[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":587},["ShallowReactive",2],{"publication-annual-report-2019":3,"related-annual-report-2019":75},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"date_created":8,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":20,"link_internal":27,"link_external":28,"featured":19,"topics":29,"languages":33,"type":34,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"image":36,"countries":47,"tags":48,"pdf":49,"authors":74},1855,"published",null,"2022-04-27T11:54:17.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:51.000Z",1748,"annual-report-2019","Annual Report 2019","Our Annual Report 2019 highlights our achievements in the past year, but also looks forward to the future. It is a chance to reflect on how corruption and governance are changing around the world and how we are adapting to new challenges. It is also a chance to thank, once again, our partners and donors for their unwavering support. \n\nHere is the foreword by Managing Director Gretta Fenner and President of the Board Mark Pieth.\n\n### Corruption and poor governance: enemies of the people\n\nAs we write this note for our annual report, the world has become a different place. A global pandemic is spreading fast, globalisation has come to a virtual standstill, and almost everything we took for granted is no longer a given.\n\nWe have been warned. Not specifically about covid-19, but about the risk of a global pandemic. Yet in many countries we see that structures are not in place and warnings have been ignored for too long. As we are still grappling to understand what is happening, one cannot help but ask, whether governance systems have failed us.\n\nWhen essential services are deprived of funding because it does not fit the political agenda of those in charge, this points to distorted governance systems that fail to set the right priorities for the public good. And can we really disregard the role corruption has played in fuelling this crisis? No, we cannot. It is clear that public officials have received grease payments to turn a blind eye to illegal trade in endangered species and disregard sub-standard hygiene in markets from where the  virus has seemingly spread.\n\nFighting corruption and strengthening governance may not be at the top of most officials’ priority lists right now as they are busy trying to control the spread of the virus and keep mortality levels low. But when we take a step back and have more space to reflect on underlying causes, we will have a terrible re-awakening to the realisation that corruption and bad governance are devastating our world and our lives.\n\nThat’s why at the Basel Institute, we see our mission of combating corruption and strengthening governance not as a cause in itself. Instead, we see it as our contribution to sustainable development, equitable growth, stability, respect for human rights and peace.\n\nOur team has worked hard again in 2019 to make inroads toward these overarching global goals. We are proud of our achievements, and acutely aware how our work interplays with the work of many others, be it in anti-corruption and governance or in other fields. This includes health, where corruption and weak governance compromise the achievement of better development outcomes. \n\nOur partnerships with governments, the private sector, other international organisations and civil society are critical. The covid-19 crisis has shown us like nothing else that we need to come together to go forward.\n\nWe hope that the work we describe in our annual report inspires you. By now, when we write this foreword, we know only too well what topic will dominate the year 2020. We sincerely hope to make a contribution to fighting the root causes of this pandemic, so that we may come out of this tragic crisis not only with losses, but also with a new understanding of our global responsibilities, individually and collectively.","","English",2020,"Basel Institute on Governance","2020-05-18",false,[21,22,23,24,25,26],"Asset Recovery","Collective Action","Compliance","Green Corruption","Public Finance Management","Public Governance",[],[],[30,22,31,24,25,32],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement","Business Integrity Ethics and Compliance","Corruption Prevention and Public Governance",[15],[35],"Annual report",{"id":37,"storage":38,"filename_disk":39,"filename_download":40,"title":41,"type":42,"created_on":8,"modified_on":8,"charset":7,"filesize":43,"width":44,"height":45,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":7,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":46,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"32d64a48-05ab-4816-9401-5f44ad2bd3ca","local","32d64a48-05ab-4816-9401-5f44ad2bd3ca.jpg","AR19-front-cover-pub.jpg","Annual report 2019","image\u002Fjpeg",160056,300,424,{},[],[],[50],{"id":51,"publications_id":52,"directus_files_id":65},1890,{"id":5,"status":6,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":8,"user_updated":54,"date_updated":9,"nid":10,"slug":11,"image":37,"title":12,"body":13,"citation":14,"language":15,"year":16,"publisher":17,"date_published":18,"external":19,"topic":55,"link_internal":56,"link_external":57,"featured":19,"topics":58,"languages":59,"type":60,"area":7,"programme":7,"websites":7,"summary":7,"pdf_text":7,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"countries":61,"tags":62,"pdf":63,"authors":64},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[21,22,23,24,25,26],[],[],[30,22,31,24,25,32],[15],[35],[],[],[51],[],{"id":66,"storage":38,"filename_disk":67,"filename_download":68,"title":68,"type":69,"folder":70,"uploaded_by":53,"created_on":8,"modified_by":7,"modified_on":71,"charset":7,"filesize":72,"width":7,"height":7,"duration":7,"embed":7,"description":73,"location":7,"tags":7,"metadata":7,"focal_point_x":7,"focal_point_y":7,"tus_id":7,"tus_data":7,"uploaded_on":8},"48af5413-6cc3-452a-a40e-9a5c90e11ac1","48af5413-6cc3-452a-a40e-9a5c90e11ac1.pdf","Basel-Institute-Annual-Report-2019.pdf","application\u002Fpdf","67f22e04-d26f-4baa-b91f-acc5f89d87f5","2022-04-27T11:54:18.000Z",5757498,"View Annual Report (PDF)",[],[76,127,163,194,254,300,370,437,471,519],{"id":77,"slug":78,"title":79,"status":6,"nid":80,"year":81,"body":82,"external":19,"topic":83,"language":15,"type":85,"date_published":87,"image":88,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":89,"link_external":93,"authors":94,"countries":103,"tags":104,"pdf":121,"topics":123,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":124,"user_updated":54,"date_updated":125,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":126},2395,"quick-guide-39-business-integrity-and-ethics","Quick Guide 39: Business integrity and ethics",2785,2025,"The changing landscape of anti-corruption regulation and enforcement has triggered important discussions around the role of ethics and compliance in business strategies and in the economy as a whole. It has also given impetus to the narrative that anti-corruption compliance programmes are inevitably costly, potentially ineffective and bureaucratic. \n\nThis ignores many of the positive advances in compliance that have been made in recent years, as well as the growing body of evidence supporting the business case for compliance.\n\nThis Quick Guide covers five broad areas in which mature and well-constructed ethics and compliance systems can benefit businesses even in the face of an uncertain regulatory and enforcement framework. It is based on a roundtable convened by the Basel Institute on Governance and bilateral discussions with key figures in the business and anti-corruption community.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[22,84],"Private Sector",[86],"Quick Guide","2025-03-25","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9a75cbfc-a56c-4739-b683-d2122f94d9bc?width=600&height=840",[90],{"url":91,"caption":92},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Quick%20Guide"," View all Quick Guides",[],[95,99],{"authors_id":96},{"id":97,"name":98},298,"Vanessa Hans",{"authors_id":100},{"id":101,"name":102},296,"Monica Guy",[],[105,109,113,117],{"tags_id":106},{"id":107,"name":108},830,"Business integrity",{"tags_id":110},{"id":111,"name":112},1274,"Ethics",{"tags_id":114},{"id":115,"name":116},1380,"Sustainability",{"tags_id":118},{"id":119,"name":120},859,"Corruption risks",[122],2436,[22,84,31],"2025-03-25T17:05:22.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:52.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-39-business-integrity-and-ethics",{"id":128,"slug":129,"title":130,"status":6,"nid":131,"year":132,"body":133,"external":19,"topic":134,"language":15,"type":135,"date_published":137,"image":138,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":139,"link_external":140,"authors":144,"countries":145,"tags":146,"pdf":156,"topics":158,"featured":19,"languages":159,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":160,"user_updated":54,"date_updated":161,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":162},2377,"putting-business-integrity-global-agenda-report-5th-international-collective-action","Putting business integrity on the global agenda: Report from the 5th International Collective Action Conference",2725,2024,"The 5th International Collective Action Conference represented another significant milestone in the development of responsible and ethical business practices through anti-corruption Collective Action. \n\nThe conference, hosted by the Basel Institute with the support of the Siemens Integrity Initiative, took place on 24 and 25 June 2024 in Basel, Switzerland. This short conference report presents main insights, quotes as well as infographics and graphic recordings from the two-day event, which welcomed around 200 people from around the world and across all sectors.\n\nA key theme of this year’s conference was the importance of building local, regional and international communities of practice. These communities bring together different constellations of people and organisations interested in the Collective Action approach to improve skills, develop joint solutions and advance knowledge about how to make initiatives effective in different contexts. \n\nFive panel discussions, three interactive breakout sessions and multiple networking opportunities, including an exhibition, offered many occasions for sharing experiences and best practices in anti-corruption Collective Action and breaking down silos.\n\n### About this report and acknowledgements\n\nThe Basel Institute on Governance thanks the Siemens Integrity Initiative for supporting and providing funding for the conference’s 5th edition, as well as all speakers and breakout session facilitating organisations. The full list of presenters and sessions can be found on conference pages of the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fevents\u002Ficac-2024\u002Fagenda\">B20 Collective Action Hub\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\nGraphic recording illustrations: Tetyana Kalyuzhna, Basel Institute on Governance.\nPhoto and video credit: David Borter, LEO MEDIA GmbH \u002F BBM PRODUCTIONS AG.\n\nThe report is free to share or republish under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en\">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\u003C\u002Fa>). Please credit the Basel Institute on Governance and link to: \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\">https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u003C\u002Fa>.",[22,84],[136],"Report","2024-11-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F02044130-66da-43f7-8ee2-ef45cc33cc96?width=600&height=840",[],[141],{"url":142,"caption":143},"https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fevents\u002Ficac-2024\u002F"," See Conference web page",[],[],[147,150,152],{"tags_id":148},{"id":149,"name":22},909,{"tags_id":151},{"id":107,"name":108},{"tags_id":153},{"id":154,"name":155},982,"Anti-corruption",[157],2415,[22,84,31],[15],"2024-12-05T14:06:46.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:53.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fputting-business-integrity-global-agenda-report-5th-international-collective-action",{"id":164,"slug":165,"title":166,"status":6,"nid":167,"year":132,"body":168,"external":19,"topic":169,"language":15,"type":170,"date_published":172,"image":173,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":174,"link_external":175,"authors":176,"countries":185,"tags":186,"pdf":187,"topics":189,"featured":19,"languages":190,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":191,"user_updated":54,"date_updated":192,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":193},2359,"wp-53","Working Paper 53: Good governance and the just transition: Implications for renewable energy companies",2673,"There is broad agreement that ensuring a just energy transition is key for achieving the trust and support from citizens needed to succeed with the green transition and the COP28 goal of tripling renewable energy capacity by 2030.\n\nThis paper discusses the concept of a just transition, with a particular focus on the importance of achieving a transition that benefits both local communities and society at large. It examines the governance and corruption challenges that could jeopardise this goal and discusses how industry associations and companies in the renewable energy sector could step up its efforts to address these challenges to realise the ambition of a just transition.\n\nThe paper draws on lessons from the experience of tackling governance and corruption risks in the extractive sector and sets out proposals on how to accelerate collective action in the renewable energy sector. \n\n### About this report\n\nThis is a guest Working Paper of the Basel Institute on Governance, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish the report under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, University of Basel or funding organisations.\n\nSuggested citation: de Vibe, Maja, and Mark Robinson. 2024. ‘Good governance and the just transition: Implications for renewable energy companies.’ Working Paper 53, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-53.",[22,24,84],[171],"Working Paper","2024-09-01","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Facad9a6f-74c5-48d5-9305-a053ed97aa91?width=600&height=840",[],[],[177,181],{"authors_id":178},{"id":179,"name":180},546,"Maja de Vibe",{"authors_id":182},{"id":183,"name":184},547,"Mark Robinson",[],[],[188],2445,[22,24,84],[15],"2024-08-30T16:05:06.000Z","2026-05-31T22:51:53.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-53",{"id":195,"slug":196,"title":197,"status":6,"nid":198,"year":199,"body":200,"external":19,"topic":201,"language":15,"type":202,"date_published":204,"image":205,"citation":14,"publisher":17,"link_internal":206,"link_external":215,"authors":219,"countries":224,"tags":237,"pdf":248,"topics":250,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":251,"user_updated":54,"date_updated":252,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":253},2446,"quick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions","Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions",2971,2026,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law?\n\nWeak institutions, political protection or limited law enforcement capacity can make it difficult to investigate or prosecute powerful individuals suspected of corruption. In response, some governments have turned to corruption sanctions.\n\nCorruption sanctions allow governments to impose restrictions on people suspected of serious corruption even without a criminal conviction.\n\nThis Quick Guide introduces corruption sanctions, explains how they work and highlights both their potential and the concerns they raise.\n\n### About this Quick Guide\n\nYou are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F\">BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence\u003C\u002Fa>. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428\">ISSN 2673-5229\u003C\u002Fa>.",[21],[203],"Quick guide","2026-06-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fe0094eda-5362-4227-966b-d676340e21be?width=600&height=840",[207,210,213],{"url":208,"caption":209},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62"," Read related Working Paper",{"url":211,"caption":212},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2968"," See related webinar",{"url":214,"caption":92},"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428",[216],{"url":217,"caption":218},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=386"," View online on LEARN",[220],{"authors_id":221},{"id":222,"name":223},597,"Dr Anton Moiseienko",[225,229,233],{"countries_id":226},{"id":227,"name":228},225,"Ukraine",{"countries_id":230},{"id":231,"name":232},36,"Canada",{"countries_id":234},{"id":235,"name":236},14,"Australia",[238,242,246],{"tags_id":239},{"id":240,"name":241},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":243},{"id":244,"name":245},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":247},{"id":154,"name":155},[249],2499,[30],"2026-06-04T21:25:14.000Z","2026-06-04T21:40:35.000Z","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-43-corruption-sanctions",{"id":122,"slug":255,"title":256,"status":6,"nid":257,"year":199,"body":258,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":259,"date_published":260,"image":261,"citation":262,"publisher":17,"link_internal":263,"link_external":267,"authors":268,"countries":273,"tags":286,"pdf":291,"topics":294,"featured":19,"languages":295,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":296,"user_updated":54,"date_updated":297,"main_points":7,"short_version":298,"subtitle":7,"link":299},"wp-62","Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know",2970,"How can governments respond to serious corruption when those responsible are beyond the reach of the law? Some governments have turned to corruption sanctions to address this issue.\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption sanctions – tools that allow governments to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals suspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court – have evolved over the past decade, and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use.\n\n::: button https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002F260529_WP-62.pdf\n**Download the Working Paper here**\n:::\n\n### Advantages and limitations of corruption sanctions\n\nCorruption sanctions emerged primarily to address situations where notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal systems. Their key strengths lie in their flexibility and versatility:\n\n- they can be applied regardless of any geographical link between the sanctioning state and the alleged corruption, based on relatively low evidentiary thresholds; and \n- they can serve a wide range of objectives – from disrupting and deterring corrupt activity to condemning corruption, facilitating asset recovery and signalling support for another country's law enforcement efforts.\n\nHowever, the paper also highlights important limitations. Corruption sanctions are often wielded without a clear post-imposition strategy. And: their inherent flexibility comes with due process trade-offs, including broad governmental discretion and limited judicial oversight.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nDrawing on an extensive analysis of the experiences of key jurisdictions – including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia – the author puts forward nine recommendations for governments on how to design and maintain credible and effective corruption sanctions regimes. These include publishing clear criteria for high-priority targets, strengthening transparency around licensing and delisting decisions, and exploring sanctions against professional enablers in major financial centres.\n\nThe paper is aimed primarily at policymakers but will also be of interest to anti-corruption activists, private-sector financial crime specialists and academics.\n\n### About this paper\n\nThis paper is published as part of the Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper series, ISSN: 2624-9650. You may share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002Fdeed.en) International Licence.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[171],"2026-05-28","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0b54d63b-364d-478e-b7a6-29c8a4f6333b?width=600&height=840","Moiseienko, Anton. 2026. “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know.” Working Paper 62, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",[264],{"url":265,"caption":266},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Working%20Paper","View all Working Papers",[],[269],{"authors_id":270},{"id":271,"name":272},583,"Anton Moiseienko",[274,278,282,284],{"countries_id":275},{"id":276,"name":277},228,"United States",{"countries_id":279},{"id":280,"name":281},74,"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":283},{"id":231,"name":232},{"countries_id":285},{"id":235,"name":236},[287,289],{"tags_id":288},{"id":244,"name":245},{"tags_id":290},{"id":154,"name":155},[292,293],2490,2491,[30],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:25.000Z","2026-06-02T14:08:57.000Z","Corruption sanctions allow governments to impose financial and travel\nrestrictions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on persons (mostly foreigners)\nsuspected of corruption without any finding of guilt in a court of law. Such\nsanctions have emerged over the past decade primarily to address situations\nwhere notoriously corrupt individuals enjoy impunity within their own legal\nsystems. They are also occasionally used to support foreign investigations by\nenabling authorities to swiftly freeze suspected proceeds of corruption.\n\n### Advantages\nCorruption sanctions regimes offer two main advantages that make them a useful\naddition to a government’s anti-corruption arsenal: flexibility and versatility.\n\nThe flexibility of corruption sanctions stems from the relatively low evidentiary\nstandards required to implement them, which are far less exacting than\nthe civil or criminal standards of proof. It also reflects there being no need\nfor any geographical nexus between the sanctioning state and the alleged\ncorruption, such that sanctions can be wielded against anyone involved in\ncorruption anywhere in the world. These features allow governments to resort\nto corruption sanctions in circumstances where conventional law enforcement\naction, such as prosecutions or confiscation proceedings, would be out of\nreach.\n\nThe versatility of such sanctions is a product of the freedom that governments\nenjoy in their imposition. Corruption sanctions can be, and have been, put\nto use to achieve a varied set of objectives. Those include disrupting corrupt\nactivity; deterring would-be corruption or corruption facilitation; condemning\ncorruption; punishing the perpetrators; facilitating asset recovery; or signalling\nsupport for another country’s law enforcement actions.\n\n### Limitations\nThis flexibility and versatility combine to produce a unique and valuable anticorruption tool. However, all too often it is wielded without a clear post-imposition\nstrategy, namely a coherent and credible approach to what the sanctions are\nmeant to achieve once they are in effect; how long they will be kept in place;\nand how they interact with other available law enforcement tools. In some cases,\nthe imposition of sanctions may be predicated on the expectation that other\nmeasures – such as asset confiscation – will follow. In others, they may be a selfstanding response to allegations of serious corruption.\n\nThe inherent flexibility in these tools also comes with due process trade-offs.\nCorruption sanctions regimes grant governments broad powers, including a\nwide discretion in imposing and lifting corruption sanctions or granting licences\nfor transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under such sanctions.\nThese powers are often subject only to light-touch judicial oversight. This has\nunderstandably raised concerns over their vulnerability to errors or, in extreme\ncases, abuse.\n\nTo ensure consistent and credible use of corruption sanctions, policymakers\nshould review applicable evidentiary standards and judicial review rules;\npublish clear criteria outlining what makes for a high-priority target for\ncorruption sanctions; publish clear criteria for sanctions licences and delisting;\nand set out processes and expectations for sanctions dossier submissions from\ncivil society organisations. While all of these measures preserve governments’\nflexibility in the imposition of corruption sanctions, taken together they will go\nsome way towards minimising the risks of politicisation or abuse.\n\n### A useful addition to the anti-corruption toolbox\nAll in all, corruption sanctions have transformed and enriched the anticorruption enforcement landscape. Their evident advantages suggest that\nstates that have not yet done so should consider whether the introduction of\ncorruption sanctions is right for them, and that those states that already have a\nmechanism in place should explore how they can use it to the greatest effect.\nSometimes, governments are reluctant to make full use of corruption sanctions\nfor fears of foreign policy repercussions. But, as the analysis in this paper\nsuggests, such sensitivities can be managed through careful target selection.\n\nIn summary, if designed and implemented transparently and responsibly – not\nas a low-cost substitute for traditional enforcement tools but as a complement\nto them when they are not available – these mechanisms can be used to target\nand challenge otherwise unchecked corruption globally. The analysis in this\npaper, and the recommendations it contains in its conclusion, aim to support\nthis endeavour.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-62",{"id":301,"slug":302,"title":303,"status":6,"nid":304,"year":199,"body":305,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":306,"date_published":307,"image":308,"citation":7,"publisher":17,"link_internal":309,"link_external":316,"authors":317,"countries":338,"tags":351,"pdf":362,"topics":364,"featured":19,"languages":365,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":296,"user_updated":366,"date_updated":367,"main_points":7,"short_version":368,"subtitle":7,"link":369},2439,"corruption-risk-management-latam-timber-value-chain","Preventing corruption in the timber value chain: Risk management experiences in Latin America",2927,"Corruption in the timber value chain is a major challenge for environmental sustainability and governance in Latin America.\n\nThis report presents the application of a corruption risk management approach by environmental authorities in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, implemented through technical assistance from the Basel Institute on Governance’s [Green Corruption programme](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fgreen-corruption).\n\n[**Download the report here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-04\u002F260401_Preventing-corruption-in-the-timber-value-chain_Latam.pdf)\n\n### Key corruption risks\n\nThe report describes the main corruption risks identified in collaboration with five environmental authorities responsible for integrity in the timber value chain, covering:\n\n- The granting of forestry rights\n- The issuance and use of timber transport waybills\n- The control and supervision of authorised actors.\n\nThe main corruption risks identified involve:\n\n- Improper agreements between public servants and third parties\n- Abuse of authority\n- Undue influence or pressure from superiors\n\n### Mitigation measures\n\nPlanned mitigation measures fall into four main categories:\n\n- Regulatory improvements, including updating procedures, closing implementation gaps and improving efficiency\n- Strengthened supervision, such as file tracking systems and alerts to reduce discretion\n- Enhanced communication, including multicultural approaches for Indigenous and rural communities\n- Cross-cutting measures to promote integrity such as awareness-raising, ethical reflection and training\n\nGiven common patterns across natural resource sectors, these measures may be relevant for other environmental agencies, though they should be adapted to local contexts.\n\n### Lessons learned\n\nThe experiences in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru highlight the importance of tailoring risk management approaches to national contexts, ensuring institutional leadership and fostering inter-institutional collaboration. They also underline the value of peer learning and cross-border exchange.",[136],"2026-04-02","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fa4345633-502b-4784-b391-b3ca6bafb2c5?width=600&height=840",[310,313],{"url":311,"caption":312},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fprotecting-forests-through-corruption-prevention-videos-on-promising-initiatives-in-bolivia-ecuador-and-peru-2726","Learn more about protecting forests through corruption prevention",{"url":314,"caption":315},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fjoining-forces-to-protect-the-amazon-forest-and-its-communities-from-corruption-2717","Read related news",[],[318,322,326,330,334],{"authors_id":319},{"id":320,"name":321},586,"Aldo Bautista",{"authors_id":323},{"id":324,"name":325},587,"Mirtha Muniz",{"authors_id":327},{"id":328,"name":329},588,"Karla Coronado",{"authors_id":331},{"id":332,"name":333},589,"Patricia Torres",{"authors_id":335},{"id":336,"name":337},590,"Francisco Bustamante",[339,343,347],{"countries_id":340},{"id":341,"name":342},171,"Peru",{"countries_id":344},{"id":345,"name":346},28,"Bolivia",{"countries_id":348},{"id":349,"name":350},60,"Ecuador",[352,356,360],{"tags_id":353},{"id":354,"name":355},1303,"Environment",{"tags_id":357},{"id":358,"name":359},1373,"Corruption prevention",{"tags_id":361},{"id":119,"name":120},[363],2494,[24],[15],"b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-02T21:18:25.000Z","Corruption in the timber value chain represents a major challenge for environmental sustainability\nand governance in Latin America. This report introduces the application of a **corruption risk\nmanagement approach** by environmental authorities in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. This\napproach was implemented within the framework of technical assistance provided by the Green\nCorruption programme of the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nCorruption refers to the misuse of entrusted power for private gain, often leading to increased\ninequality, poverty and social division. The concept of “green corruption” addresses the impact of\ncorruption as a major driver of environmental devastation and increased risk of harm to the\nenvironment and natural resources. Corruption risk refers to the possibility of a corrupt act\noccurring, but does not necessarily mean that a corrupt act has taken place. Mitigation measures\n– based on identified corruption risks, their impacts and likelihoods – are typically a prioritised set\nof recommended actions to address weaknesses, allocate resources, seek external support or\noffset the impact of negative conditions.\n\nUtilising the Green Corruption programme’s corruption risk management approach,\nrepresentatives of the environmental authorities identified corruption risks within the timber value\nchain related to **three key risk contexts**:\n1. The granting of forestry rights\n2. The issuance and use of timber transport waybills\n3. The control and supervision of authorised actors.\n\n**Priority areas of concern** included documentary procedures, physical inspections and the\nadministrative sanctioning procedure.\n\n**Specific corruption risks** identified involved:\n- the potential for improper agreements between public servants and third parties;\n- abuse of authority; and\n- undue influence or other improper pressures from hierarchical superiors within organisations.\n\nThe majority of planned **mitigation measures** can be grouped into four categories:\n- **Regulatory improvement**, to be accomplished by reviewing and updating administrative procedures, closing implementation gaps and other opportunities for corruption and improving operating efficiency.\n- **Strengthened supervision** through the implementation of file tracking systems and alerts as well as the use of verification formats in the approval of forestry rights and the issuance of timber transport waybills, and other practices that reduce the discretion of operational units.\n- **Enhanced communication strategies** to support information exchange and joint action within the timber value chain. Specifically, a multicultural strategy was developed as a way of reducing the vulnerability to corruption for Indigenous and rural farming communities.\n- **Cross-cutting measures** to promote integrity through awareness-raising, ethical reflection and training for public servants and other actors in the timber value chain.\n\nThis document concludes with lessons learned and recommendations, highlighting the\nimportance of tailoring the approach to recognise the unique context of each country, its\ninstitutional leadership in risk management and the contribution of inter-institutional collaborative\nwork. The risk management experiences in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru also highlight the value of\npeer learning and the exchange of experiences, including across national borders.\n\nIn summary, this publication offers a practical approach for implementing corruption risk\nmanagement as an effective tool to reduce the likelihood of corrupt or unethical behaviour and to\nstrengthen the institutional framework for the timber value chain in Latin America.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruption-risk-management-latam-timber-value-chain",{"id":371,"slug":372,"title":373,"status":6,"nid":374,"year":199,"body":375,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":376,"date_published":378,"image":379,"citation":380,"publisher":17,"link_internal":381,"link_external":388,"authors":395,"countries":404,"tags":409,"pdf":428,"topics":430,"featured":19,"languages":431,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":432,"user_updated":366,"date_updated":433,"main_points":434,"short_version":7,"subtitle":435,"link":436},2441,"cs-13","Case Study 13: The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders",2937,"This Case Study analyses how Colombian authorities recovered assets linked to drug trafficking and held in a trust in Guernsey. It sets out the legal tools and procedures in Colombia and in Guernsey that enabled Colombia’s first international recovery under its non-conviction based forfeiture model _Extinción de dominio_. The Case Study highlights lessons for international cooperation between jurisdictions with different forfeiture systems or even legal traditions.\n\nThe International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance provided technical assistance as part of a Memorandum of Understanding with the General Prosecutor’s Office of Colombia.\n\n[**Download Case Study here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-05\u002FCase-Study-13_Beauty-Queen.pdf)\n\nOn 30 November 2023, the Fourth Court of the Specialised Extinción de Dominio Circuit of Colombia ordered the non-conviction based forfeiture of a Guernsey trust account issued by Northern Trust Fiduciary Services (Guernsey) Limited. The beneficiary was María Marcela Serrano Camacho, a Colombian model and former beauty queen.\n\nThe Colombian forfeiture order extinguished property rights over the account – amounting to GBP 361,146 – on the grounds that the funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed by Efraín Antonio Hernández Ramírez (“Don Efra”), a well-known Colombian drug trafficker, and his former spouse María Serrano in the 1990s.\n\nOn 30 January 2025, following successful mutual legal assistance proceedings between Colombia and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the two jurisdictions concluded an asset sharing agreement for the repatriation of the confiscated assets.\n\nThis marked Colombia’s first successful international recovery through non-conviction based forfeiture.\n\nThis Case Study examines how early and effective coordination between Colombia and Guernsey enabled the identification, freezing, forfeiture and repatriation of the assets. It analyses the legal framework underpinning Colombia's Extinción de dominio regime and how it was applied, leading to the forfeiture of the Guernsey acccount. It also describes the procedural mechanisms used in Guernsey to execute foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders.\n\nThe interaction between the authorities in both jurisdictions offers valuable lessons and examples of good practices.\n\n**Main takeaways of the case:**\n\n- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives\n\nThe Case Study can be read alongside [Policy Brief 16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16): \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres\".\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BYNC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery.\n\nThis is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Case Study is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[377],"Case Study","2026-03-31","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6f1661b8-eab6-4ce0-902d-f6c97f85dd29?width=600&height=840","Solórzano, Oscar, and Diana Cordero. 2026. ‘The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture of criminal assets across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.’ Case Study 13, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13).",[382,385],{"url":383,"caption":384},"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcolombiaguernsey-cooperation-leads-to-successful-non-conviction-based-forfeiture-of-illicit-assets-2716","Read related blog",{"url":386,"caption":387},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications","Read related Policy Brief 16",[389,392],{"url":390,"caption":391},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=368","View online on Basel LEARN",{"url":393,"caption":394},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=72","eLearning course: International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters",[396,400],{"authors_id":397},{"id":398,"name":399},294,"Oscar Solorzano",{"authors_id":401},{"id":402,"name":403},591,"Diana Cordero",[405],{"countries_id":406},{"id":407,"name":408},47,"Colombia",[410,414,418,422,426],{"tags_id":411},{"id":412,"name":413},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":415},{"id":416,"name":417},822,"International cooperation",{"tags_id":419},{"id":420,"name":421},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":423},{"id":424,"name":425},1374,"Law enforcement",{"tags_id":427},{"id":244,"name":245},[429],2495,[30],[15],"2026-06-01T22:10:26.000Z","2026-06-02T14:22:13.000Z","- Early and trust-based international cooperation is decisive\n- Non-conviction based forfeiture is indispensable when criminal routes are closed\n- Identifying beneficial ownership is central to effective asset recovery\n- Direct enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders increases efficiency and legal certainty\n- Asset sharing agreements strengthen cooperation incentives","Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13",{"id":438,"slug":439,"title":440,"status":6,"nid":441,"year":199,"body":442,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":443,"date_published":378,"image":445,"citation":7,"publisher":17,"link_internal":446,"link_external":449,"authors":451,"countries":454,"tags":455,"pdf":464,"topics":466,"featured":19,"languages":467,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":432,"user_updated":54,"date_updated":468,"main_points":7,"short_version":7,"subtitle":469,"link":470},2442,"pb-16","Policy Brief 16: Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders",2947,"This Policy Brief analyses emerging international standards aimed at addressing recurring challenges in judicial practice with regard to the enforcement of non-conviction based forfeiture orders issued by foreign states. It focuses in particular on the historical absence of a binding obligation on requested states to cooperate in such cases and, where cooperation is available, on the structural tension between direct and indirect enforcement models.\n\n[**Download Policy Brief here**](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-03\u002FPolicy-Brief-16_Enforcing-foreign-NCBF-orders.pdf)\n\nRevisions in 2023 to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 4 and 38 seek to clarify and strengthen states’ cooperation in the enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders. In this context, the recognition and execution of foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders are central components of the evolving international asset recovery framework.\n\nThrough analysis and case studies involving Latin American states and international financial centres, this Policy Brief demonstrates that the choice of procedural model for enforcing foreign forfeiture orders – direct or indirect – has significant implications, while acknowledging the competing legal and institutional interests involved.\n\nIn line with FATF Recommendation 38, the Policy Brief argues in favour of direct enforcement in the requested state, based on the facts established by the foreign authority. This promotes efficiency, legal certainty and mutual trust. Indirect enforcement models that may require domestic investigations by the requested state, on the other hand, often lead to delays, duplication and increased costs, which hinders international asset recovery efforts.\n\nThe analysis provides empirical insight into how the revised FATF standards address practical deficiencies and the implications for judicial practice in requested states. For the Latin American context, the Policy Brief suggests to go beyond technical compliance of domestic non-conviction based forfeiture regimes with the FATF standards to strengthen the effectiveness of cross-border enforcement in practice.\n\nThis Policy Brief can be read alongside [Case Study 13](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-13): “The Beauty Queen case: non-conviction based forfeiture across borders. Lessons learned from Colombia–Guernsey cooperation.”\n\n### About this Policy Brief\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series [ISSN 2624-9669](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type\\[]=257). You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons [BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F) licence.\n\nIt is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.\n\n**Disclaimer**: This Policy Brief is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute and\u002For substitute legal or other professional advice. The contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n\n**Suggested citation**: Solórzano, Oscar. 2026. \"Enforcing foreign non-conviction based forfeiture orders: FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres.\" Policy Brief 16, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: [baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16).",[444],"Policy Brief","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff866220c-dddd-41b3-a45e-c2d7992d39e1?width=600&height=840",[447],{"url":386,"caption":448},"Read related Case Study 13",[450],{"url":393,"caption":394},[452],{"authors_id":453},{"id":398,"name":399},[],[456,458,460,462],{"tags_id":457},{"id":412,"name":413},{"tags_id":459},{"id":416,"name":417},{"tags_id":461},{"id":420,"name":421},{"tags_id":463},{"id":424,"name":425},[465],2496,[30],[15],"2026-06-02T14:16:22.000Z","FATF standards and asset recovery practice in Latin America and financial centres","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-16",{"id":472,"slug":473,"title":474,"status":6,"nid":475,"year":199,"body":476,"external":19,"topic":7,"language":7,"type":477,"date_published":378,"image":478,"citation":479,"publisher":17,"link_internal":480,"link_external":484,"authors":487,"countries":492,"tags":501,"pdf":512,"topics":514,"featured":19,"languages":515,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":54,"date_created":432,"user_updated":366,"date_updated":516,"main_points":517,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":518},2443,"cs-14","Case Study 14: Madagascar: a landmark conviction for money laundering linked to environmental crime",2948,"This Case Study demonstrates how international cooperation and the follow-the-money approach revealed a transnational criminal network trafficking endangered species and led to Madagascar’s first money laundering conviction related to wildlife trafficking.\n\n### About this Case Study\n\nThis publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Case Study series, [ISSN 2813-3900](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcase-studies). It is licensed for sharing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License ([CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https:\u002F\u002Fcreativecommons.org\u002Flicenses\u002Fby-nc-nd\u002F4.0\u002F)).\n\nPhoto: [Studio Sifaka](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.studiosifaka.org\u002Farticles\u002Factualites\u002Fitem\u002F8084-plus-de-mille-tortues-et-pres-d-une-cinquantaine-de-lemuriens-vivants-saisis-en-thailande.html) \u002F khaosodenglish (used with permission).\n\nThe Case Study series offers practitioners insights into interesting and precedent-setting cases involving corruption and asset recovery. This case relates to the Basel Institute's [Green Corruption programme](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fgreen-corruption).\n\nThe development of this publication was funded through the Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) Challenge Fund.\n\nThe contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Basel Institute on Governance, its donors and partners, or the University of Basel.\n",[377],"https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fea8361c6-bffd-4cfd-9119-7bc822b39af7?width=600&height=840","Rakotondramanana, Joseph. 2026. “Madagascar: a landmark conviction for money laundering linked to environmental crime.” Case Study 14, Basel Institute on Governance. Available at: https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-14",[481],{"url":482,"caption":483},"\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications?type=Case%20Study","View all Case Studies",[485],{"url":486,"caption":391},"https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=369",[488],{"authors_id":489},{"id":490,"name":491},567,"Joseph Rakotondramanana",[493,497],{"countries_id":494},{"id":495,"name":496},139,"Madagascar",{"countries_id":498},{"id":499,"name":500},213,"Thailand",[502,504,508],{"tags_id":503},{"id":354,"name":355},{"tags_id":505},{"id":506,"name":507},879,"Money laundering",{"tags_id":509},{"id":510,"name":511},1193,"Financial investigations",[513],2497,[24],[15],"2026-06-02T21:14:32.000Z","- In 2024, Thai authorities carried out the country's largest ever single wildlife seizure, intercepting 48 lemurs and more than 1,000 tortoises endemic to Madagascar.\n- The seizure triggered a joint Thai-Malagasy investigation that traced smuggling routes through Indonesia, uncovered a transnational criminal network and led to arrests in both countries, the freezing of bank accounts and the confiscation of vehicles and vessels.\n- In 2025, the Anti-Corruption Court in Antananarivo convicted 10 individuals for trafficking in protected species, money laundering and criminal conspiracy. Sentences of up to 10 years in prison were handed down, alongside approximately USD 8.7 million in customs penalties and damages. This is the first time Madagascar has applied the offence of money laundering to a wildlife trafficking case.\n- Training on financial investigations by the Basel Institute on Governance, together with the facilitation of information exchange and peer learning among enforcement practitioners, contributed to this landmark result. The Malagasy authorities are now better equipped to overcome structural challenges in applying a “follow-the-money” approach to organised environmental crime, including limited technical expertise, insufficient resources and the complexity of cross-border financial investigations.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcs-14",{"id":520,"slug":521,"title":522,"status":6,"nid":523,"year":199,"body":524,"external":19,"topic":525,"language":15,"type":526,"date_published":527,"image":528,"citation":14,"publisher":529,"link_internal":530,"link_external":531,"authors":538,"countries":555,"tags":560,"pdf":580,"topics":582,"featured":19,"languages":7,"summary":7,"programme":7,"area":7,"websites":7,"pdf_text":7,"sort":7,"user_created":53,"date_created":583,"user_updated":54,"date_updated":584,"main_points":585,"short_version":7,"subtitle":7,"link":586},2433,"addressing-conflicts-interest-and-corruption-indonesias-energy-transition","Addressing conflicts of interest and corruption in Indonesia’s energy transition",2936,"This U4 Issue analyses Indonesia's ambitious energy transition and highlights how political finance, weak regulations and a \"revolving door\" of personnel between public office and the private sector create vulnerabilities. The publication was produced by U4 and the Basel Institute on Governance through its Green Corruption programme.\n\n\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2026-02\u002FAddressing-conflicts-of-interest-and-corruption-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition_U4-Issue.pdf\">Download publication here\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n### About the paper\n\nConflicts of interest and corruption in Indonesia's political economy pose significant risks to its energy transition, including the Just Energy Transition Partnership. Existing legal and institutional frameworks are fragmented, inconsistently applied, and often fail to address the risk of state capture by powerful political and economic actors, especially in the extractive and energy sectors.\n\nThe reliance on fossil fuel industries for political financing and the monopolistic nature of state-owned entities further complicate the shift to a low- or no-carbon system, despite the country's ambitious renewable energy targets.\n\nPotential pathways to greater anti-corruption resilience lie in improvements to beneficial ownership transparency and strengthening regulation, monitoring and sanctioning of conflict of interest violations.\n",[24],[136],"2026-02-24","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd97f2ca5-300d-45c9-9de9-33152b72f96c?width=600&height=840","U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre",[],[532,535],{"url":533,"caption":534},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.u4.no\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-conflicts-of-interest-and-corruption-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition"," View on U4 website",{"url":536,"caption":537},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.u4.no\u002Fblog\u002Fimproving-anti-corruption-resilience-in-indonesia-s-energy-transition"," Read related U4 blog",[539,543,547,551],{"authors_id":540},{"id":541,"name":542},581,"Robert Forster",{"authors_id":544},{"id":545,"name":546},582,"Aled Williams",{"authors_id":548},{"id":549,"name":550},523,"Lakso Anindito",{"authors_id":552},{"id":553,"name":554},579,"Dr Amanda Cabrejo le Roux",[556],{"countries_id":557},{"id":558,"name":559},99,"Indonesia",[561,563,565,569,573,576],{"tags_id":562},{"id":154,"name":155},{"tags_id":564},{"id":420,"name":421},{"tags_id":566},{"id":567,"name":568},804,"Natural resources",{"tags_id":570},{"id":571,"name":572},1371,"Public governance",{"tags_id":574},{"id":575,"name":23},1236,{"tags_id":577},{"id":578,"name":579},973,"Corruption",[581],2489,[24],"2026-02-27T15:11:31.000Z","2026-05-23T20:08:18.000Z","- Corruption and conflicts of interest are embedded in the energy transition process due to the strong links between political power, private wealth (especially from extractive industries) and public office holders.\n- Existing anti-corruption regulations are often vague, fragmented across different legal instruments, and suffer from inconsistent enforcement, which creates loopholes susceptible to manipulation.\n- Progress in renewable energy uptake is slowed by the enduring influence and interests of fossil fuel incumbents who benefit from subsidies that keep coal an artificially cheap and viable energy source.\n- The Just Energy Transition Partnership is vulnerable to misallocations due to concentrated decision-making power, limited transparency in project selection and insufficient involvement of national anti-corruption bodies and civil society in its planning.\n- Improving transparency of beneficial ownership and strengthening the monitoring and sanctioning of conflict of interest violations are possible pathways to build greater anti-corruption resilience, though these institutional efforts alone are insufficient to fully address state capture dynamics.","\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Faddressing-conflicts-interest-and-corruption-indonesias-energy-transition",1780676546286]