296},[],[352,354,356,358],{"tags_id":353},{"id":309,"name":310},{"tags_id":355},{"id":147,"name":148},{"tags_id":357},{"id":315,"name":316},{"tags_id":359},{"id":319,"name":320},[361],2496,[32],[15],"2026-06-02T14:16:22.000Z","FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16",{"id":368,"slug":369,"title":370,"status":6,"nid":371,"year":372,"body":373,"external":30,"topic":374,"language":15,"type":376,"date_published":378,"image":379,"citation":14,"publisher":66,"link_internal":380,"link_external":381,"authors":385,"countries":386,"tags":387,"pdf":392,"topics":394,"featured":30,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":84,"date_created":395,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":396,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":397},2429,"basel-aml-index-2025","Basel AML Index 2025",2893,2025,"This is the 14th annual Public Edition report of the Basel AML Index, an independent, data-based ranking and risk assessment tool for money laundering and related financial crime risks around the world.\n\nThe Basel AML Index provides risk scores for jurisdictions based on data from 17 publicly accessible sources such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Transparency International and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. The risk scores cover five domains considered to contribute to a high money laundering risk:\n\n\n- Quality of AML\u002FCFT\u002FCPF framework\n- Corruption and fraud risks\n- Financial transparency and standards\n- Public transparency and accountability\n- Political and legal risks\n\n\nThe Basel AML Index is developed and maintained by the Basel Institute on Governance through its \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F25\">International Centre for Asset Recovery\u003C\u002Fa> (ICAR). ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.",[375,21],"Anti-Money Laundering",[377],"Report","2025-12-08","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F19665416-644c-4110-9642-07b31f849971?width=600&height=840",[],[382],{"url":383,"caption":384},"https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F"," View Basel AML Index website",[],[],[388],{"tags_id":389},{"id":390,"name":391},1346,"Basel AML Index",[393],2484,[375,32],"2025-12-08T11:05:33.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:02.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2025",{"id":399,"slug":400,"title":401,"status":6,"nid":402,"year":372,"body":403,"external":30,"topic":404,"language":15,"type":405,"date_published":406,"image":407,"citation":408,"publisher":409,"link_internal":410,"link_external":414,"authors":415,"countries":416,"tags":425,"pdf":428,"topics":430,"featured":30,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":84,"date_created":431,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":432,"main_points":433,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":434},2427,"cs-11","International cooperation in the Migori County corruption case",2870,"This Case Study describes how Kenya obtained crucial overseas intelligence in a corruption case through the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre, leading to the recovery of USD 1.8 million in assets for the Kenyan people.\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies\">ISSN 2813-3900\u003C\u002Fa>. It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>).\n\nIt is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nWhile we have made reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of information provided in this Case Study, neither the authors nor the Basel Institute’s donors and partners assume any responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions.",[21],[274],"2025-11-18","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb444532c-4291-4a7f-a981-5d08183eb628?width=600&height=840","Basel Institute on Governance, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Kenya) and International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre. 2025. “International cooperation in the Migori County corruption case.” Case Study 11, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-11\">baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-11\u003C\u002Fa>","Basel Institute on Governance, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Kenya) and International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre",[411],{"url":412,"caption":413},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Case%20Study"," View all Case Studies",[],[],[417,421,423],{"countries_id":418},{"id":419,"name":420},113,"Kenya",{"countries_id":422},{"id":198,"name":199},{"countries_id":424},{"id":190,"name":191},[426],{"tags_id":427},{"id":147,"name":148},[429],2482,[32],"2025-11-18T17:05:42.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:56.000Z","- Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) established that between 2013 and 2017, around KES 2 billion (USD 15.5 million) was embezzled from the County Government of Migori in southwest Kenya through unlawful and irregular procurement contracts. The money was spent on property, high-end vehicles and university tuition fees for the former County Governor’s children.\n- Through the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC), the EACC obtained crucial intelligence on the suspect’s assets, travels and purchases in several jurisdictions.\n- This enabled the EACC to prepare and submit precise mutual legal assistance requests, with the assistance of a mentor from the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR).\n- The end result was timely evidence collection and an out-of-court settlement worth KES 235.6 million (USD 1.8 million) in property and vehicles. The assets will be liquidated and ultimately returned to the Kenyan treasury.\n- The case highlights the value of the IACCC as a mechanism for efficient and coordinated international cooperation in grand corruption investigations, and the benefits of ICAR’s case-based technical assistance in complex, cross-border corruption cases.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-11",{"id":436,"slug":437,"title":438,"status":6,"nid":439,"year":372,"body":440,"external":30,"topic":441,"language":15,"type":442,"date_published":443,"image":444,"citation":14,"publisher":445,"link_internal":446,"link_external":447,"authors":451,"countries":456,"tags":459,"pdf":468,"topics":469,"featured":30,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":84,"date_created":470,"user_updated":86,"date_updated":471,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":472},2424,"back-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin","Back in Action: How the UK is reviving unexplained wealth orders (The Academy Bulletin)",2864,"In an article published in the Fall 2025 issue of the Bulletin of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Ffinancialcrimelitigators.org\u002F\">International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators\u003C\u002Fa>, Andrew Dornbierer explores the revival of unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) in the United Kingdom.\n\nIntroduced in 2017 as a tool to combat the abuse of UK's markets to launder criminal proceeds, the UWO mechanism suffered a severe setback in 2020. After only a handful of attempts to use it, a decision by the High Court effectively left it sprawled on the canvas.\n\nIn the last year or so, however, the mechanism has slowly started to prove itself. Most recently, the UK's Serious Fraud Office – in its first use of the UK's UWO mechanism – secured GBP 1.1 million from the sale of a property belonging to the ex-wife of a convicted fraudster.\n\nThis article offers a short history of UWOs in the UK. It examines how, after a turbulent start and subsequent amendments to the mechanism, UWOs are now back to being used by UK authorities to tackle illicit financial flows. If applied responsibly, proportionately and in harmony with established legal rights, unexplained wealth orders promise to be a powerful tool in the UK’s fight to recover criminal assets.\n\nThis is the fifth issue of The Academy's Bulletin. It has been established to transmit the work of Academy Fellows, draw attention to matters of importance to the legal community and provide high-level analysis of cutting-edge issues in global financial crime investigations and litigation. The Basel Institute on Governance acts as Secretariat to the Academy.",[21],[96],"2025-11-03","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fc313d2fa-3e1c-43ab-b40e-3e418d819df1?width=600&height=840","International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[],[448],{"url":449,"caption":450},"https:\u002F\u002Fedit.financialcrimelitigators.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fb401d6c9-b0e4-4ab9-ad1f-948c567c6ab3.pdf","Fall 2025 Bulletin of the International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators",[452],{"authors_id":453},{"id":454,"name":455},306,"Andrew Dornbierer",[457],{"countries_id":458},{"id":190,"name":191},[460,462,464],{"tags_id":461},{"id":207,"name":208},{"tags_id":463},{"id":315,"name":316},{"tags_id":465},{"id":466,"name":467},821,"Unexplained wealth",[],[32],"2025-11-03T11:05:50.000Z","2026-05-29T22:23:01.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fback-action-how-uk-reviving-unexplained-wealth-orders-academy-bulletin",1780676532963]