[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":296},["ShallowReactive",2],{"news-2024-annual-report-and-foreword-by-peter-maurer-2829":3,"news-2024-annual-report-and-foreword-by-peter-maurer-2829-similar":58,"i-heroicons:arrow-left-20-solid":291},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"date_created":7,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":15,"activity":16,"nid":17,"topics":18,"activities":19,"programme":20,"area":20,"websites":20,"language":21,"image":22,"translation_of":20,"countries":33,"tags":34,"authors":35,"images":55,"translations":56,"content":57},10560,"published","2025-07-13T11:42:44.000Z","2026-06-23T12:56:43.000Z","2024 Annual Report and foreword by Peter Maurer","Blog","2024 was a challenging year for the Basel Institute on Governance, marked by the tragic passing of our Managing Director Gretta Fenner in April. But we have continued building on her legacy and, in early 2025, welcomed our new Executive Director Betsy Andersen to lead us into the future.\n\nIn his foreword to our [2024 Annual Report](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Far2024), the Basel Institute's President Peter Maurer reflects on how our teams have worked with partners and allies to achieve tangible progress against corruption with the ultimate goal of a more peaceful, just and sustainable world:\n\n> 2024 was profoundly overshadowed by the sudden and tragic loss of our Managing Director, Gretta Fenner, who led the Basel Institute for nearly two decades. Under her dedicated and inspirational leadership, the Institute has become what it still exemplifies today: a distinguished, hands-on centre of expertise committed to advancing the global fight against corruption and striving to create a more peaceful, secure and sustainable world.\n> \n> After Gretta’s passing, I temporarily stepped in to guide the organisation and the team during a transition period whilst a new leadership was sought. This unexpected task gave me an even deeper understanding and appreciation of the Basel Institute’s distinctively multi-disciplinary, adaptable and impactful approach – a method that is essential for tackling corruption in today’s complex and shifting political landscapes. It also confirmed the Institute’s resilience in an increasingly volatile and fragmented world.\n> \n> The Institute’s strength lies first and foremost in our skilled global team and in our ability to provide independent, expert support to stakeholders across multiple sectors and regions. We also benefit from the unwavering and generous commitment of our donors and a broad network of partners, from the local grass roots to the international community.\n> \n> In 2024 these factors were especially visible in the context of our engagement in Ukraine. Despite enormous challenges, Ukraine’s government and society have kept anti-corruption efforts in focus and on track. We are proud to support them: from helping prevent corruption in infrastructure, transport and forestry, to strengthening private-sector integrity in reconstruction projects, to assisting with transnational asset recovery. This kind of holistic engagement is both challenging and vital for Ukraine’s security, as well as Europe’s.\n> \n> Across more than 30 country programmes and projects, 2024 brought significant successes. In these pages you’ll read about, for example:\n> \n> *   How we contributed to the confiscation or return of over CHF 50 million in precedent-setting asset recovery cases, and new breakthroughs in targeting the financial aspects of environmental crimes.\n> *   Steps towards preventing corruption in timber value chains, identifying red flags for corruption at EU borders and in public procurement processes, and shining a light on sexual corruption risks faced by students.\n> *   Our compliance assistance to safeguard investments in critical infrastructure projects and how we foster high-level support for anti-corruption Collective Action to strengthen business integrity.\n> *   In Peru, how citizens are seeing real results from better public finance management: infrastructure delivered on time and vital services like vaccines and schoolbooks reaching those who need them.\n> \n> Each success, and many others not mentioned here, brings us closer to a better governed and safer world.\n> \n> Empowering people is at the heart of everything we do. Our eLearning courses now reach over 53,000 learners worldwide. More than 800 anti-corruption and conservation practitioners collaborate in one of several communities of practice. And new postgraduate programmes with the University of Basel will help build the next generation of anti-corruption and asset recovery leaders.\n> \n> Anti-corruption work has always faced resistance, from entrenched interests to institutional backsliding. At the Basel Institute, we are well prepared to defend values of integrity, transparency and accountability.\n> \n> But in the face of increasing headwinds in the geopolitical environment, we can only continue to succeed by building coalitions, breaking silos and collectively innovating to address corruption’s harmful role in major global challenges – challenges like the energy transition, healthcare and security, as well as poverty and organised crime.\n> \n> This is the charge that our new Executive Director, Elizabeth “Betsy” Andersen now leads. Appointed by the Board in late 2024 following a rigorous selection process, Betsy brings deep legal expertise, strategic vision, run-with-it motivation and a wealth of leadership experience in the non‑profit sector.\n> \n> On behalf of the Board, I warmly welcome her, convinced that her steady hand will help us guide the Institute as we chart and navigate the future.\n\nView the [2024 Annual Report of the Basel Institute on Governance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Far2024).","2025-07-09",[14],"","2024-annual-report-and-foreword-by-peter-maurer-2829",[14],2829,[],[],null,"English",{"id":23,"storage":24,"filename_disk":25,"filename_download":26,"title":27,"type":28,"created_on":7,"modified_on":7,"charset":20,"filesize":29,"width":30,"height":31,"duration":20,"embed":20,"description":20,"location":20,"tags":20,"metadata":32,"focal_point_x":20,"focal_point_y":20,"tus_id":20,"tus_data":20,"uploaded_on":7},"86cec7af-39d3-4c47-9cd8-5b004def85c4","local","86cec7af-39d3-4c47-9cd8-5b004def85c4.webp","tmp.webp","2025 Annual Report and foreword by Peter Maurer","image\u002Fwebp",6676,800,533,{},[],[],[36],{"id":37,"news_id":38,"authors_id":51},1343,{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":23,"date":12,"topic":41,"slug":15,"activity":42,"nid":17,"topics":43,"activities":44,"programme":20,"area":20,"websites":20,"translation_of":20,"language":21,"countries":45,"tags":46,"authors":47,"images":48,"translations":49,"content":50},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6",[14],[14],[],[],[],[],[37],[],[],[],{"id":52,"name":53,"position":20,"image":54},558,"Dr Peter Maurer","77976774-7119-48eb-9813-0979e38abf71",[],[],[],[59,87,114,148,176,199,220,245,268],{"id":60,"body":61,"status":6,"type":62,"date":63,"slug":64,"title":65,"image":66,"countries":67,"topic":68,"activity":69,"tags":72,"nid":73,"topics":74,"activities":75,"authors":76,"images":78,"websites":79,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":20,"translations":81,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":82,"user_updated":83,"date_updated":84,"content":85,"link":86},10445,"Published today, the 2023 Annual Report of the Basel Institute on Governance features seven stories from our work around the world to promote good governance and counter corruption.\n\nThe stories showcase different ways in which we collaborate with partners globally to advance knowledge, practice and policy on anti-corruption, asset recovery and business integrity. They illustrate not just _what we do,_ but _how we work_ to achieve real and lasting progress towards a more peaceful, just and sustainable world. \n\nRead the foreword by Peter Maurer below and [download the annual report](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2024-05\u002Fbasel_institute_annual_report_2023_spreads.pdf).\n\n> The final preparations of this annual report were overshadowed by the tragic news that Gretta Fenner, Managing Director of the Basel Institute on Governance for nearly two decades, had passed away in a car accident in Kenya on 6 April 2024.\n> \n> While we continue to be deeply saddened by the loss, we also know that Gretta was immensely proud of the Basel Institute’s achievements in 2023, as well as of the progress made over the Institute’s 20 years of existence – the latter, a large part of her legacy.\n> \n> And there are indeed many reasons to be proud and optimistic. While corruption scandals hit the headlines, the more important stories of anti-corruption progress tend to advance quietly over years. Many of the standout achievements in this annual report are not just from 2023.\n> \n> Second, anti-corruption tools yield benefits that go far beyond the immediate goal of reducing corruption risks. For example, when we provide advice to companies on compliance and multi-stakeholder Collective Action (page 18), the goal is not merely to reduce the risk of compliance-related violations but to foster resilient, ethical companies, fair competition and thriving industries.\n> \n> A third reason for optimism is that corruption is finally appearing on the agenda where it really matters – notably in the environmental sector. Our Green Corruption team has been working hard to embed anticorruption and asset recovery tools in the environmental sphere, and to build bridges between the anti-corruption and conservation communities (pages 14 and 17).\n> \n> At the Basel Institute, connections like these feed into our evolving understanding of corruption and of the changing tactics of power brokers on the political and geopolitical stage. From a narrowly defined legal concept, corruption has become a phenomenon that connects the biggest issues of our time. \n> \n> What global challenge is not caused or worsened by misuses of power and influence, with the aim of benefitting the few over the many?\n> \n> As Gretta said at the Munich Security Conference shortly before her passing, the old idea of corruption as “just” bribery causes us to overlook patterns of behaviour that have long-term, systemic impacts on both national and global stability.\n> \n> So, while we are a centre of technical competence, and advise governments worldwide on their laws and policies on corruption and asset recovery, the solutions we bring are never isolated from their political and social context.\n> \n> And we use behavioural science to better understand what really causes corrupt behaviour, and what might work to shift social norms towards compliance with laws, codes of ethics and other elements of the formal anti-corruption and anti-money laundering architecture.\n> \n> That is also why a big focus of our work is on engaging and connecting with others in the anti-corruption, asset recovery and business integrity fields, and beyond. Even if, or rather especially if, they have competing priorities. Only through negotiation and dialogue can one forge the type of common understanding and consensus that form the basis of effective and concerted action against corruption.\n> \n> As the stories in this annual report show, the trust and partnership of our donors and collaborators are vital in order for us to make progress in often turbulent and unpredictable political contexts. We are deeply grateful to those who support our ultimate goal of fighting corruption for a better world, who trust our way of working and who are willing to invest for long-term success.\n> \n> By jointly designing interventions and building in flexibility, we can continue to leverage our individual and collective resources, achieve greater impact and relevance and keep alive Gretta’s legacy over the Institute’s next 20 years and beyond.","News","2024-05-28","2023-annual-report-foreword-by-peter-maurer-2634","2023 Annual Report: Foreword by Peter Maurer","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F57bcce3f-245f-41d0-aabd-2fa58a0c5a09?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[14],[70,71],"Reports","Insights",[],2634,[],[70,71],[77],1113,[],[80],"Main page",[],"2024-05-28T10:01:30.000Z","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30","2025-08-31T23:14:40.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002F2023-annual-report-foreword-by-peter-maurer-2634",{"id":88,"body":89,"status":6,"type":62,"date":90,"slug":91,"title":92,"image":93,"countries":94,"topic":97,"activity":100,"tags":102,"nid":103,"topics":104,"activities":105,"authors":106,"images":107,"websites":20,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":21,"translations":108,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":109,"user_updated":110,"date_updated":111,"content":112,"link":113},10574,"We are delighted to announce a new grant that will enable the Basel Institute on Governance to continue and expand its support to Ukraine on integrity and accountability.\n\nThrough the Government of Norway's [Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.norad.no\u002Fen\u002Fthematic-areas\u002Fhumanitarian-assistance-and-comprehensive-response-and-the-nansen-programme-for-ukraine\u002Fthe-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine\u002Fthe-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine\u002Fhow-norad-fights-corruption-in-ukraine\u002F), the Basel Institute will work from 2025 to 2028 to promote transparency and accountability in three strategically vital sectors:\n\n*   Natural resources: Tackling corruption risks in forestry and the critical minerals sector, building on our long-standing work to combat [corruption in Ukraine’s forestry industry](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fdeepdive1-ukraine) and the expertise of our wider [Green Corruption programme](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fgreen-corruption).\n*   Energy: Supporting transparency and accountability in energy-related enterprises. In the first year, this will begin with our collaboration with the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine (Gas TSO), a vital state-owned enterprise with which we recently [signed a Memorandum of Understanding](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.facebook.com\u002Fgas.tso.ua\u002Fphotos\u002F%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80-%D0%B3%D1%82%D1%81-%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%B0%D0%B2-%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%B2%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D1%8E-%D0%B7-%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%BC-%D1%96%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%83%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BC-%D1%83%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F-%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80\u002F1414177947376981\u002F) to establish a comprehensive anti-corruption compliance system.\n*   Defence industries: Strengthening compliance and integrity systems in defence manufacturers as they produce vital materiel for Ukraine’s defence and integrate with Europe’s broader security architecture. This builds on our ongoing partnership with [Ukraine Defense Industries](https:\u002F\u002Fukroboronprom.com.ua\u002Fen\u002Fupravlinnya-ta-komplajens\u002Fat-uop-i-bazelskii-institut-upravlinnya-proveli-persu-zustric-v-ramkax-spivpraci-shhodo-posilennya-vnutrisnix-komplajens-spromoznosteiopk) (UkrOboronProm or UOP).\n\n### Strengthening integrity where it matters most\n\nThis programme is significant because natural resources, energy and defence are at the heart of Ukraine’s resilience and recovery. They are essential for the country’s security, economic stability and EU integration – yet also among the most vulnerable to corruption.\n\nWeak governance in these sectors risks undermining resilience, slowing reconstruction and eroding donor confidence.\n\nThe Government of Norway [recognises](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.norad.no\u002Fen\u002Fthematic-areas\u002Fhumanitarian-assistance-and-comprehensive-response-and-the-nansen-programme-for-ukraine\u002Fthe-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine\u002Fthe-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine\u002Fhow-norad-fights-corruption-in-ukraine\u002F) that “combating corruption and building strong institutions are central” to achieving the goals of its comprehensive Nansen Support Programme, which aims to “help secure a safe, free and independent Ukraine, strengthen vital state functions and reduce human suffering”. Like the Basel Institute, our partners in Norway acknowledge Ukraine’s progress in tackling corruption and the strong commitment of Ukrainian civil society and the public to building robust anti-corruption institutions.\n\n### Sustaining Ukraine’s path to resilience\n\nJorun Nossum, Director of Norad’s Department for the Nansen Support Programme, said:\n\n> We are very pleased to be able to continue our partnership with Basel Institute on Governance in working to prevent corruption in sectors central to Ukraine’s resistance and reforms.\n\nJuhani Grossmann, who leads the Basel Institute’s work in Ukraine and the opening of our new office in Kyiv, commented:\n\n> The support of Norway allows us to boost our integrity-building partnerships in Ukraine for the long term at a time when reliability is especially crucial. The three priority areas have been carefully selected to reflect both Ukraine's immediate needs and the desire for a sustainable recovery.\n> \n> Our natural resource partnerships will seek to ensure Ukraine’s people derive the maximum benefit from its environment and natural resources. Our energy partnerships will help build trustworthy energy partners as Ukraine integrates into European energy markets. Our defence partnerships are designed to enable Ukraine’s manufacturers to reap the full benefits for Ukraine’s security from their technical prowess.\n> \n> Enhanced and more compliant corporate structures will unlock Ukraine’s full potential to contribute to Europe’s emerging security infrastructure.\n\n### A decade of partnership with Ukraine\n\nAs featured in the [Basel Institute’s Annual Report 2024](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Far2024), we have been engaged in Ukraine for over a decade, supporting both corruption prevention and enforcement.\n\nOn the prevention side, our work since 2013 has included Collective Action and compliance initiatives in government permitting and corporate governance. We have also advised on the establishment of the Business Ombudsman, provided guidance to the Ukrainian Road Authority and supported independent commissions tasked with recruiting leaders of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions.\n\nFollowing the full-scale invasion in 2022, we significantly expanded our anti-corruption support, recognising it as both a contribution to Ukraine’s long-term European integration and to its short-term wartime resilience.\n\nWith significant funding from Switzerland and contributions from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and NEFCO, we have helped Ukrainian authorities and state-owned enterprises ensure the integrity of the wartime economy and reconstruction efforts. Priority areas have included restoration, transport and natural resources.","2025-10-20","strengthening-integrity-in-ukraines-natural-resources-energy-and-defence-sectors-with-norways-support-2857","Strengthening integrity in Ukraine’s natural resources, energy and defence sectors with Norway’s support","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fc22c8770-c1ad-4fd3-8af1-7174cdbe6b0b?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[95,96],7797,7798,[98,99],"Green Corruption","Private Sector",[101],"Partnerships",[],2857,[98,99],[101],[],[],[],"2025-10-20T16:01:43.000Z","dfef11db-1bc6-47e9-a61d-93443995484b","2026-05-08T21:11:16.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fstrengthening-integrity-in-ukraines-natural-resources-energy-and-defence-sectors-with-norways-support-2857",{"id":115,"body":116,"status":6,"type":10,"date":117,"slug":118,"title":119,"image":120,"countries":121,"topic":122,"activity":125,"tags":128,"nid":136,"topics":137,"activities":139,"authors":140,"images":142,"websites":20,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":21,"translations":143,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":144,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":145,"content":146,"link":147},10587,"_This article is adapted from the_ [_2024 Basel AML Index public report_](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024)_._\n\nPrivate companies and governments invest significant resources in efforts to combat money laundering and related financial crimes. Financial institutions alone spent an [estimated USD 206 billion globally](https:\u002F\u002Frisk.lexisnexis.com\u002Fglobal\u002Fen\u002Finsights-resources\u002Fresearch\u002Ftrue-cost-of-financial-crime-compliance-study-global-report) on anti-money laundering (AML) compliance in 2023 – and that figure is rising. Yet illicit assets continue to flow through and outside of regulated financial systems. Confiscation rates are still very low, with a long way to go before asset recovery becomes an effective deterrence to financially motivated crimes.\n\nThis is a disaster for countries deprived of [desperately needed funds for development](https:\u002F\u002Functad.org\u002Fsystem\u002Ffiles\u002Fofficial-document\u002Faldcafrica2020_en.pdf), while also negatively impacting on [economies](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.imf.org\u002Fen\u002FBlogs\u002FArticles\u002F2023\u002F12\u002F07\u002Ffinancial-crimes-hurt-economies-and-must-be-better-understood-and-curbed), [security](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fframing-financial-crime-security-threat) and the health of our [planet](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-50).\n\nIt is right to question whether we are on the path to success, and indeed what we mean by success in the fight against money laundering and related financial crimes. This article looks at what data we have and what else we should consider in answering this question.\n\n### 1 Are we making progress in terms of international standards?\n\nA very basic question is whether countries and regions are at least in line with minimum international standards for AML set by the FATF.\n\nWhile it is important to [question](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.rusi.org\u002Fexplore-our-research\u002Fpublications\u002Fcommentary\u002Fwhats-point-financial-action-task-force-standards) FATF data and standards, and to identify [abuses](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.rusi.org\u002Fexplore-our-research\u002Fprojects\u002Fcharting-authoritarian-abuses-fatf-standards) and [unintended consequences](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFinancialinclusionandnpoissues\u002FUnintended-consequences-project.html), ultimately they are the foundation of a harmonised global framework aimed at reducing opportunities for criminals to hide and launder illicit funds.\n\n#### _Technical compliance: fewer black holes on the map_\n\nFirst, the good news. Technical compliance with the FATF’s 40 Recommendations has, on average, increased by 12 percentage points globally since the start of the fourth round of evaluations in 2013. Much of that improvement comes from lower-performing countries catching up with the others. This indicates that more countries are at least meeting basic standards of an AML legal and institutional infrastructure. There are fewer black holes on the map.\n\nTo reach the 12 percentage point figure, we analysed data on 113 countries and jurisdictions that had both mutual evaluation reports (MERs) and subsequent follow-up reports (FURs) from the FATF.\n\nThe greatest progress has taken place in the area of preventive measures and targeted financial sanctions. The following table indicates the highest level of progress in technical compliance with FATF Recommendations across all 113 jurisdictions assessed with MERs and FURs:\n\nRecommendation\n\nAverage technical compliance\n\nR.7: Targeted financial sanctions – proliferation of weapons of mass destruction\n\n57% (up from 31%)\n\nR.19: Higher-risk countries\n\n74% (up from 51%)\n\nR.12: Politically exposed persons\n\n73% (up from 51%)\n\nR.16: Wire transfers\n\n71% (up from 50%)\n\nR.22: DNFBPs – Customer due diligence\n\n59% (up from 40%)\n\nR.6: Targeted financial sanctions – terrorism and terrorist financing\n\n62% (up from 43%)\n\nIt is good to see progress in R.22 on designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), since this has traditionally been an area of low performance globally and a frequently criticised weakness in AML systems.\n\nThe progress brings hope that more countries have now imposed stricter customer due diligence requirements for gambling businesses, improved record-keeping standards on customer information and transactions, increased the coverage of customer due diligence requirements to relevant professionals such as property developers and precious metal dealers, and increased the responsibilities and obligations for legal professionals.\n\nWhile improvements in most Recommendations may show real progress across countries, the dynamics in R.16 on wire transfers are complicated by the increase in new payment systems and methods that are not captured by this Recommendation.\n\nIn early 2024, the FATF conducted [public consultations](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFatfrecommendations\u002FR16-public-consultation-Feb24.html) on possible amendments to R.16 to reflect this evolution in payment systems and to increase the transparency of cross-border payments. It may be that stricter requirements under R.16 will lead to a rapid deterioration in compliance in the next period.\n\n#### _Regional picture: closing the gap_\n\nIn general, countries and regions with low scores in technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations are catching up, including as a result of being [grey listed](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Ffatf-grey-list-truth-and-myths). The top 20 countries and jurisdictions in terms of progress are mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by East Asia and Pacific, regions with low average performance previously.\n\nThe following table shows countries with the highest level of progress in technical compliance with FATF Recommendations, out of all those assessed with MERs and FURs. Countries with an asterisk (\\*) are those that are or have been on the FATF grey list.\n\nProgress between mutual evaluation report and latest follow-up report\n\nCountries and jurisdictions (progress in percentage points)\n\n40–52 percentage points\n\nMauritius\\* (52), Botswana\\* (50), Vanuatu\\* (49), Mauritania (48), Uganda\\* (40)\n\n25–39 percentage points\n\nPakistan\\* (33), Iceland\\* (33), Saint Lucia (29), Bahamas\\* (28), Sri Lanka\\* (27), Zimbabwe\\* (26)\n\n20–25 percentage points\n\nMongolia\\* (24), Kenya\\* (24), Norway (24), Costa Rica (23), Morocco\\* (23), Fiji (22), Jamaica\\* (22), Bhutan (21), Trinidad and Tobago\\* (21), Tunisia\\* (20)\n\nThese leaps in performance are not the norm, however: more than half of the assessed countries made progress of less than 10 percentage points.\n\n#### _Effectiveness is falling_\n\nMore challenging, and more depressing, is to assess changes in effectiveness according to the FATF’s 11 Immediate Outcomes (IOs). FATF follow-up reports do not currently reassess countries against these effectiveness criteria. At the global level, however, we can see that effectiveness is decreasing. And that decrease is happening from an already very low base.\n\nWe analysed the difference in global effectiveness scores as the FATF increased its coverage of fourth-round evaluation reports from 115 countries and jurisdictions in 2021 to 178 in 2024.\n\nAverage effectiveness dropped from 30 percent in 2021 to 28 percent in 2023 and remained at that low level in 2024. That means newly assessed countries have similarly low levels of effectiveness as those assessed in earlier years.\n\nWhat’s falling the most? The following table displays the IOs with the lowest effectiveness scores on average across all jurisdictions assessed with mutual evaluation reports. All of them dropped still further between 2021 and 2024:\n\nImmediate Outcome (paraphrased)\n\nAverage effectiveness\n\nIO7: Money laundering investigations, prosecutions and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions\n\n20% (down from 21% in 2021)\n\nIO5: Legal persons and arrangements prevented from misuse for money laundering and terrorist financing (ML\u002FTF); beneficial ownership information available to competent authorities\n\n21% (down from 22%)\n\nIO4: Financial institutions and DNFBPs apply AML\u002FCFT preventive measures commensurate with their risks and report suspicious transactions\n\n22% (down from 24%)\n\nIO11: Prevention of financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction\n\n22% (down from 24%)\n\nIO3: Appropriate supervision according to a risk-based approach\n\n23% (down from 26%)\n\nIO10: Prevention of terrorist financing \u002F abuse of non-profit sector\n\n24% (down from 27%)\n\nEven in the IOs with the highest average performance globally across all jurisdictions assessed with MERs, we see decreasing effectiveness as more countries are assessed:\n\nImmediate Outcome (paraphrased)\n\nAverage effectiveness\n\nIO2: International cooperation on information, financial intelligence and evidence against criminals and assets\n\n44% (down from 49% in 2021)\n\nIO1: Risks understood and domestic coordination to combat ML\u002FTF and proliferation financing\n\n36% (down from 38%)\n\nIO6: Financial intelligence and other information used investigations\n\n34% (down from 37%)\n\nIO9: Terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions\n\n33% (down from 37%)\n\nIO8: Proceeds and instrumentalities of crime confiscated\n\n27% (down from 29%)\n\nIO8 on proceeds and instrumentalities of crime confiscated dropped despite hopes for a rise, as [asset recovery was an FATF priority](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Ftopics\u002Fasset-recovery.html) in 2022–2023.\n\nThe big picture? Overall, countries’ AML frameworks are gradually becoming more technical compliant with the global standards but less effective in practice.\n\n### Effectiveness along the asset recovery chain\n\nData from the Basel AML Index Expert Edition Plus, which includes the full FATF dataset, can help to identify weak links in what we call the asset recovery “chain” – all the steps from preventing and detecting illicit financial flows through to their confiscation and restitution.\n\nApplying this concept to FATF data on effectiveness can give us a simplified picture of what might be weak links in the chain. The following figure shows FATF average effectiveness ratings applied to key links in the asset recovery “chain”:\n\n> The concept of the asset recovery chain is at the heart of the support provided by our International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) to partner countries, including Basel AML Index-based technical assistance in strengthening understanding of and resilience to money laundering risks.\n\n### 2 What other data and metrics can we use to better measure success in practice?\n\nFATF data is the best that is available for comparing money laundering vulnerabilities in different countries and jurisdictions, as the same assessment methodology is applied globally.\n\nYet alone it is clearly not enough to give an accurate picture of success. Critics point out that many countries with high performance in both technical compliance and effectiveness are favoured destinations for those seeking to stash, spend and launder money.\n\nThis is why the Basel AML Index methodology takes into account a variety of indicators beyond the quality of a country’s AML framework as assessed by the FATF. They make it easier to evaluate financial crime risk exposure more widely as well as the functioning of the system as a whole. They also make it possible to see where data is missing or could be misleading.\n\nMany of these metrics are useful in evaluating whether systems are working in practice not only to address illicit financial flows as an end in itself but considering wider implications for people and societies.\n\nThe following figure offers some illustrative examples. See the [methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fmethodology) online for more information and subscribe to the Expert Edition (free for most users outside the private sector) to view and filter the full data.\n\n### 3 Clearer goals, better evidence\n\nIt may seem obvious to readers, but it still needs to be stressed: the fight against financial crime is not a narrow technical issue but a multi-dimensional challenge that is interlinked with many aspects of our lives at both the national and global level. A single metric alone will never be sufficient to measure success.\n\nMeasuring success depends on defining the ultimate objective. The FATF’s purpose has always been to “protect financial systems and the broader economy”. This may be a useful intermediate goal. But we support rising calls to position the fight against money laundering and related financial crimes as ultimately key to achieving a more peaceful, just and sustainable world.\n\nAchieving this ambition requires a nuanced understanding of the broader factors driving money laundering risk and their far-reaching consequences, as illustrated above. It also demands robust evidence of the effectiveness and tangible benefits of AML measures, to counter scepticism and bolster the case for sustained investment in these efforts\n\nCrucially, building an effective AML system is not merely a technical task for a single government department or a compliance team. It is a collective mission that requires collaboration across sectors, industries and borders. Only through a shared commitment and clear vision of our end goal can we create a world where financial systems are resilient to exploitation for criminal purposes and where AML measures support broader societal goals.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Read the [13th annual Public Edition report of the Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024).\n*   Explore the [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F).","2025-02-20","anti-money-laundering-what-is-success-2768","Anti-money laundering: what is success?","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F947bee1f-add9-40fb-9346-e20626e7c915?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[123,124],"Anti-Money Laundering","Asset Recovery",[126,127,70,71],"Basel AML Index","Research",[129,132],{"tags_id":130},{"id":131,"name":126},1346,{"tags_id":133},{"id":134,"name":135},818,"Anti-money laundering",2768,[123,138,126],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[126,127,70,71],[141],1362,[],[],"2025-12-04T11:01:47.000Z","2026-06-07T10:31:24.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fanti-money-laundering-what-is-success-2768",{"id":149,"body":150,"status":6,"type":10,"date":151,"slug":152,"title":153,"image":154,"countries":155,"topic":156,"activity":157,"tags":158,"nid":165,"topics":166,"activities":167,"authors":168,"images":170,"websites":171,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":20,"translations":172,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":173,"user_updated":83,"date_updated":84,"content":174,"link":175},10528,"_This article is adapted from the [2024 Basel AML Index public report](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024)._ \n\n> Sound like someone you know?\n> \n> The 84-year-old who lost his life savings after receiving a panicked call from someone who sounded exactly like his granddaughter, saying she was in jail for drug possession and needed USD 10,000 for bail...\n> \n> The lonely widow seeking companionship online, who sent cash via a money transfer service to his long-distance love – who in actual fact was himself a victim of human trafficking, trapped in a \"scam centre\" on the other side of the world and defrauding hundreds simultaneously…\n> \n> The small business owner who suffered reputational and financial loss after his identity was stolen and used to establish shell companies and purchase goods as part of a money laundering scheme...\n> \n> The young professional, excited by the buzz around cryptocurrency, who invested USD 15,000 in an online crypto platform advertised on social media that promised guaranteed high returns – which vanished before she could withdraw them…\n> \n> The government that loses billions of dollars annually to healthcare fraud, money that should be spent on some of the most vulnerable in society.\n\nStories of fraud and scams like those in the box above make clear the human impact of financial crime. The financial impact is no less horrifying. The UK is estimated to lose over a [USD 1.5 billion annually to fraud](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ukfinance.org.uk\u002Fsystem\u002Ffiles\u002F2024-05\u002FAnnual%20Fraud%20Report%202024_0.pdf), which makes up 40 percent of reported crime – despite significant under-reporting. Globally, individuals are estimated to lose over [USD 1 trillion to online scams](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gasa.org\u002Fpost\u002Fglobal-state-of-scams-report-2024-1-trillion-stolen-in-12-months-gasa-feedzai) alone.\n\nWhatever the real figures, that’s a lot of money that needs to be laundered on international markets.\n\nFollowing our expert annual review meetings we decided to add indicators of fraud to the [Basel AML Index methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fmethodology) this year. This decision reflects the growing significance of fraud as a predicate offence to money laundering and as a risk that regulated entities need to consider.\n\nThough definitions of fraud vary and data is both poor and inconsistent, the huge and rising [social and economic consequences of fraud](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fbasel-aml-index-updates-methodology-to-reflect-rising-global-fraud-risks-2713) make it impossible to ignore in any money laundering risk assessment.\n\n> What is fraud?\n> \n> Given the lack of a globally accepted definition of fraud, we use the term loosely as an umbrella term for activities that involve deliberate deception of an individual or entity for the sake of obtaining a financial gain. At the transnational level, fraud schemes are often [orchestrated by organised criminal actors](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Forganized-crime\u002FPublications\u002FIssuePaperFraud-eBook.pdf) and facilitated by technology.\n\n### Fraud-related indicators in the Basel AML Index\n\nFraud-related data is sourced from the [Global Organized Crime Index](https:\u002F\u002Focindex.net\u002F) in two categories:\n\n*   “financial crimes” (covering financial fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement and misuse of funds); and\n*   “cyber-dependent crimes” (including malware, hacking, ransomware and cryptocurrency fraud).\n\nIt is not possible to disaggregate the data.\n\nBoth indicators join indicators of corruption and bribery in Domain 2 of the Basel AML Index methodology, with a weighting of 5 percent and 2.5 percent respectively. The weight of the domain (its impact on the overall Basel AML Index score) has increased from 10 percent to 17.5 percent.\n\n### What impact has the inclusion of these new indicators had?\n\nGlobally, the average risk score in Domain 2 on corruption and fraud has increased from 5.02 in 2023 to 5.12 this year following the addition of the fraud indicators. This increase may be influenced by this year’s larger country coverage, as well as by changes in performance in the existing indicators of corruption and bribery. A few highlights:\n\n*   Just under half of the countries covered – 44 percent – have a higher risk score in Domain 2. These include high-income countries and those with large financial centres. The top five from highest to lowest increase are: New Zealand (which nearly tripled its risk score), Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden. Most of these countries still have lower than average scores for corruption and bribery, but their relative wealth makes them targets for fraud, cybercrimes and the related financial crimes measured by the new indicators.\n*   Around 50 percent get a lower risk score in Domain 2 as a result of adding the two new indicators, though the impact is less drastic than for those with an increased risk score. The top five include, from biggest to smallest reduction, Antigua and Barbuda, Chad, Barbados, Central African Republic and Republic of the Congo.\n*   At the regional level, the European Union and Western Europe, North America and East Asia and Pacific saw an increase in risk scores in Domain 2 while Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa saw a decrease overall. The impact on the Middle East and North Africa was negligible. This means the gap between regions is decreasing, at least in relation to performance in Domain 2.\n\nThe following map shows the regional scores in Domain 2 (“corruption and fraud risks”) after adding fraud data in 2024 (compared to 2023):\n\n### Challenges in fraud data and analysis\n\nThe reason we don’t provide more analysis of the impact of fraud data is that there are significant challenges and concerns around the quality of fraud data generally.\n\nFirst, there are no globally recognised or unified approaches to collecting data on fraud. Data is mostly collected (if at all) at the country level and according to different definitions and scopes, for example with a focus on [scams](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gasa.org\u002Fresearch). Underreporting of fraud, perhaps due to feelings of shame or the desire among businesses to avoid reputational damage, is also a major issue.\n\nAs supported by an extensive [UNODC report on organised fraud](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Forganized-crime\u002FPublications\u002FIssuePaperFraud-eBook.pdf), a global standard and collaborative efforts to improve data collection, quality and sharing are urgently needed as the foundations of any coherent attempt to prevent and counter fraud.\n\nSecond, the cross-border nature of many forms of fraud and money laundering make it particularly challenging to assign risks to a particular jurisdiction.\n\nAn investment fraud scheme may be perpetrated in several financial centres, masterminded by a transnational organised crime group and carried out by individuals working in scam centres such as those [rapidly emerging in Southeast Asia](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.usip.org\u002Fpublications\u002F2024\u002F05\u002Ftransnational-crime-southeast-asia-growing-threat-global-peace-and-security). The proceeds may be laundered across multiple jurisdictions and through the crypto ecosystem before ending up in a bank account or real estate – perhaps even in the country in which it was stolen.\n\nGiven the above challenges, and until standards and data are improved, we would urge all users of the Basel AML Index to consult the detailed breakdown of indicators available in the [Expert Edition](http:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fexpert-edition) and to seek additional sources of data on specific fraud risks where this element is included in a risk assessment.\n\nAs a reminder, we provide free access to the Expert Edition for most organisations outside the private sector.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Read the [13th annual Public Edition report of the Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024).\n*   Explore the [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F).","2025-01-22","why-we-cant-ignore-fraud-despite-challenges-in-data-and-analysis-2746","Why we can’t ignore fraud despite challenges in data and analysis","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9754bec5-b441-4f0c-9094-ab11dea893c9?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[123],[71],[159,161],{"tags_id":160},{"id":131,"name":126},{"tags_id":162},{"id":163,"name":164},867,"Financial crime",2746,[123],[71],[169],1092,[],[80],[],"2025-01-22T17:01:46.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fwhy-we-cant-ignore-fraud-despite-challenges-in-data-and-analysis-2746",{"id":177,"body":178,"status":6,"type":10,"date":179,"slug":180,"title":181,"image":182,"countries":183,"topic":184,"activity":186,"tags":187,"nid":188,"topics":189,"activities":190,"authors":191,"images":192,"websites":193,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":20,"translations":194,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":195,"user_updated":110,"date_updated":196,"content":197,"link":198},9540,"_A guest blog by Bernard O’Donnell, Head of Fraud Investigations at the [European Investment Bank](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.eib.org\u002Fen\u002Fabout\u002Faccountability\u002Fanti-fraud\u002Findex.htm) (EIB), and Sabine Zindera, Vice President, Legal and Compliance at Siemens AG and head of the [Siemens Integrity Initiative](http:\u002F\u002Fwww.siemens.com\u002Fintegrity-initiative)._\n\nWhen companies are sanctioned for wrongdoing, is there a way to turn the punitive sanction into a positive force – not only for those wronged, but for wider business integrity around the world?\n\nThere is. Exhibit number 1 is a settlement agreement signed in 2013 between the EIB and Siemens AG that addresses alleged past violations of the EIB Anti-Fraud Policy (see the [EIB](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.eib.org\u002Fen\u002Fpress\u002Fnews\u002Feib-and-siemens-settlement-agreement.htm) and [Siemens](https:\u002F\u002Fnew.siemens.com\u002Fglobal\u002Fen\u002Fcompany\u002Fsustainability\u002Fcompliance\u002Fcollective-action\u002Feib-and-siemens-settlement-agreement.html) press releases).\n\nAs part of the settlement, Siemens committed to provide funds totalling EUR 13.64 million to organisations that support projects or other initiatives that promote good governance and the fight against corruption.\n\nIt was agreed that the money would be disbursed under the umbrella of the [Siemens Integrity Initiative](http:\u002F\u002Fwww.siemens.com\u002Fintegrity-initiative), a USD 100 million funding mechanism established following a separate agreement that Siemens had reached with the [World Bank](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.worldbank.org\u002Fen\u002Fnews\u002Fpress-release\u002F2009\u002F07\u002F02\u002Fsiemens-pay-million-fight-fraud-corruption-part-world-bank-group-settlement) in 2009.\n\nNearly a decade on, the EIB has seen the very positive progress that Siemens has made in not only taking appropriate action to remediate past cases of corruption, but also in funding a host of impactful integrity projects around the world. The company is clearly taking an active role in improving the broader situation and has pushed the anti-corruption agenda forward on a local and global level, notably by fostering [Collective Action against corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcollective-action).\n\n### Supporting the rise of Collective Action for fair and sustainable business\n\n“Collective Action” in general refers to action taken together by a group of like-minded and\u002For interested parties to try to achieve a common objective. In this case, Siemens committed to fostering the use of Collective Action to promote greater integrity, to level the playing field and to mitigate business risks.\n\nBack then, Collective Action was an innovative idea. Now, it is rapidly becoming part of [mainstream anti-corruption compliance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2021-03\u002Fmainstreaming_collective_action_-_executive_summary.pdf) practice, as companies, governments and civil society representatives see the benefits of working together to overcome hurdles to clean business.\n\nIn total, the Siemens Integrity Initiative has supported 85 projects in over 50 countries across the three Funding Rounds and so-called Golden Stretch Round, and increased its committed funding to nearly USD 120 million. All projects are detailed in the Initiative’s [annual reports](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications?topic=All&type=All&country=All&language=All&title=Siemens&external=2), which tell a powerful story about the growing maturity and reach of Collective Action.\n\nCommenting on the Golden Stretch round, of which the Basel Institute is one of the eight organisations [selected for additional funding](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fsiemens-integrity-initiative-funds-basel-institute-golden-stretch-promoting-anti-corruption), Sabine Zindera said:\n\n> In selecting the projects to be supported, we placed particular emphasis on how the sustainability of their activities and results can be ensured beyond 2024, and on how our partners will inspire, support and engage local non-governmental organisations and the public and private sectors through their longstanding networks and institutional standing. We are pleased to again support diverse projects in order to promote fair competition and fight corruption with a portfolio balanced by region and topic.\n\nThe EIB sees the value of Collective Action to combat corruption and agrees that the results are now clear: the projects have been positive for both EIB and Siemens in terms of resolving the past issues relating to the settlement. Globally, they have also had a significant impact in terms of governance and cleaner business.\n\n### Settlements that make sense\n\nSiemens was the first company to set up such a fund as part of a settlement with a multilateral development bank (MDB). Since then, [EIB has signed similar settlement agreements](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.eib.org\u002Fen\u002Fabout\u002Faccountability\u002Fanti-fraud\u002Fexclusion\u002Findex.htm) with companies including Volkswagen and, more recently, JSC Nenskra Hydro and Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co.\n\nAlthough such settlement agreements are not always appropriate, in some cases there may be suitable possibilities to include a sanction that requires the company to make additional efforts and commitments that are not purely monetary.\n\n### Proactive coordination to combat private-sector corruption\n\nThis constructive approach to settlements chimes with the proactive coordination that exists between MDBs in relation to corruption and fraud.\n\nThe six MDBs, including the World Bank and EIB, all share common definitions of fraud and corruption thanks to the 2006 [Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption](http:\u002F\u002Fwww.iadb.org\u002Fdocument.cfm?id=37018601). The Framework also introduced [guidelines and principles to conduct investigations](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.eib.org\u002Fen\u002Fabout\u002Fdocuments\u002Fifi-anti-corruption-task-force-uniform-framework.htm).\n\nThe MDBs also have [consistent policies on sanctioning](https:\u002F\u002Fidbdocs.iadb.org\u002Fwsdocs\u002Fgetdocument.aspx?docnum=EZSHARE-1138756496-328) those found to have engaged in such wrongdoing, including the [Cross-Debarment Agreement](http:\u002F\u002Fwww.iadb.org\u002Fdocument.cfm?id=35154738) signed in 2010 by the MDBs with the exception of EIB. This enables participating MDBs to mutually recognise certain sanctions imposed by any of the signatory institutions against firms and individuals found to have engaged in prohibited practices.\n\n### The bottom line\n\nThe mid-term review of the Siemens Integrity Initiative (see page 90 onwards in the [2017 Annual Report](http:\u002F\u002Fwww.siemens.com\u002Fintegrity-initiative\u002FReport2017)) concluded that there is “strong evidence” that the Siemens Integrity Initiative-funded Collective Action projects have “achieved their intended short-term results” and made “significant contributions to change within their respective contexts”.\n\nIt is “the passionate and committed work of Integrity Partners and the Siemens Munich Project Office that has helped promote, enhance the visibility of, and contribute to learning on Collective Action, including demonstrating to the private sector that there is a business case for investing in Collective Action”, it continued. In so doing, said the report, “the Integrity Initiative has made valuable contributions to the global fight against corruption”.\n\nThe story is not over yet, and we are all looking forward to seeing the fruits of anti-corruption Collective Action blossom and mature over the coming years. Visit the [B20 Collective Action Hub](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fb20-collective-action-hub), developed and maintained by the Basel Institute on Governance, for more on Collective Action and ways to get involved.\n\n### _About the authors_\n\n_Bernard O’Donnell is Head of Fraud Investigations at the European Investment Bank (EIB). In his current position, Bernie oversees investigations into allegations of fraud, corruption and other prohibited conduct affecting EIB Group financed projects and activities in collaboration with national law enforcement and prosecution offices, along with the investigation offices of other international financial Institutions and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and OLAF._\n\n_Sabine Zindera is Vice President, Legal and Compliance at Siemens AG and head of the Siemens Integrity Initiative. In this role she leads Siemens´ global Collective Action activities, helping to build alliances against corruption to foster clean business and to support fair market conditions. As part of this, she also manages Siemens' relationships with international and non-governmental organisations around the world._","2021-12-06","siemens-and-the-european-investment-bank-fostering-integrity-through-collective-action-and-constructive-settlements-2133","Siemens and the European Investment Bank: Fostering integrity through Collective Action and constructive settlements","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F47ec9765-2a36-4eba-bbc1-252dc4ea4da8?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[185,99],"Collective Action",[71,101],[],2133,[185,99],[71,101],[],[],[80,185],[],"2022-05-26T22:52:12.000Z","2026-05-08T21:11:00.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fsiemens-and-the-european-investment-bank-fostering-integrity-through-collective-action-and-constructive-settlements-2133",{"id":200,"body":201,"status":6,"type":10,"date":202,"slug":203,"title":204,"image":205,"countries":206,"topic":207,"activity":208,"tags":209,"nid":210,"topics":211,"activities":212,"authors":213,"images":214,"websites":215,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":20,"translations":216,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":217,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":145,"content":218,"link":219},10506,"The [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F) – the Basel Institute’s ranking and risk assessment tool for money laundering risks around the world – will include indicators of fraud in its 2024 methodology update.\n\nThe changes reflect the growing significance of fraud as a predicate offence to money laundering and as a risk that regulated entities need to consider. Though definitions of fraud vary and data is both poor and inconsistent, the social and economic consequences of fraud make it impossible to ignore in any money laundering risk assessment.\n\nThe changes will be implemented in the 13th Public Edition of the Basel AML Index, due to be published on 2 December this year, as well as in the subscription-based [Expert Edition and Expert Edition Plus](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fexpert-edition) from that point onwards.\n\n### Spotlight: fraud on the rise\n\nStatistics from global financial centres (e.g. [US](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thomsonreuters.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fposts\u002Finvestigation-fraud-and-risk\u002Fsars-fraud-2024\u002F), [UK](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk\u002Fwho-we-are\u002Fpublications\u002F632-2022-sars-annual-report-1\u002Ffile), [Switzerland](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fedpol.admin.ch\u002Ffedpol\u002Fen\u002Fhome\u002Fkriminalitaet\u002Fgeldwaescherei\u002Fjb.html), [Canada](https:\u002F\u002Ffintrac-canafe.canada.ca\u002Fpublications\u002Far\u002F2023\u002Far2023-eng.pdf)) indicate that fraud is among the top offences reported in suspicious activity reports submitted by banks and other regulated entities.\n\nAccording to the [U.S. 2024 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment](https:\u002F\u002Fhome.treasury.gov\u002Fsystem\u002Ffiles\u002F136\u002F2024-National-Money-Laundering-Risk-Assessment.pdf), \"\\[f\\]raud remains the largest and most significant proceed-generating crime for which funds are laundered in or through the United States.\" [Singapore’s 2024 National Risk Assessment](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.mof.gov.sg\u002Fdocs\u002Fdefault-source\u002Fdefault-document-library\u002Fml-national-risk-assessment.pdf?sfvrsn=3edc6832_3) likewise identifies fraud – particularly cyber-enabled fraud – as one of the country’s key money laundering threats.\n\nThe threat posed by fraud is not just about financial systems, but about its devastating impact on ordinary individuals and companies. Introducing the [2024 INTERPOL Global Financial Fraud Assessment](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.interpol.int\u002Fen\u002FNews-and-Events\u002FNews\u002F2024\u002FINTERPOL-Financial-Fraud-assessment-A-global-threat-boosted-by-technology), INTERPOL’s Secretary General referred to an “epidemic in the growth of financial fraud, leading to individuals, often vulnerable people, and companies being defrauded on a massive and global scale”. The assessment highlights the prevalence of investment, romance and advance payment fraud schemes.\n\nMethods used to commit fraud are also becoming more sophisticated and diversified. Technological advancements, including in artificial intelligence and virtual assets, can make (cyber) fraud and the laundering of proceeds easier to commit and more complex to investigate. The FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units have joined forces on a new initiative to [counter illicit financial flows from cyber-enabled fraud](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FMethodsandtrends\u002Fillicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.html), noting its link to other forms of criminality including human trafficking and proliferation financing.\n\n### Challenges around definitions and data\n\nBased on discussions with leading financial crime experts at two annual review meetings, we have decided to integrate fraud indicators into the Basel AML Index [methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fmethodology).\n\nThis decision comes with challenges, including:\n\n*   the broad and disputed definition and scope of “fraud”;\n*   the complex, cross-border nature of many forms of fraud and the difficulty in assigning risks to a particular jurisdiction;\n*   poor data availability, exacerbated by significant underreporting and no global standard.\n\nOther indicators of ML\u002FTF risk related to financial crimes of a cross-border nature face similar challenges. Lack of reliable data and analysis in particular is a major [obstacle to countering fraud risks](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.interpol.int\u002Fen\u002FNews-and-Events\u002FNews\u002F2024\u002FINTERPOL-Financial-Fraud-assessment-A-global-threat-boosted-by-technology).\n\n### Pragmatic approach\n\nThe Basel AML Index is primarily a framework for assessing geographic risk, defined as a jurisdiction’s vulnerability to money laundering and related financial crimes and its capacities to counter these threats. and its capacities to counter it. The Index does not attempt to measure the actual amount of money laundering activity.\n\nTherefore we believe it is appropriate for the Basel AML Index methodology to incorporate fraud data with clear caveats and a transparent recognition of the above challenges and weaknesses.\n\nGiven the lack of a globally accepted definition, we use the term fraud loosely as an umbrella term for activities that involve deliberate deception of an individual or entity for the sake of obtaining a financial gain. These crimes are often transnational, orchestrated by organised criminal actors and facilitated by technology.\n\nFraud-related data will be sourced from the [Global Organized Crime Index](https:\u002F\u002Focindex.net\u002F). This source most closely aligns with the Basel AML Index standards on data quality and coverage.\n\nData will be taken from two categories:\n\n*   “Financial crimes”, covering financial fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement and misuse of funds\n*   “Cyber-dependent crimes”, including malware, hacking, ransomware and cryptocurrency fraud\n\nBoth indicators will join indicators of corruption in Domain 2 of the Basel AML Index methodology, with a weighting of 5 percent and 2.5 percent respectively.\n\n### Other changes\n\nThree outdated indicators will be removed, bringing the total to 17:\n\n*   \"Extent of corporate transparency\" from the World Bank’s discontinued _Doing Business_ report.\n*   “Strength of auditing and reporting standards” and “Institutional pillar” from the World Economic Forum’s discontinued _Global Competitiveness Report._\n\nData from the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index will move to Domain 3 on financial transparency and standards. This will enable Basel AML Index Expert Edition users to more clearly separate jurisdictions’ performance on financial transparency from other aspects of their anti-money laundering framework.\n\nMinor adjustments have been made to the weighting to account for the above changes.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Join the [online launch event on 4 December 2024](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2714).\n*   View the Basel AML Index and its current [methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fmethodology) (prior to the above changes).\n*   Sign up for the [Expert Edition](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fexpert-edition) or Expert Edition Plus to explore the current data – it’s free for users from public-sector, non-profit and multilateral entities as well as journalists and academics.","2024-10-29","basel-aml-index-updates-methodology-to-reflect-rising-global-fraud-risks-2713","Basel AML Index updates methodology to reflect rising global fraud risks","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd49abadd-b50c-42d9-bba6-a10ee75414f0?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[123],[126],[],2713,[123,126],[126],[],[],[80,126],[],"2024-11-07T09:34:34.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fbasel-aml-index-updates-methodology-to-reflect-rising-global-fraud-risks-2713",{"id":221,"body":222,"status":6,"type":10,"date":223,"slug":224,"title":225,"image":226,"countries":227,"topic":228,"activity":229,"tags":230,"nid":233,"topics":234,"activities":235,"authors":236,"images":238,"websites":239,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":20,"translations":240,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":241,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":242,"content":243,"link":244},10532,"_This article is adapted from the_ [_2024 Basel AML Index public report_](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024)_._\n\nFinancial crime has far-reaching impacts on people’s lives. Yet often the only time it draws serious attention in the media is when a country is added to the [FATF’s grey list](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fcountries\u002Fblack-and-grey-lists.html). This designation of “jurisdictions under increased monitoring” frequently sparks debate and concern, and is clouded by misconceptions. This section looks at five common myths that we come across in our work to support partner countries seeking to avoid or leave the grey list.\n\n### Myth 1: The grey list = high-risk countries\n\nA common misconception about the FATF grey list is that it represents (the only) countries and jurisdictions that pose high risks for money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing.\n\nIn fact, in the FATF’s own words, the grey list is the public list of jurisdictions that are “actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.” It is the FATF’s black list that specifically identifies high-risk countries and calls for enhanced due diligence and\u002For countermeasures when dealing with these.\n\nThe distinction is important because not all grey-listed countries pose the same level or type of risk. Many are on a rapid path to improvement. Not all will require enhanced due diligence. And some countries that are not and never have been on the grey list may still present significant risks.\n\nInclusion on the grey list is based on the FATF's [International Co-operation Review Group](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FHigh-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions\u002FMore-on-high-risk-and-non-cooperative-jurisdictions.html) (ICRG) process and on the criteria summarised under Myth 2, rather than merely on its own criteria for identifying a higher-risk country (see box below).\n\nA complicating factor for financial institutions seeking to identify clear criteria for applying enhanced due diligence is the use of both the black and grey lists by the EU and UK for their own lists of high-risk third countries.\n\n> What is a higher-risk country?\n> \n> The Interpretative Note to the FATF’s [Recommendation 10](https:\u002F\u002Fcfatf-gafic.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Ffatf-40r\u002F376-fatf-recommendation-10-customer-due-diligence) on customer due diligence sets out guidelines on country or geographic risk factors that might trigger the application of enhanced due diligence according to a risk-based approach. The criteria (note 15b) refer to countries that are “identified by credible sources” as having inadequate AML\u002FCFT systems, high levels of corruption and crime or high levels of terrorist activity and financing, or that are subject to sanctions or similar measures. It does not specifically refer to either the grey list or the black list, though this may be one factor that organisations take into account.\n> \n> Similarly, [Recommendation 19](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cfatf-gafic.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Ffatf-40r\u002F385-fatf-recommendation-19-higher-risk-countries) on higher-risk countries and its Interpretative Note require enhanced due diligence by financial institutions to be applied only to countries “for which this is called for by the FATF”, indicating the black list of jurisdictions subject to a call for action.\n\n### Myth 2: Grey listing is a surprise\n\nEach time the FATF holds a plenary session, commentators appear to “bet” which countries will be added or removed. This leads some to believe that grey listing comes as a surprise – even to a country’s authorities.\n\nIn fact, grey listing is based mainly on a country’s poor performance in its mutual evaluation report, specifically in one of four criteria:\n\n*   Fifteen or more non-compliant or partially compliant ratings for technical compliance in any Recommendation.\n*   A non-compliant or partially compliant rating for three or more of the following Recommendations: R.3 (money laundering offences), R.5 (terrorist financing offences), R.6 (targeted financial sanctions related to terrorist financing), R.10 (customer due diligence), R.11 (record keeping) and R.20 (reporting of suspicious transactions).\n*   A low or moderate level of effectiveness for nine or more of the 11 Immediate Outcomes, with a minimum of 2 low ratings.\n*   A low level of effectiveness for six or more of the 11 Immediate Outcomes.\n\nThe authorities typically have a year or more to work on their specific weaknesses without being publicly listed, under the FATF’s International Co-operation process.\n\nThe FATF also prioritises countries and jurisdictions with significant financial centres. For the fifth round of evaluations, the threshold has been increased from USD 5 billion to USD 10 billion, measured in [broad money terms](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.oecd.org\u002Fen\u002Fdata\u002Findicators\u002Fbroad-money-m3.html).\n\nSo grey listing is rarely a surprise to the authorities. It is however less easy for third parties like financial institutions and foreign donors to predict whether a jurisdiction will end up on the grey list.\n\nOur [Expert Edition Plus](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fexpert-edition) now offers subscribers an assessment of the risks that a particular country will end up on the grey list. This makes it possible to better anticipate this and prepare accordingly – including, we would recommend, by using the Basel AML Index to assess the broad range of factors contributing to a higher level of money laundering risk.\n\n### Myth 3: Grey listing has only negative impacts\n\nBeing added to the FATF grey list can trigger severe economic consequences for countries, especially low-income countries dependent on foreign investment and assistance. Investors and financial institutions may reduce their business in the country. A 2021 [IMF paper](https:\u002F\u002Fpapers.ssrn.com\u002Fsol3\u002Fpapers.cfm?abstract_id=4026331) found that capital inflows decline on average by 7.6 percent of GDP following grey listing, for example.\n\nFinancial institutions may also “de-risk” completely – cutting off all business to avoid the extra compliance and risk management costs. Individuals and businesses may have challenges accessing financial services as a result, leading to lower financial inclusion. Other [unintended consequences](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-12) may include an increase in the use of less regulated channels to move money.\n\nNegative economic consequences are not inevitable, however, especially for more developed economies. [Croatia’s economy and its financial sector](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.imf.org\u002Fen\u002FPublications\u002FCR\u002FIssues\u002F2024\u002F07\u002F26\u002FRepublic-of-Croatia-2024-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-552561), for example, both appear to be relatively unscathed by its placement on the grey list in 2023. S&P Global even [upgraded](https:\u002F\u002Fdisclosure.spglobal.com\u002Fratings\u002Fen\u002Fregulatory\u002Farticle\u002F-\u002Fview\u002Ftype\u002FHTML\u002Fid\u002F3250133) its long-term sovereign credit rating from BBB+ to A- in September 2023.\n\nWould it have done even better if it hadn’t been grey listed? It is hard to know – but in some cases perhaps being grey listed could even help a country’s performance in the long run, by motivating it to conduct necessary reforms quickly. For example, Iceland and Malta both managed to leave the grey list after just a year, having speedily fulfilled the requirements of their action plans.\n\nFor countries receiving development aid, grey listing can bring the benefit of increased targeted assistance to implement reforms and eventually exit the grey list. However, since authorities are typically aware of the risk of grey listing in advance (see Myth 2), it would be more effective if this assistance were provided earlier to help prevent the country from being listed in the first place.\n\n### Myth 4: The grey-listing system is inherently unfair\n\nCritics of the grey-listing system point out that it unfairly penalises low-income jurisdictions with less capacity for AML\u002FCFT but also lower significance due to their small financial centres.\n\nIt is true that low-income countries are disproportionately represented on the grey list, but this is changing. More than half of grey-listed countries at the time of writing are in [Sub-Saharan Africa](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff2c74bc1-2760-4bea-a118-aaa96b9cdf09), for example. Yet the addition of European countries in 2023 and 2024 – Bulgaria, Croatia and Monaco – shows that the geography is shifting.\n\nThe following figure shows the percentage of jurisdictions in each region on the grey list as of October 2024:\n\n[](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2025-02\u002FGraphic%20regional%20percentage%20FATF%20grey%20list.png)\n\n[New prioritisation criteria](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFatfgeneral\u002FFATF-grey-listing-criteria.html) announced in October 2024 in effect apply a risk-based approach to grey listing. High-income countries and jurisdictions with financial centres over USD 10 billion will be prioritised. Least developed countries as defined by the UN will not be prioritised except in rare cases of high risk, in which case they will have a longer time period to work on their deficiencies before being grey listed.\n\nAs these changes take effect, we should see the grey-listing geography shift towards higher-income countries that are deeply integrated in financial markets.\n\nAnd there are some simple things that a country can do to avoid grey listing – namely, prepare well for the mutual evaluation process, which is always announced well in advance. Quite basic actions can help, like preparing an up-to-date [national risk assessment](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-26-national-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risk-assessments) (and specific sectoral assessments where relevant), gathering statistical data and developing strategies to mitigate identified risks.\n\nThe Basel AML Index methodology does not penalise countries for being on the grey list, since the deficiencies that led to them being grey listed are already apparent in the mutual evaluation report data. In 2023, we also [updated our methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2023-reflecting-the-progress-of-grey-listed-jurisdictions-2513) to better capture improvements in the effectiveness of jurisdictions that exit the grey list, even if the FATF does not release new effectiveness data.\n\n### Myth 5: Leaving the grey list is the end of the story\n\nGrey listing is just one period in a country’s anti-money laundering journey. Being delisted is naturally a cause for celebration and hope, but it’s not the end of the story. Many jurisdictions have been grey listed more than once, including Cambodia, Nicaragua, Panama and Pakistan.\n\nFATF standards continue to evolve and to strengthen, so jurisdictions need to constantly improve in order to keep up.\n\nA prominent example highlighted in several Basel AML Index reports over the years is Recommendation 15 on virtual assets. After it was updated in 2018, almost all subsequently assessed jurisdictions [achieved lower levels of compliance](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fvirtual-currencies-are-we-missing-a-trick-insights-from-the-basel-aml-index-2023-2541) than previously. We can expect a similar effect with the [updated Recommendations 4 and 38](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Ffatf-seeks-change-landscape-international-asset-recovery-what-means-latin-america) on asset recovery, where there are still some countries that do not meet basic criteria such as having a non-conviction based forfeiture law or enforcing international judgements based on these laws.\n\nThe FATF’s fifth round of evaluations will [emphasise effectiveness](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fcontent\u002Ffatf-gafi\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FMutualevaluations\u002FFatf-methodology.html) over technical compliance. Countries will need to put in more effort to improve their effectiveness ratings, which are, on average, less than half as strong as their ratings for technical compliance.\n\nAs financial systems continue to evolve, criminals will find ever more ingenious ways to steal, launder and hide money or to use it for illicit purposes such as the financing of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Avoiding or graduating from the grey list is one step along a never-ending journey to a resilient system that successfully wards of money laundering and related threats while not limiting financial inclusion and innovation.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Read the [13th annual Public Edition report of the Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024).\n*   Explore the [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F).","2025-02-06","fatf-grey-list-truth-and-myths-2760","FATF grey list: truth and myths","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2397c564-394a-4f1e-8448-ec230a14810c?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[123,124],[71],[231],{"tags_id":232},{"id":134,"name":135},2760,[123,138],[71],[237],1090,[],[80],[],"2025-02-06T11:01:49.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:34.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ffatf-grey-list-truth-and-myths-2760",{"id":246,"body":247,"status":6,"type":10,"date":248,"slug":249,"title":250,"image":251,"countries":252,"topic":253,"activity":254,"tags":255,"nid":256,"topics":257,"activities":258,"authors":259,"images":262,"websites":20,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":21,"translations":263,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":264,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":265,"content":266,"link":267},10584,"As cryptoassets and other blockchain-based tokens enter the mainstream, alarm bells are ringing about the risks of their misuse. The technology is neutral in itself, but like any mechanism to transfer value, it can and does facilitate a wide range of crimes.\n\nAnd it’s not just scams, hacks and ransomware attacks. Cryptoassets are now seen in practically all crime types, from drug trafficking and terrorist financing to sanctions evasion, and increasingly as a tool for laundering the proceeds of those crimes.\n\nWhen it comes to the links between crypto and _corruption_, research and closed case examples are still scant. But since both are important enablers of crime, it’s vital to better understand how they intersect.\n\nThis blog outlines some basic areas of concern. Despite the gaps in data and analysis, one thing is clear. While the technologies are fairly new, the corrupt practices are not: they are simply manifesting in different ways.\n\n> _Crypto and corruption: what we mean_\n> \n> _In this blog we take a broad view of both crypto and corruption. By “crypto”, we mean cryptoassets such as Bitcoin (BTC) and Ether (ETH) as well as stablecoins tied to fiat currencies such as Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC); plus other digital tokens that run on public, decentralised blockchains. The scope also includes the companies, industries and services built around crypto, as well as the systems for their regulation and supervision and for law enforcement. “Corruption” refers not just to bribery, but to any abuse of entrusted power for undue benefit – whether financial or political, whether personal or for a collective entity._\n\n### 1 Crypto for bribery\n\nIs crypto a brilliant way to pay bribes and kickbacks? Transfers are pseudonymous after all – linked to long wallet addresses like _1Lbcfr2sAHTG9CgdQo3HTMTkV7LK4ZnX75_ rather than names. Transfers can be made directly between individuals, through decentralised platforms or peer-to-peer transactions, which avoids awkward questions about who is who and where the money comes from.\n\nCrypto holdings are easier to keep private, so might not be included in the asset declarations of politically exposed persons keen not to reveal all of their hidden wealth. And it’s fast and easy: you can transfer crypto to any person, anywhere in the world at the touch of a button. That makes it superficially more attractive than an international bank transfer, and less hassle and personal risk than travelling to another continent carrying suitcases stuffed with cash.\n\nSome clearly think crypto is great for bribes:\n\n*   In 2024, a Ukrainian Member of Parliament was [sentenced to eight years in prison](https:\u002F\u002Fhacc-decided.ti-ukraine.org\u002Fen\u002Fnews\u002Fnardepa-odarcenka-zasudili-do-8-rokiv-vyaznici) for offering a bribe of EUR 46,000 in bitcoin to secure funding for reconstruction projects.\n*   Crypto payments were allegedly made to a former senior official at the China Securities Regulatory Commission in return for [abuses of power](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ccn.com\u002Fnews\u002Fcrypto\u002Fyao-qian-china-cbdc-crypto-corruption\u002F) in making appointments and securing loans – alongside expensive liquor and invitations to banquets.\n*   In June 2025, two employees of the state-owned China Construction Bank were charged in Hong Kong with bribery and other offences: they allegedly accepted around USD 470,000 in crypto in exchange for [authenticating false documents](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.artemis.bm\u002Fnews\u002Fchina-construction-bank-manager-accused-of-accepting-bribes-from-vesttoo-employee\u002F) for the now-bankrupt Israeli firm Vesttoo.\n\nYet the use of crypto for bribery has a unique vulnerability: transactions on public blockchains are permanent and publicly visible. If investigators can verifiably link an address to a suspect, the evidence of the bribery remains accessible forever.\n\nSadly, it’s pretty hard to identify bribes or kickbacks being paid unless you already know there’s a bribery scheme or you know the addresses of suspected accomplices. That might explain why major crypto bribery cases haven’t surfaced (yet!).\n\n### 2 Laundering proceeds of corruption using crypto\n\nWhat about laundering the proceeds of corruption? For those with a lot of dirty money to launder, crypto adds a new dimension to the playbook.\n\nSure, keep the shell companies and offshore bank accounts, the trusts and real estate and gambling schemes, the hawala networks. Now you can add to the mix by converting corrupt proceeds into crypto, converting these to other coins, hopping across blockchains and using privacy-enhancing technologies to throw investigators off track.\n\nAs adoption of tokenised assets grows – digital representations of financial or real-world assets – we can expect corrupt actors to buy not only villas in Tuscany and ski apartments in Switzerland, but tokens representing these. And while you can’t ski on a digital token, it is likely attractive to money launderers to be able to trade in a broad range of investments while keeping the beneficial owner hidden.\n\nAre corrupt actors using crypto to launder their funds? There’s little direct evidence, but it does seem likely. Corrupt individuals have long relied on professional money laundering services, often provided by lawyers and accountants. [Europol](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.europol.europa.eu\u002Fpublications-events\u002Fmain-reports\u002Fsocta-report) warns that these professionals,\n\n> “increasingly with specialised knowledge in digital asset trading, have developed parallel, underground financial systems that operate outside the regulatory frameworks governing legal financial institutions”.\n\nAnd we do see that law enforcement is starting to take down organised groups that specialise in laundering illicit funds, including through crypto.\n\nAn [Australian takedown](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ato.gov.au\u002Fmedia-centre\u002Falleged-qld-money-laundering-organisation-dismantled) of an organised money laundering operation in June 2025, for example points to millions of tainted Australian dollars laundered through crypto exchanges as well as bank accounts, couriers, a car dealership and a sales company. Some outfits specialise in a specific clientele: in the Europol-coordinated [Operation Karasu](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.europol.europa.eu\u002Fmedia-press\u002Fnewsroom\u002Fnews\u002F17-providers-of-criminal-banking-services-arrested) in 2025, authorities arrested 17 suspects alleged to be providing money laundering services to Chinese- and Arabic-speaking clients using hawala banking, cash transactions and crypto.\n\nThe largest blockbuster takedown to date is the [October 2025 indictment of the Chairman of Prince Group](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.justice.gov\u002Fopa\u002Fpr\u002Fchairman-prince-group-indicted-operating-cambodian-forced-labor-scam-compounds-engaged), a Cambodia-based multinational business enterprise, and the filing of a forfeiture action for more than 127,000 bitcoin – approximately USD 15 billion at the time of seizure. The press release described the use of professional money laundering operations and pointed to highly sophisticated techniques, such as “spraying” stolen cryptoassets across multiple addresses to obscure the trail of the funds.\n\nCommenting on the indictment, the head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration highlighted the role of corruption in such schemes. He explained how: \n\n> complex criminal schemes \\[such as this\\] exploit global financial systems and emerging technologies to conceal illicit proceeds. These networks operate at the intersection of drug trafficking, corruption, and financial crime, threatening the stability of institutions and communities, alike.\n\n### 3 Corrupt law enforcement in crypto cases\n\nSay you’re a law enforcement officer – a public servant. You’re one of the few in your agency with the technical skills to trace and seize cryptoassets suspected of being involved in crime.\n\nYou see an opportunity to supplement your salary by stealing crypto during an investigation or taking payments from criminals to leave their holdings in peace. Nobody will know – surely?\n\n*   That’s what two US agents from the [Drug Enforcement Administration](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.justice.gov\u002Farchives\u002Fopa\u002Fpr\u002Fformer-dea-agent-sentenced-extortion-money-laundering-and-obstruction-related-silk-road) and [Secret Service](http:\u002F\u002Fwww.justice.gov\u002Farchives\u002Fopa\u002Fpr\u002Fformer-secret-service-agent-sentenced-scheme-related-silk-road-investigation) thought, when they abused their power as law enforcement officers and their access to government-controlled wallets to steal tens of millions of USD in bitcoin linked to the takedown of the illicit Silk Road online marketplace.\n*   In Russia, a former investigator was found guilty in 2023 of [accepting bitcoin bribes](https:\u002F\u002Fcointelegraph.com\u002Fnews\u002Frussia-seizes-10-million-bitcoin-from-official-biggest-bribery) equivalent to tens of millions of US dollars from an organised crime group in order not to confiscate their bitcoin holdings – estimated at USD 138 million at the time.\n*   In Iran, senior intelligence officers of the Revolutionary Guard are alleged to have gained around USD 21 million during the takedown of the Cryptoland exchange: following the CEO’s arrest, they [stole and sold his tokens](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.iranintl.com\u002Fen\u002F202503309549) before the arrest was made public and the tokens’ value collapsed. \n\nIt’s not uncommon for law enforcement officers to go rogue, or for bribes to be paid to influence law enforcement actions or judicial proceedings. So authorities don’t just need to build capacity to go after crypto-related crime. They also need to look out for crypto-related corruption risks among their own ranks, including entities such as asset management offices that have custody over seized and confiscated cryptoassets.\n\n### 4 When the crypto industry meets politics\n\nCrypto is a fast-evolving industry that demonstrates genuinely exciting financial and technological innovation. It’s no wonder that politicians all over the world are getting interested.\n\nCorrupt behaviour by politicians involving the crypto industry is still a realm of speculation, as data on real-world cases is sparse. But red flags for corruption are a common feature of all fast-growing, profitable industries with highly technical aspects, like mining and defence. So, it is sensible to look out for common risks, which span from licencing schemes to the shaping of cryptoasset regulations or the resources put into enforcement.\n\nWhen it comes to public trust in government, even suspicions of crypto-related wrongdoing matter. Examples range from a [political financing scandal in Colombia](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.theblock.co\u002Fpost\u002F293857\u002Fcolombian-president-crypto-donation-campaign-2022-daily-cop) to [graft accusations in Venezuela](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.barrons.com\u002Fnews\u002Fvenezuela-kills-off-petro-cryptocurrency-1e2b0317) and to allegations of [crypto-related irregularity affecting the US President](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.economist.com\u002Fleaders\u002F2025\u002F05\u002F15\u002Fcrypto-has-become-the-ultimate-swamp-asset) and his family.\n\nAnd in the Czech Republic, when the Justice Ministry [accepted a bitcoin donation](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.occrp.org\u002Fen\u002Fnews\u002Fbitcoin-scandal-triggers-czech-government-crisis) worth around USD 46 million from a convicted criminal, the ensuing scandal triggered a public investigation and the resignation of the Justice Minister; some feared it might even topple the government.\n\n### 5 Corruption fuelling organised crime and state capture\n\nThe link between crypto and corruption with possibly the most damaging social impact is its role in enabling criminal gangs to carry out cybercrime and launder money with impunity.\n\nAs detailed in a 2025 UNODC report on [corruption and cybercrime](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Froseap\u002Fuploads\u002Fdocuments\u002FPublications\u002F2025\u002F2025.10.21_The_Nexus_Between_Cybercrime_and_Corruption.pdf), corruption both creates the “permissive environment” that allow cybercrime operations to flourish and “enables many daily operations of cybercriminal networks.”\n\nIn [Southeast Asia](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Froseap\u002Fen\u002F2025\u002F04\u002Fcyberfraud-inflection-point-mekong\u002Fstory.html), for example, a separate UNODC report depicts how industrial-scale scam centres run by organised crime groups generate huge amounts of illegal revenue – mostly in crypto. Despite often being plainly identified in public reports, they remain operational and engage in human trafficking to obtain unwilling workers. The report emphasises “high rates of corruption which criminal actors can leverage” to continue their scam operations unmolested.\n\nUNODC warns that the revenue generated by scam centres, coupled with the ability to easily launder the stolen crypto, is increasing the power and influence of organised crime groups as well as their financial liquidity. And that gives them even more ability to corrupt and capture politicians and states.\n\nThat may already be happening, according to a November 2025 _Economist_ report on [allegations of political collusion](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.economist.com\u002Fasia\u002F2025\u002F11\u002F20\u002Fthe-politicians-protecting-huge-criminal-networks) in scam operations in Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand. These have led to the resignation of a deputy finance minister, the jailing of a mayor and a warning from Thailand's deputy leader of the opposition that without action against politicians colluding in scam operations,\n\n> “we’ll wake up to find the country run by crooks in suits\".\n\n### What to do?\n\nCrypto represents an exciting transformation in financial systems. The industry and its underlying technology could improve privacy, efficiency and access to financial markets. This may benefit many people poorly served by today’s centralised systems.\n\nBut without a clear understanding of crypto-related risks and proper safeguards, the industry could create more opportunities for corruption and related financial crimes such as money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions evasion. Crypto-fuelled corruption could weaken trust in governments and be leveraged to undermine the stability and security of nation states.\n\nAt the Basel Institute, we’re keen to explore better how the worlds of crypto and corruption intersect and how best to mitigate both systemic and day-to-day risks. We’re also committed to building the capacity of anti-corruption and asset recovery practitioners to “follow the money” across blockchains and to connect these to wider financial and criminal investigations.\n\nBeyond training for [individuals](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcrypto-aml-training) and [public agencies](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002FICAR-training), we also bring together people from across sectors and geographies at our annual [Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptoassets](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002F9crc) together with Europol and UNODC. Look out for more on this topic in the coming months!","2025-11-27","crypto-the-ultimate-enabler-of-corruption-2882","Crypto: the ultimate enabler of corruption?","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd41fd31d-6c56-48e0-96cc-2be74f18b731?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[124],[71],[],2882,[138],[71],[260,261],1360,1361,[],[],"2025-11-27T17:01:44.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:38.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcrypto-the-ultimate-enabler-of-corruption-2882",{"id":269,"body":270,"status":6,"type":10,"date":271,"slug":272,"title":273,"image":274,"countries":275,"topic":276,"activity":277,"tags":278,"nid":279,"topics":280,"activities":281,"authors":282,"images":285,"websites":286,"area":20,"programme":20,"language":20,"translations":287,"translation_of":20,"user_created":39,"date_created":288,"user_updated":83,"date_updated":84,"content":289,"link":290},10433,"_This blog was originally published on the FCPA Blog, which was discontinued in February 2024._\n\nThe release on October 4 of the [11th Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F) drew attention not only to its ranking of money laundering risks in 128 countries but for its stark message: in a fast-changing world, progress in addressing money laundering and terrorist financing risks is not moving fast enough.\n\nThis year’s report explains that a small improvement in risks relating to the quality of countries’ anti-money laundering frameworks is offset by increased risks in four other areas measured by the Basel AML Index: corruption and bribery, political transparency, financial transparency, and political\u002Flegal risks.\n\nBut while money laundering continues to be a major problem from year to year, the factors that contribute to money laundering risk are evolving. One such evolution is the growing realization that money laundering weaknesses are enabling criminals to profit from harming our fragile environment. This is why this year’s Index includes a new environmental crime indicator in its set of (now) 18 indicators.\n\nWhat does environmental crime exactly have to do with money laundering risk? And what does the initial data show?\n\n_Corruption and money laundering are destroying the planet._ Environmental crimes like illegal wildlife trade, forestry crimes, illegal mining and waste trafficking are destroying our natural resources and threatening sustainable livelihoods. Together they are said to make up the world’s [fourth largest criminal industry](https:\u002F\u002Fwedocs.unep.org\u002Fhandle\u002F20.500.11822\u002F7662;jsessionid=6D555A85B36ED7EEACFD8B5E159C3069) after drug trafficking, human trafficking and counterfeiting. Estimates indicate that environmental crime produces massive illicit proceeds, [estimated](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fmethodsandtrends\u002Fdocuments\u002Fmoney-laundering-from-environmental-crime.html) at $110 billion to $281 billion each year. It is [growing](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unep.org\u002Fresources\u002Freport\u002Frise-environmental-crime-growing-threat-natural-resources-peace-development-and) at an annual 5–7 percent, more than the pace of global economic growth. While such estimates make numerous assumptions and are thus to be taken with a grain of salt, they nonetheless indicate the scale of the problem.\n\nThe global community is only just starting to realise the many roles that corruption plays in facilitating environmental crimes, with some [outstanding efforts](http:\u002F\u002Ftnrcproject.org\u002F) that lead the charge. Research is also highlighting the myriad ways in which criminals launder the massive illicit proceeds, thereby fuelling our present environmental catastrophe.\n\nThe decision to include the environmental crime data was made at the annual review meeting of the Basel AML Index, which draws experts from across sectors and geographies. The review helps to ensure that the methodology continues to be relevant and to reflect current evolutions in the anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism (AML\u002FCFT) landscape.\n\nThe inclusion aligns with the strong recommendation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that environmental crimes should be considered predicate offences for money laundering. This recommendation in turn echoes statements by other bodies, from the [UN General Assembly](https:\u002F\u002Fdocuments-dds-ny.un.org\u002Fdoc\u002FUNDOC\u002FGEN\u002FN19\u002F431\u002F54\u002FPDF\u002FN1943154.pdf?OpenElement) to the [European Union](https:\u002F\u002Fec.europa.eu\u002Fcommission\u002Fpresscorner\u002Fdetail\u002Fen\u002Fqanda_21_6745), [Eurojust](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.eurojust.europa.eu\u002Fpublication\u002Freport-eurojusts-casework-environmental-crime) and [INTERPOL and the UN Environment Program](https:\u002F\u002Fwedocs.unep.org\u002Fhandle\u002F20.500.11822\u002F9120), that it is essential to tackle the financial drivers of environmental crimes – the corrupt deals and the money laundering that facilitate criminal activity and make it profitable.\n\nUntil now, reliable data on countries’ risks of environmental crime were lacking. The [Global Organized Crime Index](https:\u002F\u002Focindex.net\u002F) has changed this. First published in 2021 by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC), the expert-led assessment looks at both levels of criminality and resilience to organised crime in the 193 countries covered.\n\nThe Basel AML Index uses data from GITOC’s index on crimes involving flora, fauna, and non-renewable resources such as minerals. The new indicator is assigned a 5 percent weight, matching existing indicators on human trafficking and narcotics trafficking. We are thereby attempting to elevate the importance of this frequently overlooked crime.\n\n_Initial insights._ Based on the data, the average global score for environmental crime is 3.62 out of 10, where 10 is the maximum risk. This sounds fairly low, but there is great variation between jurisdictions – from the highest risk score of 8.33 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) to the lowest of 0.19 (San Marino and Iceland).\n\nSub-Saharan Africa has the dubious honour of being the region with the highest risks of both environmental crime and money laundering. Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania and perform particularly poorly. Next up is the region of East Asia and the Pacific, where environmental crime scores are high for Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam.\n\nInterestingly, there is almost 100 percent correlation between a low risk of money laundering and a low risk of environmental crime. Andorra, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, San Marino, Slovenia, and Sweden, for example, all perform among the best countries in both.\n\nA similar trend, but with a less strong relation, is observed in high-risk countries. For instance, a high risk in the overall money laundering score correlates with high risks of environmental crime for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Madagascar, Myanmar, Mozambique, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.\n\n_What do we need?_ First, more and better data. While reliable enough to be included in the Basel AML Index, the Global Organized Crime Index is based on expert-led desk research from open sources. While GITOC has gone [to some length](https:\u002F\u002Fglobalinitiative.net\u002Fwp-content\u002Fuploads\u002F2021\u002F09\u002FGITOC-Global-Organized-Crime-Index-2021.pdf) to reduce these biases, having more than one source of data to rely on would allow for greater research depth.\n\nThe FATF and its regional bodies have started to assess jurisdictions’ risks associated with environmental crime as part of their rolling program of mutual evaluations. However, this assessment is conducted only as a part of the existing FATF Recommendation 1 and Immediate Outcome 1 on understanding ML\u002FTF risks and applying a risk-based approach to address them.\n\nMore focus on this issue is needed to provide the kind of disaggregated and detailed data we really need on different types of environmental crime and their links to money laundering.\n\nSecond, more action. The Basel Institute’s [Green Corruption program](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fgreen-corruption) is seeing fast-growing demand for technical assistance in applying existing tools designed to combat corruption and other financial crimes to tackle environmental crimes.\n\nFor example, governments are increasingly realising the value of conducting parallel financial investigations in cases of illegal wildlife trade and forest crimes, as the FATF recommends in the above-linked report. This enables law enforcement officers to identify and disrupt not only the poachers and illegal loggers, but the high-level traffickers and their corrupt facilitators who profit from the crimes. While appreciation for the importance of these parallel investigations is growing, they are still too frequently an afterthought to seizures and arrests.\n\nThe countries in which the Green Corruption program is currently active suffer medium to high risks of environmental crimes, according to the Global Organized Crime Index data. Indonesia, our newest country of operation, is evaluated as having a high risk, at 7.41 out of 10. In Latin America, Bolivia and Peru score 6.3 and 6.85 respectively. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Malawi (4.07) and Uganda (6.17) also face significant challenges.\n\nEfforts to address the environmental crimes that are threatening these countries’ sustainable development need to go hand in hand with improving resilience to money laundering.","2022-10-10","fcpa-blog-corruption-and-money-laundering-are-destroying-the-planet-2602","FCPA Blog: Corruption and money laundering are destroying the planet","https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcms\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F58e429e1-d67e-460d-84e3-aa81f0addec6?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=90",[],[123,98],[14],[],2602,[123,98],[],[283,284],1027,1028,[],[80],[],"2024-03-19T11:01:38.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ffcpa-blog-corruption-and-money-laundering-are-destroying-the-planet-2602",{"left":292,"top":292,"width":293,"height":293,"rotate":292,"vFlip":294,"hFlip":294,"body":295},0,20,false,"\u003Cpath fill=\"currentColor\" fill-rule=\"evenodd\" d=\"M17 10a.75.75 0 0 1-.75.75H5.612l4.158 3.96a.75.75 0 1 1-1.04 1.08l-5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 0 1 0-1.08l5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 1 1 1.04 1.08L5.612 9.25H16.25A.75.75 0 0 1 17 10\" clip-rule=\"evenodd\"\u002F>",1782230618534]