[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":375},["ShallowReactive",2],{"news-ukraines-place-in-europes-defence-industry-could-compliance-catalyse-integration-2868":3,"news-ukraines-place-in-europes-defence-industry-could-compliance-catalyse-integration-2868-similar":126,"i-heroicons:arrow-left-20-solid":370},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"date_created":7,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":15,"activity":16,"nid":19,"topics":20,"activities":22,"programme":23,"area":23,"websites":23,"language":24,"image":25,"translation_of":23,"countries":35,"tags":60,"authors":106,"images":123,"translations":124,"content":125},10578,"published","2025-11-06T17:01:42.000Z","2026-05-23T09:18:31.000Z","Ukraine’s place in Europe’s defence industry: could compliance catalyse integration?","Blog","_Ukraine is already central to Europe’s security. Its defence manufacturers are increasingly eligible for participation in the rapidly growing EU defence procurements. However, unless Ukraine’s defence manufacturers are able to meet strict EU anti-corruption and ESG standards, they risk being shut out of EU supply chains. Europe needs Ukraine’s battlefield-tested innovation and production capacity, yet compliance gaps and unclear expectations are slowing integration. Juhani Grossmann, who leads the Basel Institute’s anti-corruption programme in Ukraine, explains how joint actions to overcome compliance barriers can help secure Ukraine’s place in Europe’s defence ecosystem and strengthen our collective security._\n\n### Ukraine’s central role in EU defence\n\nThe last three and a half years have been hard fought in Ukraine. Ukrainian resilience on the battlefield is legendary. The unparalleled military support from Ukraine’s allies, fused with its own relentless technical innovation, have forged bonds that could define Europe’s emerging security infrastructure.\n\nDaring political decisions by Ukraine and its allies have hastened this integration. Among them: the European Union has adopted the Security Action For Europe ([SAFE](https:\u002F\u002Fdefence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\u002Feu-defence-industry\u002Fsafe-security-action-europe_en)) mechanism, using its combined fiscal firepower to raise low-cost loans on capital markets to encourage joint military procurement.\n\nSAFE explicitly includes Ukrainian firms in its stringent corporate and sourcing geographical origin requirements, which are designed to stimulate a native European defence industry. This recognises both Ukraine’s ongoing contribution to Europe’s security and the value of the country’s combat-driven technical innovations. From this angle, Ukraine’s defence industry is now even more critical to the EU than the UK, historically the continent’s dominant player.\n\n### Europe is vulnerable – but can’t meet its demand for defence hardware\n\nThe United States’ interest in taking responsibility for European and global security is waning, while Russia continues to probe Europe’s hard and soft defences.\n\nFeeling justifiably vulnerable, European nations have therefore committed to a huge increase in defence spending, which could reach [EUR 2 trillion](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.consilium.europa.eu\u002Fen\u002Fpolicies\u002Fdefence-numbers\u002F) over the next five years.\n\nYet EU defence industry leaders struggle to manufacture defence equipment in sufficient quality and quantity to meet the unprecedented demand and lack the battlefield-tested innovations that are at the core of Ukraine’s industry.\n\n### Ukraine could help meet demand for military equipment\n\nPartly due to the above dynamics, deep public debates are taking place in Ukraine about lifting a _de facto_ ban on the export of military goods in place since the full-scale invasion. The government is establishing [defence production offices in Berlin and Copenhagen](https:\u002F\u002Fkyivindependent.com\u002Fukraine-to-open-defense-production-offices-in-berlin-copenhagen-this-year-zelensky-says\u002F) to facilitate limited export.\n\nThis sounds counterintuitive, considering the devastating shortage of materiel at the front. Yet the truth is: Ukraine’s military is simply unable to afford all the weaponry that its manufacturers can deliver. So, the economic argument for export is strong:\n\n*   Selling excess capacity for a profit could generate significant revenue.\n*   That revenue could be used for economies of scale in production as well as for research and development.\n*   The resulting taxes would allow the state to increase the procurement of materiel for its own troops.\n\nIn a confirmation of the compelling market forces, Ukrainian drone manufacturers have started investments in Europe to set up production outside of Ukraine.\n\nThey certainly have products that would be marketable: their innovation has resulted in weekly software updates and continued hardware improvements. The more traditional howitzers, tanks and armoured personnel carriers are cost competitive and highly scalable. Battlefield command and control software is reported to be top notch.\n\n### What could derail Ukraine’s integration in EU defence markets\n\nOn the surface, the pieces of the puzzle of European defence are aligning neatly. But one major obstacle needs to be cleared for a healthy and thriving trade: Ukrainian defence manufacturers must meet EU standards on anti-corruption compliance and related environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters.\n\nThese include issues such as sustainable sourcing of aviation fuel, employee protections and human rights across the supply chain, as well as good governance of these topics. They also include regulations and standards on integrity and anti-corruption.\n\nThe defence sector globally is struggling to meet many of these requirements. And Ukraine’s fast-growing innovators have understandably not prioritised such matters over the wartime need to deliver at speed.\n\nWithout a rapid move to address this shortfall, Ukraine’s innovators could be shut out from European markets. The EU defence industry – and its citizens – would in turn be deprived of crucial expertise, leaving all allies weaker and poorer. Temptations would mount to soften standards, as is already the case with [fiscal probity requirements](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.consilium.europa.eu\u002Fen\u002Fpress\u002Fpress-releases\u002F2025\u002F10\u002F10\u002Feconomic-governance-council-approves-germany-s-fiscal-expenditure-path-and-its-flexibility-to-increase-defence-spending\u002F) when it pertains to military spending.\n\nThat would be a mistake for both Ukraine and its European allies. Instead, overcoming these challenges could be a boost for both the EU and the Ukrainian defence industry and further cement their partnership.\n\n### Robust internal controls bring many benefits\n\nThe measures required to attain EU standards on anti-corruption compliance and related ESG topics are no doubt arduous. Solid internal control systems, which can produce verifiable data, will need to be established.\n\nBut that brings solid benefits. Information from internal control systems will help to convince customers that the products they are literally entrusting their lives to are reliable, safe and effective. It will provide the basis for ESG reporting in future.\n\nAnd while the effectiveness of Ukraine’s defence systems is convincingly demonstrated through frontline usage, as its defence industry matures, it could greatly benefit from the efficiencies that robust internal control systems bring. \n\n### Challenges meeting EU regulations\n\nEuropean defence firms are eager to work with Ukrainian partners, yet are finding it difficult to meet their own regulatory obligations at the same time. We see several reasons for this:\n\n*   Sourcing of components is swift, creative and results driven. Without control systems, companies might struggle to verifiably certify their ability to meet the SAFE requirement that 65 percent of the weapon’s value must originate from EU\u002FEEA\u002FEFTA member states or Ukraine.\n*   Corporate ownership structures in Ukraine can be challenging for due diligence – particularly when it comes to establishing ultimate beneficial owners of companies.\n*   There is a lack of consensus on what good anti-corruption and ethics policy implementation looks like. This leaves Ukrainian partners unsure of the priorities, direction and speed of any required internal reforms.\n*   Track and trace measures are insufficiently robust. This makes it hard to reliably avoid sanctions violations in the procurement of components and to ensure environmentally sustainable sourcing of raw materials.\n*   Wartime lack of physical access to sites makes traditional verification mechanisms impossible.\n\nThese obstacles are formidable and have the potential to threaten otherwise promising partnerships.\n\n### There is a joint path forward\n\nThankfully, we see a strong desire on both sides to navigate a path through these obstacles.\n\n*   Reforms are progressing fast. Ukrainian Defence Industry, the holding company for the majority of state-owned defence manufacturers, has made impressive strides in adopting reforms at the top level. It is gradually cascading these down to the 50+ companies under its purview, including the producers of such notable products as the _Lyutii_ drone, the _Neptune_ subsonic cruise missile_,_ the _Bohdana_ howitzer and the _Stugna_\u002F_Skif_ anti-tank missile. While a long road remains to reform these highly traditional producers, the political will and technical capacity at the top are formidable.\n*   Anti-corruption policies are being implemented. The more established private manufacturers are increasingly adopting and publicising ethics and anti-corruption policies. They are also implementing and developing channels for reporting violations of integrity standards, and organising contractual activities based on ethical and compliance requirements.\n*   Engagement is strengthening. European manufacturers, who act as both suppliers and potential customers, are keen to engage more closely with their existing or potential Ukrainian partners to smooth the compliance obstacles as their relationships develop. These manufacturers are also keen to bolster their own contextual understanding of the operating environment in Ukraine, allowing them to manage the reputational and legal risks more professionally.\n*   Corruption is being investigated and prosecuted. Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) are making significant headway in pursuing officials and company representatives who are willing to use criminal behaviour, including corruption, to personally benefit from wartime deprivations.\n*   Risk prevention measures are underway. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) is leading the process of conducting a comprehensive risk assessment in the defence sector.\n*   International support is there. Increasingly, Ukrainian and international policy and advisory supporters are engaging in the sector. This includes the International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct for the Aerospace and Defence Industry ([IFBEC](http:\u002F\u002Fifbec.info\u002F)), NATO’s [Building Integrity](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.nato.int\u002Fcps\u002Fen\u002Fnatohq\u002Ftopics_68368.htm) programme and Norway’s Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector ([CIDS](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.regjeringen.no\u002Fen\u002Ftopics\u002Fdefence\u002Fcentre-for-integrity-in-the-defence-sector-cids\u002Fid3114785\u002F)). The Basel Institute on Governance has recently commenced efforts in this space through funding from Norway.\n\nTogether, these efforts have the potential to make significant progress in overcoming obstacles.\n\n### How to accelerate progress\n\nWhile progress is happening, it is still insufficient given the urgency of the security situation in Europe. That is why we propose the following five catalysts:\n\n*   Set clear compliance requirements. EU member states at the forefront of defence procurement should spell out their internal control and anti-corruption requirements in plain and detailed terms. This would enable Ukrainian firms to participate in projects, either in collaboration with EU partners or independently. Providing early support and education would help potential Ukrainian partners meet these standards quicker.\n*   Improve implementation and verification systems. Industry associations should strengthen their anti-corruption standards and\u002For guidance by creating clear systems for implementation, verification and measurement.\n*   Allow time to comply. Companies should share their subcontracting compliance requirements with prospective partners well ahead of procurement deadlines, and work with them to build the systems needed to meet these standards.\n*   Share risk insights. Independent corruption risk assessment findings in the defence manufacturing sector, in both Europe and Ukraine, should be shared widely within the professional community.\n*   Collective integrity standards. Private manufacturers in Ukraine should create joint anti-corruption standards, ideally through a [Collective Action](https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002F) approach – i.e. involving all relevant stakeholders working together in a trust-based environment over a sustained period of time. This would help stop individual companies using corrupt practices while others play fair, and reduce compliance costs for individual companies.\n\nAt the Basel Institute we are proud to continue and expand our work in this space with the generous support of Norway. We welcome partners to join these efforts and help ensure Ukraine’s defence innovation becomes a permanent pillar of Europe’s security.","2025-11-06",[14],"","ukraines-place-in-europes-defence-industry-could-compliance-catalyse-integration-2868",[17,18],"Insights","Partnerships",2868,[21],"Ukraine",[17,18],null,"English",{"id":26,"storage":27,"filename_disk":28,"filename_download":29,"title":9,"type":30,"created_on":7,"modified_on":7,"charset":23,"filesize":31,"width":32,"height":33,"duration":23,"embed":23,"description":23,"location":23,"tags":23,"metadata":34,"focal_point_x":23,"focal_point_y":23,"tus_id":23,"tus_data":23,"uploaded_on":7},"c5b007eb-82d5-4cda-a6e1-773cfa16ad5d","local","c5b007eb-82d5-4cda-a6e1-773cfa16ad5d.webp","tmp.webp","image\u002Fwebp",4508,800,533,{},[36],{"id":37,"news_id":38,"countries_id":55},7800,{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":26,"date":12,"topic":41,"slug":15,"activity":42,"nid":19,"topics":43,"activities":44,"programme":23,"area":23,"websites":23,"translation_of":23,"language":24,"countries":45,"tags":46,"authors":50,"images":52,"translations":53,"content":54},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30",[14],[17,18],[21],[17,18],[37],[47,48,49],5635,5636,5637,[51],1357,[],[],[],{"id":56,"name":21,"code":57,"latitude":58,"longitude":59},225,"UA",48.37943,31.16558,[61,76,91],{"id":47,"news_id":62,"tags_id":73},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":26,"date":12,"topic":63,"slug":15,"activity":64,"nid":19,"topics":65,"activities":66,"programme":23,"area":23,"websites":23,"translation_of":23,"language":24,"countries":67,"tags":68,"authors":69,"images":70,"translations":71,"content":72},[14],[17,18],[21],[17,18],[37],[47,48,49],[51],[],[],[],{"id":74,"name":75},1376,"Defence and security",{"id":48,"news_id":77,"tags_id":88},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":26,"date":12,"topic":78,"slug":15,"activity":79,"nid":19,"topics":80,"activities":81,"programme":23,"area":23,"websites":23,"translation_of":23,"language":24,"countries":82,"tags":83,"authors":84,"images":85,"translations":86,"content":87},[14],[17,18],[21],[17,18],[37],[47,48,49],[51],[],[],[],{"id":89,"name":90},982,"Anti-corruption",{"id":49,"news_id":92,"tags_id":103},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":26,"date":12,"topic":93,"slug":15,"activity":94,"nid":19,"topics":95,"activities":96,"programme":23,"area":23,"websites":23,"translation_of":23,"language":24,"countries":97,"tags":98,"authors":99,"images":100,"translations":101,"content":102},[14],[17,18],[21],[17,18],[37],[47,48,49],[51],[],[],[],{"id":104,"name":105},1303,"Environment",[107],{"id":51,"news_id":108,"authors_id":119},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":26,"date":12,"topic":109,"slug":15,"activity":110,"nid":19,"topics":111,"activities":112,"programme":23,"area":23,"websites":23,"translation_of":23,"language":24,"countries":113,"tags":114,"authors":115,"images":116,"translations":117,"content":118},[14],[17,18],[21],[17,18],[37],[47,48,49],[51],[],[],[],{"id":120,"name":121,"position":23,"image":122},299,"Juhani Grossmann","f6e8d3b4-6d55-423e-bf4d-2da3f5ea6b46",[],[],[],[127,151,182,206,227,250,276,300,347],{"id":128,"body":129,"status":6,"type":10,"date":130,"slug":131,"title":132,"image":133,"countries":134,"topic":136,"activity":137,"tags":139,"nid":140,"topics":141,"activities":142,"authors":143,"images":145,"websites":23,"area":23,"programme":23,"language":24,"translations":146,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":147,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":148,"content":149,"link":150},10567,"Today, the Basel Institute on Governance jointly published a report with Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention and State Audit Service on corruption risks in Ukraine's civil infrastructure restoration efforts. \n\nWith damage from the Russian aggression estimated to exceed EUR 500 billion, safeguarding state and foreign donor investments in restoration projects is imperative. \n\nThe report highlights 10 key priority risks and suggests mitigation measures. These cover areas such as establishing clear prioritisation criteria for projects, improving public procurement processes and strengthening oversight for construction projects.\n\nThe report, _Assessment of corruption risks in the construction, reconstruction and renovation of civilian infrastructure of Ukraine_, is available [here in Ukrainian](https:\u002F\u002Fnazk.gov.ua\u002Fpdfjs\u002F?file=\u002Fwp-content\u002Fuploads\u002FPages\u002Fa6\u002F84\u002Fa684c9bcc3dd2ba5e6135be3f225c688759f81ac32d035fb14ef47fad29dddbf2744054.pdf) on the NACP website. The Basel Institute and our Kyiv-based team contributed to its development with the support of Switzerland.\n\nThe launch event brought together key stakeholders in the restoration process, including Members of Parliament, representatives of the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, the State Agency for Restoration and Development of Infrastructure of Ukraine, the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, the Antimonopoly Committee, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, as well as representatives of local self-government and the private sector.\n\nJuhani Grossmann, who leads the Basel Institute's support to Ukraine on anti-corruption, delivered introductory remarks highlighting the centrality of a robust and independent anti-corruption infrastructure to safeguard restoration funds. These are found below:\n\n> Dear colleagues, dear friends,\n> \n> It is a pleasure to be with you today and discuss this crucial topic: restoring Ukraine's infrastructure and services efficiently and transparently, making the best use of limited funds.\n> \n> Allow me to start by acknowledging the exceptionally challenging circumstances you operate under and my appreciation for your continued bravery in the light of seemingly impossible obstacles.\n> \n> As members of the European family, your sacrifices made at the front are the investment in our collective European security. You are protecting the family, a fact which we have to treat with respect. It is my ardent hope that we will be able to honour these sacrifices by jointly building a Ukrainian future that makes today’s deprivations worthwhile.\n> \n> Family members support each other, and so we at the Basel Institute seek to support you. A top priority for us is to provide the tools you need in the face of unprecedented challenges.\n> \n> Those of us not in the military space provide support to the extent of our own capacity. For us at the Basel Institute, that means supporting your efforts to combat corruption – an enemy you have been fighting for decades, and an enemy that continues to have the potential to threaten your ability to mount an effective defence and restoration of your country today.\n> \n> Corruption is such a complicated topic: most of us just want to wish it away, like a bad dream, but unfortunately, it continues to be a reality. That does not mean it is stagnant. Like any enemy, it adapts, mutates, strengthens or weakens, depending on how we treat it.\n> \n> Ukraine’s relentless fight against corruption over the last decade has meant that you, in turn, have been able to hone your anti-corruption weapons. Conceptually similar to your relentless military innovation, you have step by step built your anti-corruption arsenal to a degree where Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure – consisting of specialised agencies, decentralised corruption prevention officers, robust civil society and independent media – met some of the highest global standards and often exceeded that of Western counterparts.\n> \n> There is a dedicated international standard about the independence of anti-corruption agencies, called the [Jakarta Principles](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Fcorruption\u002FWG-Prevention\u002FArt_6_Preventive_anti-corruption_bodies\u002FJAKARTA_STATEMENT_en.pdf). This highlights the importance of ensuring independence in the appointment of the leadership, continuity in the agencies’ work and budgetary autonomy, as well as protecting employees from malicious civil and criminal proceedings.\n> \n> I don't say this lightly: when I travel around the world to the countries with which I work, and tell them about the fact that you continue to robustly pursue corruption during a full-scale war, my colleagues tell me they wish they had your anti-corruption infrastructure.\n> \n> We understand that this anti-corruption infrastructure is not something that was achieved easily. Rather, you had to fight for every law to remain intact, strengthen every regulation repeatedly to address residual risk, build and protect every case against obstacles, shepherd every risk assessment to the mitigation stage and then negotiate, argue, cajole and convince opponents to have these mitigation measures implemented.\n> \n> I know how carefully you considered the recruitment of every detective, analyst, prosecutor and judge. And the resulting system has been impressive – a national treasure. You should be proud of it, as should all Ukrainian citizens and leaders alike. We have certainly been privileged to be associated with it.\n> \n> The value of this anti-corruption infrastructure to Ukraine is not (only) sentimental. It is also of crucial importance as a counter-message to those who say – often without any personal experience or understanding of the issue – that any money or resources sent to Ukraine will only fuel corruption. It is also a crucial counter-message to russian propaganda which loves to portray Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt. You, the anti-corruption institutions, helped us build the arguments against these sceptics:\n> \n> *   How can Ukraine be hopeless, we argue, if it has managed to decrease corruption perceptions by 5 points between 2019 and this year, showing one of the best results in the region?\n> *   How can Ukraine be hopeless if it manages to investigate, arrest and convict high-level corrupt officials?\n> *   How can Ukraine be hopeless if the maturity of its anti-corruption institutions, as recently assessed by the OECD, surpasses many of those in OECD member countries?\n> *   How can Ukraine be hopeless if it has one of the most transparent public procurement systems?\n> *   How can it be hopeless if its public service digitalisation has drastically decreased opportunities for rent-seeking by bureaucrats?\n> *   How can Ukraine’s restoration be hopeless if it has as sophisticated a corruption risk analysis as the one we are presenting today?\n> \n> These are real-life arguments that result in real-life financial, political and military support because they confirm your responsible stewardship of the support you receive. They have allowed us to say that Ukraine is not a corrupt country; it is a country that fights corruption.\n> \n> To those of you in the anti-corruption community: thank you for your hard work over the last 12 years to build and sustain this anti-corruption infrastructure against extraordinary odds.\n> \n> We understand that this week’s efforts have changed the landscape drastically, but fighting corruption remains as important as ever.\n> \n> Your work has been inspiring us, and we will continue to support Ukraine’s anti-corruption aspirations to safeguard this essential dimension of your national defence and restoration.","2025-07-24","mitigating-corruption-risks-in-ukraine039s-restoration-new-report-2836","Mitigating corruption risks in Ukraine's restoration: new report","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd9cd78fe-043c-482d-92c1-5152e324e1c7?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[135],7791,[14],[138,17],"Reports",[],2836,[21],[138,17],[144],1349,[],[],"2025-08-21T23:48:00.000Z","2026-05-23T09:18:20.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fmitigating-corruption-risks-in-ukraine039s-restoration-new-report-2836",{"id":152,"body":153,"status":6,"type":154,"date":155,"slug":156,"title":157,"image":158,"countries":159,"topic":161,"activity":163,"tags":165,"nid":166,"topics":167,"activities":169,"authors":170,"images":171,"websites":172,"area":174,"programme":23,"language":24,"translations":176,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":177,"user_updated":178,"date_updated":179,"content":180,"link":181},10557,"Five practitioners from Ukraine’s leading anti-corruption institutions have been certified as national trainers in financial investigations and asset recovery following their successful completion of the [Train-the-Trainer programme](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\u002Ftraining-programmes) of our International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR).\n\nThe group includes Andrii Kasian, Rostyslav Batih and Serhii Podhorets from the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), Oleksii Geiko from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and Oleksii Kravchuk from the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC). Congratulations to all.\n\nAmid the ongoing full-scale invasion, Ukraine and its international partners continue to invest in long-term solutions to strengthen the fight against corruption. The certification of these trainers marks an important step towards embedding sustainable, practitioner-led training across national anti-corruption institutions.\n\nIt also brings a valuable secondary impact: as practitioners themselves, the trainers are well placed to promote and apply innovative approaches to investigations and asset recovery within their institutions.\n\n### Investing in local capacity\n\nAcross four financial investigation and asset recovery workshops, which began in June 2024, the newly certified trainers received close mentoring from our ICAR training team. During the process, they gradually progressed from co-facilitators to fully independent trainers.\n\nIn the final workshop, they successfully delivered the programme to 25 peers from their own institutions. This brings the total number of anti-corruption practitioners trained during the programme to 102.\n\nWith certification now complete, the newly qualified trainers are expected to lead further sessions in the coming months.\n\n### Practical, immersive and localised\n\nICAR's methodology is built around realistic case simulations that mirror the complexity of actual financial investigations. Participants analyse documents, follow leads and justify evidence requests from foreign counterparts. This enables them to develop the mindset and skills needed to tackle real cases.\n\nA key aim of the Train-the-Trainer programme was to ensure this approach could be effectively localised and delivered by Ukrainian professionals. When taught by national practitioners who understand the legal and institutional context, the methodology becomes even more relevant and impactful.\n\nOne participant from the final workshop described the training as\n\n> “a chance to piece together knowledge like a puzzle and sharpen judgement like a diamond being polished”.\n\nAnother commented:\n\n> It was probably the best and most practical training I’ve attended in recent years.\n\n### From training to practice: dual impact\n\nBeyond their new role, the certified trainers are experienced practitioners embedded in key anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine. This dual role enables them to reinforce training messages through daily casework and to champion innovative practices from within. All trainers noted that they are currently testing and promoting new tools, including standalone money laundering prosecutions, the use of circumstantial evidence and a \"follow the money\" approach that reduces reliance on direct proof of financial crimes like bribery.\n\nOne trainer reflected that the sessions provided:\n\n> “structured knowledge of money laundering that I used in one of my cases”.\n\nThey also noted the training offered\n\n> clear guidance to work through lengthy civil confiscation materials, which come in constantly.\n\nBeyond improving casework, the opportunity to train others was described as a chance to\n\n> test and discuss ideas, receive additional knowledge of the subject and valuable points of view from other specialists in the same field of work.\n\nNow equipped to deliver training, and with further workshops planned, they are bridging training and practice. Their work is helping to embed good practices in their institutions and shape how complex financial crime cases are tackled in Ukraine.\n\n### About the training and the Basel Institute’s wider support to Ukraine\n\nThe ICAR Train-the-Trainer programme was supported by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation through the Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Support Project ([ACARSU](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.eda.admin.ch\u002Fcountries\u002Fukraine\u002Fde\u002Fhome\u002Finternationale-zusammenarbeit\u002Fprojekte.html\u002Fcontent\u002Fdezaprojects\u002FSDC\u002Fen\u002F2017\u002F7F09386\u002Fphase2?oldPagePath=\u002Fcontent\u002Fcountries\u002Fukraine\u002Fde\u002Fhome\u002Finternationale-zusammenarbeit\u002Fprojekte.html)). The final workshop, held on 26–30 May 2025, received additional financial and logistical support from the US Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.\n\nMore broadly, the Basel Institute on Governance has supported Ukraine’s anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts since 2014. Our holistic programme includes:\n\n*   Helping government ministries, agencies and state-owned enterprises to prevent corruption in critical sectors related to reconstruction, infrastructure and natural resources. Assisting with transnational corruption investigations and the recovery of assets from abroad. Working with investors and contractors to minimise integrity risks in construction and development cooperation projects.\n\nThis programme of work is carried out by a combination of a local team based in Kyiv and Basel Institute staff who travel regularly to Ukraine.","News","2025-06-05","five-ukrainian-anti-corruption-practitioners-certified-as-national-trainers-2817","Five Ukrainian anti-corruption practitioners certified as national trainers","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ffe2fe038-6bcd-4d4e-82e5-e0aee16fb0c8?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[160],7780,[162],"Asset Recovery",[164],"Training",[],2817,[168,21],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[164],[],[],[173],"Main page",[175],"Anti-Corruption & Prevention",[],"2025-06-05T16:01:34.000Z","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6","2026-05-29T22:22:36.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ffive-ukrainian-anti-corruption-practitioners-certified-as-national-trainers-2817",{"id":183,"body":184,"status":6,"type":154,"date":185,"slug":186,"title":187,"image":188,"countries":189,"topic":191,"activity":193,"tags":194,"nid":195,"topics":196,"activities":197,"authors":198,"images":199,"websites":200,"area":23,"programme":23,"language":23,"translations":201,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":202,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":203,"content":204,"link":205},10356,"We are delighted to have signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Ministry of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine, the Ministry responsible for Ukraine's restoration. Under the agreement, we will work to minimise corruption risks in the use of state and donor funds allocated for the reconstruction of critical infrastructure.\n\nThis will include strengthening anti-corruption compliance in the road sector and assessing integrity risks when determining the cost of road works and services.\n\nOleksandr Kubrakov, Deputy Prime Minister for the Restoration of Ukraine, signed the Memorandum of Cooperation with Peter Maurer and Gretta Fenner, President and Managing Director of the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\n### Anti-corruption: a critical need\n\nAs the Ministry stated in its [Facebook post](https:\u002F\u002Fm.facebook.com\u002Flogin.php?next=https%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2Fstory.php%3Fstory_fbid%3Dpfbid0kbZLjavApNcrxp99SWuYTQ8P36N8h2YoxBaGAKise9CVuHNmABCCVSpLEUMxY5Yel%26id%3D100064745704510&refsrc=deprecated&_rdr), the World Bank has estimated the total reconstruction need at USD 411 billion. Housing and critical infrastructure facilities require the most funds.\n\nUkraine is actively working to attract international partners, governmental and non-governmental organisations to assist in financing the reconstruction. The consistency of financial assistance directly depends on effective anti-corruption measures.\n\nUkraine is already working on digitalising processes and reforming the procurement sector to ensure transparency and accountability at all stages of reconstruction.\n\nReferring to these challenges, Minister Kubrakov said:\n\n> We are grateful to have the Basel Institute on Governance as a partner in our efforts to strengthen internal controls and promote integrity in the infrastructure sector.\n\nJuhani Grossmann, the Institute’s Senior Advisor for Central and Eastern Europe noted:\n\n> “The Basel Institute has long supported the Ukrainian government in the fight against the “enemy within” – corruption. With the full-scale invasion over a year ago, the corruption risk profile in Ukraine has evolved significantly and the need to prevent corruption in the restoration processes is essential. It is our honour to support the Ministry and its agencies in this endeavour.”\n\n### Cooperation agreement\n\nThe memorandum provides support for Ukraine's efforts to maintain and restore critical infrastructure. It focuses on strengthening resilience and integrity in the operational processes of the Ministry and its subordinate enterprises.\n\nThe cooperation also includes: \n\n*   conducting corruption risk assessments;\n*   development of plans to identify the risks of corruption-related criminal offences and anti-corruption plans\n*   identification of measures to reduce the risks of fraud and corruption;\n*   training of officials responsible for integrity and anti-corruption policy implementation.\n\nOur work in Ukraine is supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, as well as the Principality of Liechtenstein which is funding our Green Corruption work on [illegal logging in Ukraine](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fdeepdive1-ukraine).\n\n### More\n\n*   View joint recommendations by the Basel Institute and Transparency International Ukraine presented at the [Ukraine Recovery Conference](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fukraine-recovery-conference-anti-corruption-critical-condition-sustainable-recovery) and [International Anti-Corruption Conference](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fstrengthening-ukraines-anti-corruption-and-judicial-infrastructure-safeguard-recovery) last year.\n*   Read a [joint blog](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fdont-let-kleptocrats-war-destroy-ukraines-reconstruction) by Gretta Fenner (Basel Institute) and Andrii Borovyk (Transparency International Ukraine) on safeguarding Ukraine's reconstruction from corruption.\n*   Learn more about financing Ukraine's reconstruction using recovered assets in this [panel discussion](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fasset-recovery-developments-start-war-ukraine) and [working paper](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42).\n*   Read about the [RISE Ukraine coalition](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Frise-ukraine-coalition-launched-today-basel-institute-among-20-partners-promoting-transparent) of Ukrainian organisations and international partners that promotes a vision of integrity, sustainability and efficiency for the country’s post-war reconstruction.","2023-04-05","transparent-reconstruction-in-ukraine-ministry-for-restoration-and-basel-institute-on-governance-sign-memorandum-of-cooperation-2425","Transparent reconstruction in Ukraine: Ministry for Restoration and Basel Institute on Governance sign Memorandum of Cooperation","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F0c954837-9f58-4922-893e-a488e62b694f?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[190],7190,[192],"Private Sector",[18],[],2425,[192,21],[18],[],[],[173],[],"2023-03-31T10:01:24.000Z","2026-05-23T09:20:06.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ftransparent-reconstruction-in-ukraine-ministry-for-restoration-and-basel-institute-on-governance-sign-memorandum-of-cooperation-2425",{"id":207,"body":208,"status":6,"type":10,"date":209,"slug":210,"title":211,"image":212,"countries":213,"topic":214,"activity":215,"tags":216,"nid":217,"topics":218,"activities":219,"authors":220,"images":221,"websites":23,"area":23,"programme":23,"language":24,"translations":222,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":223,"user_updated":178,"date_updated":224,"content":225,"link":226},10600,"_Reflections by Francesca Grandi, PhD (Transparency International Defence & Security), Elizabeth Andersen and Juhani Grossmann (Basel Institute on Governance) from the Munich Security Conference 2026._\n\nEurope’s ambitious defence spending plans will only pay off if corruption risks are taken seriously. At our joint roundtable at the Munich Security Conference, industry and political leaders agreed: transparency and strong anti-corruption safeguards are essential if higher spending is to deliver technological innovation, real security gains and voter trust. It is time to place integrity at the centre of Europe’s defence agenda.\n\nAt the 2026 Munich Security Conference, political leaders spoke with urgency about readiness, deterrence, industrial capacity and the need to mobilise unprecedented levels of public and private financing. The tone was sober, the geopolitical risks real and the commitments delivered with a sense of urgency. \n\nThe presence of the defence industry was impossible to miss. Private sector actors were actively engaged in shaping the debate, not only across panels and more informally, but also with a [gigantic billboard](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gettyimages.nl\u002Fdetail\u002Fnieuwsfoto%27s\u002Fan-advertisement-for-helsing-gmbh-near-the-venue-for-the-nieuwsfotos\u002F2260760403) “We Got This” directly in front of the conference venue. \n\nWhat we _didn’t_ get was much focus on governance.\n\n### With money comes responsibility – and corruption risks\n\nEurope’s defence architecture is being reshaped at historic speed and scale. As we convened our joint [roundtable](https:\u002F\u002Fti-defence.org\u002Fti-ds-munich-security-conference-2026\u002F), _Get the Balance Right: Capability, Integrity and Effectiveness in Europe’s Emerging Defence Architecture_, one theme stood out: this build-up is vital to European security. But it is also a systemic governance test.\n\nThe scale of financing under discussion is enormous. Meeting Europe’s defence commitments is estimated to require additional financing of around 2 percent of EU [GDP](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ecb.europa.eu\u002Fpress\u002Fblog\u002Fdate\u002F2025\u002Fhtml\u002Fecb.blog20250725~f26b4ef0f3.en.html). At this magnitude, even small governance gaps could translate into billions lost to misallocation, corruption, or fraud. Governance infrastructure must scale in line with spending.\n\nAccelerated procurement, emergency procedures and exceptional budgetary tools are being justified with the urgency of the task, which is understandable. But without enhanced safeguards, they risk:\n\n*   heightening fragmentation, overpricing, undue influence, and fiscal distortion; \n*   weakening transparency and reducing opportunities for civic monitoring; and \n*   limiting the parliamentary and independent oversight that is necessary to maintain the democratic legitimacy of defence investments.\n\n### More spending doesn’t mean more security\n\nThe lesson from past [crises](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cambridge.org\u002Fcore\u002Fjournals\u002Fjournal-of-public-policy\u002Farticle\u002Fcan-bigger-health-budgets-cushion-pandemics-an-empirical-test-of-covid19-deaths-across-the-world\u002F34DA705F15995903F26A72C4E33C9DDE) is clear: spending more does not automatically deliver more security. Defence build-up without governance produces predictable and avoidable [risks](https:\u002F\u002Fti-defence.org\u002Fgdi\u002F). Transparency and oversight are not luxuries – they are force multipliers.\n\nThis is not a marginal issue. Weak governance undermines defence readiness as surely as underinvestment does. It erodes public trust. It fuels political polarisation. It creates openings for foreign interference and [strategic corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg37). And it risks turning today’s security investments into tomorrow’s legitimacy crises.\n\nAcross panels and side conversations, we repeatedly heard that “the money is there.” What remains contested is how to spend it wisely. How to balance speed with scrutiny? How to ensure that urgent injections of capital do not come at the expense of robust internal controls? How can transparent spending foster flexibility and innovation in defence technology?\n\n### Acknowledging the problem is the first step to solving it\n\nAt our event in Munich, participants spoke candidly about the tension between scaling production and modernising compliance systems, the political consequences of potential scandals and the perceived trade-offs between oversight and urgency. \n\nIn separate [conversations](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fukraines-place-europes-defence-industry-could-compliance-catalyse-integration), Ukrainian partners described the dual challenge of mobilising wartime production at the same time as they are strengthening anti-corruption standards, all the while living and working under existential threat. \n\nOne structural risk clearly stands out: no single authority is responsible for safeguarding integrity across Europe’s evolving defence ecosystem.\n\nBut how do we embed integrity into the EU's defence architecture?\n\n*   First, protect a transparency baseline, even under urgency. Accelerated procedures cannot mean suspended scrutiny. Parliamentary access to information, audit trails, and structured civilian oversight must remain operational. Where secrecy is required, tailored transparency can still reinforce accountability, especially when normal procurement rules are set aside. \n*   Second, hardwire integrity into new defence financing tools. From day one, EU and national instruments should require machine-readable procurement data, beneficial ownership disclosure, conflict-of-interest controls, and interoperable oversight systems. \n*   Third, regulate influence where money and policy meet. Public–private cooperation should not blur lines of accountability. As industry access expands, so must lobbying transparency, cooling-off periods, and enforceable revolving-door rules. \n*   Fourth, align regulation with effectiveness. Smart, predictable standards reduce risk premiums, limit market distortion, and create fair entry points to stimulate innovation.\n*   Fifth, designate a clear political authority responsible for governance of Europe’s defence architecture. A harmonised anti-corruption framework requires defined leadership. Otherwise, oversight will continue to fall between institutions and funding mechanisms.\n\n### Is Europe serious about governance and democratic accountability?\n\nMSC 2026 demonstrated that Europe is serious about rearmament. The question now is whether it is equally serious about governance.\n\nEuropean citizens will only support sustained defence spending, and the social trade-offs that come with it, if they trust that resources are used strategically and with integrity. That trust can only be secured through robust oversight, transparency, and accountability. \n\nIf we are committed to long-term security – beyond the announcements and beyond Munich – then integrity must move from the margins to the centre of the agenda.\n\nThe task ahead is clear: get the balance right, and make governance a core pillar of Europe’s emerging defence architecture.\n\n_We are grateful to Norway for supporting this roundtable and [related programming](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fstrengthening-integrity-ukraines-natural-resources-energy-and-defence-sectors-norways-support)._\n\n_This blog and additional photos are also published on the Transparency International Defence & Security website [here](https:\u002F\u002Fti-defence.org\u002Feuropes-defence-windfall-will-it-survive-the-corruption-test\u002F)._","2026-02-18","europe039s-defence-windfall-will-it-survive-the-corruption-test-2931","Europe's defence windfall: will it survive the corruption test?","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F737092c2-e1b7-4580-ab14-4ce24e90ee8d?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[14],[17],[],2931,[],[17],[],[],[],"2026-02-27T15:07:17.000Z","2026-04-15T22:28:53.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Feurope039s-defence-windfall-will-it-survive-the-corruption-test-2931",{"id":228,"body":229,"status":6,"type":10,"date":230,"slug":231,"title":232,"image":233,"countries":234,"topic":235,"activity":236,"tags":237,"nid":238,"topics":239,"activities":240,"authors":241,"images":244,"websites":23,"area":23,"programme":23,"language":24,"translations":245,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":246,"user_updated":178,"date_updated":247,"content":248,"link":249},10584,"As cryptoassets and other blockchain-based tokens enter the mainstream, alarm bells are ringing about the risks of their misuse. The technology is neutral in itself, but like any mechanism to transfer value, it can and does facilitate a wide range of crimes.\n\nAnd it’s not just scams, hacks and ransomware attacks. Cryptoassets are now seen in practically all crime types, from drug trafficking and terrorist financing to sanctions evasion, and increasingly as a tool for laundering the proceeds of those crimes.\n\nWhen it comes to the links between crypto and _corruption_, research and closed case examples are still scant. But since both are important enablers of crime, it’s vital to better understand how they intersect.\n\nThis blog outlines some basic areas of concern. Despite the gaps in data and analysis, one thing is clear. While the technologies are fairly new, the corrupt practices are not: they are simply manifesting in different ways.\n\n> _Crypto and corruption: what we mean_\n> \n> _In this blog we take a broad view of both crypto and corruption. By “crypto”, we mean cryptoassets such as Bitcoin (BTC) and Ether (ETH) as well as stablecoins tied to fiat currencies such as Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC); plus other digital tokens that run on public, decentralised blockchains. The scope also includes the companies, industries and services built around crypto, as well as the systems for their regulation and supervision and for law enforcement. “Corruption” refers not just to bribery, but to any abuse of entrusted power for undue benefit – whether financial or political, whether personal or for a collective entity._\n\n### 1 Crypto for bribery\n\nIs crypto a brilliant way to pay bribes and kickbacks? Transfers are pseudonymous after all – linked to long wallet addresses like _1Lbcfr2sAHTG9CgdQo3HTMTkV7LK4ZnX75_ rather than names. Transfers can be made directly between individuals, through decentralised platforms or peer-to-peer transactions, which avoids awkward questions about who is who and where the money comes from.\n\nCrypto holdings are easier to keep private, so might not be included in the asset declarations of politically exposed persons keen not to reveal all of their hidden wealth. And it’s fast and easy: you can transfer crypto to any person, anywhere in the world at the touch of a button. That makes it superficially more attractive than an international bank transfer, and less hassle and personal risk than travelling to another continent carrying suitcases stuffed with cash.\n\nSome clearly think crypto is great for bribes:\n\n*   In 2024, a Ukrainian Member of Parliament was [sentenced to eight years in prison](https:\u002F\u002Fhacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org\u002Fen\u002Fnews\u002Fnardepa-odarcenka-zasudili-do-8-rokiv-vyaznici) for offering a bribe of EUR 46,000 in bitcoin to secure funding for reconstruction projects.\n*   Crypto payments were allegedly made to a former senior official at the China Securities Regulatory Commission in return for [abuses of power](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ccn.com\u002Fnews\u002Fcrypto\u002Fyao-qian-china-cbdc-crypto-corruption\u002F) in making appointments and securing loans – alongside expensive liquor and invitations to banquets.\n*   In June 2025, two employees of the state-owned China Construction Bank were charged in Hong Kong with bribery and other offences: they allegedly accepted around USD 470,000 in crypto in exchange for [authenticating false documents](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.artemis.bm\u002Fnews\u002Fchina-construction-bank-manager-accused-of-accepting-bribes-from-vesttoo-employee\u002F) for the now-bankrupt Israeli firm Vesttoo.\n\nYet the use of crypto for bribery has a unique vulnerability: transactions on public blockchains are permanent and publicly visible. If investigators can verifiably link an address to a suspect, the evidence of the bribery remains accessible forever.\n\nSadly, it’s pretty hard to identify bribes or kickbacks being paid unless you already know there’s a bribery scheme or you know the addresses of suspected accomplices. That might explain why major crypto bribery cases haven’t surfaced (yet!).\n\n### 2 Laundering proceeds of corruption using crypto\n\nWhat about laundering the proceeds of corruption? For those with a lot of dirty money to launder, crypto adds a new dimension to the playbook.\n\nSure, keep the shell companies and offshore bank accounts, the trusts and real estate and gambling schemes, the hawala networks. Now you can add to the mix by converting corrupt proceeds into crypto, converting these to other coins, hopping across blockchains and using privacy-enhancing technologies to throw investigators off track.\n\nAs adoption of tokenised assets grows – digital representations of financial or real-world assets – we can expect corrupt actors to buy not only villas in Tuscany and ski apartments in Switzerland, but tokens representing these. And while you can’t ski on a digital token, it is likely attractive to money launderers to be able to trade in a broad range of investments while keeping the beneficial owner hidden.\n\nAre corrupt actors using crypto to launder their funds? There’s little direct evidence, but it does seem likely. Corrupt individuals have long relied on professional money laundering services, often provided by lawyers and accountants. [Europol](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.europol.europa.eu\u002Fpublications-events\u002Fmain-reports\u002Fsocta-report) warns that these professionals,\n\n> “increasingly with specialised knowledge in digital asset trading, have developed parallel, underground financial systems that operate outside the regulatory frameworks governing legal financial institutions”.\n\nAnd we do see that law enforcement is starting to take down organised groups that specialise in laundering illicit funds, including through crypto.\n\nAn [Australian takedown](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ato.gov.au\u002Fmedia-centre\u002Falleged-qld-money-laundering-organisation-dismantled) of an organised money laundering operation in June 2025, for example points to millions of tainted Australian dollars laundered through crypto exchanges as well as bank accounts, couriers, a car dealership and a sales company. Some outfits specialise in a specific clientele: in the Europol-coordinated [Operation Karasu](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.europol.europa.eu\u002Fmedia-press\u002Fnewsroom\u002Fnews\u002F17-providers-of-criminal-banking-services-arrested) in 2025, authorities arrested 17 suspects alleged to be providing money laundering services to Chinese- and Arabic-speaking clients using hawala banking, cash transactions and crypto.\n\nThe largest blockbuster takedown to date is the [October 2025 indictment of the Chairman of Prince Group](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.justice.gov\u002Fopa\u002Fpr\u002Fchairman-prince-group-indicted-operating-cambodian-forced-labor-scam-compounds-engaged), a Cambodia-based multinational business enterprise, and the filing of a forfeiture action for more than 127,000 bitcoin – approximately USD 15 billion at the time of seizure. The press release described the use of professional money laundering operations and pointed to highly sophisticated techniques, such as “spraying” stolen cryptoassets across multiple addresses to obscure the trail of the funds.\n\nCommenting on the indictment, the head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration highlighted the role of corruption in such schemes. He explained how: \n\n> complex criminal schemes \\[such as this\\] exploit global financial systems and emerging technologies to conceal illicit proceeds. These networks operate at the intersection of drug trafficking, corruption, and financial crime, threatening the stability of institutions and communities, alike.\n\n### 3 Corrupt law enforcement in crypto cases\n\nSay you’re a law enforcement officer – a public servant. You’re one of the few in your agency with the technical skills to trace and seize cryptoassets suspected of being involved in crime.\n\nYou see an opportunity to supplement your salary by stealing crypto during an investigation or taking payments from criminals to leave their holdings in peace. Nobody will know – surely?\n\n*   That’s what two US agents from the [Drug Enforcement Administration](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.justice.gov\u002Farchives\u002Fopa\u002Fpr\u002Fformer-dea-agent-sentenced-extortion-money-laundering-and-obstruction-related-silk-road) and [Secret Service](http:\u002F\u002Fwww.justice.gov\u002Farchives\u002Fopa\u002Fpr\u002Fformer-secret-service-agent-sentenced-scheme-related-silk-road-investigation) thought, when they abused their power as law enforcement officers and their access to government-controlled wallets to steal tens of millions of USD in bitcoin linked to the takedown of the illicit Silk Road online marketplace.\n*   In Russia, a former investigator was found guilty in 2023 of [accepting bitcoin bribes](https:\u002F\u002Fcointelegraph.com\u002Fnews\u002Frussia-seizes-10-million-bitcoin-from-official-biggest-bribery) equivalent to tens of millions of US dollars from an organised crime group in order not to confiscate their bitcoin holdings – estimated at USD 138 million at the time.\n*   In Iran, senior intelligence officers of the Revolutionary Guard are alleged to have gained around USD 21 million during the takedown of the Cryptoland exchange: following the CEO’s arrest, they [stole and sold his tokens](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.iranintl.com\u002Fen\u002F202503309549) before the arrest was made public and the tokens’ value collapsed. \n\nIt’s not uncommon for law enforcement officers to go rogue, or for bribes to be paid to influence law enforcement actions or judicial proceedings. So authorities don’t just need to build capacity to go after crypto-related crime. They also need to look out for crypto-related corruption risks among their own ranks, including entities such as asset management offices that have custody over seized and confiscated cryptoassets.\n\n### 4 When the crypto industry meets politics\n\nCrypto is a fast-evolving industry that demonstrates genuinely exciting financial and technological innovation. It’s no wonder that politicians all over the world are getting interested.\n\nCorrupt behaviour by politicians involving the crypto industry is still a realm of speculation, as data on real-world cases is sparse. But red flags for corruption are a common feature of all fast-growing, profitable industries with highly technical aspects, like mining and defence. So, it is sensible to look out for common risks, which span from licencing schemes to the shaping of cryptoasset regulations or the resources put into enforcement.\n\nWhen it comes to public trust in government, even suspicions of crypto-related wrongdoing matter. Examples range from a [political financing scandal in Colombia](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.theblock.co\u002Fpost\u002F293857\u002Fcolombian-president-crypto-donation-campaign-2022-daily-cop) to [graft accusations in Venezuela](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.barrons.com\u002Fnews\u002Fvenezuela-kills-off-petro-cryptocurrency-1e2b0317) and to allegations of [crypto-related irregularity affecting the US President](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.economist.com\u002Fleaders\u002F2025\u002F05\u002F15\u002Fcrypto-has-become-the-ultimate-swamp-asset) and his family.\n\nAnd in the Czech Republic, when the Justice Ministry [accepted a bitcoin donation](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.occrp.org\u002Fen\u002Fnews\u002Fbitcoin-scandal-triggers-czech-government-crisis) worth around USD 46 million from a convicted criminal, the ensuing scandal triggered a public investigation and the resignation of the Justice Minister; some feared it might even topple the government.\n\n### 5 Corruption fuelling organised crime and state capture\n\nThe link between crypto and corruption with possibly the most damaging social impact is its role in enabling criminal gangs to carry out cybercrime and launder money with impunity.\n\nAs detailed in a 2025 UNODC report on [corruption and cybercrime](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Froseap\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocuments\u002FPublications\u002F2025\u002F2025.10.21_The_Nexus_Between_Cybercrime_and_Corruption.pdf), corruption both creates the “permissive environment” that allow cybercrime operations to flourish and “enables many daily operations of cybercriminal networks.”\n\nIn [Southeast Asia](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Froseap\u002Fen\u002F2025\u002F04\u002Fcyberfraud-inflection-point-mekong\u002Fstory.html), for example, a separate UNODC report depicts how industrial-scale scam centres run by organised crime groups generate huge amounts of illegal revenue – mostly in crypto. Despite often being plainly identified in public reports, they remain operational and engage in human trafficking to obtain unwilling workers. The report emphasises “high rates of corruption which criminal actors can leverage” to continue their scam operations unmolested.\n\nUNODC warns that the revenue generated by scam centres, coupled with the ability to easily launder the stolen crypto, is increasing the power and influence of organised crime groups as well as their financial liquidity. And that gives them even more ability to corrupt and capture politicians and states.\n\nThat may already be happening, according to a November 2025 _Economist_ report on [allegations of political collusion](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.economist.com\u002Fasia\u002F2025\u002F11\u002F20\u002Fthe-politicians-protecting-huge-criminal-networks) in scam operations in Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand. These have led to the resignation of a deputy finance minister, the jailing of a mayor and a warning from Thailand's deputy leader of the opposition that without action against politicians colluding in scam operations,\n\n> “we’ll wake up to find the country run by crooks in suits\".\n\n### What to do?\n\nCrypto represents an exciting transformation in financial systems. The industry and its underlying technology could improve privacy, efficiency and access to financial markets. This may benefit many people poorly served by today’s centralised systems.\n\nBut without a clear understanding of crypto-related risks and proper safeguards, the industry could create more opportunities for corruption and related financial crimes such as money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions evasion. Crypto-fuelled corruption could weaken trust in governments and be leveraged to undermine the stability and security of nation states.\n\nAt the Basel Institute, we’re keen to explore better how the worlds of crypto and corruption intersect and how best to mitigate both systemic and day-to-day risks. We’re also committed to building the capacity of anti-corruption and asset recovery practitioners to “follow the money” across blockchains and to connect these to wider financial and criminal investigations.\n\nBeyond training for [individuals](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcrypto-aml-training) and [public agencies](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002FICAR-training), we also bring together people from across sectors and geographies at our annual [Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptoassets](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002F9crc) together with Europol and UNODC. Look out for more on this topic in the coming months!","2025-11-27","crypto-the-ultimate-enabler-of-corruption-2882","Crypto: the ultimate enabler of corruption?","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd41fd31d-6c56-48e0-96cc-2be74f18b731?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[162],[17],[],2882,[168],[17],[242,243],1360,1361,[],[],"2025-11-27T17:01:44.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:38.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcrypto-the-ultimate-enabler-of-corruption-2882",{"id":251,"body":252,"status":6,"type":10,"date":253,"slug":254,"title":255,"image":256,"countries":257,"topic":258,"activity":261,"tags":263,"nid":264,"topics":265,"activities":267,"authors":268,"images":269,"websites":270,"area":23,"programme":23,"language":23,"translations":271,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":272,"user_updated":178,"date_updated":273,"content":274,"link":275},10417,"How can corruption affect peace and security? Where does corruption influence or intersect with geopolitics? And how can peace-building and anti-corruption serve a common goal?\n\nA two-hour workshop at [Basel Peace Forum 2024](https:\u002F\u002Fbasel-peace.org\u002Fbpf-2024\u002F), organised by [Swisspeace](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.swisspeace.ch\u002F), delved into these questions and more. Moderated by Gretta Fenner, Managing Director at the Basel Institute on Governance, the panel looked at some of the most critical intersections of corruption, security, peace and geopolitics.\n\nOur thanks to the engaged audience and fantastic panel of speakers from [Transparency International’s Defence and Security programme](https:\u002F\u002Fti-defence.org\u002F), [NAKO – the Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Commission of Ukraine](https:\u002F\u002Fnako.org.ua\u002Fen), the [Centre for the Study of Democracy](https:\u002F\u002Fcsd.bg\u002F) in Bulgaria and our own Prevention, Research and Innovation team.\n\nThe main takeaway? The urgency of more collaboration and knowledge exchange between the anti-corruption, peace building and defence and security fields. As Gretta Fenner said in her closing remarks:\n\n> It’s time to fight for peace through anti-corruption and to fight corruption through peace building.\n\n### Corruption: about power and influence\n\nWhen we look at corruption in the context of peace, stability and geopolitics, we must first understand that when we say “corruption”, we mean more than “just” the bribery often associated with the word corruption. Instead, the notion of corruption encompasses behaviours like patronage, nepotism, embezzlement, influence peddling or the manipulation of legislative processes with a corrupt objective.\n\nAny of these corrupt practices can serve a one-off purpose. But they are more often than not employed as part of a long-term game, for example to gain or preserve power or geopolitical influence. This is when we can refer to it as “strategic corruption”.\n\nThat understanding of corruption as a functional instrument of power and influence helps us to see why corruption is so relevant to peace and security. As Claudia Baez Camargo, Head of Prevention, Research and Innovation, Basel Institute on Governance, said:\n\n> Corruption has a direct effect on the manner in which state power is exercised. As such, it affects security outcomes… Strategic corruption relies on building strategic transboundary networks where financial and political interests are intermixed. Those networks that can be activated and instrumentally used to destabilise and to threaten and to cause harm to other states.\n\nSee more about understanding corruption and security through the lens of power and functionality in this [blog](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-strategic-corruption-fuels-insecurity-affecting-power) by Claudia and her colleague Saba Kassa.\n\n### Strategic corruption affects Europe\n\nRussia provides a standout example of the strategic use of corruption to achieve geopolitical goals, said panellists. Martin Vladimirov of the Centre for the Study of Democracy and co-author of the [_The Kremlin Playbook_](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.csis.org\u002Fprograms\u002Feurope-russia-and-eurasia-program\u002Fprojects\u002Frussia-and-eurasia\u002Fkremlin-playbook) explained how Putin’s regime achieves political influence in Europe by activating a network of oligarchs with commercial interests on both sides of the border:\n\n> The Kremlin is able to weaponise the oligarchic networks that have been established between Russian companies and European counterparts in order to achieve an outsized political influence.\n\nEurope needs to wake up to that quickly, warned Olena Tregub, Secretary General of NAKO, the Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Commission of Ukraine:\n\n> In order to dominate countries, Russia uses corruption as a foreign policy tool. It is penetrating into the energy landscape, the media landscape, into education, culture and the financial sector. It’s important to find those corrupt influences in Europe, expose them and stop them from happening. They are making Europe weaker and more vulnerable.\n\n### Treating corruption as a security issue\n\nAttention to the nexus between corruption, peace, defence and security grew after the U.S. [established corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.whitehouse.gov\u002Fbriefing-room\u002Fpresidential-actions\u002F2021\u002F06\u002F03\u002Fmemorandum-on-establishing-the-fight-against-corruption-as-a-core-united-states-national-security-interest\u002F) as a “core issue of national security” in 2021.\n\nElevating corruption to the level of security means that governments need to look at corruption across the state apparatus. The implication is that anti-corruption should form a central part of both domestic security and foreign policy. In other words, corruption can no longer be treated as a side issue.\n\nAra Marcen Naval, Head of Advocacy Defence and Security at Transparency International, argued:\n\n> Designating corruption as a national security issue means that corruption cannot take a back seat to other security priorities. It means that it has to be a priority for foreign policy… It means that we need to build governance closer to security.\n\nIn some cases, she said, this may mean bringing oversight and accountability mechanisms to the defence sector and arms trade, both of which have traditionally been rather closed and secretive. Tools like freedom of information, beneficial ownership transparency and whistleblower protection could play a greater role in ensuring a country’s defence sector is resilient to corruption and stronger as a result.\n\nAt the very least, panellists mentioned the need to take corruption risks into account in strategic defence planning and when negotiating peace deals or working in conflict-afflicted areas.\n\n### Bringing anti-corruption, peace and security together\n\nCorruption may be a useful tool for unscrupulous elites to gain power, money and influence at home and abroad – but _anti-corruption_ reforms and tools can also help strengthen security.\n\nOlena Tregub emphasised that\n\n> anti-corruption reforms since 2014 were crucial in creating a stronger Ukrainian state, a resilient state which would be able to survive Russian invasion.\n\nSo too, she said, was Ukraine’s strong and engaged civil society – a hallmark of a state that takes fighting corruption seriously.\n\nAnd of course, the links go deeper than military defence. Corruption and poor governance undermine peace and security by fuelling organised crime and terrorism, increasing inequality and radicalisation, and undermining trust in institutions.\n\nWhere to start? The first step is to encourage more collaboration and knowledge exchange between the anti-corruption, peace building and defence and security fields. We have a lot to learn from each other.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Gretta Fenner will moderate a panel discussion on corruption and security at the [Munich Security Conference 2024](https:\u002F\u002Fsecurityconference.org\u002Fen\u002Fmsc-2024\u002F) from 16–18 February 2024.\n*   Related blog: [How (strategic) corruption fuels insecurity by affecting power](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-strategic-corruption-fuels-insecurity-affecting-power).\n*   Learn more about the [Basel Peace Forum](https:\u002F\u002Fbasel-peace.org\u002Fbpf-2024\u002F).","2024-02-13","fighting-corruption-to-promote-peace-and-security-basel-peace-forum-2024-2583","Fighting corruption to promote peace and security: Basel Peace Forum 2024","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F30911b00-fd61-462b-8ee2-89fcfa023e2d?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[162,259,260],"Prevention"," Research and Innovation",[262,17],"Events",[],2583,[168,266],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[262,17],[],[],[173],[],"2024-02-13T11:01:29.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:28.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ffighting-corruption-to-promote-peace-and-security-basel-peace-forum-2024-2583",{"id":277,"body":278,"status":6,"type":154,"date":279,"slug":280,"title":281,"image":282,"countries":283,"topic":285,"activity":286,"tags":288,"nid":289,"topics":290,"activities":291,"authors":292,"images":293,"websites":294,"area":23,"programme":23,"language":23,"translations":295,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":296,"user_updated":178,"date_updated":297,"content":298,"link":299},10328,"The war in Ukraine has caused hundreds of billions of dollars of damage so far, including to critical infrastructure. Funding the country's ongoing and post-war reconstruction efforts is a topic very much under debate. Some suggest that assets frozen under war-related sanctions could be used to partly fund the reconstruction. Could they? How?\n\nTogether with the Basel Institute, [Transparency International Ukraine](https:\u002F\u002Fti-ukraine.org\u002Fen\u002F) hosted a session at the [International Anti-Corruption Conference 2022](https:\u002F\u002Fiaccseries.org\u002F) in Washington D.C. to explore these questions with those on the front lines of tracing, freezing and seizing assets subject to sanctions.\n\nThe session aimed to generate a realistic understanding of options for recovering assets frozen under sanctions related to the war in Ukraine. It also sought to identify and promote new instruments that countries could introduce for this purpose. Ultimately, these discussions and actions will contribute to global efforts to accelerate asset recovery and push boundaries of current practice.\n\n### Takeaways\n\n*   The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has given impetus to the country’s asset recovery efforts. A specialised Freeze and Seize Task Force was set up within the Prosecutor General's Office to help freeze, seize and confiscate Russian assets; its mandate has now expanded to cover assets related to sanctions. A legislative amendment has expanded the range of crimes under which assets may be forfeited. In addition, a new [administrative procedure](https:\u002F\u002Fti-ukraine.org\u002Fen\u002Fnews\u002Fmechanisms-for-confiscation-of-russian-assets-what-does-the-legislation-say\u002F) has been established that enables assets related to Russian aggression and sanctions to be forfeited; five cases are already proceeding. This fresh momentum is significant, given the slow progress in Ukraine’s previous efforts to recover stolen assets.\n*   Though unprecedented in their number and scope, the sanctions imposed on Russian individuals and companies, as well as the Russian state, are temporary and non-punitive. This means they are not a legal basis for confiscation. Confiscation would usually require a criminal conviction or a judgement under non-conviction based forfeiture or unexplained wealth\u002F[illicit enrichment](https:\u002F\u002Fillicitenrichment.baselgovernance.org\u002F) legislation.\n*   Efforts to target kleptocratic assets need to extend beyond the assets themselves – yachts, airplanes, bank accounts, etc. – to the surrounding infrastructure, from service providers to so-called enablers. These efforts can and already have incentivised individuals and companies to proactively identify assets subject to sanctions that may otherwise have missed.\n*   The significance of international efforts to proactively target the assets of sanctioned individuals goes beyond the utility of putting pressure on Russia’s political establishment. The efforts send a powerful message of the strong political commitment among Ukraine’s international partners to cut off the financing of Russia’s war machine and to support Ukraine’s citizens in defending their sovereign nation. Where frozen assets can subsequently be confiscated, the funds could potentially be of significant utility in Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery.\n*   International cooperation between Ukraine and other states on asset recovery has strengthened considerably, particularly in the EU and US. The establishment of dedicated taskforces has helped. There is a welcome openness among international partners to explore every possible avenue to admit dual criminality, including under civil \u002F non-conviction based forfeiture laws and other such laws that are effective but not yet widely in use.\n*   Enforcing criminal penalties for attempted sanctions evasion could be a powerful option for confiscating at least some of the assets currently frozen. In Europe, following a Council Decision on 28 November 2022 that [adds sanctions violation](https:\u002F\u002Fec.europa.eu\u002Fcommission\u002Fpresscorner\u002Fdetail\u002Fen\u002Fqanda_22_7373) to the list of EU-wide crimes, the European Commission is putting forward a new directive that harmonises criminal definitions and penalties for violating sanctions. One positive effect of making sanctions evasion an EU-wide crime is that it helps to mobilise authorities across the board, from asset recovery agencies to financial intelligence units.\n*   Private assets, corporate assets and sovereign assets require different mechanisms of seizure, forfeiture and disposal. Sovereign Russian assets that have been frozen could potentially be placed in an escrow account or trust fund, to be returned only if there is a peace agreement and as part of a binding reparation agreement. Other mechanisms would need to be applied for private and corporate assets.\n*   A compensation mechanism would ease the use of confiscated private or corporate assets to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery. Such a mechanism would need to be developed through close cooperation with Ukraine’s authorities and civil society, to ensure it aligns with the approach to compensations developed by Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice and the related General Assembly resolution.\n*   Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has a strong role to play in providing specialist expertise and oversight throughout the process. Civil society representatives have been in constant communication with the EU taskforce, for example, and as Anton Korynevych stated: “From the perspective of the Ukrainian Government, cooperation with civil society is of utmost importance in all areas related to accountability.”\n*   The urgency of efforts to confiscate kleptocratic assets needs to be balanced with respect for due process and the rule of law. Ambition, creativity and pushing boundaries are all welcome – indeed essential. But pushing too far could risk hurting Ukraine more than it helps, and undermining the very principles for which anti-corruption advocates in the democratic world have fought for so long. Ukrainian civil society can help keep that focus on asset recovery mechanisms that work in practice and respect the rule of law that they and their compatriots are fighting to preserve.\n\n### About the session\n\nThe session took place at [International Anti-Corruption Conference 2022](https:\u002F\u002Fiaccseries.org\u002F) on 9 December 2022 and was organised by Transparency International Ukraine together with the Basel Institute on Governance. Many thanks to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Ukraine programme at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for their continued support to the Basel Institute and to asset recovery efforts in Ukraine, among many other valuable programmes.\n\nGretta Fenner moderated the panel, which featured:\n\n*   Péter Csonka, Deputy Director, Directorate Criminal Justice, Directorate General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission\n*   Anton Korynevych, Head of Freeze and Seize Task Force, Ukraine\n*   David Lim, Deputy Director, Task Force KleptoCapture, Department of Justice, United States\n*   Kateryna Ryzhenko, Deputy Executive Director for Legal Affairs, Transparency International Ukraine\n\n[View the video recording](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.youtube.com\u002Fwatch?v=E-C80WdMUkI). \n\nSee other [#IACC2022 sessions](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fbasel-iacc2022) in which the Basel Institute and partners were involved.","2022-12-10","asset-recovery-developments-since-the-start-of-the-war-in-ukraine-2330","Asset recovery developments since the start of the war in Ukraine","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F7fa266f5-a283-4ea6-ab90-dddfbb9a1a70?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[284],7206,[162],[262,17,287],"Presentations",[],2330,[168],[262,17,287],[],[],[173],[],"2022-12-12T11:01:25.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:24.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fasset-recovery-developments-since-the-start-of-the-war-in-ukraine-2330",{"id":301,"body":302,"status":6,"type":10,"date":303,"slug":304,"title":305,"image":306,"countries":307,"topic":311,"activity":312,"tags":314,"nid":335,"topics":336,"activities":337,"authors":338,"images":340,"websites":341,"area":23,"programme":23,"language":23,"translations":342,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":343,"user_updated":178,"date_updated":344,"content":345,"link":346},10339,"As the war in Ukraine intensifies, calls are growing for states to confiscate Russian assets frozen under sanctions and redirect them to provide support to Ukraine. Our latest Working Paper argues that states can and should do this by enhancing the effectiveness and scope of established asset recovery measures​​​​ – not by introducing new untested mechanisms that risk inviting future legal challenges, defeating the purpose of sanctions and violating the rule of law. \n\nGo straight to [Working Paper 42: From sanctions to confiscation while upholding the rule of law​​​​](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-42) or read the key takeaways:\n\n### Executive summary\n\nIn light of recent world events, political leaders around the world have questioned whether it is justifiable to confiscate assets frozen under financial sanctions in order to redirect them to the victims of state aggression.\n\nSome states have even sought to introduce legislative mechanisms to make it possible to confiscate an asset frozen under sanctions, purely on the basis that the asset has been made subject to a sanction. One state – Canada – has already done so.\n\nThe intention behind these mechanisms is clear: assets frozen under sanctions could be confiscated and repurposed to provide assistance and compensation to the victims of the sanctioned target.\n\nIn the context of the Ukraine war, for example, proponents argue that these measures will allow states to permanently confiscate Russian-linked assets under sanction and redirect them to provide support to Ukraine.\n\n### The debate\n\nShould states be able to confiscate sanctioned assets\\* purely on the basis that they have been sanctioned?\n\nThe justifiability and legality of mechanisms such as Canada’s is currently the subject of debate. Two key issues include whether the confiscation of assets in such circumstances:\n\n*   is acceptable in the context of established legal rights and norms; \n*   defeats the primary purpose of sanctions as a tool of coercion.\n\n### Issues of property and due process rights\n\nWith regards to the first point, the lack of adequate judicial oversight included in such mechanisms, and the fact that these mechanisms aim to permanently deprive sanctioned targets of their assets, raises serious questions surrounding property and due process rights.\n\nIf such a mechanism was introduced in Europe for example, it is likely to be challenged on the grounds that it violates Protocol 1 Article 1 as well as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.\n\nIf such mechanisms were also applied to state-linked assets (such as sanctioned assets belonging to central banks) then this would also raise concerns regarding a possible infringement of domestic and international laws relating to state immunity.\n\n### Undermining the purpose of sanctions\n\nWith regards to the second point, permitting the confiscation of sanctioned assets arguably annuls the coercive purpose of sanctions regimes to act as a tool to persuade targets to cease their adverse behaviour.\n\nIf states are permitted to confiscate sanctioned assets (and make it impossible for a target to retrieve their frozen assets) then this effectively removes any incentive for the target to change their behaviour. In such cases, rather than operating as tools of coercion, sanctions would instead primarily operate to punish a target and provide compensation to the victims for the harm that has been caused.\n\nOf course, some have argued that there is a greater need for these latter objectives, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine where financial assistance is required urgently.\n\nOthers however argue that despite the urgency this situation presents, the long-term objective of sanctions should remain coercion, particularly if sanctioning states wish to compel the aggressing state, Russia, to contribute to post-war reconstruction efforts in the future.\n\n### Other options through which to confiscate assets under sanction\n\nThere are, in addition, several established avenues for seeking war reparations that should also be explored.\n\nSuch established measures that states could adopt and apply to target sanctioned assets include:\n\n*   Traditional conviction-based confiscation measures, including ‘extended confiscation’ mechanisms\n*   Non-conviction based confiscation (NCB) measures\n*   Unexplained wealth laws\n\nThese measures could be used to target:\n\n*   Assets that are involved in sanctions violations\n*   Sanctioned assets that are also the proceeds of crimes unrelated to the sanctions regime, such as corruption or organised crime offences\n*   Unexplained wealth\n\n### Maximising effectiveness of established asset recovery mechanisms\n\nWhile these avenues may be limited, and can only result in the permanent confiscation of a portion of sanctioned assets, states could take various steps to maximise their effectiveness.\n\nFor example legislative amendments could be considered to broaden the scope of relevant terms like ‘money laundering’ and to specifically permit confiscated assets to be redirected to the victims of state aggression.\n\nDomestic and international coordination could be improved by creating dedicated law enforcement bodies for example, or through participating in international coordination initiatives.\n\nImportantly, these avenues target established criminal activity and\u002For include defined judicial processes through which a targeted person can challenge any attempts to confiscate their property. Therefore they can be applied without unacceptably infringing on legal rights.\n\nMoreover, if states take measures to enhance the effectiveness and scope of established asset recovery measures, additional benefits can be derived for the broader fight against financial crime and kleptocracy.\n\n### The bottom line: maintaining the rule of law\n\nOpting for mechanisms that abide by established legal rights will not only significantly increase the chance of recovering assets without subsequent legal challenges.\n\nIt will also ensure that the very reason for targeting the assets in the first place – namely to seek justice and compensation for acts of aggression – is not undermined through the erosion of the rule of law.\n\n_\\* The term ‘[sanctioned assets](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.lawinsider.com\u002Fdictionary\u002Fsanctioned-assets)’ is used as a shorthand to refer to assets of a sanctioned person or country._\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   [Download the Working Paper](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2023-03\u002F230309%20Working%20Paper%2042.pdf).\n*   Watch or read the main takeaways from a December 2022 panel discussion on [asset recovery developments since the start of the war in Ukraine](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fasset-recovery-developments-start-war-ukraine).","2023-02-21","working-paper-sheds-fresh-light-on-the-sanctions-and-confiscation-debate-2347","Working Paper sheds fresh light on the sanctions and confiscation debate","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff3b37dcf-a8eb-4ee4-9ef0-767e01dde1cf?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[308,309,310],7198,7199,7200,[162],[313,17],"Research",[315,319,323,327,331],{"tags_id":316},{"id":317,"name":318},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":320},{"id":321,"name":322},821,"Unexplained wealth",{"tags_id":324},{"id":325,"name":326},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":328},{"id":329,"name":330},1379,"Non-conviction based forfeiture",{"tags_id":332},{"id":333,"name":334},1215,"Illicit financial flows",2347,[168],[313,17],[339],1148,[],[173],[],"2023-02-21T17:01:25.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:25.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fworking-paper-sheds-fresh-light-on-the-sanctions-and-confiscation-debate-2347",{"id":348,"body":349,"status":6,"type":154,"date":350,"slug":351,"title":352,"image":353,"countries":354,"topic":356,"activity":357,"tags":358,"nid":359,"topics":360,"activities":361,"authors":362,"images":363,"websites":364,"area":23,"programme":23,"language":23,"translations":365,"translation_of":23,"user_created":39,"date_created":366,"user_updated":178,"date_updated":367,"content":368,"link":369},9954,"Corruption remains endemic in Ukraine and a severe impediment to democratic and economic development in the country. Support to anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine is a high political priority for the European Union.\n\nThe [EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine](https:\u002F\u002Feeas.europa.eu\u002Fdelegations\u002Fukraine_en\u002F49261\u002FEU%20Anti-Corruption%20Initiative%20in%20Ukraine) (EUACI) 2017-2019, a three-year programme implemented by the Danish International Development Agency, aims to improve the implementation of anti-corruption policy in Ukraine, thereby contributing to a reduction in corruption. The programme supports all critical institutions for anti-corruption justice in Ukraine, including the newly established Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA).\n\nThe [International Centre for Asset Recovery](\u002Fnode\u002F25\u002F) (ICAR), a part of the Basel Institute on Governance, recently provided support to this project in the form of a five-day [training workshop on financial investigations, asset tracing\u002Fforfeiture, Mutual Legal Assistance and new payment methods](\u002Fnode\u002F225\u002F). It took into account recently adopted legislation on seizure and special confiscation and the ARMA, which represents a significant step towards harmonisation of the Ukrainian legislation with European and international standards and best practice in the field of asset recovery.\n\nThe 23 participants of the training workshop, which took place in Kyiv during 4-8 June 2018, included representatives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), in addition to staff of the new ARMA.\n\nThe training focused on a practical understanding of the asset tracing process and encouraging inter-agency co-operation. Although ARMA has no criminal investigative powers of its own, it has the authority to find and trace assets at the request of law enforcement authorities, prosecutors and courts for the purpose of seizing and confiscating such assets, thus emphasising its importance in the overall criminal justice system.","2018-06-19","icar-training-supports-new-anti-corruption-body-in-ukraine-85","ICAR training supports new anti-corruption body in Ukraine","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F35aac6b3-5e34-4a8e-8df2-22912a74f92a?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[355],7533,[162],[164],[],85,[168],[164],[],[],[173],[],"2022-05-26T22:57:48.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:05.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ficar-training-supports-new-anti-corruption-body-in-ukraine-85",{"left":371,"top":371,"width":372,"height":372,"rotate":371,"vFlip":373,"hFlip":373,"body":374},0,20,false,"\u003Cpath fill=\"currentColor\" fill-rule=\"evenodd\" d=\"M17 10a.75.75 0 0 1-.75.75H5.612l4.158 3.96a.75.75 0 1 1-1.04 1.08l-5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 0 1 0-1.08l5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 1 1 1.04 1.08L5.612 9.25H16.25A.75.75 0 0 1 17 10\" clip-rule=\"evenodd\"\u002F>",1780676514294]