[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":358},["ShallowReactive",2],{"news-eu-anti-corruption-strategy":3,"news-eu-anti-corruption-strategy-similar":70,"i-heroicons:arrow-left-20-solid":353},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"date_created":7,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":15,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":17,"language":19,"image":20,"translation_of":13,"countries":32,"tags":33,"authors":65,"images":66,"translations":67,"content":68,"translations_news":69},10644,"published","2026-07-16T06:54:18.000Z","2026-07-16T08:16:54.000Z","Four priorities for an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy","Blog","With good governance norms under growing pressure, the EU has an opportunity to show decisive leadership in the fight against corruption.\n\nThe European Commission’s [first EU-wide Anti-Corruption Strategy](https:\u002F\u002Fcommission.europa.eu\u002Fnews-and-media\u002Fnews\u002Fcommission-seeks-views-eu-anti-corruption-strategy-2026-05-11_en), building on the recently adopted EU Anti-Corruption Directive, is a chance to strengthen coordination across Member States and realise the promise of the Directive for the EU’s 450+ million inhabitants.\n\nDone well, it will reinforce the security, economic prosperity and political stability that underpin Europe’s long-term competitiveness.\n\nThe Basel Institute on Governance has responded to the Commission’s call for evidence with recommendations drawn from more than two decades of research and hands-on work with governments, law enforcement agencies, businesses and civil society. Our submission highlights four areas that we believe should be central to the new Strategy. These are briefly summarised below, and included in full in the submission \\[_PDF download_\\].\n\n## Promote a whole-of-society approach\n\nGovernments cannot tackle complex corruption risks alone. Businesses, civil society, researchers and affected communities all have a role to play.\n\nThe Strategy should therefore explicitly endorse [Anti-Corruption Collective Action](https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002F). This approach brings stakeholders together to identify shared risks, agree standards and develop practical mechanisms for compliance and accountability.\n\nIt has been used to address money laundering risks in the financial services sector, bribery and extortion in ports, corruption in public procurement and integrity challenges in the defence sector. It is widely endorsed by organisations including the OECD, UNODC and UN Global Compact, and already included in many national anti-corruption strategies.\n\n## Harness data and technology responsibly\n\nArtificial intelligence, big data analytics, open-source intelligence and automated risk indicators can help identify suspicious procurement patterns, conflicts of interest, illicit financial flows and hidden relationships.\n\nResearch through the [EU-funded FALCON project,](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F) of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member, shows that effective anti-corruption systems increasingly depend on the ability to collect, connect and analyse large volumes of information.\n\nThe Strategy should support responsible testing of new tools, including through regulatory sandboxes, while also investing in the foundations they require: digitisation, interoperable systems, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and secure cross-border data sharing.\n\n## Focus on priority risks and high-risk activities\n\nBeyond these approaches, our submission highlights four high-risk areas requiring particular attention.\n\n-   **Foreign bribery:** Enforcement remains uneven and settlements often fail to address the harm suffered by affected countries and communities. The Strategy should promote stronger enforcement and fairer approaches to compensation and the use of recovered proceeds.\n\n-   **Public procurement:** Risks are rising as Europe increases investment in defence, infrastructure, energy security and strategic technologies. Priorities should include stronger transparency, better oversight and data-driven risk assessment.\n\n-   **Borders and customs:** Corruption at borders can facilitate smuggling, trafficking, sanctions evasion and tax fraud. Greater automation, data integration and consistent procedures can strengthen prevention and detection.\n\n-   **Financial infrastructure:** Shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and virtual assets can help conceal corrupt proceeds. The Strategy should strengthen links between anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and asset recovery, including through the EU’s new Anti-Money Laundering Authority.\n\n## Build in an ongoing research, innovation and learning agenda\n\nCorruption constantly evolves as actors adapt to new laws, technologies and enforcement practices. Anti-corruption policy must evolve too.\n\nResearch also shows that anti-corruption laws alone do not change corrupt behaviour. Social norms, political incentives and institutional cultures can sustain corruption even where formal rules are strong.\n\nThe Strategy should support sustained applied research and create stronger channels for researchers, policymakers, law enforcement, businesses and civil society to exchange evidence and lessons. It should also use differences between national systems as opportunities to test approaches, evaluate results and improve policy across the Union.\n\n# Learn more\n\n-   Download the [Basel Institute on Governance’s full submission](https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F580b64a2-b6bc-44de-9cc7-5525cea37391) to the European Commission’s call for evidence on the EU Anti-Corruption Strategy.\n-   See complementary perspectives on the EU Anti-Corruption Directive on how it might affect [anti-corruption enforcement](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Feu-directive-enforcement) from a legal and institutional perspective, and on what the Directive reveals about [how corruption is evolving in the EU and beyond](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Feu-directive-political-lens).","2026-07-16",null,"eu-anti-corruption-strategy",[16],"Corruption Prevention and Public Governance",[18],"Main page","English",{"id":21,"storage":22,"filename_disk":23,"filename_download":24,"title":25,"type":26,"created_on":27,"modified_on":7,"charset":13,"filesize":28,"width":29,"height":30,"duration":13,"embed":13,"description":25,"location":13,"tags":13,"metadata":31,"focal_point_x":13,"focal_point_y":13,"tus_id":13,"tus_data":13,"uploaded_on":27},"b062a775-61d9-4afd-8181-af06fb6169ef","local","b062a775-61d9-4afd-8181-af06fb6169ef.jpg","IMG-20251015-WA0020.jpg","Elizabeth Andersen speaking at a meeting of the EU Network Against Corruption, which is engaged in consultations around the Anti-Corruption Strategy","image\u002Fjpeg","2026-07-16T06:51:41.000Z",115459,1555,1037,{},[],[34,51],{"id":35,"news_id":36,"tags_id":48},6068,{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":37,"date_created":7,"user_updated":37,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":21,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":38,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":39,"translation_of":13,"language":19,"countries":40,"tags":41,"authors":43,"images":44,"translations":45,"content":46,"translations_news":47},"545a204d-e41b-4882-afda-481ecf3fd971",[16],[18],[],[35,42],6069,[],[],[],[],[],{"id":49,"name":50},982,"Anti-corruption",{"id":42,"news_id":52,"tags_id":62},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":37,"date_created":7,"user_updated":37,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":21,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":53,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":54,"translation_of":13,"language":19,"countries":55,"tags":56,"authors":57,"images":58,"translations":59,"content":60,"translations_news":61},[16],[18],[],[35,42],[],[],[],[],[],{"id":63,"name":64},909,"Collective Action",[],[],[],[],[],[71,106,143,175,204,242,269,295,327],{"id":72,"body":73,"status":6,"type":10,"date":74,"slug":75,"title":76,"image":77,"countries":78,"topic":13,"activity":13,"tags":79,"nid":13,"topics":94,"activities":13,"authors":96,"images":97,"websites":98,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":19,"translations":99,"translation_of":13,"user_created":100,"date_created":101,"user_updated":100,"date_updated":102,"content":103,"translations_news":104,"link":105},10640,"In episode 37 of the podcast [Sophie au pays des possibles](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sophieaupaysdespossibles.com\u002F), host and anti-corruption expert Sophie Lemaître conversed with [Claudia Baez Camargo](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fabout\u002Fteam\u002Fdr-claudia-baez-camargo\u002F), Director of Prevention, Research and Innovation at the Basel Institute on Governance. \n\nClaudia leads a specialised team of researchers who leverage behavioural science, political economy analysis and field research to design context-sensitive anti-corruption strategies. Among others, they advance approaches based on understanding and targeting social norms.\n\nThis Q&A is an edited extract of their discussion on why top-down laws often fail against local realities and how practical, bottom-up solutions can empower citizens to drive real change. \n\n**Sophie Lemaître: What are social norms, and why is it essential to consider them when addressing corruption?**\n\nClaudia Baez Camargo: Essentially, social norms are what we perceive as typical, expected or socially accepted behaviour in a given context. \n\nFor example, if a traffic officer stops you in Mexico – where I was born and grew up – most would offer a bribe to get out of the predicament. Or when accessing healthcare services, people might give a “gift” or bribe before receiving care. If they don't, they fear they won't receive the service or the correct medicine. \n\nEven if they are personally against corruption and know the law forbids it, the social expectation can push them to do it anyway.\n\nUnderstanding these expectations is key to designing effective anti-corruption interventions.\n\n**Sophie: I've heard statements like \"Corruption is part of the culture of this country.\" Can we say some cultures or countries are more corrupt than others?**\n\nClaudia: I've often been told, across Africa, Latin America, the Balkans or Asia, \"Oh, Claudia, it's in our culture. What are we going to do?\" \n\nBut these regions have such vastly different cultures that I doubt culture is the defining factor. In my view, the real drivers are structural. \n\n- First, there are resource constraints: living in poverty and unmet need drives corruption. \n- Second, there are weak state institutions. When the state fails to deliver, it generates incentives to bypass the law just to solve problems, make money or access services. \n\nCulture simply adapts around these realities, absorbing corrupt practices through local names and jokes.\n\nSocial norms apply to concrete, narrow situations – they dictate what we're expected to do. \n\nCulture is something we all have an emotional stake in, so calling a culture corrupt is self-degrading and ignores how rich cultures are. \n\nI prefer to focus on social norms because they provide a concrete entry point where we can actually act and change things.\n\n**Sophie: Have you noticed people saying that addressing corruption is a Western thing?**\n\nClaudia: Government and anti-corruption officials across the board have assimilated the language of good governance, largely because their laws follow UN Conventions. At that level, a Westernised view definitely prevails.\n\nAt the grassroots, it's completely different. In research in Uganda and Tanzania, we used fictional \"vignettes\" to ask citizens about their perceptions of public officials, presenting two characters: \n\n- One who strictly abides by the law and refuses bribes.\n- Another who uses their authority to extract resources, but distributes them to their family and community. Stealing in order to share, like Robin Hood.\n\nAlmost without exception, people said the one stealing and sharing was great, loved and respected, while the law-abiding official was called a traitor who ignored his community responsibilities. \n\nFrom this view, the \"corrupt\" ones are those who fail to use power to look after their network. \n\nUltimately, there is vast room for interpretation regarding what corruption is, depending entirely on social norms, cultural environments and practical needs.\n\n**Sophie: How can we induce behaviour change to create a culture of integrity when the situation involves so many social norms, informal practices and other drivers?**\n\nClaudia: A lot of anti-corruption projects and investments are still very prescriptive. Focusing purely on top-down \"best practices\" and laws creates an \"implementation gap\": countries with excellent laws on paper but terrible results in practice.\n\nTo achieve sustainable change, we must go bottom-up. \n\nWorking at the subnational or municipal level shows a lot of promise, because it allows local governments to engage directly with constituents, jointly identify priorities and co-design solutions. \n\nAs scholar Yuen Yuen Ang argues in her work on [adaptive political economy](https:\u002F\u002Fmuse.jhu.edu\u002Farticle\u002F954433), you cannot expect context-defying behaviours to emerge just because you pass a law. We need to use what is already there – local practices, social networks and community groups – to solve problems sustainably without corruption. \n\nIt does not have to be a textbook Western \"best practice\", as long as it works.\n\n**Sophie: Do you have a success story or promising initiative you could share?**\n\nClaudia: On success stories, once I worked on a project on a remote island in the Philippines where the mayor was a true champion for his community. He even gave his personal mobile number to every citizen. \n\nIt was a very poor community, but because things were decided collectively, their few resources were visibly used in the best interest of everyone.\n\nOn promising initiatives, I'm currently supporting a Swiss-funded project in Moldova that takes this bottom-up approach seriously: its first year is dedicated purely to building trust among local stakeholders. Without trust, people can't collaborate or identify joint priorities. \n\nInvesting in trust, then letting the community take the driver's seat, is essential for sustainability. Otherwise, once funding dries up, everything regresses.\n\n**Sophie: Anti-corruption progress is slow, and we’re experiencing a global backlash. What keeps you motivated?**\n\nClaudia: What I love about my job is going to different countries and speaking with mayors, citizen groups, civil society organisations and the private sector – the real people on the ground whose lives would be transformed if there were less corruption.\n\nThat's what motivates me. Corruption remains a devastating barrier to development and poverty reduction. We often hear we need to \"raise awareness\", but that isn't true; in almost every context, people already know what's corrupt, suffer from it and dislike it.\n\nWe simply cannot give up. The climate can be demotivating, but if we're passive spectators, we can say goodbye to the institutions we've fought for. With our actions, we can intervene and change the course of events.\n\n**Sophie: One final question: how can we as individual citizens play a role in fighting corruption?**\n\nClaudia: First, by understanding our duties. Good governance is fundamentally linked to democracy, and whether you live in an established or fragile democracy, the legal framework almost always gives citizens instruments to engage with their representatives.\n\nIf we normalise using these tools to question authority and demand accountability, we strengthen the rule of law and put corrupt actors under scrutiny. If enough people do this, a lot can change.\n\n## Learn more\n\n::: links\n\n- [Quick Guide: Social norms and corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-10-social-norms-and-corruption\u002F)\n-  [Research Case Study: Harnessing behavioural approaches against corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fresearch-case-5\u002F)\n- [Blog – Bridging the gap: How behavioural science can strengthen anti-corruption and crime prevention](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fbridging-the-gap-how-behavioural-science-can-strengthen-anti-corruption-and-crime-prevention-2809\u002F)\n- [Article – Corruption and Social Norms: A New Arrow in the Quiver](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruption-and-social-norms-new-arrow-quiver\u002F)\n- [Episode 37 of *Sophie au pays des possibles*](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sophieaupaysdespossibles.com\u002F37-normes-sociales-corruption)\n:::\n","2026-07-02","podcast-interview-sophie-lemaitre-social-norms","There’s a gap between what laws say and what people do. How is that useful for anti-corruption work?","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F3920eb09-db0e-48e7-8a49-8b841e448232?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[80,84,86,90],{"tags_id":81},{"id":82,"name":83},848,"Behavioural science",{"tags_id":85},{"id":49,"name":50},{"tags_id":87},{"id":88,"name":89},1373,"Corruption prevention",{"tags_id":91},{"id":92,"name":93},1309,"Informality",[16,95],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[],[],[18],[],"115250da-6c1d-42e7-888a-fbbe909fc524","2026-06-24T15:49:48.000Z","2026-07-02T09:26:36.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fpodcast-interview-sophie-lemaitre-social-norms",{"id":107,"body":108,"status":6,"type":10,"date":109,"slug":110,"title":111,"image":112,"countries":113,"topic":13,"activity":13,"tags":114,"nid":13,"topics":131,"activities":13,"authors":132,"images":134,"websites":135,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":19,"translations":136,"translation_of":13,"user_created":37,"date_created":137,"user_updated":138,"date_updated":139,"content":140,"translations_news":141,"link":142},10633,"_This article by [Dr Jacopo Costa](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fabout\u002Fteam\u002Fdr-jacopo-costa\u002F) is one of two Basel Institute commentaries on the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive._\n\n_While the [companion piece by Rita Simões](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Feu-directive-enforcement) examines the directive's legal and institutional implications, this article takes a political economy perspective. It considers what the directive reveals about changing understandings of corruption, how corruption risks are evolving in an increasingly interconnected and technology-driven environment, and where future EU anti-corruption efforts may need to focus._\n\n_The key message is that the directive represents an important advance in legal harmonisation, but that effective anti-corruption policy will also require stronger strategic thinking, greater use of data and technology, and closer attention to emerging corruption risks linked to procurement, border security and financial infrastructure._\n\nApril 2026, the European Union formally adopted [Directive 2026\u002F1021](https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Feli\u002Fdir\u002F2026\u002F1021\u002Foj\u002Feng) on combatting corruption. Following years of negotiations, political disagreements and institutional bargaining, the EU now has a comprehensive anti-corruption framework establishing common definitions, offences, sanctions and preventive measures across its member states.\n\nThis is a landmark achievement. But it would be a mistake to view the directive as the culmination of the European anti-corruption journey.\n\nIn fact, its adoption marks the beginning of a much larger challenge: turning a legal framework into an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy that can address the evolving forms of corruption emerging in an increasingly complex geopolitical and technological landscape.\n\n## Why the directive matters\n\nFor years, the EU lacked a coherent anti-corruption framework. Although member states had their own legislation, there were significant differences in how corruption offences were defined, investigated and punished.\n\nThese discrepancies created loopholes that could be exploited by corrupt individuals and hindered cross-border cooperation between national authorities.\n\nThe new directive aims to address these issues by introducing common minimum standards across the EU. In particular, it:\n\n-   harmonises the definitions of bribery in the public and private sectors, trading in influence, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment and the concealment of criminal proceeds;\n-   introduces common standards for criminal sanctions, corporate liability, statutes of limitation, whistleblower protection, anti-corruption strategies and specialised anti-corruption bodies; and\n-   broadens the definition of public officials to encompass not only national officeholders, but also senior EU officials and individuals performing public duties on behalf of public institutions. This reflects the reality of contemporary governance, where public services are increasingly delivered through hybrid public–private arrangements.\n\nIt is the most ambitious attempt yet to establish a shared European anti-corruption framework.\n\n## A more modern understanding of corruption\n\nOne of the directive's most significant strengths is its recognition that corruption is not confined to the traditional notion of an envelope stuffed with cash being exchanged.\n\nWe welcome this change in perspective greatly, because our research demonstrates clearly that contemporary [corruption is increasingly networked, sophisticated and relational](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fcorruption-complex-adaptive-network). It often relies on intermediaries, influence brokers, hidden financial channels, luxury gifts, preferential treatment, future career opportunities and informal exchanges of favours.\n\nIncluding offences such as trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealing criminal proceeds and aiding or abetting corruption schemes shows an understanding of how corruption operates in modern societies.\n\nThis evolution is important because anti-corruption frameworks often struggle to keep up with the evolving nature of corruption. The directive is a valuable attempt to address this issue and close the resulting gap.\n\n## The price of political compromise\n\nLegislation is never produced in isolation from politics. Significant disagreements emerged among EU institutions and member states during the adoption process. Several governments expressed concerns about subsidiarity and the potential consequences of criminalising particular behaviours.\n\nSo, the final directive is less ambitious than the original proposal.\n\nOne example concerns the offence previously known as “abuse of office”. Following intense political resistance, particularly from countries such as Germany and Italy, the final text replaced it with the more cautious formulation of “unlawful exercise of public functions”. The compromise facilitated agreement, but introduced ambiguity that could hinder enforcement.\n\nSimilarly, criminal sanctions and limitation periods were reduced during negotiations. Maximum prison sentences were reduced, and statutes of limitation were scaled back considerably compared to earlier drafts.\n\nThese compromises highlight a recurring dilemma in policymaking not only in Europe but everywhere: achieving consensus often necessitates compromising on ambition. The result is a directive that establishes a common baseline, yet leaves considerable room for interpretation among member states.\n\n## The missing security lens\n\nPerhaps the most significant limitation of the directive is its relatively little guidance on what anti-corruption efforts should look like in today's rapidly changing security environment.\n\nThis is because corruption is increasingly also a geopolitical and security issue. Foreign influence operations, sanctions evasion schemes, strategic corruption, illicit financial networks, organised crime infiltration and the manipulation of critical supply chains all represent corruption-related risks affecting European security and resilience.\n\nYet these challenges remain largely outside the directive's core focus. There is a risk that anti-corruption efforts will continue to focus on traditional forms of misconduct while underestimating emerging threats linked to geopolitical competition and hybrid forms of influence.\n\n## The technology gap\n\nConsidering the hype around artificial intelligence in society generally, the most striking omission in the directive is the limited attention devoted to technological innovation. Over the past decade, governments, international organisations and researchers have been exploring how artificial intelligence, big data analytics, risk indicators, predictive modelling and open-source intelligence can bolster anti-corruption initiatives.\n\nTechnology is now essential for identifying suspicious procurement patterns, pinpointing conflicts of interest, tracing illicit financial flows and exposing corruption networks. Yet the directive contains almost no strategic vision regarding the role of technology in anti-corruption governance, which is surprising.\n\nResearch conducted under the EU-funded [FALCON project](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F) – of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member – demonstrates that effective anti-corruption systems are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures capable of collecting, integrating, analysing and cross-referencing large volumes of information. Without these capabilities, many corruption risks remain invisible until significant damage has already occurred.\n\nIt’s important to stress that adopting new technologies – purchasing software, etc. – is the easy part. EU states also need to create the institutional and data infrastructures that allow these technologies to function effectively. Digitisation, interoperability, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and cross-border information sharing are all prerequisites for the next generation of anti-corruption systems.\n\n## Three areas that deserve greater attention\n\nFrom our research in the following areas, we can say for sure that they deserve particular attention in the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy and future initiatives:\n\n**1\\. Public procurement**\n\nPublic procurement remains one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. This issue is exacerbated by [Europe's increased investment in defence](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Foperational-credibility-is-a-strategic-asset-in-the-defence-industry-what-does-that-mean-for-ukraine-and-its-partners-2965\u002F), critical infrastructure, energy security, technological innovation and strategic industrial policies.\n\n[Central priorities](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fhigh-level-corruption-analysis-schemes-costs-and-policy-recommendations) should include strengthening transparency, reducing direct awards, improving oversight of sub-threshold contracts, and introducing AI-based risk assessment tools.\n\n**2\\. Border governance**\n\nManaging borders and customs procedures is another critical challenge, as research at the [Port of Rotterdam](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-corruption-helps-drug-traffickers-adapt-to-strengthened-border-enforcement-2848\u002F) and the [Kapitan Andreevo crossing](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-stronger-borders-can-create-smarter-corruption-lessons-from-one-of-europes-most-strategic-border-crossings-2972\u002F) demonstrates. Corruption at the border facilitates a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, evasion of sanctions, tax fraud and the movement of illicit goods.\n\nGreater automation, data integration and harmonisation of [border management systems](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Frecommendations-combatting-border-corruption-falcon-policy-brief) across member states could significantly reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the EU's capacity to detect emerging threats.\n\n**3\\. Financial infrastructures**\n\nModern corruption relies heavily on [financial infrastructure](https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10610-024-09591-z). Complex financial networks, shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and, increasingly, cryptoassets can facilitate the movement and concealment of illicit funds.\n\nThe future of anti-corruption policy hinges on strengthening the links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks, and on developing new approaches that can address digital financial ecosystems.\n\n## Will the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy help put the directive into action?\n\nThe adoption of Directive 2026\u002F1021 sends an important message that corruption remains a priority issue for the European Union. The directive establishes a much-needed common foundation and introduces valuable innovations to improve both prevention and enforcement. It provides a stronger legal framework than the fragmented system that existed previously.\n\nBut legal harmonisation alone will not be enough. The directive's effectiveness will ultimately depend on how member states implement its provisions, and on whether the European Union can develop a broader strategic vision capable of addressing emerging corruption risks.\n\nThis is where the forthcoming EU Anti-Corruption Strategy could play a decisive role. To be effective and not just a paper exercise, it must be adaptive, technology-driven and security-conscious. This strategy must respond to current corruption and anticipate its potential evolution.\n\nAnd it needs to be based on a participative process that considers the valuable research and perspectives of civil society organisations, academics and others outside of government.\n\nIf the directive provides the legal architecture, the strategy can provide the direction. Together, they could form the basis of a more adaptive and forward-looking European anti-corruption framework – one that is able to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.","2026-06-07","eu-directive-political-lens","Corruption in the age of networks, data and influence – does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive rise to the challenge?","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fdaa620e4-883a-414b-9422-156b0bf16c2b?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[115,119,123,125,129],{"tags_id":116},{"id":117,"name":118},879,"Money laundering",{"tags_id":120},{"id":121,"name":122},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":124},{"id":49,"name":50},{"tags_id":126},{"id":127,"name":128},1215,"Illicit financial flows",{"tags_id":130},{"id":88,"name":89},[16,95],[133],1381,[],[18],[],"2026-06-06T14:25:32.000Z","d22c72aa-896a-43ce-acca-4154ff70a25a","2026-07-02T09:50:06.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Feu-directive-political-lens",{"id":144,"body":145,"status":6,"type":10,"date":146,"slug":147,"title":148,"image":149,"countries":150,"topic":13,"activity":13,"tags":151,"nid":13,"topics":152,"activities":157,"authors":159,"images":161,"websites":162,"area":163,"programme":166,"language":19,"translations":168,"translation_of":13,"user_created":37,"date_created":169,"user_updated":170,"date_updated":171,"content":172,"translations_news":173,"link":174},10590,"This feature appears in the 2025 Basel AML Index Public Edition report. \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fdownloads\">Download the full report and related resources\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n\u003Cblockquote>\n\u003Ch2>Key takeaways\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Understanding national risks linked to virtual assets is now essential\u003C\u002Fstrong>, as their use has moved from niche to mainstream and is increasingly exploited for financial crime.&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Risk assessments are inherently challenging \u003C\u002Fstrong>as (a) virtual assets are borderless by design, (b) large parts of the ecosystem fall outside regulation and (c) reliable national-level data remains limited.&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Illicit activity involving virtual assets does not take place in isolation\u003C\u002Fstrong>: offenders exploit the same weaknesses – corruption, fraud, weak supervision and poor enforcement – that already undermine the wider financial system.&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>The Basel AML Index provides valuable indicators to assess both a jurisdiction’s structural vulnerabilities and its capacity to counter threats \u003C\u002Fstrong>related to financial crimes in general, including those related to virtual assets, even though it does not include a dedicated virtual assets risk indicator.&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003C\u002Fblockquote>\n\n\u003Cem>Note: in this article we use the term virtual assets in line with the FATF’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Ftopics\u002Fvirtual-assets.html\">definition\u003C\u002Fa> of “any digital representation of value that can be digitally traded, transferred or used for payment”. The terms crypto, cryptoassets, digital assets, digital currencies, etc. form part of this loose family, though they are often defined differently in different contexts – a factor that also complicates risk assessments and data analysis.\u003C\u002Fem>\n\n\u003Ch2>\u003Cstrong>Why assessing risks related to virtual assets matters&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\nGovernments and private firms alike are under growing pressure to understand the risks associated with virtual assets. What was once a niche is becoming a mainstream part of financial markets and a common feature in all forms of financial crime.\n\nAs the virtual assets industry continues to mature, national authorities that lack a clear understanding of the risks find themselves on the back foot when drafting legislation, supervising market participants or countering financial crime.\n\nFor financial institutions, a clear picture of jurisdiction-level risk is essential for customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, calibrating controls and taking strategic decisions about where or where not to operate. Financial institutions that misjudge these risks leave themselves exposed to illicit finance, reputational harm and potential regulatory action.\n\n\u003Ch2>Why jurisdiction-level risk assessments are difficult\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\n\u003Ch3>1. A borderless system by design\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\nUnlike bank accounts or trust funds, virtual asset wallets or addresses do not have a meaningful jurisdictional location. There is no crypto equivalent of “a bank account in Switzerland”. A wallet can be accessed anywhere and may be controlled by a person or entity whose location is unknown or easily obscured. Large parts of the virtual asset ecosystem also fall outside the boundaries of traditional financial regulation. Self-hosted wallets, peer-to-peer transfers, decentralised finance (DeFi) protocols and informal over-the-counter (OTC) brokers create pockets of activity that are largely invisible. Any jurisdiction-level assessment will inevitably be incomplete.\n\nThe activities of virtual asset service providers (VASPs) further complicate matters. A VASP may be established in one jurisdiction while primarily serving customers in another. In the absence of harmonised legislation or cooperation among supervisors, many operate across numerous markets with minimal physical presence or regulatory engagement.\n\n\u003Ch3>2. Data is limited, patchy and uncertain\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\nReliable quantitative data on financial crime risks related to virtual assets at the national level is scarce. In addition to the issue of contrasting definitions and the technology’s borderless nature, several factors contribute to this lack.\n\nFirst, commercial blockchain analytics providers publish broad indicators of virtual asset adoption and estimates of illicit usage. These can be helpful for spotting trends but require careful interpretation. They rely on estimates and proxies, including web traffic to exchanges or intermediaries, and do not provide precise amounts or reliably distinguish licit from illicit activity.\n\nSecond, it is reasonable to assume that where adoption rises, illicit activity will also increase, simply because criminals use the same infrastructure as legitimate users. However, such relationships cannot be measured with confidence.\n\nThird, at the government level, many jurisdictions still lack a coordinated approach across authorities to collect, share and analyse statistics on money laundering and related financial crimes. In many jurisdictions, data on virtual assets is either not gathered consistently or not collected at all.\n\nWithout reliable data on virtual assets usage and risks, national risk assessments may become detached from real-world threats. The result: regulation and supervision that is either insufficient or unnecessarily burdensome.\n\n## How the Basel AML Index can be used\n\nFor the above reasons, the Basel AML Index does not offer a dedicated indicator for virtual assets. Nevertheless, the Index data is still useful because illicit activity involving virtual assets typically exploits the same underlying weaknesses that enable money laundering, corruption, fraud and other financial crimes in the traditional financial system. Where protections against fraud are weak, for example, where supervision is lacking or where enforcement of regulations is inconsistent or politically compromised, opportunities to misuse virtual assets for illegal purposes tend to expand.\n\n\u003Cblockquote>\n\u003Cstrong>Two components of risk&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fstrong>\n\nIn line with the holistic methodology of the Basel AML Index and most AML\u002FCFT risk assessment frameworks, evaluating jurisdiction-level risk related to virtual assets centres on two elements:\n\n\u003Cp>a) \u003Cem>vulnerability \u003C\u002Fem>to the illicit use of virtual assets; and b) \u003Cem>capacity to mitigate \u003C\u002Fem>and respond to these threats.&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003C\u002Fblockquote>\n\n## Relevant indicators\n\nThe following graphic highlights indicators of the Basel AML Index that are relevant for assessing either \u003Cem>structural vulnerabilities \u003C\u002Fem>that illicit actors may exploit, or a jurisdiction’s \u003Cem>capacity to counter \u003C\u002Fem>threats. These can be viewed individually in the Expert Edition.\n\n![](https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F7f446525-136f-4018-a322-8a4e8872f23b) *Indicators visible in the Basel AML Index Edition that are particularly relevant to assessing national risks relating to virtual assets.*\n\n\n### FATF data\n\nUsing the Expert Edition Plus subscription and its quantitative analysis of the latest FATF mutual evaluation and follow-up reports, Basel AML Index users can gain rapid insights into whether a jurisdiction’s AML\u002FCFT framework provides it with the capacity to \u003Cem>counter threats \u003C\u002Fem>related to financial crimes generally, including those involving virtual assets. FATF Recommendations that may be highly relevant for this include:\n\n- R.15 (new technologies)\n- R.16 (payment transparency)\n- R.26 &amp; 27 (regulation and supervision)\n- R.29–31 (law enforcement)\n- R.36–40 (international cooperation)\n\nAn additional useful source of information for jurisdiction-level risk assessments is the FATF’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFatfrecommendations\u002Ftargeted-update-virtual-assets-vasps-2025.html\">\u003Cem>2025 Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fa>. This report summarises progress in implementing FATF Recommendation 15 by FATF members and additional jurisdictions with materially important global virtual asset activity. “Materially important” refers to the presence of large VASPs (accounting for more than 0.25 percent of global trading) and\u002For a large virtual asset user base.\n\n## Where to start\n\nFor jurisdictions at an early stage of assessing national risks related to virtual assets, the World Bank’s \u003Cem>\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fopenknowledge.worldbank.org\u002Fentities\u002Fpublication\u002Fbb5a7475-ac52-4697-afdc-5f618a550623\">AML\u002FCFT National Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers: Guidance Manual\u003C\u002Fa> \u003C\u002Fem>(published in October 2025) is a strong starting point. It covers both threats and vulnerabilities, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation measures.\n\nAdditional useful resources include:\n- \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002F9crc-crypto-regulation\">\u003Cstrong>Practical recommendations from regulators and supervisors\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fa>, developed at the 9th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptoassets, on understanding financial crime risks linked to virtual assets and designing effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks.\n- \u003Cstrong>Structured public–private partnerships\u003C\u002Fstrong>, such as the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fefippp.eu\u002F\">Europol Financial Intelligence Sharing Public Private Partnership\u003C\u002Fa>, which offer opportunities to learn from peers and obtain early insights into emerging threats and financial crime typologies involving virtual assets.\n","2025-12-08","assessing-national-risks-related-to-virtual-assets","Assessing national risks related to virtual assets","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F78f8a1ec-bf8d-469a-ab92-228e79ddd8f2?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[],[153,154,155,16,156],"Anti-Money Laundering","Asset Recovery and Enforcement","Business Integrity Ethics and Compliance","Basel AML Index",[156,158],"Research",[160],1365,[],[156],[164,165],"Asset Recovery & Enforcement","Business Integrity & Governance",[167],"International Centre for Asset Recovery",[],"2025-12-05T11:43:36.000Z","dfef11db-1bc6-47e9-a61d-93443995484b","2026-06-24T13:41:09.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fassessing-national-risks-related-to-virtual-assets",{"id":176,"body":177,"status":6,"type":178,"date":179,"slug":180,"title":181,"image":182,"countries":183,"topic":184,"activity":187,"tags":190,"nid":191,"topics":192,"activities":194,"authors":195,"images":196,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":19,"translations":197,"translation_of":13,"user_created":198,"date_created":199,"user_updated":170,"date_updated":200,"content":201,"translations_news":202,"link":203},10573,"The Basel Institute’s first international postgraduate programme in anti-corruption has begun. 12 students from 11 countries across Africa, Europe and North America are taking part in the six-month course, led by Basel Institute staff and resulting in a Certificate of Advanced Studies from the University of Basel.\n\nThe course, [Mastering Today’s Anti-Corruption Challenges](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study\u002Fcas-anti-corruption), equips mid-career professionals with the tools, skills and networks to address corruption and governance challenges in their work.\n\nLead instructor Dr Claudia Baez Camargo, Director of the Institute’s Prevention, Research and Innovation team, explained:\n\n> Through this programme, participants will not only deepen their understanding of corruption in today’s complex world, but also learn to evaluate the real evidence on what works. Most importantly, they will be empowered to apply these insights with confidence in their own countries and professional contexts, helping to strengthen integrity and good governance where it matters most.\n\n## Shaping the next generation of anti-corruption leaders\n\nThree participants attended the opening event on 26–27 September in person in Basel, while those unable to travel joined the sessions online.\n\nThe first cohort is made up of peers with diverse academic backgrounds – including legal, economic, political and other disciplines – and professional experience in the public, private and civil society sectors, in multilateral organisations and the media.\n\nThey were welcomed by the Basel Institute’s President Peter Maurer and Executive Director Betsy Andersen, together with the Basel STUDY team and instructors.\n\nVisits to the University of Basel and the historic centre gave participants and instructors the chance to bond while exploring Swiss traditions.\n\nThe participants who attended the launch in person described themselves as:\n\n> “excited”, “grateful” and “honoured”.\n\nAsked what she hoped to get out of the course, Tamara Lee, a Business Analyst and Project Manager from Ireland, said:\n\n> I hope I’ll learn to see corruption issues with a sharper, more professional lens. Instead of falling back on the usual buzzwords or the kind of surface-level ideas we see on social media or hear in conversations, I’d like to be able to look at situations in a deeper, more critical way.\n\nDr Ramadhani Marijani, a Senior Lecturer and Researcher at Tanzania’s University of Dodoma, added: \n\n> I hope I can be able to resolve anti-corruption challenges from an African perspective and understand other challenges in the global sphere. I am looking forward to engaging in classes, sharing and learning from other fellow participants from Africa and other countries and from the community of practice fighting the war against corruption globally.\n\nIlinca-Ioana Bīlc, Legal Advisor at a bank in Romania, emphasised her desire to explore a holistic approach to anti-corruption: \n\n> I want to know how I can fight \\[corruption\\] from different angles besides the basic one that everyone expects: you just follow the guidelines and then there will be no corruption. When in fact, the problem is much bigger and we need way more different ways of tackling it. \n\n## Exploring corruption’s links to today’s greatest challenges\n\nSaturday’s classroom sessions with Dr Saba Kassa explored how corruption connects to today’s greatest concerns, from shifting geopolitics and democratic backsliding to migration and climate change. This sets the foundation for modules delivered in live online sessions over the next six months and covering:\n\n*   How corruption and governance impact states, societies and organisations.\n*   The fundamentals of anti-corruption practice, from legal instruments to effective enforcement and prevention.\n*   Novel approaches to anti-corruption, drawing on political and behavioural sciences.\n*   How anti-corruption strategies are implemented internationally – and how they could be made more effective.\n\nStudents will apply their knowledge through a personal study project on a corruption challenge of their choice.\n\n## Scholarship fund opens doors to global talent\n\nSeveral participants benefited from tuition support thanks to generous donors to the [Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study\u002Fscholarship).\n\nThe fund supports applicants from lower-income backgrounds who show strong commitment to anti-corruption, transparency and good governance. It reflects the vision of the Basel Institute’s late Managing Director Gretta Fenner to educate and empower anti-corruption leaders everywhere, regardless of financial means.\n\nOne recipient is Nigerian lawyer Emmanuela OkonkwoAbutu of the Abuja-based African Centre for Governance, Asset Recovery and Sustainable Development. She shared:\n\n> This prestigious study programme... offers a forum to learn from professionals who are influencing the global conversation on anti-corruption… This educational journey would not have been possible without the support of the Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund.\n\nWe are grateful to The International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, the Academy’s co-founders Elizabeth Ortega (ECO Strategic Communications), Stéphane Bonifassi (Bonifassi Avocats) and Lincoln Caylor (Bennett Jones), as well as Swiss law firm Kellerhals Carrard for their generous donations to the Fund.\n\n## Expanding opportunities through Basel STUDY\n\n[Basel STUDY](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study) – the Basel Institute’s postgraduate programme initiative – is designed to boost the knowledge, skills and careers of professionals committed to countering corruption and financial crime.\n\nIt builds on the Institute’s long-standing capacity-building approach, encouraging peer learning, hands-on practice and real-life cases. The two available Certificate of Advanced Studies programmes combine this practitioner-led spirit with the academic rigour of the University of Basel.\n\nThe second course, [_Combating_ _Financial Crime Through Asset Recovery_](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study\u002Fcas-asset-recovery), starts in February 2026. Applications remain open for self-funded or employer-funded participants.\n\n## Learn more\n\n*   Explore other learning opportunities at the Basel Institute, including free eLearning courses on [Basel LEARN](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002F), our four-day course on [crypto, financial crime and AML compliance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcrypto-aml-training), and our flagship [asset recovery training programmes](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\u002Ftraining-programmes) for law enforcement agencies.\n*   Learn about the [Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study\u002Fscholarship) – and consider donating to help change lives and create impact!","News","2025-09-29","global-professionals-begin-new-anti-corruption-studies-2851","Global professionals begin new anti-corruption studies","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fbe4b8143-bba3-4760-8f60-d11dcedc3f7b?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[185,186],"Prevention"," Research and Innovation",[188,189],"Courses","Training",[],2851,[16,95,193],"Learning and training",[188,189],[],[],[],"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","2025-09-29T16:01:39.000Z","2026-06-24T13:41:14.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fglobal-professionals-begin-new-anti-corruption-studies-2851",{"id":205,"body":206,"status":6,"type":10,"date":207,"slug":208,"title":209,"image":210,"countries":211,"topic":212,"activity":214,"tags":216,"nid":230,"topics":231,"activities":232,"authors":233,"images":235,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":19,"translations":236,"translation_of":13,"user_created":198,"date_created":237,"user_updated":170,"date_updated":238,"content":239,"translations_news":240,"link":241},10564,"_Our Senior Communications and External Relations Specialist Monica Guy looks back on how a curious mind paired with diverse learning opportunities and the desire to make an impact can pave the way into anti-corruption. This article is part of a series on careers in fighting financial crime and opportunities to learn and study with the Basel Institute._\n\nOne of the many things I’ve learned at the Basel Institute on Governance is that rewarding jobs in the field of countering financial crime are not just for those who woke up aged 10 and said: “Mummy, I want to be an anti-corruption prosecutor”. Or who studied business and law with the dream of becoming a compliance officer.\n\nMy own journey has been rather zig-zaggy, from caring for Stephen Hawking to managing multilingual content projects for Google and big companies in the travel and shipping industries. And a lot in between.\n\nEducation and continuous learning have been crucial in giving me the flexibility to bounce from one thing to another and hopefully make at least a tiny bit of impact on the way.\n\n## From dusty libraries to blended learning\n\nI didn’t learn much of practical use during my first degree in Classics at Cambridge. But it was a good way to learn to think, read, write and argue with clever people about the world with all its wonders and weirdness. That’s something I have to do a lot in my communications role at the Basel Institute, though thankfully not in ancient Greek.\n\nMy first master’s in interactive communications at Quinnipiac University was one of the earliest “blended learning” degree courses. I.e. hybrid classes and the (then) revolutionary idea that it’s better to learn the theory in advance and use precious class time to practise and discuss.\n\nWhat was in 2010 the cutting edge of communications now looks like stone-age cave paintings. But it did give me the basics to start building websites (early web design = animated cave paintings) and think a bit more strategically about things like audience, purpose and how communications and social media tactics can be used for good or ill. That has been of real practical value in our efforts to build the Basel Institute’s visibility and reputation over the last years.\n\n## Digging deeper (but I wish Basel STUDY had existed then)\n\nYou can’t be successful in communicating if you don’t understand what you’re talking about. So during covid times I took another master’s course, this time in sustainable development at SOAS University of London. I wanted that deeper understanding of topics like poverty, globalisation and environment that are fundamental to the work the Basel Institute does.\n\nThis degree was fully online and designed to fit alongside a full-time job. But I’ll be honest: if our [Basel STUDY](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fstudy) courses had existed then, I’d have gladly taken them instead.\n\nBasel STUDY – that's our postgraduate programmes with the University of Basel: they are six months, hands-on, with live classes and in-person meetings, top-notch instructors and a diverse group of other participants with real-world experience. That’s a lot more fun, useful and digestible than a two-year master's degree, plus easier to combine with other modules and qualifications.\n\n## Free or low-cost learning\n\nI absolutely know that I’ve been privileged to be able to study at good universities, with grants and jobs to pay the way.\n\nBut I’ve also learned a lot through MOOCs (Massive Online Open Courses) and other free or low-cost online learning opportunities from organisations like Coursera and the University of Leiden. And of course the crème de la crème of eLearning: our own free [Basel LEARN courses](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002F) on countering financial crime.\n\n## A desire to learn\n\nAll this to say that you don’t need to be a “financial crime professional” to play a part in making the world a better place.\n\nJust as you don’t need to be a “communications professional” to communicate effectively about countering corruption, fostering good governance, catalysing asset recovery and all the other difficult but worthwhile things we do here in Basel and around the world.\n\nWhat you do need is a desire to learn – from courses, peers and colleagues.\n\n## Join in\n\nMy “call to action”? Take a look at the opportunities we offer at the Basel Institute for individuals who also burn to learn about countering corruption and financial crime and build practical skills they can apply in their daily work:\n\n*   [Basel LEARN](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002F) – our online training and learning hub with free eLearning courses and lots more\n*   [Basel STUDY](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fstudy) – our new academic programmes with the University of Basel on anti-corruption and asset recovery\n*   Our forthcoming open course on [Introduction to blockchain: crypto investigation and AML compliance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcrypto-aml-training)","2025-06-26","not-just-for-lawyers-learning-your-way-into-anti-corruption-2822","Not just for lawyers: learning your way into anti-corruption","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F99b2b185-92d4-46cc-8c21-6b0c8f20cf39?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[213],"",[215],"Insights",[217,219,223,227],{"tags_id":218},{"id":49,"name":50},{"tags_id":220},{"id":221,"name":222},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":224},{"id":225,"name":226},1300,"Education",{"tags_id":228},{"id":229,"name":189},1372,2822,[16],[215],[234],1346,[],[],"2025-07-13T11:42:47.000Z","2026-06-24T13:41:17.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fnot-just-for-lawyers-learning-your-way-into-anti-corruption-2822",{"id":243,"body":244,"status":6,"type":178,"date":245,"slug":246,"title":247,"image":248,"countries":249,"topic":251,"activity":253,"tags":256,"nid":257,"topics":258,"activities":259,"authors":260,"images":261,"websites":262,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":13,"translations":263,"translation_of":13,"user_created":198,"date_created":264,"user_updated":170,"date_updated":265,"content":266,"translations_news":267,"link":268},10367,"Business integrity is vital to the health of the vibrant economies of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as of the companies based or seeking to do business in the region. Fostering trust and transparency through [Collective Action](https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002F) between stakeholders – local businesses, foreign investors, governments, civil society – is key to advancing a strong culture of business integrity, levelling the playing field and solving practical challenges that hold back fair business.\n\nBusiness integrity is one of the three pillars of the [Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific (ACI)](https:\u002F\u002Fevents.development.asia\u002Flearning-events\u002Fanti-corruption-initiative-asia-and-pacific) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The initiative was formed in 1999 to cooperate with governments in the fight against corruption and support national and multilateral efforts to reduce corruption in Asia and the Pacific. The ACI includes two additional pillars: Law Enforcement and Public Integrity.\n\nWe are delighted to have joined the ACI’s Advisory Group, alongside representatives from the Australian Attorney General's Office and Federal Police, Transparency International and UNODC among others. This marks an expansion of our role, building on our [Private Sector team](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fprivate-sector)’s ongoing support to the ACI’s Working Group on Business Integrity launched in 2019.\n\n## 11th Regional Conference – exploring Collective Action\n\nThe ACI’s [11th Regional Conference](https:\u002F\u002Fevents.development.asia\u002Flearning-events\u002F11th-regional-conference-pandemic-recovery-building-resilient-economies-through) in Manila, Philippines, from 9–11 May was the first in-person meeting and conference since the Covid-19 pandemic, making it a valuable opportunity to map out pathways for future work. These will follow the Initiative’s mandate to support the 34 member governments in three core areas:\n\n*   Policy dialogue and sharing anti-corruption best practices at the regional meetings and conferences\n*   Policy analysis, including thematic reviews and stocktaking\n*   Corruption prevention and law enforcement capacity development activities\n\nAt a plenary on business integrity moderated by our Head of Private Sector Vanessa Hans, representatives from the Malaysia-based Business Integrity Alliance, Thai Collective Action Against Corruption and National Commission of Supervision of China explored how Collective Action can support prevention efforts in the region. The plenary was followed by a breakout session facilitated by Vanessa Hans in order to identify Collective Action initiatives in the region and share best practices.\n\nEmphasising the importance of the ACI due to its scope, reach and the involvement of so many motivated and knowledgeable professionals, Vanessa Hans said:\n\n> The ACI is a great platform for peer learning and showcasing of best practices in the anti-corruption community within Asia and the Pacific. Topics of business integrity and the benefits of anti-corruption Collective Action have been central to the discussions during the conference. We at the Basel Institute are honoured to be able to support this initiative. \n\n## Looking back\n\nOur support to the ACI’s Advisory Group looks back to the former role of our Managing Director Gretta Fenner as the founding Programme Manager of the ACI in 1999\u002F2000.\n\nAt that time, the group endorsed the first ever regional collaborative framework to combat corruption in the Asia-Pacific region (the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia-Pacific). The group continued to lead innovation in the fight against corruption, for example in the immediate aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the ACI swiftly brought together governments, the private sector and civil society to address urgent corruption risks and prevention mechanisms in the tsunami reconstruction process. \n\nThis was a pioneering approach at a time when multistakeholder collaboration through Collective Action was still a novel concept.\n\n## Looking ahead\n\nWe look forward to continuing to support the ACI through the Advisory Group as we increase our anti-corruption work and partnerships in the region.\n\nSave the date, among other things, for our regional Collective Action Forum in the Philippines on 25 September 2023. This will follow a similar format to our [Southern Africa Collective Action Forum](https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fevents) on 31 May 2023 and include a regional [award](https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fawards) for an outstanding anti-corruption Collective Action initiative.\n\nQuestions? Ask our [Collective Action Helpdesk](https:\u002F\u002Fcollective-action.com\u002Fget-involved\u002Fhelpdesk).","2023-05-30","fostering-anti-corruption-in-asiapacific-through-collective-action-2456","Fostering anti-corruption in Asia–Pacific through Collective Action","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F83af013f-7599-4d69-bc8e-2ddadbe40481?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[250],7182,[64,252],"Private Sector",[254,255],"Events","International cooperation",[],2456,[64,252,16],[254,255],[],[],[18,64],[],"2023-05-30T16:01:25.000Z","2026-06-24T13:42:07.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ffostering-anti-corruption-in-asiapacific-through-collective-action-2456",{"id":270,"body":271,"status":6,"type":10,"date":272,"slug":273,"title":274,"image":275,"countries":276,"topic":277,"activity":279,"tags":281,"nid":282,"topics":283,"activities":284,"authors":285,"images":287,"websites":288,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":13,"translations":289,"translation_of":13,"user_created":198,"date_created":290,"user_updated":170,"date_updated":291,"content":292,"translations_news":293,"link":294},9595,"_During SDC Governance Week, a cross-agency learning event for staff and partners of the Governance network of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Basel Institute’s Public Governance team will speak about its support to the agency’s development of new strategic anti-corruption guidelines. The process of updating the guidelines aims to reflect evolving risks, emerging understandings of corruption and fresh evidence about effective approaches to anti-corruption interventions._ _In this quick guide, Claudia Baez Camargo, Head of the Basel Institute’s Public Governance team, explains the purpose, focus and value of strategic anti-corruption guidelines for development agencies:_\n\n## In what context do development agencies face corruption issues?\n\nIn their efforts to promote sustainable development around the world, development agencies and their country offices face a variety of corruption risks. Some risks directly threaten funded projects, for example if money intended to finance a new hospital is embezzled, or the building contract is given to the friend of a local politician and at an inflated value. Other corruption risks more indirectly, or at least less visibly, impact the ability of development agencies to achieve their project goals. For instance, if sextortion – the coercive extraction of sexual favours – is prevalent, it will undermine programmes aimed at promoting gender equality. And when corruption is a systemic issue, it hampers sustainable development directly and in multiple ways. Development agencies may therefore consider addressing systemic corruption issues strategically through a dedicated anti-corruption programme.\n\n## What is a “strategic” approach to anti-corruption?\n\nThe above three types of corruption risk that development agencies face often overlap and spring from the same underlying factors. These factors, or drivers, include the political economy and prevailing power relations in a country or community, as well as the social norms that influence people’s behaviour. A strategic approach to anti-corruption in a specific context will therefore always start with a good diagnosis that covers two broad areas:\n\n*   First, the major corruption issues in that country or context that are hindering sustainable development. For example, widespread petty corruption in the health sector or a flawed procurement system that sees inflated contracts going to political cronies.\n*   Second, the underlying drivers of those problems, such as social norms around the need to give “gifts” to health workers, or state capture through powerful networks of elites.\n\nStrategic approaches to anti-corruption will be based on this diagnosis and design projects that are – at the very least – relevant, feasible, sustainable and mindful of risks or unintended consequences.\n\n## Setting out an anti-corruption strategy in black and white – why?\n\nNot all development agencies have written guidelines setting out their strategic approach to anti-corruption. But they have multiple benefits. Their main purpose is to support the development of evidence-based and effective anti-corruption programming decisions. This makes targeted anti-corruption interventions more likely to succeed in their goals, to help the beneficiary communities in tangible ways and to be a good use of taxpayers’ money. By setting out their strategic anti-corruption approach in black and white, the agency leadership clearly signals which areas are important to focus on and how to go about it. This clear messaging is extremely useful for staff in country offices who face the task of identifying which programmes to fund and how best to design them. New staff joining the country office can quickly grasp not only which projects are being implemented and how, but also – very importantly – why. The consistent underlying approach also provides a solid base for learning from the experiences of peers in other country offices.\n\n## Developing the guidelines – a valuable collaborative exercise\n\nLike all strategic documents, the value is not only in the final product but in the process of developing it. What helps tremendously when developing anti-corruption guidelines is to convene a series of discussion groups that bring people from multiple units, disciplines and levels of hierarchy around the table. This is because corruption is a transversal issue, cutting across almost all other thematic areas and professional specialisms. It is not just a topic for the anti-corruption department and external anti-corruption experts, but needs to include the experiences, views and concerns of those working on the ground. Getting a broad range of inputs helps to make the guidelines more robust and reflective of the real challenges that country offices and programme managers face. The process also helps to get buy-in, which is crucial when it comes to implementation. An agile approach with multiple rounds is probably needed. At the Basel Institute, we typically also find it valuable for a partner anti-corruption organisation or expert to sense-check and challenge the drafts. It is worth taking this time to get the strategic guidelines right. This is because unlike hands-on operational guidance documents and tools that may evolve more rapidly, the strategic guidelines are approved at the highest levels of the agency and need to be built to last.\n\n## Turning strategy into practice – implementing the guidelines\n\nStrategic guidelines are not a recipe for what you should do, but a recipe for how you should think and what you should consider. How best can a development agency help staff turn that knowledge into practical action and avoid it getting lost in the heaps of paperwork that country offices inevitably have to deal with? A must-have is an operational guidance document that translates the guidelines into practical resources and tools. Additional short explainers on particular topics, like how to set up a useful monitoring and evaluation system on anti-corruption, are often helpful. But however user-friendly these documents are, they are the basis for discussion and not a substitute for it. Some ideas to encourage dialogue and active implementation are:\n\n*   Short training interventions, in which country staff have the opportunity to raise questions about their specific issues.\n*   Peer learning events on anti-corruption, to share experiences with colleagues and learn what’s working elsewhere.\n*   An on-demand support function for country staff to bounce ideas around and discuss doubts and concerns relating to anti-corruption.\n\n## Learn more\n\n*   Find out more about the [Public Governance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublic-governance) team and its research, training and technical assistance services.\n*   See the team’s dedicated resource site on [informal governance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublic-governance\u002Fresearch-projects\u002Finformal-governance) and its implications for the fight against corruption.\n*   [Download this quick guide as a PDF](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-21-strategic-anti-corruption-guidelines-development-agencies) and [view all quick guides](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?type=2428).","2021-06-08","quick-guide-to-strategic-anti-corruption-guidelines-for-development-agencies-2030","Quick guide to strategic anti-corruption guidelines for development agencies","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fa0fa0dd2-78e0-4f03-8a88-be27e982eb93?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[278],"Public Governance",[158,280],"Anti-corruption interventions",[],2030,[16],[158,280],[286],807,[],[18],[],"2022-05-26T22:53:01.000Z","2026-06-24T13:42:56.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fquick-guide-to-strategic-anti-corruption-guidelines-for-development-agencies-2030",{"id":296,"body":297,"status":6,"type":10,"date":298,"slug":299,"title":300,"image":301,"countries":302,"topic":304,"activity":306,"tags":307,"nid":314,"topics":315,"activities":316,"authors":317,"images":319,"websites":320,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":13,"translations":321,"translation_of":13,"user_created":198,"date_created":322,"user_updated":170,"date_updated":323,"content":324,"translations_news":325,"link":326},9812,"High-profile law enforcement operations against illegal wildlife trade (IWT), such as Interpol’s [Operation Thunderball](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.interpol.int\u002Fen\u002FNews-and-Events\u002FNews\u002F2019\u002FWildlife-trafficking-organized-crime-hit-hard-by-joint-INTERPOL-WCO-global-enforcement-operation) in July 2019 and the arrest of notorious trafficker [Moazu Kromah](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cbsnews.com\u002Fnews\u002Fwildlife-heroin-trafficking-ring-africa-bust-southern-district-new-york-fish-and-wildlife\u002F) in Uganda in June, have drawn welcome attention to IWT as a financial and organised crime and not only a conservation issue. Yet in working to strengthen legal frameworks and law enforcement capacity in countries that suffer from high levels of IWT, we must not forget the social drivers and facilitators behind wildlife trafficking – factors that laws alone are powerless to change. This quick guide draws on a recent Basel Institute Working Paper on [Corruption and wildlife trafficking](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fnew-working-paper-corruption-and-illegal-wildlife-trade-east-africa), published in the context of a multi-disciplinary programme of work focused on financial crime in IWT.\n\n## Wildlife trafficking is a lucrative crime…\n\nIWT is sometimes described as a low-risk, high-reward business. In many source and transit countries in Southern and Eastern Africa, for example, rates of detection and arrests are low, prosecutions are rare and penalties are weak even for those caught red-handed. These low risks are offset against the high prices that traffickers can obtain by selling valuable illegal wildlife products such as ivory, rhino horn and pangolin scales to black markets mainly in Asia.\n\n## …yet it’s not just about money and the law\n\nA growing body of research supports the idea that behaviour is driven by a complex array of social, cultural and other behavioural factors. Illicit behaviour is thus not only the result of a cost-benefit analysis by individuals seeking personal economic gain. Nor, therefore, will it be solved by laws and law enforcement alone. International agreements such as [CITES](https:\u002F\u002Fcites.org\u002F), which regulates the global trade in wildlife, along with national efforts to strengthen the enforcement of formal regulations, are necessary but not sufficient. This is because they do not address the underlying social context that motivates individuals to engage in trafficking in the first place. With a better understanding of these factors, we will be better equipped to design effective interventions that influence the attitudes and behaviours of people directly involved in the early stages of IWT, as well as those who are indifferent or directly support them.\n\n## What drives people to engage in wildlife trafficking?\n\nBeyond purely economic factors, our preliminary research indicates three main beliefs that drive and justify individuals’ decisions to engage in wildlife crime. Firstly, that trafficking engenders wealth and status. The financial rewards of IWT allow poachers and traders to acquire more wealth than they can access through relying on the formal economy. The money trickles down through social and family networks to benefit the rest of the community. This raises their prestige and status in the community and simultaneously helps to legitimise the illegal behaviour. Secondly, there is often a belief that wildlife trafficking is a victimless crime. In many countries where humans and wild animals live in close proximity, animals are viewed as either sources of food or nuisances that destroy crops and threaten personal security. Widespread human-wildlife conflict can drive people to consider wildlife products as any other kind of commodity. This legitimises behaviours such as actively engaging in trafficking (on the side of the citizens) or facilitating trafficking by turning a blind eye (on the side of public officials). Thirdly, members of a community may consider they have a moral right to appropriate wildlife. Communities that have lost land to newly created (or colonial-era) safari parks and protected environmental zones may resist legislation protecting wildlife on the grounds that it criminalises a generations-old right to access and use wildlife.\n\n## How do socio-economic and political factors play a role?\n\nCommunities along the major wildlife trafficking routes in Africa generally suffer from poverty and limited employment opportunities. The constrained socio-economic context can drive otherwise law-abiding individuals, be it members of the community or local public officials, to assist in activities such as moving contraband from point A to point B. Poverty therefore sets the stage for both poaching and the trafficking of commodities across cities and countries. A thriving supply of illegal wildlife products is the result. Ironically, in demand countries on the other side of the globe, it is the increasing wealth of the middle and upper classes that is helping fuel the demand for these in the first place. The political context is also key to explaining how wildlife trafficking can take place with impunity. Poor governance, endemic corruption and constrained public institutions in source and transit countries are important facilitators of IWT. Even more worryingly, there are countless examples of militants and terrorist groups engaging in poaching and wildlife trafficking to fund their operations, from the Lord’s Resistance Army to the Janjaweed Arab militia of Sudan.\n\n## Drivers and facilitators are intertwined – and we need to understand both\n\nThe socio-economic and political context in which IWT takes place increases and facilitates the propensity for individuals to engage in trafficking. Social norms and beliefs help explain the underlying motivations and justifications individuals may adopt to actually engage in trafficking. We need to understand both a lot better if we want laws and law enforcement to stand a chance of effectively taking down the trafficking networks threatening our endangered animals and global biodiversity.\n\n## Learn more\n\n*   Learn more about the Basel Institute’s [social norms research](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublic-governance\u002Fresearch-projects\u002Fsocial-norms).\n*   Read about how insights into social norms can be applied to prevent [bribery in the Tanzanian health sector](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fclaudia-baez-camargos-quick-guide-social-norms-and-corruption).\n*   Download the full Working Paper 30: [Corruption and wildlife trafficking: exploring drivers, facilitators and networks behind illegal wildlife trade in East Africa](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fnew-working-paper-corruption-and-illegal-wildlife-trade-east-africa).\n*   Read about the Basel Institute’s programme of work focused on [intelligence-led action against financial crime in IWT](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fillegal-wildlife-trade).\n*   [Download a PDF of this quick guide.](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2020-08\u002Fqg11_drivers_iwt.pdf)","2019-09-06","saba-kassas-quick-guide-to-drivers-and-facilitators-of-wildlife-trafficking-997","Saba Kassa’s quick guide to drivers and facilitators of wildlife trafficking","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F712e0be9-042c-4216-8b3b-d5ea91cb6c48?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[303],6527,[305,278],"Green Corruption",[158,215],[308,312],{"tags_id":309},{"id":310,"name":311},1303,"Environment",{"tags_id":313},{"id":82,"name":83},997,[305,16],[158,215],[318],881,[],[18],[],"2022-05-26T22:56:01.000Z","2026-06-24T13:43:56.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fsaba-kassas-quick-guide-to-drivers-and-facilitators-of-wildlife-trafficking-997",{"id":328,"body":329,"status":6,"type":10,"date":330,"slug":331,"title":332,"image":333,"countries":334,"topic":336,"activity":337,"tags":338,"nid":341,"topics":342,"activities":343,"authors":344,"images":346,"websites":347,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":13,"translations":348,"translation_of":13,"user_created":198,"date_created":349,"user_updated":170,"date_updated":323,"content":350,"translations_news":351,"link":352},9813,"_This quick guide draws on a [more comprehensive blog](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.globalintegrity.org\u002F2019\u002F09\u002F04\u002Fsocialnorms\u002F) by Claudia Baez Camargo published on the website of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI-ACE) research programme._ _Find more details on the GI-ACE anti-corruption research projects led by Dr Baez Camargo’s team at the Basel Institute on Governance, as well as other pioneering research on social norms and implications for anti-corruption practice, at the end of this guide._\n\n## What is a social norm?\n\nLike many abstract concepts it is slippery, but a good definition is that of Church and Chigas (2019): social norms are “mutual expectations held by members of a group about the right way to behave in a particular situation”. For an everyday example, think of your workplace. You and your colleagues expect each other to behave in a certain way in shared office spaces, at meetings, during joint projects, etc. These unspoken expectations are social norms, and you may not even realise that they exist – until somebody breaks them.\n\n## How do social norms drive and perpetuate corrupt behaviour?\n\nIf most people believe acts of corruption are accepted and expected by those around them, it is not difficult to see why corruption persists. Say you grew up and live in a community where public officials routinely demand bribes and your family and friends routinely pay them without questioning whether it is right or wrong to do so.  You would probably find it hard to even recognise that this behaviour might be corrupt and unfair, never mind stand up against it.\n\n## The case of health facilities in East Africa\n\nIn a [recent research project](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruption-social-norms-and-behaviours-comparative-assessment-rwanda-tanzania-and) in East Africa, we found that users of public health facilities often offer unsolicited bribes and gifts in order to create a relationship with the provider. The expectation is that having a “provider friend” helps facilitate access to treatment. This is perhaps no surprise when you think about the queues, waiting times and shortage of essential medicines and medical supplies at many of these public health facilities. Now comes the first interesting question: is a social norm underpinning this behaviour?\n\n## How to identify social norms that drive corrupt behaviour\n\nFirst, let’s distinguish between four related concepts:*   Personal attitudes: What an individual believes is appropriate behaviour in a particular situation, e.g. a health worker believes that it is wrong to accept a gift from a patient.\n*   Descriptive social norms: Beliefs about what others do, e.g. the health worker believes that her colleagues routinely accept gifts from patients.\n*   Injunctive social norms: Beliefs about what behaviours others approve or disapprove of, e.g. the health worker believes that most of her colleagues think it is fine to accept gifts from patients.\n*   Behaviours: What people actually do when confronted with that situation, e.g. the health worker accepts or rejects a gift from a patient.\nYou can see that social norms (2 and 3) are different from both personal attitudes (1) and from actual behaviours (4). Which makes them difficult to measure. The trick is to look for an informal _enforcement_ component – i.e. when people who behave in a particular way are rewarded (e.g. reputation, friendships, smiles) and those who break the norm are punished (e.g. social isolation, gossiping, frowns). Back to our research project in East Africa: during field research in Tanzania, we found that bribery and gift-giving is widespread, expected and accepted in public health facilities by both patients and providers. Those who refuse to give or accept bribes and gifts suffer social costs such as gossiping and bad-mouthing. The exchange of gifts and bribes at public health facilities in Tanzania is therefore a social norm.\n\n## What are the implications for anti-corruption practice?\n\nIf social norms are driving corrupt behaviour, then anti-corruption measures that only target individual incentives and behaviours are unlikely to work. They ignore the overpowering social pressures generated by these collective beliefs. And they ignore the fact that social norms are often unconscious and not a result of deliberate cost-benefit calculations. The implications for anti-corruption practice are therefore huge.\n\n## The million-dollar question\n\n…is of course, how to design anti-corruption interventions to identify social norms that fuel and perpetuate corruption, measure them and tackle them. This is exactly what we are doing in the GI-ACE-funded project, [Addressing Bribery in the Tanzanian Health Sector: A Behavioural Approach](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.globalintegrity.org\u002Fproject\u002Fgi-ace-basel\u002F), together with co-investigators Dr. Richard Sambaiga (University of Dar es Salaam), Prof. Tobias Stark (University of Utrecht) and Ms Ruth Persian (UK Behavioural Insights Team). We hope that the results of our pilot intervention in Tanzania will be valuable in informing anti-corruption interventions in public health sectors worldwide. As well as – why not! – all cases of corrupt behaviour where social norms have a major role to play.\n\n## Find out more\n\n*   View Claudia Baez Camargo’s blog on the GI-ACE website: [_Working with social norms to develop effective anti-corruption interventions_](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.globalintegrity.org\u002F2019\u002F09\u002F04\u002Fsocialnorms\u002F)\n*   Learn about the Basel Institute’s recent [research projects and findings](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublic-governance\u002Fresearch-projects).\n*   See current projects and publications on [social norms and corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fpublic-governance\u002Fresearch-projects\u002Fsocial-norms).\n*   Read about a separate GI-ACE research project led by the Basel Institute on [Harnessing Informality: Designing Anti-Corruption Network Interventions and Strategic Use of Legal Instruments](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fharnessing-informality-promote-integrity-and-design-better-anti-corruption-programmes-new).\n*   [Download a PDF of this quick guide.](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.baselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2020-08\u002Fqg10_social_norms.pdf)","2019-09-04","claudia-baez-camargos-quick-guide-to-social-norms-and-corruption-996","Claudia Baez Camargo’s quick guide to social norms and corruption","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff63ef44a-3aa7-4488-8ce4-ca57a40bbfd5?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[335],6528,[278],[158,215,280],[339],{"tags_id":340},{"id":82,"name":83},996,[16],[158,215,280],[345],882,[],[18],[],"2022-05-26T22:56:02.000Z",[],[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fclaudia-baez-camargos-quick-guide-to-social-norms-and-corruption-996",{"left":354,"top":354,"width":355,"height":355,"rotate":354,"vFlip":356,"hFlip":356,"body":357},0,20,false,"\u003Cpath fill=\"currentColor\" fill-rule=\"evenodd\" d=\"M17 10a.75.75 0 0 1-.75.75H5.612l4.158 3.96a.75.75 0 1 1-1.04 1.08l-5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 0 1 0-1.08l5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 1 1 1.04 1.08L5.612 9.25H16.25A.75.75 0 0 1 17 10\" clip-rule=\"evenodd\"\u002F>",1784220850972]