[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":379},["ShallowReactive",2],{"news-assessing-national-risks-related-to-virtual-assets":3,"news-assessing-national-risks-related-to-virtual-assets-similar":70,"i-heroicons:arrow-left-20-solid":374},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"date_created":7,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":15,"activities":21,"programme":23,"area":25,"websites":28,"language":29,"image":30,"translation_of":13,"countries":43,"tags":44,"authors":45,"images":67,"translations":68,"content":69},10590,"published","2025-12-05T11:43:36.000Z","2026-06-24T13:41:09.000Z","Assessing national risks related to virtual assets","Blog","This feature appears in the 2025 Basel AML Index Public Edition report. \u003Ca href=\"https://index.baselgovernance.org/downloads\">Download the full report and related resources\u003C/a>.\n\n\u003Cblockquote>\n\u003Ch2>Key takeaways\u003C/h2>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Understanding national risks linked to virtual assets is now essential\u003C/strong>, as their use has moved from niche to mainstream and is increasingly exploited for financial crime. \u003C/p>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Risk assessments are inherently challenging \u003C/strong>as (a) virtual assets are borderless by design, (b) large parts of the ecosystem fall outside regulation and (c) reliable national-level data remains limited. \u003C/p>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Illicit activity involving virtual assets does not take place in isolation\u003C/strong>: offenders exploit the same weaknesses – corruption, fraud, weak supervision and poor enforcement – that already undermine the wider financial system. \u003C/p>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>The Basel AML Index provides valuable indicators to assess both a jurisdiction’s structural vulnerabilities and its capacity to counter threats \u003C/strong>related to financial crimes in general, including those related to virtual assets, even though it does not include a dedicated virtual assets risk indicator. \u003C/p>\n\u003C/blockquote>\n\n\u003Cem>Note: in this article we use the term virtual assets in line with the FATF’s \u003Ca href=\"https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/virtual-assets.html\">definition\u003C/a> of “any digital representation of value that can be digitally traded, transferred or used for payment”. The terms crypto, cryptoassets, digital assets, digital currencies, etc. form part of this loose family, though they are often defined differently in different contexts – a factor that also complicates risk assessments and data analysis.\u003C/em>\n\n\u003Ch2>\u003Cstrong>Why assessing risks related to virtual assets matters \u003C/strong>\u003C/h2>\n\nGovernments and private firms alike are under growing pressure to understand the risks associated with virtual assets. What was once a niche is becoming a mainstream part of financial markets and a common feature in all forms of financial crime.\n\nAs the virtual assets industry continues to mature, national authorities that lack a clear understanding of the risks find themselves on the back foot when drafting legislation, supervising market participants or countering financial crime.\n\nFor financial institutions, a clear picture of jurisdiction-level risk is essential for customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, calibrating controls and taking strategic decisions about where or where not to operate. Financial institutions that misjudge these risks leave themselves exposed to illicit finance, reputational harm and potential regulatory action.\n\n\u003Ch2>Why jurisdiction-level risk assessments are difficult\u003C/h2>\n\n\u003Ch3>1. A borderless system by design\u003C/h3>\n\nUnlike bank accounts or trust funds, virtual asset wallets or addresses do not have a meaningful jurisdictional location. There is no crypto equivalent of “a bank account in Switzerland”. A wallet can be accessed anywhere and may be controlled by a person or entity whose location is unknown or easily obscured. Large parts of the virtual asset ecosystem also fall outside the boundaries of traditional financial regulation. Self-hosted wallets, peer-to-peer transfers, decentralised finance (DeFi) protocols and informal over-the-counter (OTC) brokers create pockets of activity that are largely invisible. Any jurisdiction-level assessment will inevitably be incomplete.\n\nThe activities of virtual asset service providers (VASPs) further complicate matters. A VASP may be established in one jurisdiction while primarily serving customers in another. In the absence of harmonised legislation or cooperation among supervisors, many operate across numerous markets with minimal physical presence or regulatory engagement.\n\n\u003Ch3>2. Data is limited, patchy and uncertain\u003C/h3>\n\nReliable quantitative data on financial crime risks related to virtual assets at the national level is scarce. In addition to the issue of contrasting definitions and the technology’s borderless nature, several factors contribute to this lack.\n\nFirst, commercial blockchain analytics providers publish broad indicators of virtual asset adoption and estimates of illicit usage. These can be helpful for spotting trends but require careful interpretation. They rely on estimates and proxies, including web traffic to exchanges or intermediaries, and do not provide precise amounts or reliably distinguish licit from illicit activity.\n\nSecond, it is reasonable to assume that where adoption rises, illicit activity will also increase, simply because criminals use the same infrastructure as legitimate users. However, such relationships cannot be measured with confidence.\n\nThird, at the government level, many jurisdictions still lack a coordinated approach across authorities to collect, share and analyse statistics on money laundering and related financial crimes. In many jurisdictions, data on virtual assets is either not gathered consistently or not collected at all.\n\nWithout reliable data on virtual assets usage and risks, national risk assessments may become detached from real-world threats. The result: regulation and supervision that is either insufficient or unnecessarily burdensome.\n\n## How the Basel AML Index can be used\n\nFor the above reasons, the Basel AML Index does not offer a dedicated indicator for virtual assets. Nevertheless, the Index data is still useful because illicit activity involving virtual assets typically exploits the same underlying weaknesses that enable money laundering, corruption, fraud and other financial crimes in the traditional financial system. Where protections against fraud are weak, for example, where supervision is lacking or where enforcement of regulations is inconsistent or politically compromised, opportunities to misuse virtual assets for illegal purposes tend to expand.\n\n\u003Cblockquote>\n\u003Cstrong>Two components of risk \u003C/strong>\n\nIn line with the holistic methodology of the Basel AML Index and most AML/CFT risk assessment frameworks, evaluating jurisdiction-level risk related to virtual assets centres on two elements:\n\n\u003Cp>a) \u003Cem>vulnerability \u003C/em>to the illicit use of virtual assets; and b) \u003Cem>capacity to mitigate \u003C/em>and respond to these threats. \u003C/p>\n\u003C/blockquote>\n\n## Relevant indicators\n\nThe following graphic highlights indicators of the Basel AML Index that are relevant for assessing either \u003Cem>structural vulnerabilities \u003C/em>that illicit actors may exploit, or a jurisdiction’s \u003Cem>capacity to counter \u003C/em>threats. These can be viewed individually in the Expert Edition.\n\n![](https://jam.baselgovernance.org/api/assets/7f446525-136f-4018-a322-8a4e8872f23b) *Indicators visible in the Basel AML Index Edition that are particularly relevant to assessing national risks relating to virtual assets.*\n\n\n### FATF data\n\nUsing the Expert Edition Plus subscription and its quantitative analysis of the latest FATF mutual evaluation and follow-up reports, Basel AML Index users can gain rapid insights into whether a jurisdiction’s AML/CFT framework provides it with the capacity to \u003Cem>counter threats \u003C/em>related to financial crimes generally, including those involving virtual assets. FATF Recommendations that may be highly relevant for this include:\n\n- R.15 (new technologies)\n- R.16 (payment transparency)\n- R.26 & 27 (regulation and supervision)\n- R.29–31 (law enforcement)\n- R.36–40 (international cooperation)\n\nAn additional useful source of information for jurisdiction-level risk assessments is the FATF’s \u003Ca href=\"https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/targeted-update-virtual-assets-vasps-2025.html\">\u003Cem>2025 Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers\u003C/em>\u003C/a>. This report summarises progress in implementing FATF Recommendation 15 by FATF members and additional jurisdictions with materially important global virtual asset activity. “Materially important” refers to the presence of large VASPs (accounting for more than 0.25 percent of global trading) and/or a large virtual asset user base.\n\n## Where to start\n\nFor jurisdictions at an early stage of assessing national risks related to virtual assets, the World Bank’s \u003Cem>\u003Ca href=\"https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/bb5a7475-ac52-4697-afdc-5f618a550623\">AML/CFT National Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers: Guidance Manual\u003C/a> \u003C/em>(published in October 2025) is a strong starting point. It covers both threats and vulnerabilities, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation measures.\n\nAdditional useful resources include:\n- \u003Ca href=\"https://baselgovernance.org/9crc-crypto-regulation\">\u003Cstrong>Practical recommendations from regulators and supervisors\u003C/strong>\u003C/a>, developed at the 9th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptoassets, on understanding financial crime risks linked to virtual assets and designing effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks.\n- \u003Cstrong>Structured public–private partnerships\u003C/strong>, such as the \u003Ca href=\"https://efippp.eu/\">Europol Financial Intelligence Sharing Public Private Partnership\u003C/a>, which offer opportunities to learn from peers and obtain early insights into emerging threats and financial crime typologies involving virtual assets.\n","2025-12-08",null,"assessing-national-risks-related-to-virtual-assets",[16,17,18,19,20],"Anti-Money Laundering","Asset Recovery and Enforcement","Business Integrity Ethics and Compliance","Corruption Prevention and Public Governance","Basel AML Index",[20,22],"Research",[24],"International Centre for Asset Recovery",[26,27],"Asset Recovery & Enforcement","Business Integrity & Governance",[20],"English",{"id":31,"storage":32,"filename_disk":33,"filename_download":34,"title":35,"type":36,"created_on":37,"modified_on":38,"charset":13,"filesize":39,"width":40,"height":41,"duration":13,"embed":13,"description":35,"location":13,"tags":13,"metadata":42,"focal_point_x":13,"focal_point_y":13,"tus_id":13,"tus_data":13,"uploaded_on":37},"78f8a1ec-bf8d-469a-ab92-228e79ddd8f2","local","78f8a1ec-bf8d-469a-ab92-228e79ddd8f2.png","Indicators for virtual assets.png","Indicators for Virtual Assets","image/png","2025-12-05T11:54:54.000Z","2025-12-06T21:13:00.000Z",133953,888,583,{},[],[],[46],{"id":47,"news_id":48,"authors_id":62},1365,{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":49,"date_created":7,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":31,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":51,"activities":52,"programme":53,"area":54,"websites":55,"translation_of":13,"language":29,"countries":56,"tags":57,"authors":58,"images":59,"translations":60,"content":61},"545a204d-e41b-4882-afda-481ecf3fd971","dfef11db-1bc6-47e9-a61d-93443995484b",[16,17,18,19,20],[20,22],[24],[26,27],[20],[],[],[47],[],[],[],{"id":63,"name":64,"position":65,"image":66},556,"Dr Kateryna Boguslavska","Head of Financial Crime Risk","1a304c66-8f40-4954-9bae-37fc556a7789",[],[],[],[71,107,136,161,199,240,269,298,326,352],{"id":72,"body":73,"status":6,"type":10,"date":74,"slug":75,"title":76,"image":77,"countries":78,"topic":13,"activity":13,"tags":79,"nid":13,"topics":92,"activities":13,"authors":94,"images":97,"websites":98,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":100,"translation_of":13,"user_created":101,"date_created":102,"user_updated":103,"date_updated":104,"content":105,"link":106},10637,"_Investigative journalists and civil society organisations are often the first to uncover corruption, suspicious financial flows and hidden assets. But turning those discoveries into successful financial investigations and recovered assets requires specialised knowledge that many practitioners have never had the opportunity to acquire._\n\n_To help bridge this gap, the Basel Institute's International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) has developed a new training course on [Asset Recovery for Civil Society and Journalists](https://baselgovernance.org/learning/courses/asset-recovery)._ \n\n_Combining practical exercises, open-source intelligence techniques and a realistic corruption case simulation, the course equips participants with a deeper understanding of how assets are traced, investigated and ultimately recovered._\n\n_In this Q&A, ICAR trainers Tom Walugembe and Emmanuel Mringo explain why the training was developed, what makes its approach distinctive, who it is designed for and the impact they hope participants will have after completing it._\n\n## What specific gap or need led to the development of this course for civil society and investigative journalists?\n\nIn the past two decades we have seen major financial crime scandals, such as the Panama and Pandora Papers leaks, in which efforts by organisations like the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) have led to financial crime investigations and prosecutions. \n\nYet in many parts of the world, journalists and other non-state actors like civil society organisations (CSOs) are under-equipped with the knowledge of asset recovery processes needed to carry out their core work effectively. \n\nFor CSOs, that often includes advocacy for policy reform. For journalists, it means evidence-based investigative reporting, as well as the skills to trace illicit financial flows, understand money laundering typologies and gather actionable information whose exposure can trigger financial investigations and lead to the recovery of stolen assets.\n\nThere is international recognition of their importance in the fight against corruption – e.g., [Article 13 of the UN Convention Against Corruption](https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf), which requires state parties to take measures to promote the participation of CSOs and individuals in the fight against corruption. \n\nBut when it comes to investigating and recovering proceeds of corruption, there is little or no targeted training to enable CSOs and journalists to play this role effectively. We developed the course to address these capacity gaps.\n\n### How does this course fit within and complement ICAR’s wider training and learning offer?\n\nThis course complements [ICAR’s broader training portfolio](https://baselgovernance.org/learning/training) by broadening its traditional audience. \n\nICAR training programmes focus heavily on law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, financial intelligence units and judicial authorities.\n\nThis new module extends ICAR’s reach to non-state actors while aligning with ICAR’s uniquely effective methodology and offerings. It also integrates with [Basel LEARN](https://baselgovernance.org/learning/basel-learn), the Basel Institute’s online learning platform, which enables blended learning and pre-course preparation. \n\nThe course emphasises core ICAR themes, including parallel financial investigations, international cooperation, and asset tracing, freezing and confiscation.\n\n### And ICAR’s postgraduate programmes on asset recovery?\n\nUnlike the ICAR-led Certificate of Advanced Studies (CAS) programme on [Combating Financial Crime Through Asset Recovery](https://baselgovernance.org/learning/basel-study/cas-asset-recovery/), this is a short professional training course rather than a university-accredited academic programme.\n\nThe CAS programmes, delivered in partnership with the University of Basel, run over six months and require around 300 hours of study. By contrast, this course provides a focused, accessible introduction to asset recovery concepts and practical skills. \n\nThe aim is to enable individuals to strengthen their contribution to transparency, accountability and anti-corruption efforts without the substantial time commitment of a postgraduate programme.\n\n### What makes the course’s approach – especially the use of a simulated case and OSINT –distinctive for this audience?\n\nLike other ICAR training modules, the course focuses on developing practical skills through the “learn by doing” methodology. Participants do not simply learn theoretical concepts in a classroom setting. Working in teams, they conduct a simulated corruption and money laundering investigation. They learn to follow financial trails wherever they lead, through layers of international banking transactions and the misuse of offshore shell companies.\n\nAs this audience of CSOs and investigative journalists lacks investigative powers (such as accessing bank accounts or searching premises), the course emphasises alternative methods for securing information that could trigger or support financial investigations. These include using access to public information laws and open-source intelligence (OSINT).\n\n### What kind of real-world impact do you realistically hope participants will have after completing the training?\n\n#### First, better investigations. \n\nIndividuals who complete the course will gain stronger OSINT skills to effectively gather information on financial crime and illicit assets. They will have broader knowledge to detect modern bribery and money laundering schemes. They will understand anti-money laundering frameworks and the meticulous process of conducting financial investigations. They will have  greater capacity to analyse financial records, such as bank statements, company documents and procurement records.\n\n#### Second, more objective reporting.\n\nThe course will expose participants to the practical challenges of financial investigations and asset recovery, including capacity gaps, asset management and slow international cooperation. This will lead to, among other things, more objective press reporting on financial crimes and asset recovery cases. \n\n#### Third, a stronger accountability role. \n\nUpon completing the course, participants will also have the broader knowledge needed to report on and follow up on the reuse of recovered assets, ensuring they are used effectively. \n\n#### Fourth, a stronger network.\n\nThe course will provide a platform to foster better cooperation among CSOs, investigative journalists and law enforcement agencies. It will also foster regional and international cooperation among CSOs and Investigative Journalists. \n\nOur dream? That CSOs and journalists go from being external observers and reporters to complementary actors who ensure that financial investigations are effective and transparent, and that stolen assets are quickly detected, traced, seized, well-managed, confiscated, repatriated and deployed to achieve sustainable development. \n\nAmbitious, but essential to making a dent in the corruption and financial crime that hinder development and prosperity worldwide.\n\n## Interested in bringing this training to your organisation or network?\n\nThe [Asset Recovery for Civil Society and Journalists course](https://baselgovernance.org/learning/courses/asset-recovery) can be delivered either onsite or online for booked groups of approximately 25–30 participants. It is suitable for national, regional or international audiences and can be tailored to specific contexts and learning needs.\n\nFor individuals, the course is also offered online as an open enrolment programme, allowing participants from anywhere in the world to join. To learn more or discuss delivery options, contact training@baselgovernance.org.\n","2026-06-12","interview-why-journalists-need-asset-recovery-skills","Q&A: Why civil society and journalists need asset recovery skills – and how they can gain them","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/b659354b-528b-418e-b5ee-d94e2496efaa?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[80,84,88],{"tags_id":81},{"id":82,"name":83},843,"Asset recovery",{"tags_id":85},{"id":86,"name":87},1372,"Training",{"tags_id":89},{"id":90,"name":91},1300,"Education",[17,93],"Learning and training",[95,96],1383,1384,[],[99],"Main page",[],"115250da-6c1d-42e7-888a-fbbe909fc524","2026-06-12T13:19:29.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2026-06-22T09:53:41.000Z",[],"/resources/news/interview-why-journalists-need-asset-recovery-skills",{"id":108,"body":109,"status":6,"type":10,"date":110,"slug":111,"title":112,"image":113,"countries":114,"topic":13,"activity":13,"tags":115,"nid":13,"topics":128,"activities":13,"authors":129,"images":130,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":131,"translation_of":13,"user_created":49,"date_created":132,"user_updated":103,"date_updated":133,"content":134,"link":135},10636,"How can investigative journalists help expose crypto-related crime – and educate both the public and policymakers in an increasingly complex financial landscape?\n\nThat was the knot unravelled in a recent [webinar](https://baselgovernance.org/journalism_virtualassets) jointly organised by the Basel Institute on Governance and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and moderated by **Dr Jolly Mtaba** of Malawi University of Business and Applied Sciences.\n\nSpeakers spanning investigative journalism, law enforcement and public-private cooperation discussed the opportunities and challenges of investigating illicit activity involving virtual assets. They also probed the skills and collaborations needed to turn media investigations into on-the-ground impact on public awareness, policy advancement and law enforcement action.\n\nBelow are some of the key takeaways from the discussion.\n\n## Why does investigative journalism matter in the fight against crypto-related crime?\n\nAccording to investigative journalist **Geoff White**, journalists play two critical roles.\n\nOne is investigative: uncovering wrongdoing, exposing weaknesses in systems and shining a light on fraud, corruption and money laundering.\n\nThe other is educational.\n\nMany people have heard of cryptocurrency, but far fewer understand how it works, how it can be misused or why it can create opportunities for criminals. Journalists therefore have an important role in helping the public, policymakers and law enforcement agencies understand increasingly complex financial crime risks.\n\nAs White noted, and has sought to do in his latest book [_Rinsed_](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/455031/rinsed-by-white-geoff/9780241624869) and podcast series [_The Lazarus Heist_](https://geoffwhite.tech/podcasts/),\n\n> there's the explanation piece, and then there's also the investigation and the forcing daylight into this industry.\n\n## What makes crypto investigations different?\n\nThe panellists agreed that crypto-related investigative reporting presents unique challenges.\n\n**Spencer Woodman** of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists ([ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/)) gave an example from the ICIJ’s [Coin Laundry investigation](https://www.icij.org/investigations/coin-laundry/). He explained that while many aspects of crypto investigations resemble traditional money laundering investigations, aspects such as self-custody wallets and crypto-to-cash services introduce a new level of complexity.\n\nUnlike traditional financial accounts, self-custody wallets can be created quickly, anonymously and without the involvement of a financial institution, he explained:\n\n> One thing that amazed me in this investigation was figuring out how easy it is to make my own self-custody wallet. You can generate these things at the click of a button, and that’s one reason scammers have such an easy time laundering money in crypto.\n\nThis makes tracing funds significantly more difficult, particularly when cryptocurrency is converted into cash through informal crypto-to-cash desks or courier services operating outside traditional regulatory frameworks.\n\nBuilding on White’s comments about the explanatory function of journalism, an additional challenge is explaining complex blockchain technology to the audience, said Woodman:\n\n> These scoops and new pieces of information are often about complex financial dealings, and that's already difficult to explain to readers in a succinct way. And then you have this additional challenge of having to explain what cryptocurrency is at a more basic level to a general readership. So the stories are serving a dual purpose – explaining the complex ins and outs of crypto, and then trying to explain the often complicated findings of our investigation.\n\n## Can investigative journalism lead to real-world action?\n\nThe answer is a clear yes.\n\n**Alexandra Gillies** of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project ([OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en)) highlighted several investigations that led to concrete outcomes.\n\nAfter one investigation into the Lithuanian crypto company [Bankera](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/bankera-revelations-lead-to-raids-court-fight), the Lithuanian authorities launched a criminal investigation and conducted more than 30 raids of companies connected to the case. Two banks in Lithuania and Vanuatu faced consequences too.\n\nAnother OCCRP investigation uncovered links between two UK-registered crypto exchanges and suspected Iranian money laundering networks. Following publication, the companies were [removed](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/uk-to-dissolve-crypto-exchange-accused-of-funding-irans-revolutionary-guard) from the UK corporate register. She explained:\n\n> At OCCRP we take a proactive approach. First, through outreach to people who can use the information, such as the briefings we gave to law enforcement agencies and policymakers about the findings of our big [Scam Empire](https://www.occrp.org/en/project/scam-empire) project. \n\n> Second by collaborating with civil society organisations such as Transparency International – where the journalists do their reporting, and then the civil society groups push for policy change, or for accountability and legal consequences for those involved in the wrongdoing. This has worked really well on a number of corruption issues.\n\nModerator Dr Jolly Ntaba added an example from Malawi, where a collaborative corruption investigation by journalists sparked a national debate and led to a presidential directive aimed at addressing some of the issues uncovered.\n\n## How can journalists and law enforcement work together without compromising independence?\n\nThis was one of the webinar's central themes.\n\n**Eric van der Schild**, Head of Europol's Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership ([EFIPPP](https://efippp.eu/)), emphasised that trust is essential.\n\nJournalists and law enforcement agencies have different mandates and operate under different constraints, but both share an interest in exposing criminal activity and improving public safety.\n\nHe and other panellists stressed that cooperation does not mean sharing unpublished information or compromising journalistic independence.\n\nGillies clarified that OCCRP's engagement with law enforcement takes place after publication and is based on publicly available reporting:\n\n> The way we share information is by publishing stories.\n\nInstead, panellists highlighted the value of dialogue, mutual learning and ensuring that investigative findings reach the institutions best placed to act on them. The old adage remains true, said van der Schild:\n\n> Trust arrives on foot and leaves on horseback.\n\n## What skills do journalists need to investigate crypto-related crime?\n\nSeveral panellists highlighted the growing need for specialist expertise.\n\n**Tom Walugembe** of the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery pointed to a range of skills that can strengthen investigative reporting, including financial analysis, open source intelligence techniques and a better understanding of asset recovery mechanisms.\n\nHe also emphasised the importance of understanding how law enforcement agencies conduct investigations and cooperate across borders.\n\nThe need for such skills beyond law enforcement is the main driver of the Basel Institute’s development of a new [course on financial investigations and asset recovery](https://baselgovernance.org/fiar_csos) directed specifically at civil society organisations and investigative journalists.\n\nWoodman argued that journalists do not need to become blockchain specialists overnight. However, they do need a solid understanding of the basics:\n\n> The best way to operate, in my opinion, as a reporter focusing on crypto, is to build some capacity and understanding of how to use public blockchain explorers.\n\nThat foundation allows journalists to engage more effectively with technical experts and critically assess the information they receive:\n\n> There are things in the metadata of those transactions that can really trip you up… relationships with experts are crucial, but it’s never very helpful to go to an expert and say: tell me everything about what I’m looking at here. You need to look at the thing yourself and then say: am I looking at this correctly?\n\n## Are there enough resources and expertise available?\n\nNot yet.\n\nBoth OCCRP and ICIJ described ongoing efforts to build internal expertise on cryptocurrency and blockchain analysis.\n\nOne challenge is that many media organisations rely on commercial blockchain analytics providers, which can be expensive and may have potential conflicts of interest due to their relationships with industry clients.\n\nAs a result, several speakers stressed the importance of building in-house expertise.\n\nGillies noted that investigative journalism increasingly requires multidisciplinary teams capable of combining traditional reporting skills with technical and financial expertise. At the OCCRP, they are keen to strengthen collaboration with academic researchers and data scientists, she said.\n\n## What challenges do journalists face?\n\nApart from the omnipresent challenges of resources and expertise, the risks associated with investigating crypto-related crime are often the same risks faced by journalists investigating corruption, organised crime and money laundering more broadly.\n\nThese include legal threats, cyberattacks, political pressure and, in some countries, threats to personal safety.\n\nIn response to a question from the audience, panellists emphasised the impact of declining press freedom.\n\nRestrictions on independent journalism can lead to self-censorship, force journalists into exile and reduce the amount of actionable information that reaches the public domain. Gillies said:\n> \n> There’s a lot of stress and distraction that comes from managing repression.\n\nThe panellists agreed that protecting press freedom is essential if investigative journalism is to continue playing an effective accountability role. It’s in governments’ interests to “take that issue seriously and put it at the top of the agenda”, including both legal protections and adequate resourcing.\n\n## What was the overall message?\n\nThe webinar highlighted that cracking down on crypto-related crime is a complex challenge that is evolving at a dizzying rate and that requires all hands on deck.\n\nInvestigative journalists, law enforcement agencies, civil society organisations, researchers and policymakers each bring different strengths to that effort.\n\nAnd though the technology may be evolving rapidly, the aim remains the same: follow the money, expose wrongdoing, ensure that those responsible are held accountable and strengthen policies to protect people, businesses and states.\n\nAs the discussion demonstrated, investigative journalism continues to be one of the most powerful tools available for achieving that goal.\n\n## Learn more\n\n::: links\n- [View the webinar recording on YouTube](https://youtu.be/6sDullt2gWM)\n-  [Read about the role of international and non-profit organisations in tackling crypto-related crime, drawing on another Basel Institute–OSCE webinar and insights from UNODC, the FIU]((https://baselgovernance.org/blog/virtual-assets-real-world-crime-and-search-effective-responses))\n:::","2026-06-10","virtualassets-journalism","The powerful role of investigative journalists in tackling crypto-related crime (and what would boost it)","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/e6fa4394-8830-4c8d-a5d8-28aac4d49d06?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[116,120,124],{"tags_id":117},{"id":118,"name":119},854,"Virtual assets",{"tags_id":121},{"id":122,"name":123},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":125},{"id":126,"name":127},1193,"Financial investigations",[17],[],[],[],"2026-06-10T13:48:40.000Z","2026-06-24T13:27:03.000Z",[],"/resources/news/virtualassets-journalism",{"id":137,"body":138,"status":6,"type":10,"date":139,"slug":140,"title":141,"image":142,"countries":143,"topic":13,"activity":13,"tags":144,"nid":13,"topics":151,"activities":13,"authors":152,"images":154,"websites":155,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":156,"translation_of":13,"user_created":49,"date_created":157,"user_updated":103,"date_updated":158,"content":159,"link":160},10635,"_What does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive actually change, and where does it fall short? This article by Rita Simões of the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery takes a closer look at the final text. She looks at what was adopted, what was left out during negotiations, and what the final text is likely to mean for enforcement across the EU._\n\n_For a broader reflection on what the directive reveals about changing corruption risks and the future direction of EU anti-corruption policy, see a [companion analysis by Dr Jacopo Costa](https://baselgovernance.org/resources/news/eu-directive-political-lens)._\n\nThe European Union (EU) has adopted and published its [Anti-Corruption Directive](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2026/1021/oj/eng), concluding a process that began with the Commission’s proposal in [May 2023](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-new-era-for-european-defence-and-security/file-directive-on-combating-corruption).\n\nIts adoption comes amid a broader recalibration of global anti-corruption enforcement, marked by decreased U.S. leadership through the scaling back of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement and increased expectations for the EU to assume a more central role in global anti-corruption efforts.\n\nFollowing a lengthy negotiation period, the final directive is a compromise between the widely differing levels of ambition reflected in the proposals put forth by the [European Parliament](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0048_EN.html) and [European Commission](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2023:234:FIN). It establishes a common baseline of corruption offences, corporate liability rules and jurisdiction, but leaves member states significant discretion to limit the scope of new measures.\n\nThe final version also omits key provisions relating to political financing, non-trial resolutions and victims’ rights.\n\nTherefore, the directive's central achievement is the harmonisation of anti-corruption offences and sanctions. Its central limitation is that it leaves key aspects of enforcement practice largely in the hands of member states.\n\n## Important changes in criminal law, liability and jurisdiction\n\nThe directive establishes a detailed enforcement and prevention framework. It requires member states to, among others:\n\n-   create independent anti-corruption bodies;\n-   adopt national strategies;\n-   conduct sector-specific risk assessments;\n-   provide training for officials; and\n-   use Europol’s SIENA system for information exchange.\n\nThese measures are complemented by harmonised statistical reporting obligations on investigations, prosecutions and sanctions.\n\nOn **substantive criminal law,** the directive introduces a harmonised baseline of corruption offences across member states including domestic and foreign bribery, trading in influence, misappropriation, abuse of functions and obstruction of justice.\n\nThe directive also requires member states to establish a broad **criminal liability regime for legal persons**. Under this framework, companies can be held accountable for corruption offences, including those resulting from lapses in senior management supervision. Notably, the directive reinforces this regime through obligating the use of dissuasive measures, such as fines based on global turnover and exclusion from public procurement.\n\nThe directive also strengthens **jurisdictional** rules. Member states must assert jurisdiction over offences committed on their territory or by their nationals. Furthermore, a member state can prosecute offences committed abroad without needing the state where the crime occurred to report it first. .\n\n## How these could help enhance anti-corruption enforcement\n\nThese measures aim to strengthen the EU’s enforcement capacity by expanding the legal tools available to investigate and prosecute corruption, particularly in cross-border cases.\n\nMeasures on corporate liability, for instance, will strengthen the ability of member states to address complex bribery schemes involving multinational structures.\n\nSimilarly, the enhanced jurisdictional rules will enable member states to pursue corruption cases that occurred outside their territory, even where the state in which the corruption took place is unwilling or unable to act.\n\nIn addition, the institutional and procedural framework – particularly coordination, risk assessments and dedicated enforcement bodies – should strengthen the EU’s ability to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute corruption.\n\nHowever, enforcement effectiveness will still depend heavily on national implementation capacity and political will.\n\n## Three missed opportunities: political financing, non-trial resolutions and victim participation\n\n[Previously identified](https://baselgovernance.org/blog/eus-anti-corruption-directive-enters-critical-juncture) as areas of significant potential, several key measures proposed by the European Parliament that could have further enhanced enforcement were excluded or significantly watered down in the final directive.\n\n### Political financing\n\nThe European Parliament had proposed stronger measures to tackle illicit political financing, including enhanced transparency requirements and potential criminalisation of certain violations.\n\nHowever, member states are only encouraged – not required – to address risks linked to political funding, with no binding obligation to implement transparency measures or criminalise political financing.\n\nThis leaves the EU without a harmonised framework in this area. This is a critical gap given growing concerns about how illicit funding can distort electoral processes and enable undue influence over public decision-making, both [globally](https://www.idea.int/news/when-money-buys-power-unseen-link-between-corruption-and-political-finance) and at the [European level](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653631/EXPO_STU(2021)653631_EN.pdf).\n\n### Non-trial resolutions\n\nProposed mandatory frameworks for non-trial resolutions in cases involving legal persons, reflecting established practice in jurisdictions such as the [United Kingdom](https://baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-55), were not retained as binding obligations in the final directive.\n\nAs a result, this instrument does not establish a level playing field across the EU. This is likely to lead to divergent enforcement approaches, with some jurisdictions relying on negotiated resolutions while others depending on full criminal proceedings.\n\nSuch fragmentation may weaken the effective imposition of financial sanctions on companies, as well as the recovery of proceeds and their use for compensating victims of corruption or enhance [anti-corruption efforts](https://baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-59).\n\n### Victim and public participation in corruption cases\n\nThe final version of the directive requires member states to grant procedural rights to victims and members of the public affected by corruption offences. But it largely relies on existing EU frameworks and national law, providing participation rights only where they already exist domestically.\n\nBy contrast, the European Parliament’s proposal was more ambitious: it sought to define these categories explicitly, regulate their procedural rights and grant victims a clear right to compensation.\n\nAs a result, recognition of victims in corruption cases remains uneven across member states. This approach also may limit victim and civil society participation, despite growing international support for [more participatory](https://cifar.eu/tools-networks/civil-society-principles/victims-in-asset-recovery) approaches.\n\n## Anti-corruption ambition is now up to member states\n\nThe directive adopts an anti-corruption approach that strengthens enforcement powers while maintaining deference to national legal systems.\n\nIts effectiveness will depend heavily on implementation, particularly where it sets only minimum standards or leaves room for national discretion. In practice, this is likely to produce uneven legal frameworks across the EU, shaped more by domestic political will than by EU-led harmonisation.\n\nMember states implementing the directive will face a choice:\n\n-   Should they adhere to the minimum requirements only?\n-   Or take the opportunity to pursue more ambitious anti-corruption reforms, including some of the broader measures originally proposed by the European Parliament?\n\nChoosing a more ambitious approach presents an opportunity to lead by example and influence future EU reform.","2026-06-08","eu-directive-enforcement","How will the EU Anti-Corruption Directive affect enforcement against corruption?","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/1a3d289c-bb83-4907-9a81-5f3e9dc9de8d?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[145,147],{"tags_id":146},{"id":82,"name":83},{"tags_id":148},{"id":149,"name":150},982,"Anti-corruption",[17],[153],1382,[],[99],[],"2026-06-09T17:46:14.000Z","2026-06-24T13:28:12.000Z",[],"/resources/news/eu-directive-enforcement",{"id":162,"body":163,"status":6,"type":10,"date":164,"slug":165,"title":166,"image":167,"countries":168,"topic":13,"activity":13,"tags":169,"nid":13,"topics":188,"activities":13,"authors":190,"images":192,"websites":193,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":194,"translation_of":13,"user_created":49,"date_created":195,"user_updated":103,"date_updated":196,"content":197,"link":198},10633,"_This article by [Dr Jacopo Costa](https://baselgovernance.org/about/team/dr-jacopo-costa/) is one of two Basel Institute commentaries on the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive._\n\n_While the [companion piece by Rita Simões](https://baselgovernance.org/resources/news/eu-directive-enforcement) examines the directive's legal and institutional implications, this article takes a political economy perspective. It considers what the directive reveals about changing understandings of corruption, how corruption risks are evolving in an increasingly interconnected and technology-driven environment, and where future EU anti-corruption efforts may need to focus._\n\n_The key message is that the directive represents an important advance in legal harmonisation, but that effective anti-corruption policy will also require stronger strategic thinking, greater use of data and technology, and closer attention to emerging corruption risks linked to procurement, border security and financial infrastructure._\n\nApril 2026, the European Union formally adopted [Directive 2026/1021](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2026/1021/oj/eng) on combatting corruption. Following years of negotiations, political disagreements and institutional bargaining, the EU now has a comprehensive anti-corruption framework establishing common definitions, offences, sanctions and preventive measures across its member states.\n\nThis is a landmark achievement. But it would be a mistake to view the directive as the culmination of the European anti-corruption journey.\n\nIn fact, its adoption marks the beginning of a much larger challenge: turning a legal framework into an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy that can address the evolving forms of corruption emerging in an increasingly complex geopolitical and technological landscape.\n\n## Why the directive matters\n\nFor years, the EU lacked a coherent anti-corruption framework. Although member states had their own legislation, there were significant differences in how corruption offences were defined, investigated and punished.\n\nThese discrepancies created loopholes that could be exploited by corrupt individuals and hindered cross-border cooperation between national authorities.\n\nThe new directive aims to address these issues by introducing common minimum standards across the EU. In particular, it:\n\n-   harmonises the definitions of bribery in the public and private sectors, trading in influence, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment and the concealment of criminal proceeds;\n-   introduces common standards for criminal sanctions, corporate liability, statutes of limitation, whistleblower protection, anti-corruption strategies and specialised anti-corruption bodies; and\n-   broadens the definition of public officials to encompass not only national officeholders, but also senior EU officials and individuals performing public duties on behalf of public institutions. This reflects the reality of contemporary governance, where public services are increasingly delivered through hybrid public–private arrangements.\n\nIt is the most ambitious attempt yet to establish a shared European anti-corruption framework.\n\n## A more modern understanding of corruption\n\nOne of the directive's most significant strengths is its recognition that corruption is not confined to the traditional notion of an envelope stuffed with cash being exchanged.\n\nWe welcome this change in perspective greatly, because our research demonstrates clearly that contemporary [corruption is increasingly networked, sophisticated and relational](https://baselgovernance.org/blog/corruption-complex-adaptive-network). It often relies on intermediaries, influence brokers, hidden financial channels, luxury gifts, preferential treatment, future career opportunities and informal exchanges of favours.\n\nIncluding offences such as trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealing criminal proceeds and aiding or abetting corruption schemes shows an understanding of how corruption operates in modern societies.\n\nThis evolution is important because anti-corruption frameworks often struggle to keep up with the evolving nature of corruption. The directive is a valuable attempt to address this issue and close the resulting gap.\n\n## The price of political compromise\n\nLegislation is never produced in isolation from politics. Significant disagreements emerged among EU institutions and member states during the adoption process. Several governments expressed concerns about subsidiarity and the potential consequences of criminalising particular behaviours.\n\nSo, the final directive is less ambitious than the original proposal.\n\nOne example concerns the offence previously known as “abuse of office”. Following intense political resistance, particularly from countries such as Germany and Italy, the final text replaced it with the more cautious formulation of “unlawful exercise of public functions”. The compromise facilitated agreement, but introduced ambiguity that could hinder enforcement.\n\nSimilarly, criminal sanctions and limitation periods were reduced during negotiations. Maximum prison sentences were reduced, and statutes of limitation were scaled back considerably compared to earlier drafts.\n\nThese compromises highlight a recurring dilemma in policymaking not only in Europe but everywhere: achieving consensus often necessitates compromising on ambition. The result is a directive that establishes a common baseline, yet leaves considerable room for interpretation among member states.\n\n## The missing security lens\n\nPerhaps the most significant limitation of the directive is its relatively little guidance on what anti-corruption efforts should look like in today's rapidly changing security environment.\n\nBecause corruption is increasingly also a geopolitical and security issue. Foreign influence operations, sanctions evasion schemes, strategic corruption, illicit financial networks, organised crime infiltration and the manipulation of critical supply chains all represent corruption-related risks affecting European security and resilience.\n\nYet these challenges remain largely outside the directive's core focus. There is a risk that anti-corruption efforts will continue to focus on traditional forms of misconduct while underestimating emerging threats linked to geopolitical competition and hybrid forms of influence.\n\n## The technology gap\n\nConsidering the hype around artificial intelligence in society generally, the most striking omission in the directive is the limited attention devoted to technological innovation. Over the past decade, governments, international organisations and researchers have been exploring how artificial intelligence, big data analytics, risk indicators, predictive modelling and open-source intelligence can bolster anti-corruption initiatives.\n\nTechnology is now essential for identifying suspicious procurement patterns, pinpointing conflicts of interest, tracing illicit financial flows and exposing corruption networks. Yet the directive contains almost no strategic vision regarding the role of technology in anti-corruption governance, which is surprising.\n\nResearch conducted under the EU-funded [FALCON project](https://www.falcon-horizon.eu/) – of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member – demonstrates that effective anti-corruption systems are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures capable of collecting, integrating, analysing and cross-referencing large volumes of information. Without these capabilities, many corruption risks remain invisible until significant damage has already occurred.\n\nIt’s important to stress that adopting new technologies – purchasing software, etc. – is the easy part. EU states also need to create the institutional and data infrastructures that allow these technologies to function effectively. Digitisation, interoperability, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and cross-border information sharing are all prerequisites for the next generation of anti-corruption systems.\n\n## Three areas that deserve greater attention\n\nFrom our research in the following areas, we can say for sure that they deserve particular attention in the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy and future initiatives:\n\n**1\\. Public procurement**\n\nPublic procurement remains one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. This issue is exacerbated by [Europe's increased investment in defence](https://baselgovernance.org/resources/news/operational-credibility-is-a-strategic-asset-in-the-defence-industry-what-does-that-mean-for-ukraine-and-its-partners-2965/), critical infrastructure, energy security, technological innovation and strategic industrial policies.\n\n[Central priorities](https://baselgovernance.org/resources/publications/high-level-corruption-analysis-schemes-costs-and-policy-recommendations) should include strengthening transparency, reducing direct awards, improving oversight of sub-threshold contracts, and introducing AI-based risk assessment tools.\n\n**2\\. Border governance**\n\nManaging borders and customs procedures is another critical challenge, as research at the [Port of Rotterdam](https://baselgovernance.org/resources/news/how-corruption-helps-drug-traffickers-adapt-to-strengthened-border-enforcement-2848/) and the [Kapitan Andreevo crossing](https://baselgovernance.org/resources/news/how-stronger-borders-can-create-smarter-corruption-lessons-from-one-of-europes-most-strategic-border-crossings-2972/) demonstrates. Corruption at the border facilitates a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, evasion of sanctions, tax fraud and the movement of illicit goods.\n\nGreater automation, data integration and harmonisation of [border management systems](https://baselgovernance.org/resources/publications/recommendations-combatting-border-corruption-falcon-policy-brief) across member states could significantly reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the EU's capacity to detect emerging threats.\n\n**3\\. Financial infrastructures**\n\nModern corruption relies heavily on [financial infrastructure](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10610-024-09591-z). Complex financial networks, shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and, increasingly, cryptoassets can facilitate the movement and concealment of illicit funds.\n\nThe future of anti-corruption policy hinges on strengthening the links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks, and on developing new approaches that can address digital financial ecosystems.\n\n## Will the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy help put the directive into action?\n\nThe adoption of Directive 2026/1021 sends an important message that corruption remains a priority issue for the European Union. The directive establishes a much-needed common foundation and introduces valuable innovations to improve both prevention and enforcement. It provides a stronger legal framework than the fragmented system that existed previously.\n\nBut legal harmonisation alone will not be enough. The directive's effectiveness will ultimately depend on how member states implement its provisions, and on whether the European Union can develop a broader strategic vision capable of addressing emerging corruption risks.\n\nThis is where the forthcoming EU Anti-Corruption Strategy could play a decisive role. To be effective and not just a paper exercise, it must be adaptive, technology-driven and security-conscious. This strategy must respond to current corruption and anticipate its potential evolution.\n\nAnd it needs to be based on a participative process that considers the valuable research and perspectives of civil society organisations, academics and others outside of government.\n\nIf the directive provides the legal architecture, the strategy can provide the direction. Together, they could form the basis of a more adaptive and forward-looking European anti-corruption framework – one that is able to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.","2026-06-07","eu-directive-political-lens","Corruption in the age of networks, data and influence – does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive rise to the challenge?","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/daa620e4-883a-414b-9422-156b0bf16c2b?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[170,174,178,180,184],{"tags_id":171},{"id":172,"name":173},879,"Money laundering",{"tags_id":175},{"id":176,"name":177},967,"Organised crime",{"tags_id":179},{"id":149,"name":150},{"tags_id":181},{"id":182,"name":183},1215,"Illicit financial flows",{"tags_id":185},{"id":186,"name":187},1373,"Corruption prevention",[19,189],"Prevention Research and Innovation",[191],1381,[],[99],[],"2026-06-06T14:25:32.000Z","2026-06-24T13:28:45.000Z",[],"/resources/news/eu-directive-political-lens",{"id":200,"body":201,"status":6,"type":10,"date":202,"slug":203,"title":204,"image":205,"countries":206,"topic":212,"activity":214,"tags":217,"nid":228,"topics":229,"activities":230,"authors":231,"images":232,"websites":233,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":234,"translation_of":13,"user_created":235,"date_created":236,"user_updated":103,"date_updated":237,"content":238,"link":239},10611,"_When states fail to hold corrupt actors to account, ordinary citizens pay the price. Corruption sanctions were born from the idea that no one should be above the law, no matter where they are in the world. In a new Working Paper, Dr Anton Moiseienko explores how these tools have evolved and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use._\n\n_Here we share the foreword to his paper by the Basel Institute's Andrew Dornbierer, Head of Policy and Research, International Centre for Asset Recovery._\n\n## Foreword\n\nEvery state has an obligation to investigate and prosecute corruption within their jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many states around the world are not willing to fulfil this responsibility.\n\nAs a result, the very individuals within these states tasked with serving the public interest are instead given free rein to commit acts that not only serve themselves but also corrode the fabric of the state. And ordinary citizens have no alternative but to endure the ensuing economic and social damage.\n\nThe development of sanctions tools targeting corruption stemmed from the idea that justice should be universal; that no one in any society around the world should be above the law.\n\nThey are powerful tools, built on powerful principles. States introducing them understand that unchecked corruption will always suffocate a state’s ability to provide security, fairness and prosperity to its citizens.\n\nComparatively though, corruption sanctions are still an underdeveloped concept and are far from perfect. Only a handful of states have introduced them, and those that have are not often using them to their full potential.\n\nThey also spark valid concerns surrounding due process. These criticisms shouldn’t be ignored: they offer an insight on how these tools could be further developed and enhanced to ensure that they are more credibly and consistently applied.\n\nIn his paper, Anton Moiseienko provides an excellent and well-researched overview of how corruption sanctions could be designed and employed to better achieve their potential. He explains how these tools have evolved over the last two decades and how they could be further refined to be more effective and achieve a wider range of impact.\n\nCritically, his paper is an indispensable resource for those looking to understand exactly how such sanctions can help states deter, disrupt and debilitate the notoriously corrupt that are unreachable through standard criminal justice tools.\n\n## Learn more\n\n*   Read Dr Anton Moiseienko’s Working Paper “[Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know](https://baselgovernance.org/publications/wp-62)” for a deeper analysis of the topic and key policy recommendations.\n*   Get a brief introduction to corruption sanctions from our related [Quick Guide](https://baselgovernance.org/publications/qg43).\n*   Register for our public webinar \"[Corruption sanctions – reaching those beyond the law](https://baselgovernance.org/node/2968)\" on 18 June 2026, marking the launch of Dr Moiseienko's Working Paper.","2026-06-03","holding-the-corrupt-to-account-the-promise-and-potential-of-corruption-sanctions-2979","Holding the corrupt to account: the promise and potential of corruption sanctions","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/9f5fad98-9243-40da-98d0-1271edd00df2?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[207,208,209,210,211],7808,7809,7818,7819,7820,[213],"Asset Recovery",[215,216],"Reports","Insights",[218,222,224],{"tags_id":219},{"id":220,"name":221},1227,"Sanctions",{"tags_id":223},{"id":149,"name":150},{"tags_id":225},{"id":226,"name":227},1374,"Law enforcement",2979,[17],[215,216],[86],[],[99],[],"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","2026-06-04T21:13:40.000Z","2026-06-24T13:30:38.000Z",[],"/resources/news/holding-the-corrupt-to-account-the-promise-and-potential-of-corruption-sanctions-2979",{"id":241,"body":242,"status":6,"type":243,"date":244,"slug":245,"title":246,"image":247,"countries":248,"topic":249,"activity":250,"tags":252,"nid":259,"topics":260,"activities":261,"authors":262,"images":263,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":264,"translation_of":13,"user_created":235,"date_created":265,"user_updated":103,"date_updated":266,"content":267,"link":268},10612,"Reducing the economic power of organised crime is essential to improving security, strengthening justice systems and supporting sustainable development across Latin America and the Caribbean. And doing that requires strong and dependable partnerships.\n\nBuilding on more than a decade of support to authorities across the region, the Basel Institute on Governance has formally joined the [Alliance for Security, Justice and Development](https://www.iadb.org/en/who-we-are/topics/modernization-state/citizen-security-and-justice/alliance-security-justice-and-development), a regional initiative led by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).\n\nThe Alliance seeks to strengthen coordinated responses to organised crime in Latin America and the Caribbean through dialogue, cooperation, knowledge exchange and resource mobilisation.\n\n## Supporting the fight against illicit financial flows\n\nFor the Basel Institute and its International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR), participation in the Alliance represents a further opportunity to contribute its expertise in financial investigations, asset recovery, international cooperation and public financial management while working alongside governments, international organisations and other partners committed to strengthening security, justice and development across the region.\n\nExecutive Director Elizabeth Andersen signed the declaration formalising the Basel Institute’s participation in the Alliance in Washington, D.C. The signing followed close engagement between senior IDB and Alliance representatives and Oscar Solórzano, Head of ICAR Latin America.\n\n## Strengthening regional cooperation\n\nThe Alliance for Security, Justice and Development is a regional platform for dialogue, cooperation, knowledge exchange and resource mobilisation aimed at preventing and responding to organised crime in Latin America and the Caribbean.\n\nCoordinated by the IDB through its Citizen Security Division, the Alliance currently brings together 23 member states and multiple strategic partners from the international, development and security sectors.\n\nIts work is structured around three strategic pillars:\n\n*   protecting vulnerable communities from organised crime and violence;\n*   strengthening institutional resilience within security and justice systems; and\n*   reducing illicit financial flows and illicit markets to weaken the operational capacity and influence of criminal organisations.\n\n## Bringing expertise in asset recovery and financial investigations\n\nThe Basel Institute will contribute particularly to the third pillar, leaning on the expertise and two decades of experience of its specialised International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR).\n\nElizabeth Andersen stated that the Basel Institute is honoured to participate in such a high-level initiative focused on issues of critical importance for Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as for the broader international community.\n\nOscar Solórzano highlighted that the Alliance represents an important opportunity to support countries in strengthening asset recovery systems, international cooperation and institutional capacities against increasingly sophisticated forms of organised crime and illicit economies.\n\n## Building on a decade of support in Latin America\n\nOur participation builds on more than a decade of operational and technical support to authorities across Latin America in areas including financial investigations, asset recovery, international cooperation and – through a dedicated programme – public financial management.\n\nActivities under the Alliance framework are expected to begin in the region in the coming months, with our teams supporting key initiatives and technical workstreams developed through the Alliance in the years ahead.\n\nOur participation reflects our longstanding commitment to helping countries tackle corruption, illicit financial flows and organised crime, and our belief that sustainable impact is achieved through strong partnerships that bring together public authorities, international organisations and practitioners around shared goals.","News","2026-06-02","basel-institute-joins-regional-effort-to-strengthen-security-justice-and-development-in-latin-america-2977","Basel Institute joins regional effort to strengthen security, justice and development in Latin America","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/da8fdbf2-aea0-4009-8f38-8a04c5d8e964?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[213],[251],"Partnerships",[253,255,257],{"tags_id":254},{"id":176,"name":177},{"tags_id":256},{"id":82,"name":83},{"tags_id":258},{"id":182,"name":183},2977,[17],[251],[],[],[],"2026-06-04T21:13:42.000Z","2026-06-24T13:30:53.000Z",[],"/resources/news/basel-institute-joins-regional-effort-to-strengthen-security-justice-and-development-in-latin-america-2977",{"id":270,"body":271,"status":6,"type":10,"date":272,"slug":273,"title":274,"image":275,"countries":276,"topic":277,"activity":278,"tags":280,"nid":287,"topics":288,"activities":289,"authors":290,"images":291,"websites":292,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":293,"translation_of":13,"user_created":235,"date_created":294,"user_updated":103,"date_updated":295,"content":296,"link":297},10617,"As the use of virtual assets accelerates worldwide, so too does their appeal to criminal actors looking to move money faster, hide transactions more effectively and stay one step ahead of enforcement authorities.\n\nAnd it’s natural that when people discuss crypto-related crime, the focus is often on governments, regulators, law enforcement agencies and the private sector – crypto exchanges, financial institutions and blockchain intelligence firms.\n\nWhat about international organisations, non-profits, expert networks and professional associations – what role do they play behind the scenes? And how much impact can they really have when it comes to tackling illicit activity involving virtual assets?\n\nThese questions were at the centre of a [webinar](https://baselgovernance.org/IOs_virtualassets) co-hosted by the Basel Institute on Governance and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The discussion brought together experts from the OSCE, the Basel Institute, the Financial Intelligence Unit of Moldova, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime.\n\nAcross the discussion, speakers kept circling around the same point: the crypto-crime field does not need more vague talk about cooperation or more one-off awareness workshops. It needs practical, sustained and operational forms of support that help investigators, prosecutors and financial intelligence units respond to increasingly sophisticated criminal activity.\n\n## Beyond awareness raising\n\nA recurring theme throughout the discussion was the gap between recognising the problem and building the capability to address it.\n\nSpeakers noted that crypto-related crime evolves faster than most institutions can adapt. Bots on the Telegram messaging app are now providing money-laundering-as-a-service, as one speaker noted by way of example. Criminal actors – and bots – exploit regulatory gaps, fragmented information-sharing systems and uneven levels of expertise across jurisdictions.\n\nAt the same time, many authorities are still in the early stages of developing operational capacity.\n\nThis is where international organisations and networks can play an important role. Not simply by producing guidance documents or organising workshops and conferences – which are necessary but not sufficient – but by helping countries build practical and lasting capabilities.\n\nThe OSCE shared examples from its regional [project on mitigating the money laundering risks of virtual assets](https://baselgovernance.org/IOs_virtualassets), which supports participating states across Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Mongolia.\n\nOne example was Moldova’s sectoral national risk assessment on virtual assets. Beyond identifying vulnerabilities, the process helped prompt institutional action and legislative development.\n\nThe OSCE also pointed to measurable operational outcomes linked to its capacity-building support. Institutions supported through the programme, for example, traced more than USD 100 million in illicit crypto assets in 2025 alone.\n\n## Why PowerPoint presentations are not enough\n\nSeveral speakers emphasised that complex investigations involving virtual assets and asset recovery require highly specialised expertise that cannot be built through isolated workshops.\n\nInvestigators need opportunities to apply knowledge in real cases. Financial intelligence units need ongoing mentoring and technical support. Prosecutors need to understand not only the technology itself but also how to present complex digital evidence in court.\n\nThe Basel Institute highlighted the importance of long-term engagement with practitioners. The approach of its [International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR)](https://baselgovernance.org/asset-recovery) includes combining case-centered training with hands-on mentoring, operational support on live cases and efforts to foster collaboration between different government agencies and with the private sector.\n\nTogether with highly effective train-the-trainer programmes, the focus is on helping agencies develop capabilities that can evolve alongside changing technologies and criminal methods, rather than delivering isolated workshops.\n\n## Networks that make cooperation operational\n\nThe webinar also challenged the tendency to talk about “international cooperation” in abstract terms. In practice, it’s difficult to develop trusting relationships between individuals and institutions operating in very different legal and cultural contexts, especially where there are language barriers.\n\nIn this environment, organisations such as the OSCE, Basel Institute, UNODC and the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime can act as connectors between sectors, jurisdictions and professional communities. They can:\n\n*   help investigators and practitioners exchange expertise and emerging typologies;\n*   create trusted channels for faster information sharing;\n*   connect authorities facing similar challenges across jurisdictions;\n*   support the development of common standards and approaches; and\n*   bridge gaps between public authorities, financial institutions and technical experts\n\nOne example is the Global Coalition’s proposal to develop a framework for sharing illict crypto wallet attribution data between public authorities – a major need, especially for jurisdictions without the resources to purchase multiple blockchain intelligence tools.\n\n## Research and analysis as a basis for action\n\nAnother important thread running through the webinar was the role of research and evidence-based analysis.\n\nAs technologies and criminal typologies evolve rapidly, policymakers and practitioners need reliable analysis rather than hype or speculation. Speakers discussed how international organisations support countries by analysing emerging threats, identifying trends and helping governments design informed legal and operational responses.\n\nSpeakers highlighted several concrete projects, such as UNODC research into [scam compounds](https://track.unodc.org/track/en/track/resourcehub/2025/inflection_point_global_implications_of_scam_centres_underground_banking_and_illicit_online_marketplaces_in_southeast_asia.html) and cyber-enabled fraud in Southeast Asia and into the links between [cybercrime and corruption](https://track.unodc.org/track/en/track/resourcehub/2025/the_nexus_between_cybercrime_and_corruption.html), and the Global Coalition’s research on links between gaming and crypto-related financial crime.\n\n## A rapidly evolving challenge\n\nThe webinar closed with a discussion on what aspects of collaboration participants would most like to strengthen in the virtual assets space.\n\nWhile perspectives differed, there was broad agreement that current models of cooperation and capacity building are still not moving fast enough to match the pace of technological change and criminal innovation.\n\nIt’s been said many times, but it warrants saying again: As virtual assets continue to evolve at breakneck speed, so too must the international response.\n\nThe discussion demonstrated that international organisations, non-profits and professional networks can have significant impact – particularly when they focus less on rhetoric and more on operational support, sustained partnerships and measurable outcomes.\n\n## Speakers\n\nWith thanks to our moderator, Vera Strobachova-Budway, Head of the Economic Governance Unit, OSCE, and to our excellent speakers:\n\n*   Erlin Agich, Associate Anti-Corruption Officer, OSCE\n*   Valentin Draganel, Deputy Head, Financial Intelligence Unit Moldova\n*   Alexandru Donciu, Specialist, Financial Investigations – Virtual Assets, Basel Institute on Governance\n*   Fabrizio Fioroni, AML/CFT Advisor, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)\n*   Michal Gromek, Chair, Digital Assets Task Force, Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime\n\n## Learn more\n\n*   View the recordings: browse the [full playlist](https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLYRnhpCcnLP8mqlkcvhkC5kNXuX1M7ax4&si=HeEsEW6u_V9OnsCb) or go straight to individual interventions: [Vera Strobachova-Budway](https://youtu.be/PyjFVx3Da1I), [Erlin Agich](https://youtu.be/yxyKjh2qbc0), [Valentin Draganel](https://youtu.be/fn-P6Q1Q04Y), [Alexandru Donciu](https://youtu.be/i6AoR2bBGGk), [Fabrizio Fioroni](https://youtu.be/JCET83V2nFk) and [Michal Gromek](https://youtu.be/b18ACqpIM64), plus the final [lightning round](https://youtu.be/u61VF8rxR5k).\n*   Sign up to the second joint Basel Institute-OSCE webinar on the role of [investigative journalists in tackling crime linked to virtual assets](https://baselgovernance.org/journalism_virtualassets), on 2 June 2026.\n*   Read the OSCE’s [Decoding Crypto Crime – A Guide for Law Enforcement](https://oceea.osce.org/oceea/587475) in multiple languages.\n*   Learn more about the [OSCE Virtual Assets project](https://projects.osce.org/virtualassets).\n*   Learn about the Global Coalition’s [Digital Asset Task Force](https://www.gcffc.org/sectors/digital-asset-task-force-(datf)) and how you can get involved.\n\nThe Basel Institute’s training opportunities are now open to individuals – learn more about short online courses on [crypto and blockchain compliance](https://baselgovernance.org/crypto-aml-training) and [financial investigations and asset recovery](https://baselgovernance.org/assetrecovery-openenrolment); plus [postgraduate courses on anti-corruption and asset recovery](https://baselgovernance.org/study).","2026-05-19","virtual-assets-real-world-crime-and-the-search-for-effective-responses-2967","Virtual assets, real-world crime and the search for effective responses","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/b16bddc0-613b-402f-baca-77cc9a835cd9?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[16,213],[279],"Events",[281,285],{"tags_id":282},{"id":283,"name":284},818,"Anti-money laundering",{"tags_id":286},{"id":118,"name":119},2967,[17],[279],[],[],[99],[],"2026-06-04T21:13:46.000Z","2026-06-24T13:32:32.000Z",[],"/resources/news/virtual-assets-real-world-crime-and-the-search-for-effective-responses-2967",{"id":299,"body":300,"status":6,"type":243,"date":301,"slug":302,"title":303,"image":304,"countries":305,"topic":306,"activity":307,"tags":308,"nid":315,"topics":316,"activities":317,"authors":318,"images":319,"websites":320,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":321,"translation_of":13,"user_created":235,"date_created":322,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":323,"content":324,"link":325},10620,"The Basel Institute on Governance is expanding its training offer to help more professionals build practical skills in financial investigations and asset recovery.\n\nBuilding on decades of global experience, we are launching new courses for both public-sector practitioners and non-state actors. Our hands-on, case-based training is now accessible to a wider audience than ever before.\n\n## Reaching new audiences\n\nFor the first time, our flagship financial investigations and asset recovery training is available as an open enrolment online course for individual public-sector practitioners.\n\nWe are also expanding our offer for civil society organisations, investigative journalists and other professionals outside government. These groups play a growing role in exposing financial misconduct and supporting accountability.\n\nThe new courses build on the success of our popular [Introduction to blockchain: Crypto investigation and AML compliance](https://baselgovernance.org/crypto-aml-training) course. This course equips participants to tackle the misuse of cryptoassets for financial crime.\n\n## New course for public-sector practitioners\n\nThe [financial investigations and asset recovery online course](https://baselgovernance.org/assetrecovery-openenrolment) is a five-day, instructor-led training for investigators, prosecutors, judges and financial intelligence practitioners.\n\nParticipants work through a realistic case. They apply practical techniques to follow financial leads across jurisdictions, analyse financial flows, gather evidence using open-source intelligence and develop effective investigative strategies.\n\nThe first open-enrolment course will take place from 20–24 July 2026.\n\n## New courses for civil society and journalists\n\nWe are also launching Asset recovery for civil society and journalists, tailored to non-state actors working to uncover corruption and track public funds. This includes private-sector professionals working in compliance or investigations.\n\nTwo formats are available:\n\n*   An [online course for individual participants](https://baselgovernance.org/fiar_csos), with the first open-enrolment session planned from 2–5 November 2026.\n*   A [tailored training programme for organisations and groups](https://baselgovernance.org/course-asset-recovery-training-civil-society-and-journalists), delivered on site or virtually.\n\nBoth formats are built around a realistic corruption case. Participants gain hands-on experience in tracing assets, analysing financial information and understanding how asset recovery works in practice.\n\n## Part of a wider learning offer\n\nThese courses complement our broader learning ecosystem.\n\nThis includes [Basel LEARN](https://baselgovernance.org/basel-learn), our free eLearning platform, and [Basel STUDY](https://baselgovernance.org/study), our academic programmes. Together, they provide flexible pathways for professionals to build and deepen their expertise.\n\n## A proven track record\n\nThe training courses are led by practitioners from the Basel Institute's International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR). Over the past 18 years, ICAR has trained more than 5,800 practitioners from financial intelligence units, law enforcement, prosecuting and judicial authorities in over 138 countries.\n\nAn independent study by Fondazione Safe found that our case-based, \"learning by doing\" approach drives meaningful institutional change and strengthens the effectiveness of efforts to tackle corruption and related crimes. Thierry Ravalomanda, Head of Training at ICAR, explained:\n\n> “We know from experience that practical, skills-based training makes a real difference in the fight against financial crime. By opening up our flagship courses to individual practitioners and expanding our offer for civil society and journalists, we are helping more people develop the tools they need to trace assets, follow the money and support accountability.”\n\nWith these new courses, we aim to make our expertise accessible to a broader community working to prevent, detect and address financial crime.","2026-05-07","new-training-courses-expand-access-to-financial-investigation-and-asset-recovery-skills-2961","New training courses expand access to financial investigation and asset recovery skills","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/d35bd5ef-7211-4d1f-8ff5-4b27afe8aa5c?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[213],[87],[309,311,313],{"tags_id":310},{"id":82,"name":83},{"tags_id":312},{"id":90,"name":91},{"tags_id":314},{"id":86,"name":87},2961,[213,93,17],[87],[],[],[99],[],"2026-06-04T21:13:49.000Z","2026-06-24T13:39:44.000Z",[],"/resources/news/new-training-courses-expand-access-to-financial-investigation-and-asset-recovery-skills-2961",{"id":327,"body":328,"status":6,"type":243,"date":329,"slug":330,"title":331,"image":332,"countries":333,"topic":335,"activity":336,"tags":338,"nid":341,"topics":342,"activities":343,"authors":344,"images":345,"websites":346,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":347,"translation_of":13,"user_created":235,"date_created":348,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":349,"content":350,"link":351},10605,"> These administrative steps are where asset recovery really happens… when dirty assets are transformed into resources that support law enforcement and serve the public good.\n\nWith these words, [Oscar Solórzano](https://baselgovernance.org/about/people/oscar-solorzano), Head of Latin America at the Basel Institute on Governance, captured the often unseen but transformative impact of asset recovery. \n\nHis remark follows a high-level meeting in Peru marking the final phase of a pioneering international agreement.\n\nOn 26 March 2026, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of Peru hosted the Meeting of the States Parties to the [Tripartite Agreement between Peru, Switzerland and Luxembourg](https://baselgovernance.org/news/it-takes-three-tango-switzerland-luxembourg-and-peru-sign-agreement-return-usd-26-million) on the transfer of confiscated assets. \n\nOpened by Minister Luis Enrique Jiménez Borra, the meeting brought together key Peruvian institutions alongside representatives of the Swiss authorities to review progress, assess institutional impact and discuss the next steps towards closure.\n\n## From frozen assets to public benefit\n\nThrough this cooperation, assets derived from corruption cases and previously frozen abroad have been returned to Peru and reinvested in strengthening the justice system. \n\nProjects funded under the agreement have enhanced the capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption and organised crime, improved coordination between institutions and strengthened mechanisms for asset recovery and asset management.\n\nThe National Program for Seized Assets ([PRONABI](https://www.gob.pe/pronabi)) has overseen the transparent and accountable administration of these funds, ensuring they directly support institutions at the forefront of combating corruption.\n\nHighlighting the broader significance of the initiative, Minister Jiménez Borra stated:\n\n> International cooperation can turn assets derived from corruption into concrete tools for strengthening justice and public integrity. The Tripartite Agreement shows how recovered assets can be reinvested to benefit citizens and strengthen the rule of law.\n\n## Strong international partnership and Swiss engagement\n\nPeru’s tripartite collaboration with Switzerland and Luxembourg has provided a strong framework for cooperation. It demonstrates how countries can work together to return illicit assets in a transparent and impactful way. \n\nThe Basel Institute on Governance, through its [International Centre for Asset Recovery](https://baselgovernance.org/asset-recovery) (ICAR), has played a central role in supporting implementation by providing technical advice and accompanying institutions throughout the process. \n\nPaul Garnier, Ambassador of Switzerland to Peru, noted: \n\n> This meeting provides an important opportunity to review the current status of the project and the progress achieved so far. Switzerland also values the continued technical support provided by the Basel Institute on Governance throughout the implementation of this initiative. \n\nDuring the technical session, Oscar Solórzano and [Límberg Chero](https://baselgovernance.org/about/people/limberg-chero), a senior member of the Basel Institute’s [Public Finance Management programme in Peru](https://baselgovernance.org/public-finance-peru), shared reflections on the implementation, impact and sustainability of the projects.\n\nCelso Alfredo Saavedra Sobrados, Executive Coordinator of PRONABI, emphasise that:\n\n> PRONABI has worked to ensure that the restituted funds are administered with transparency, efficiency and accountability, so that they directly contribute to strengthening the institutions responsible for combating corruption.\n\nHe also highlighted the close and timely technical support provided by the Basel Institute on Governance during the implementation of the project.\n\n## Setting a regional example for asset recovery\n\nThe experience demonstrates how sustained international cooperation, combined with targeted technical support, can ensure that recovered assets deliver tangible benefits for citizens and reinforce the rule of law.\n\nIt also offers a compelling example for other jurisdictions, showing that asset return can be both practical and impactful when underpinned by trust, transparency and shared objectives. \n\nThe hope is that this model will inspire further mutually beneficial efforts to return stolen assets and put them to work for the public good.","2026-04-02","where-asset-recovery-really-happens-peru-advances-landmark-restitution-initiative-2949","Where asset recovery really happens: Peru advances landmark restitution initiative","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/acf1f9c4-3c0f-46da-a4c6-cb846ceacb26?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[334],7806,[213],[337],"International cooperation",[339],{"tags_id":340},{"id":82,"name":83},2949,[17],[337],[],[],[99],[],"2026-04-15T22:45:17.000Z","2026-06-24T13:39:45.000Z",[],"/resources/news/where-asset-recovery-really-happens-peru-advances-landmark-restitution-initiative-2949",{"id":353,"body":354,"status":6,"type":10,"date":355,"slug":356,"title":357,"image":358,"countries":359,"topic":360,"activity":361,"tags":362,"nid":363,"topics":364,"activities":365,"authors":366,"images":368,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":29,"translations":369,"translation_of":13,"user_created":235,"date_created":370,"user_updated":50,"date_updated":371,"content":372,"link":373},10608,"_Criminal assets can cross borders in hours, while international asset recovery often struggles to keep pace. The INTERPOL Silver Notice is designed to close this gap by enabling earlier identification and tracing of criminal assets across jurisdictions. Can this new instrument fundamentally change how law enforcement responds to the rapid flight of illicit wealth?_\n\nCriminal funds can be moved across jurisdictions, layered through shell companies or converted into digital assets in a matter of hours. By contrast, international legal cooperation frequently moves at a far slower pace. The mismatch between the speed of asset flight and the pace of enforcement is one of the central reasons why several international bodies estimate that a very high proportion of [criminal assets](https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2025/INTERPOL-publishes-first-Silver-Notice-targeting-criminal-assets#:~:text=Valdecy%20Urquiza%2C%20INTERPOL%20Secretary%20General,of%20criminal%20assets%20remain%20unrecovered.) ultimately remain unrecovered.\n\nINTERPOL’s Silver Notices seek to narrow this gap. They provide law enforcement with an early, structured mechanism to identify and trace assets across borders, strengthening one of the weakest stages of asset recovery: the initial [identification of criminal assets](https://baselgovernance.org/blog/interpols-silver-notice-paving-way-improved-asset-recovery). For practitioners dealing with fraud, corruption, money laundering and organised crime, Silver Notices reflect a shift toward treating asset recovery as an enforcement priority rather than merely a consequence of criminal conviction.\n\n## The state of play\n\nINTERPOL launched the Silver Notice as a pilot initiative in January 2025, involving 52 jurisdictions across all regions. [As of November 2025, 133 Silver Notices and 35 Diffusions had been published](https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2025/Together-Against-Crime-INTERPOL-General-Assembly-approves-blueprint-for-future) at the request of 39 countries, linked to suspected financial harm exceeding EUR 30 billion, according to INTERPOL.\n\nSwitzerland does not currently participate in the pilot and therefore does not issue Silver Notices. However, Swiss authorities may still receive Silver Notices and share information through existing police cooperation channels.\n\nIn November 2025, during the 93rd INTERPOL General Assembly in Marrakech, delegates approved the extension of the Silver Notice pilot, allowing additional jurisdictions to participate. For practitioners, this expansion matters: broader participation directly increases the likelihood that assets can be identified and preserved before they are moved beyond the reach of enforcement authorities.\n\n## What is the Silver Notice?\n\nINTERPOL Notices enable countries to share critical criminal intelligence and request operational assistance across borders. A Silver Notice is a non-coercive intelligence tool designed to support the identification and tracing of assets linked to serious criminal offences. It does not, by itself, authorise the freezing, seizure or confiscation of assets. Any such measures must be taken in accordance with national law and applicable judicial procedures.\n\nIn practice, Silver Notices may be used to:\n\n*   flag bank accounts, real estate, corporate holdings and digital assets;\n*   identify beneficial owners or persons exercising control over assets;\n*   enable secure and structured intelligence sharing between participating jurisdictions.\n\n## From identification to legal action\n\nOne of the most persistent challenges in cross-border asset recovery lies in the slow and often complex operation of Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) mechanisms used to gather evidence or freeze assets. Evidentiary thresholds and procedural requirements vary widely across jurisdictions, and delays in cooperation can allow assets to be dissipated.\n\nWhen a Silver Notice leads to the identification of assets, the jurisdiction in which they are located informs the requesting country and INTERPOL, outlines domestic legal options, and acts within its legal framework. Early bilateral engagement allows investigators and prosecutors to align MLA requests with domestic standards, shortening the transition from intelligence to evidence and from tracing to freezing, helping preserve asset value and improving the prospects of confiscation and victim restitution or compensation.\n\n## Safeguards and limits\n\nBefore any Notice is circulated, it must pass a strict legal compliance review to ensure that it complies with INTERPOL’s Constitution, including the prohibition on matters of a political, military, racial or religious character. These safeguards are essential to maintaining trust between member countries and protecting the system from misuse, particularly in sensitive or high-profile cases.\n\nThe Silver Notice is also deliberately designed to avoid coercive overreach. Key safeguards include:\n\n*   restriction to serious criminal offences;\n*   a requirement for a clear factual link between the assets and suspected criminal conduct;\n*   use within the framework of national legal systems, including judicial or prosecutorial oversight where required.\n\nAt the same time, Silver Notices are not without limitations. For example, in politically sensitive cases, careful scrutiny is required to ensure that asset-tracing requests are not used to advance improper objectives. This makes the robustness and independence of INTERPOL’s compliance review mechanisms particularly important.\n\nUltimately, Silver Notices are not a solution to all asset recovery challenges. Their effectiveness depends on domestic legal framework and the willingness and ability of authorities to act on shared intelligence. They enhance international cooperation, but they do not replace the need for strong national asset recovery regimes or effective MLA processes.\n\n## Closing the enforcement gap\n\nThe speed at which criminal assets move across borders continues to outpace traditional enforcement tools. Silver Notices respond to this challenge by enabling earlier asset tracing and more timely operational engagement between jurisdictions.\n\nMore broadly, Silver Notices reflect an evolving approach to financial crime enforcement that prioritises proactive, intelligence-led intervention over reactive asset recovery at the end of lengthy criminal proceedings. Silver Notices are an enabler, not a shortcut. Used effectively and responsibly, they can strengthen the strategic focus on asset recovery and materially improve the prospects of asset confiscation and victim restitution.\n\n_This blog is also published on the [Hochschule Luzern Economic Crime Blog here](https://hub.hslu.ch/economiccrime/?p=6536)._","2026-03-16","interpol-silver-notices-speeding-up-the-tracing-of-criminal-assets-2944","INTERPOL Silver Notices: Speeding up the tracing of criminal assets","https://baselgovernance.org/cms/api/assets/daf2f81c-8270-46aa-93a2-3a8a469a7420?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[16,213],[216],[],2944,[16,17],[216],[367],1371,[],[],"2026-04-15T22:45:19.000Z","2026-06-24T13:39:46.000Z",[],"/resources/news/interpol-silver-notices-speeding-up-the-tracing-of-criminal-assets-2944",{"left":375,"top":375,"width":376,"height":376,"rotate":375,"vFlip":377,"hFlip":377,"body":378},0,20,false,"\u003Cpath fill=\"currentColor\" fill-rule=\"evenodd\" d=\"M17 10a.75.75 0 0 1-.75.75H5.612l4.158 3.96a.75.75 0 1 1-1.04 1.08l-5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 0 1 0-1.08l5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 1 1 1.04 1.08L5.612 9.25H16.25A.75.75 0 0 1 17 10\" clip-rule=\"evenodd\"/>",1782383390858]