[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":295},["ShallowReactive",2],{"news-2023-annual-report-foreword-by-peter-maurer-2634":3,"news-2023-annual-report-foreword-by-peter-maurer-2634-similar":62,"i-heroicons:arrow-left-20-solid":290},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"date_created":7,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":15,"activity":16,"nid":19,"topics":20,"activities":21,"programme":22,"area":22,"websites":23,"language":22,"image":25,"translation_of":22,"countries":36,"tags":37,"authors":38,"images":59,"translations":60,"content":61},10445,"published","2024-05-28T10:01:30.000Z","2025-08-31T23:14:40.000Z","2023 Annual Report: Foreword by Peter Maurer","News","Published today, the 2023 Annual Report of the Basel Institute on Governance features seven stories from our work around the world to promote good governance and counter corruption.\n\nThe stories showcase different ways in which we collaborate with partners globally to advance knowledge, practice and policy on anti-corruption, asset recovery and business integrity. They illustrate not just _what we do,_ but _how we work_ to achieve real and lasting progress towards a more peaceful, just and sustainable world. \n\nRead the foreword by Peter Maurer below and [download the annual report](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2024-05\u002Fbasel_institute_annual_report_2023_spreads.pdf).\n\n> The final preparations of this annual report were overshadowed by the tragic news that Gretta Fenner, Managing Director of the Basel Institute on Governance for nearly two decades, had passed away in a car accident in Kenya on 6 April 2024.\n> \n> While we continue to be deeply saddened by the loss, we also know that Gretta was immensely proud of the Basel Institute’s achievements in 2023, as well as of the progress made over the Institute’s 20 years of existence – the latter, a large part of her legacy.\n> \n> And there are indeed many reasons to be proud and optimistic. While corruption scandals hit the headlines, the more important stories of anti-corruption progress tend to advance quietly over years. Many of the standout achievements in this annual report are not just from 2023.\n> \n> Second, anti-corruption tools yield benefits that go far beyond the immediate goal of reducing corruption risks. For example, when we provide advice to companies on compliance and multi-stakeholder Collective Action (page 18), the goal is not merely to reduce the risk of compliance-related violations but to foster resilient, ethical companies, fair competition and thriving industries.\n> \n> A third reason for optimism is that corruption is finally appearing on the agenda where it really matters – notably in the environmental sector. Our Green Corruption team has been working hard to embed anticorruption and asset recovery tools in the environmental sphere, and to build bridges between the anti-corruption and conservation communities (pages 14 and 17).\n> \n> At the Basel Institute, connections like these feed into our evolving understanding of corruption and of the changing tactics of power brokers on the political and geopolitical stage. From a narrowly defined legal concept, corruption has become a phenomenon that connects the biggest issues of our time. \n> \n> What global challenge is not caused or worsened by misuses of power and influence, with the aim of benefitting the few over the many?\n> \n> As Gretta said at the Munich Security Conference shortly before her passing, the old idea of corruption as “just” bribery causes us to overlook patterns of behaviour that have long-term, systemic impacts on both national and global stability.\n> \n> So, while we are a centre of technical competence, and advise governments worldwide on their laws and policies on corruption and asset recovery, the solutions we bring are never isolated from their political and social context.\n> \n> And we use behavioural science to better understand what really causes corrupt behaviour, and what might work to shift social norms towards compliance with laws, codes of ethics and other elements of the formal anti-corruption and anti-money laundering architecture.\n> \n> That is also why a big focus of our work is on engaging and connecting with others in the anti-corruption, asset recovery and business integrity fields, and beyond. Even if, or rather especially if, they have competing priorities. Only through negotiation and dialogue can one forge the type of common understanding and consensus that form the basis of effective and concerted action against corruption.\n> \n> As the stories in this annual report show, the trust and partnership of our donors and collaborators are vital in order for us to make progress in often turbulent and unpredictable political contexts. We are deeply grateful to those who support our ultimate goal of fighting corruption for a better world, who trust our way of working and who are willing to invest for long-term success.\n> \n> By jointly designing interventions and building in flexibility, we can continue to leverage our individual and collective resources, achieve greater impact and relevance and keep alive Gretta’s legacy over the Institute’s next 20 years and beyond.","2024-05-28",[14],"","2023-annual-report-foreword-by-peter-maurer-2634",[17,18],"Reports","Insights",2634,[],[17,18],null,[24],"Main page",{"id":26,"storage":27,"filename_disk":28,"filename_download":29,"title":9,"type":30,"created_on":31,"modified_on":31,"charset":22,"filesize":32,"width":33,"height":34,"duration":22,"embed":22,"description":22,"location":22,"tags":22,"metadata":35,"focal_point_x":22,"focal_point_y":22,"tus_id":22,"tus_data":22,"uploaded_on":31},"57bcce3f-245f-41d0-aabd-2fa58a0c5a09","local","57bcce3f-245f-41d0-aabd-2fa58a0c5a09.webp","tmp.webp","image\u002Fwebp","2025-05-12T21:10:49.000Z",49982,1400,933,{},[],[],[39],{"id":40,"news_id":41,"authors_id":55},1113,{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":42,"date_created":7,"user_updated":43,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":26,"date":12,"topic":44,"slug":15,"activity":45,"nid":19,"topics":46,"activities":47,"programme":22,"area":22,"websites":48,"translation_of":22,"language":22,"countries":49,"tags":50,"authors":51,"images":52,"translations":53,"content":54},"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","b0662e2a-864d-4888-a1b7-4342b7570b30",[14],[17,18],[],[17,18],[24],[],[],[40],[],[],[],{"id":56,"name":57,"position":22,"image":58},558,"Dr Peter Maurer","77976774-7119-48eb-9813-0979e38abf71",[],[],[],[63,84,108,132,155,184,217,242,266],{"id":64,"body":65,"status":6,"type":10,"date":66,"slug":67,"title":68,"image":69,"countries":70,"topic":71,"activity":72,"tags":73,"nid":74,"topics":75,"activities":76,"authors":77,"images":78,"websites":79,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":22,"translations":80,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":81,"user_updated":43,"date_updated":8,"content":82,"link":83},10373,"We are delighted to publish our [2022 Annual Report](https:\u002F\u002Far.baselgovernance.org\u002F), this year in a new interactive version.\n\nThe Annual Report spotlights eight stories from our work around the world. They illustrate not just _what we do,_ but _how we work_ to achieve real and lasting progress in the fight against corruption.\n\n*   How we seek to change behaviours using a range of prevention and enforcement tools.\n*   Our continual efforts to encourage dialogue between stakeholders.\n*   The fact that people are at the heart of our work.\n*   Keeping up with the changing nature of corruption by fostering virtuous learning circles and helping practitioners to help each other.\n\nWe take the opportunity to thank Professor [Mark Pieth](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fmark-pieth-fighting-corruption-basel-institute-and-beyond), our Co-Founder and President for nearly 20 years, and to welcome his successor Peter Maurer.\n\nWe also highlight two long-standing members of our Management Group who are taking a step back after long and productive careers: [Gemma Aiolfi](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fevolutions-anti-corruption-compliance-hope-future), Head of Compliance and Collective Action until 2022, and [Phyllis Atkinson](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fpersonal-history-icar-training-qa-phyllis-atkinson), Head of Training at our International Centre for Asset Recovery until July 2023.\n\nOur achievements are shared success stories, jointly realised with our valued partners in government and international organisations, civil society and the private sector – to whom we are immensely grateful. As we move forward into our 20th year, we remain focused on a world of peace, where prosperity, equality and progress may thrive and corruption is crushed.\n\n*   [Read the Annual Report online](https:\u002F\u002Far.baselgovernance.org\u002F)\n*   [Download the PDF](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2023-06\u002FAR%202022%20DIGITAL.pdf)","2023-06-20","out-now-annual-report-2022-2470","Out now: Annual Report 2022","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9245b10d-08f4-436a-9a5b-371305b49c8c?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[14],[14],[],2470,[],[],[],[],[24],[],"2023-06-20T21:49:34.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fout-now-annual-report-2022-2470",{"id":85,"body":86,"status":6,"type":87,"date":88,"slug":89,"title":90,"image":91,"countries":92,"topic":93,"activity":95,"tags":97,"nid":98,"topics":99,"activities":100,"authors":101,"images":102,"websites":103,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":22,"translations":104,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":105,"user_updated":43,"date_updated":8,"content":106,"link":107},10506,"The [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F) – the Basel Institute’s ranking and risk assessment tool for money laundering risks around the world – will include indicators of fraud in its 2024 methodology update.\n\nThe changes reflect the growing significance of fraud as a predicate offence to money laundering and as a risk that regulated entities need to consider. Though definitions of fraud vary and data is both poor and inconsistent, the social and economic consequences of fraud make it impossible to ignore in any money laundering risk assessment.\n\nThe changes will be implemented in the 13th Public Edition of the Basel AML Index, due to be published on 2 December this year, as well as in the subscription-based [Expert Edition and Expert Edition Plus](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fexpert-edition) from that point onwards.\n\n### Spotlight: fraud on the rise\n\nStatistics from global financial centres (e.g. [US](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thomsonreuters.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fposts\u002Finvestigation-fraud-and-risk\u002Fsars-fraud-2024\u002F), [UK](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk\u002Fwho-we-are\u002Fpublications\u002F632-2022-sars-annual-report-1\u002Ffile), [Switzerland](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fedpol.admin.ch\u002Ffedpol\u002Fen\u002Fhome\u002Fkriminalitaet\u002Fgeldwaescherei\u002Fjb.html), [Canada](https:\u002F\u002Ffintrac-canafe.canada.ca\u002Fpublications\u002Far\u002F2023\u002Far2023-eng.pdf)) indicate that fraud is among the top offences reported in suspicious activity reports submitted by banks and other regulated entities.\n\nAccording to the [U.S. 2024 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment](https:\u002F\u002Fhome.treasury.gov\u002Fsystem\u002Ffiles\u002F136\u002F2024-National-Money-Laundering-Risk-Assessment.pdf), \"\\[f\\]raud remains the largest and most significant proceed-generating crime for which funds are laundered in or through the United States.\" [Singapore’s 2024 National Risk Assessment](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.mof.gov.sg\u002Fdocs\u002Fdefault-source\u002Fdefault-document-library\u002Fml-national-risk-assessment.pdf?sfvrsn=3edc6832_3) likewise identifies fraud – particularly cyber-enabled fraud – as one of the country’s key money laundering threats.\n\nThe threat posed by fraud is not just about financial systems, but about its devastating impact on ordinary individuals and companies. Introducing the [2024 INTERPOL Global Financial Fraud Assessment](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.interpol.int\u002Fen\u002FNews-and-Events\u002FNews\u002F2024\u002FINTERPOL-Financial-Fraud-assessment-A-global-threat-boosted-by-technology), INTERPOL’s Secretary General referred to an “epidemic in the growth of financial fraud, leading to individuals, often vulnerable people, and companies being defrauded on a massive and global scale”. The assessment highlights the prevalence of investment, romance and advance payment fraud schemes.\n\nMethods used to commit fraud are also becoming more sophisticated and diversified. Technological advancements, including in artificial intelligence and virtual assets, can make (cyber) fraud and the laundering of proceeds easier to commit and more complex to investigate. The FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units have joined forces on a new initiative to [counter illicit financial flows from cyber-enabled fraud](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FMethodsandtrends\u002Fillicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.html), noting its link to other forms of criminality including human trafficking and proliferation financing.\n\n### Challenges around definitions and data\n\nBased on discussions with leading financial crime experts at two annual review meetings, we have decided to integrate fraud indicators into the Basel AML Index [methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fmethodology).\n\nThis decision comes with challenges, including:\n\n*   the broad and disputed definition and scope of “fraud”;\n*   the complex, cross-border nature of many forms of fraud and the difficulty in assigning risks to a particular jurisdiction;\n*   poor data availability, exacerbated by significant underreporting and no global standard.\n\nOther indicators of ML\u002FTF risk related to financial crimes of a cross-border nature face similar challenges. Lack of reliable data and analysis in particular is a major [obstacle to countering fraud risks](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.interpol.int\u002Fen\u002FNews-and-Events\u002FNews\u002F2024\u002FINTERPOL-Financial-Fraud-assessment-A-global-threat-boosted-by-technology).\n\n### Pragmatic approach\n\nThe Basel AML Index is primarily a framework for assessing geographic risk, defined as a jurisdiction’s vulnerability to money laundering and related financial crimes and its capacities to counter these threats. and its capacities to counter it. The Index does not attempt to measure the actual amount of money laundering activity.\n\nTherefore we believe it is appropriate for the Basel AML Index methodology to incorporate fraud data with clear caveats and a transparent recognition of the above challenges and weaknesses.\n\nGiven the lack of a globally accepted definition, we use the term fraud loosely as an umbrella term for activities that involve deliberate deception of an individual or entity for the sake of obtaining a financial gain. These crimes are often transnational, orchestrated by organised criminal actors and facilitated by technology.\n\nFraud-related data will be sourced from the [Global Organized Crime Index](https:\u002F\u002Focindex.net\u002F). This source most closely aligns with the Basel AML Index standards on data quality and coverage.\n\nData will be taken from two categories:\n\n*   “Financial crimes”, covering financial fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement and misuse of funds\n*   “Cyber-dependent crimes”, including malware, hacking, ransomware and cryptocurrency fraud\n\nBoth indicators will join indicators of corruption in Domain 2 of the Basel AML Index methodology, with a weighting of 5 percent and 2.5 percent respectively.\n\n### Other changes\n\nThree outdated indicators will be removed, bringing the total to 17:\n\n*   \"Extent of corporate transparency\" from the World Bank’s discontinued _Doing Business_ report.\n*   “Strength of auditing and reporting standards” and “Institutional pillar” from the World Economic Forum’s discontinued _Global Competitiveness Report._\n\nData from the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index will move to Domain 3 on financial transparency and standards. This will enable Basel AML Index Expert Edition users to more clearly separate jurisdictions’ performance on financial transparency from other aspects of their anti-money laundering framework.\n\nMinor adjustments have been made to the weighting to account for the above changes.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Join the [online launch event on 4 December 2024](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2714).\n*   View the Basel AML Index and its current [methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fmethodology) (prior to the above changes).\n*   Sign up for the [Expert Edition](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fexpert-edition) or Expert Edition Plus to explore the current data – it’s free for users from public-sector, non-profit and multilateral entities as well as journalists and academics.","Blog","2024-10-29","basel-aml-index-updates-methodology-to-reflect-rising-global-fraud-risks-2713","Basel AML Index updates methodology to reflect rising global fraud risks","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fd49abadd-b50c-42d9-bba6-a10ee75414f0?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[94],"Anti-Money Laundering",[96],"Basel AML Index",[],2713,[94],[96],[],[],[24,96],[],"2024-11-07T09:34:34.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fbasel-aml-index-updates-methodology-to-reflect-rising-global-fraud-risks-2713",{"id":109,"body":110,"status":6,"type":10,"date":111,"slug":112,"title":113,"image":114,"countries":115,"topic":117,"activity":119,"tags":121,"nid":122,"topics":123,"activities":124,"authors":125,"images":126,"websites":127,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":22,"translations":128,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":129,"user_updated":43,"date_updated":8,"content":130,"link":131},10378,"The San Martín region of northern Peru is known for its Amazon rainforest and rich biodiversity. To protect these, the regional authorities have recently agreed an action plan to reduce corruption risks in the timber trade, which is an important local source of livelihoods.\n\nThe action plan is based on principles of integrity and transparency and takes into account Peruvian laws and regulations such as the _General Guidelines to Implement Internal Control Systems_ and _Recommendations for the Management of Risks Affecting Public Integrity_.\n\nAlongside control measures to prevent corruption risks in the timber value chain, it specifies the bodies or units that are responsible for implementing these and the deadlines for their implementation. This is important for monitoring, follow-up and accountability.\n\nOur Green Corruption programme has been providing technical assistance to the Regional Government and Regional Environmental Authority of San Martín in developing the plan, under a framework agreement signed on 24 May 2023. We congratulate the authorities of San Martín on being the first region in Peru to introduce such a plan, and look forward to providing further support with the implementation.\n\n### Addressing corruption risks in forest and wildlife management\n\nThe passing of the action plan underscores the commitment of San Martín’s high-level authorities to strengthening forestry and wildlife management using a risk management approach.\n\nAt a wider level, the development illustrates two important aspects of tackling environmental crime:\n\n#### Ground-level action\n\nFirst, international and national laws and policies are important in the fight against environmental crime. But it is at the ground level that things need to happen, and where the challenges to implementation are.\n\nThis is why our [Green Corruption programme](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fgreen-corruption) works with individual state-owned-enterprises, agencies and governments at the subnational as well as national level. Important is that they demonstrate – as San Martín’s regional government does – the political will to acknowledge and address corruption risks that threaten their precious environment.\n\n#### Emphasis on prevention\n\nSecond, international attention tends to focus on the enforcement of laws against illegal wildlife trade and other environmental crimes.\n\nEnforcement is critical to bring criminals and their corrupt facilitators to justice and to take away their illicit gains. It can have a strong deterrent effect. But ultimately, we need to prevent the crimes from happening in the first place.\n\n[Corruption risk assessments](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fcorruption-risk-assessments-and-illegal-wildlife-trade-enforcement) and projects to strengthen [internal controls](http:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-24-internal-controls-and-anti-corruption) may not hit the headlines, but they can go a long way to stopping corruption from facilitating environmental crimes.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   [See the San Martín Regional Government press release](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gob.pe\u002Finstitucion\u002Fregionsanmartin\u002Fnoticias\u002F779415-firman-plan-de-accion-para-reducir-riesgos-de-corrupcion-en-la-cadena-de-valor-de-la-madera).\n*   The above-mentioned work takes place under the project \"Promoting asset recovery techniques in crimes against the environment and preventing environmental corruption in Peru\", funded by the UK's Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. [Learn more about the CSSF](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gov.uk\u002Fgovernment\u002Forganisations\u002Fconflict-stability-and-security-fund\u002Fabout).\n*   Learn more about how our Green Corruption programme balances prevention and enforcement in this feature in our Annual Report 2022: [From seizing fishing vessels to supporting SOEs.](https:\u002F\u002Far.baselgovernance.org\u002F16\u002F)\n*   The Basel Institute has been working closely with Peruvian subnational governments since 2015, under the successful [Programa GFP Subnacional](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gfpsubnacional.pe\u002F) programme funded by the Swiss SECO Cooperation in Peru.","2023-07-11","cutting-corruption-in-the-timber-trade-in-northern-peru-action-plan-2486","Cutting corruption in the timber trade in northern Peru: action plan","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6823b760-09f8-4781-bcb2-ef7cb5e48cbc?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[116],7175,[118],"Green Corruption",[120],"Partnerships",[],2486,[118],[120],[],[],[24],[],"2023-07-11T10:01:29.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcutting-corruption-in-the-timber-trade-in-northern-peru-action-plan-2486",{"id":133,"body":134,"status":6,"type":10,"date":135,"slug":136,"title":137,"image":138,"countries":139,"topic":141,"activity":143,"tags":144,"nid":145,"topics":146,"activities":147,"authors":148,"images":149,"websites":150,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":22,"translations":151,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":152,"user_updated":43,"date_updated":8,"content":153,"link":154},10331,"Peru has taken an important step towards improving integrity in its public administration and the ability of public-sector entities to deliver services to citizens.\n\nThe Government’s Secretariat for Public Integrity has published a new [Guide to Managing Risks that Affect Public Integrity](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fguia-para-la-gestion-de-riesgos-que-afectan-la-integridad-publica), with the technical support of the Swiss SECO-funded [Strengthening Subnational Public Finance Management Programme](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gfpsubnacional.pe\u002F) implemented by the Basel Institute on Governance.\n\nIn a [press release](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gob.pe\u002Finstitucion\u002Fpcm\u002Fnoticias\u002F686880-ejecutivo-publica-guia-para-gestionar-riesgos-de-corrupcion-en-la-administracion-publica) following the Guide’s formal adoption by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister Alberto Otárola stressed that this action reflects the government's firm commitment to advancing the fight against corruption using a preventive approach.\n\nIts publication, Prime Minister Otárola said, aligns with the policies of President Dina Boluarte and commitments made at the last session of the High Level Anti-Corruption Commission, during the presentation of [Peru's Anti-Corruption Agenda](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gob.pe\u002Finstitucion\u002Fcan\u002Finformes-publicaciones\u002F3810790-agenda-anticorrupcion-medidas-a-corto-y-mediano-plazo-a-impulsar-durante-el-gobierno-de-transicion).\n\n### What it covers\n\nThe guide seeks to help Peru’s public institutions reduce the risk of corruption and other misconduct, especially in critical areas such as service provision, public procurement and human resources.\n\nIt provides detailed guidance on the underlying framework and fundamental aspects of integrity risk management plus the four phases: identification, evaluation, mitigation and monitoring\u002Fcontinuous improvement.\n\nBased on international best practices and tailored to Peru’s context, the Guide will strengthen the risk management component of the national Integrity Model that public-sector entities in the country are progressively adopting.\n\n### Another achievement of _Programa GFP_\n\nSince 2015, a dedicated group of [Public Finance Management](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublic-finance-peru) experts has been assisting subnational governments in 11 regions and municipalities in Peru to improve their management of public finances.\n\n_Programa GFP_, funded by the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and [extended](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fsubnational-public-finance-management-programme-peru-hits-ground-running-second-phase) by the Peruvian and Swiss governments in 2019, has made significant achievements in the last seven years.\n\nAmong other things, an innovative [training concept](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fperus-innovation-week-showcases-training-concept-our-public-finance-management-team) enabled thousands of public officials to continue building capacity even during the worst of the Covid-19 pandemic. As described in this [excerpt](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2023-01\u002FPFM%20Peru_annual%20report%20excerpt.pdf) from the Basel Institute’s 2021 Annual Report, technical support by the Programme’s mentors and advisors has enabled the collection of significantly more tax revenue and improved efficiency of essential services such as vaccine rollouts, the provision of school books and waste management.\n\nLearn more about the risk management guide and programme on the [Programa GFP website](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gfpsubnacional.pe\u002F2023\u002F01\u002F09\u002Fejecutivo-publica-guia-para-gestionar-riesgos-de-corrupcion-en-la-administracion-publica\u002F) (in Spanish).","2023-01-19","peruvian-government-publishes-integrity-risk-management-guidelines-with-support-from-the-basel-institutes-public-finance-management-programme-2342","Peruvian Government publishes integrity risk management guidelines with support from the Basel Institute’s Public Finance Management programme","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F50a661d0-e004-4711-a83e-afa956d710d5?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[140],7205,[142],"Public Finance Management",[14],[],2342,[142],[],[],[],[24],[],"2023-01-19T17:01:26.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fperuvian-government-publishes-integrity-risk-management-guidelines-with-support-from-the-basel-institutes-public-finance-management-programme-2342",{"id":156,"body":157,"status":6,"type":87,"date":158,"slug":159,"title":160,"image":161,"countries":162,"topic":163,"activity":164,"tags":165,"nid":173,"topics":174,"activities":175,"authors":176,"images":178,"websites":179,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":22,"translations":180,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":181,"user_updated":43,"date_updated":8,"content":182,"link":183},10528,"_This article is adapted from the [2024 Basel AML Index public report](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024)._ \n\n> Sound like someone you know?\n> \n> The 84-year-old who lost his life savings after receiving a panicked call from someone who sounded exactly like his granddaughter, saying she was in jail for drug possession and needed USD 10,000 for bail...\n> \n> The lonely widow seeking companionship online, who sent cash via a money transfer service to his long-distance love – who in actual fact was himself a victim of human trafficking, trapped in a \"scam centre\" on the other side of the world and defrauding hundreds simultaneously…\n> \n> The small business owner who suffered reputational and financial loss after his identity was stolen and used to establish shell companies and purchase goods as part of a money laundering scheme...\n> \n> The young professional, excited by the buzz around cryptocurrency, who invested USD 15,000 in an online crypto platform advertised on social media that promised guaranteed high returns – which vanished before she could withdraw them…\n> \n> The government that loses billions of dollars annually to healthcare fraud, money that should be spent on some of the most vulnerable in society.\n\nStories of fraud and scams like those in the box above make clear the human impact of financial crime. The financial impact is no less horrifying. The UK is estimated to lose over a [USD 1.5 billion annually to fraud](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ukfinance.org.uk\u002Fsystem\u002Ffiles\u002F2024-05\u002FAnnual%20Fraud%20Report%202024_0.pdf), which makes up 40 percent of reported crime – despite significant under-reporting. Globally, individuals are estimated to lose over [USD 1 trillion to online scams](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gasa.org\u002Fpost\u002Fglobal-state-of-scams-report-2024-1-trillion-stolen-in-12-months-gasa-feedzai) alone.\n\nWhatever the real figures, that’s a lot of money that needs to be laundered on international markets.\n\nFollowing our expert annual review meetings we decided to add indicators of fraud to the [Basel AML Index methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fmethodology) this year. This decision reflects the growing significance of fraud as a predicate offence to money laundering and as a risk that regulated entities need to consider.\n\nThough definitions of fraud vary and data is both poor and inconsistent, the huge and rising [social and economic consequences of fraud](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fbasel-aml-index-updates-methodology-to-reflect-rising-global-fraud-risks-2713) make it impossible to ignore in any money laundering risk assessment.\n\n> What is fraud?\n> \n> Given the lack of a globally accepted definition of fraud, we use the term loosely as an umbrella term for activities that involve deliberate deception of an individual or entity for the sake of obtaining a financial gain. At the transnational level, fraud schemes are often [orchestrated by organised criminal actors](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Forganized-crime\u002FPublications\u002FIssuePaperFraud-eBook.pdf) and facilitated by technology.\n\n### Fraud-related indicators in the Basel AML Index\n\nFraud-related data is sourced from the [Global Organized Crime Index](https:\u002F\u002Focindex.net\u002F) in two categories:\n\n*   “financial crimes” (covering financial fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement and misuse of funds); and\n*   “cyber-dependent crimes” (including malware, hacking, ransomware and cryptocurrency fraud).\n\nIt is not possible to disaggregate the data.\n\nBoth indicators join indicators of corruption and bribery in Domain 2 of the Basel AML Index methodology, with a weighting of 5 percent and 2.5 percent respectively. The weight of the domain (its impact on the overall Basel AML Index score) has increased from 10 percent to 17.5 percent.\n\n### What impact has the inclusion of these new indicators had?\n\nGlobally, the average risk score in Domain 2 on corruption and fraud has increased from 5.02 in 2023 to 5.12 this year following the addition of the fraud indicators. This increase may be influenced by this year’s larger country coverage, as well as by changes in performance in the existing indicators of corruption and bribery. A few highlights:\n\n*   Just under half of the countries covered – 44 percent – have a higher risk score in Domain 2. These include high-income countries and those with large financial centres. The top five from highest to lowest increase are: New Zealand (which nearly tripled its risk score), Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden. Most of these countries still have lower than average scores for corruption and bribery, but their relative wealth makes them targets for fraud, cybercrimes and the related financial crimes measured by the new indicators.\n*   Around 50 percent get a lower risk score in Domain 2 as a result of adding the two new indicators, though the impact is less drastic than for those with an increased risk score. The top five include, from biggest to smallest reduction, Antigua and Barbuda, Chad, Barbados, Central African Republic and Republic of the Congo.\n*   At the regional level, the European Union and Western Europe, North America and East Asia and Pacific saw an increase in risk scores in Domain 2 while Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa saw a decrease overall. The impact on the Middle East and North Africa was negligible. This means the gap between regions is decreasing, at least in relation to performance in Domain 2.\n\nThe following map shows the regional scores in Domain 2 (“corruption and fraud risks”) after adding fraud data in 2024 (compared to 2023):\n\n### Challenges in fraud data and analysis\n\nThe reason we don’t provide more analysis of the impact of fraud data is that there are significant challenges and concerns around the quality of fraud data generally.\n\nFirst, there are no globally recognised or unified approaches to collecting data on fraud. Data is mostly collected (if at all) at the country level and according to different definitions and scopes, for example with a focus on [scams](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gasa.org\u002Fresearch). Underreporting of fraud, perhaps due to feelings of shame or the desire among businesses to avoid reputational damage, is also a major issue.\n\nAs supported by an extensive [UNODC report on organised fraud](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.unodc.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Forganized-crime\u002FPublications\u002FIssuePaperFraud-eBook.pdf), a global standard and collaborative efforts to improve data collection, quality and sharing are urgently needed as the foundations of any coherent attempt to prevent and counter fraud.\n\nSecond, the cross-border nature of many forms of fraud and money laundering make it particularly challenging to assign risks to a particular jurisdiction.\n\nAn investment fraud scheme may be perpetrated in several financial centres, masterminded by a transnational organised crime group and carried out by individuals working in scam centres such as those [rapidly emerging in Southeast Asia](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.usip.org\u002Fpublications\u002F2024\u002F05\u002Ftransnational-crime-southeast-asia-growing-threat-global-peace-and-security). The proceeds may be laundered across multiple jurisdictions and through the crypto ecosystem before ending up in a bank account or real estate – perhaps even in the country in which it was stolen.\n\nGiven the above challenges, and until standards and data are improved, we would urge all users of the Basel AML Index to consult the detailed breakdown of indicators available in the [Expert Edition](http:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fexpert-edition) and to seek additional sources of data on specific fraud risks where this element is included in a risk assessment.\n\nAs a reminder, we provide free access to the Expert Edition for most organisations outside the private sector.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Read the [13th annual Public Edition report of the Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024).\n*   Explore the [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F).","2025-01-22","why-we-cant-ignore-fraud-despite-challenges-in-data-and-analysis-2746","Why we can’t ignore fraud despite challenges in data and analysis","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F9754bec5-b441-4f0c-9094-ab11dea893c9?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[94],[18],[166,169],{"tags_id":167},{"id":168,"name":96},1346,{"tags_id":170},{"id":171,"name":172},867,"Financial crime",2746,[94],[18],[177],1092,[],[24],[],"2025-01-22T17:01:46.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fwhy-we-cant-ignore-fraud-despite-challenges-in-data-and-analysis-2746",{"id":185,"body":186,"status":6,"type":87,"date":187,"slug":188,"title":189,"image":190,"countries":191,"topic":192,"activity":194,"tags":196,"nid":203,"topics":204,"activities":206,"authors":207,"images":209,"websites":22,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":210,"translations":211,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":212,"user_updated":213,"date_updated":214,"content":215,"link":216},10587,"_This article is adapted from the_ [_2024 Basel AML Index public report_](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024)_._\n\nPrivate companies and governments invest significant resources in efforts to combat money laundering and related financial crimes. Financial institutions alone spent an [estimated USD 206 billion globally](https:\u002F\u002Frisk.lexisnexis.com\u002Fglobal\u002Fen\u002Finsights-resources\u002Fresearch\u002Ftrue-cost-of-financial-crime-compliance-study-global-report) on anti-money laundering (AML) compliance in 2023 – and that figure is rising. Yet illicit assets continue to flow through and outside of regulated financial systems. Confiscation rates are still very low, with a long way to go before asset recovery becomes an effective deterrence to financially motivated crimes.\n\nThis is a disaster for countries deprived of [desperately needed funds for development](https:\u002F\u002Functad.org\u002Fsystem\u002Ffiles\u002Fofficial-document\u002Faldcafrica2020_en.pdf), while also negatively impacting on [economies](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.imf.org\u002Fen\u002FBlogs\u002FArticles\u002F2023\u002F12\u002F07\u002Ffinancial-crimes-hurt-economies-and-must-be-better-understood-and-curbed), [security](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fframing-financial-crime-security-threat) and the health of our [planet](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-50).\n\nIt is right to question whether we are on the path to success, and indeed what we mean by success in the fight against money laundering and related financial crimes. This article looks at what data we have and what else we should consider in answering this question.\n\n### 1 Are we making progress in terms of international standards?\n\nA very basic question is whether countries and regions are at least in line with minimum international standards for AML set by the FATF.\n\nWhile it is important to [question](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.rusi.org\u002Fexplore-our-research\u002Fpublications\u002Fcommentary\u002Fwhats-point-financial-action-task-force-standards) FATF data and standards, and to identify [abuses](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.rusi.org\u002Fexplore-our-research\u002Fprojects\u002Fcharting-authoritarian-abuses-fatf-standards) and [unintended consequences](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFinancialinclusionandnpoissues\u002FUnintended-consequences-project.html), ultimately they are the foundation of a harmonised global framework aimed at reducing opportunities for criminals to hide and launder illicit funds.\n\n#### _Technical compliance: fewer black holes on the map_\n\nFirst, the good news. Technical compliance with the FATF’s 40 Recommendations has, on average, increased by 12 percentage points globally since the start of the fourth round of evaluations in 2013. Much of that improvement comes from lower-performing countries catching up with the others. This indicates that more countries are at least meeting basic standards of an AML legal and institutional infrastructure. There are fewer black holes on the map.\n\nTo reach the 12 percentage point figure, we analysed data on 113 countries and jurisdictions that had both mutual evaluation reports (MERs) and subsequent follow-up reports (FURs) from the FATF.\n\nThe greatest progress has taken place in the area of preventive measures and targeted financial sanctions. The following table indicates the highest level of progress in technical compliance with FATF Recommendations across all 113 jurisdictions assessed with MERs and FURs:\n\nRecommendation\n\nAverage technical compliance\n\nR.7: Targeted financial sanctions – proliferation of weapons of mass destruction\n\n57% (up from 31%)\n\nR.19: Higher-risk countries\n\n74% (up from 51%)\n\nR.12: Politically exposed persons\n\n73% (up from 51%)\n\nR.16: Wire transfers\n\n71% (up from 50%)\n\nR.22: DNFBPs – Customer due diligence\n\n59% (up from 40%)\n\nR.6: Targeted financial sanctions – terrorism and terrorist financing\n\n62% (up from 43%)\n\nIt is good to see progress in R.22 on designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), since this has traditionally been an area of low performance globally and a frequently criticised weakness in AML systems.\n\nThe progress brings hope that more countries have now imposed stricter customer due diligence requirements for gambling businesses, improved record-keeping standards on customer information and transactions, increased the coverage of customer due diligence requirements to relevant professionals such as property developers and precious metal dealers, and increased the responsibilities and obligations for legal professionals.\n\nWhile improvements in most Recommendations may show real progress across countries, the dynamics in R.16 on wire transfers are complicated by the increase in new payment systems and methods that are not captured by this Recommendation.\n\nIn early 2024, the FATF conducted [public consultations](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFatfrecommendations\u002FR16-public-consultation-Feb24.html) on possible amendments to R.16 to reflect this evolution in payment systems and to increase the transparency of cross-border payments. It may be that stricter requirements under R.16 will lead to a rapid deterioration in compliance in the next period.\n\n#### _Regional picture: closing the gap_\n\nIn general, countries and regions with low scores in technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations are catching up, including as a result of being [grey listed](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Ffatf-grey-list-truth-and-myths). The top 20 countries and jurisdictions in terms of progress are mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by East Asia and Pacific, regions with low average performance previously.\n\nThe following table shows countries with the highest level of progress in technical compliance with FATF Recommendations, out of all those assessed with MERs and FURs. Countries with an asterisk (\\*) are those that are or have been on the FATF grey list.\n\nProgress between mutual evaluation report and latest follow-up report\n\nCountries and jurisdictions (progress in percentage points)\n\n40–52 percentage points\n\nMauritius\\* (52), Botswana\\* (50), Vanuatu\\* (49), Mauritania (48), Uganda\\* (40)\n\n25–39 percentage points\n\nPakistan\\* (33), Iceland\\* (33), Saint Lucia (29), Bahamas\\* (28), Sri Lanka\\* (27), Zimbabwe\\* (26)\n\n20–25 percentage points\n\nMongolia\\* (24), Kenya\\* (24), Norway (24), Costa Rica (23), Morocco\\* (23), Fiji (22), Jamaica\\* (22), Bhutan (21), Trinidad and Tobago\\* (21), Tunisia\\* (20)\n\nThese leaps in performance are not the norm, however: more than half of the assessed countries made progress of less than 10 percentage points.\n\n#### _Effectiveness is falling_\n\nMore challenging, and more depressing, is to assess changes in effectiveness according to the FATF’s 11 Immediate Outcomes (IOs). FATF follow-up reports do not currently reassess countries against these effectiveness criteria. At the global level, however, we can see that effectiveness is decreasing. And that decrease is happening from an already very low base.\n\nWe analysed the difference in global effectiveness scores as the FATF increased its coverage of fourth-round evaluation reports from 115 countries and jurisdictions in 2021 to 178 in 2024.\n\nAverage effectiveness dropped from 30 percent in 2021 to 28 percent in 2023 and remained at that low level in 2024. That means newly assessed countries have similarly low levels of effectiveness as those assessed in earlier years.\n\nWhat’s falling the most? The following table displays the IOs with the lowest effectiveness scores on average across all jurisdictions assessed with mutual evaluation reports. All of them dropped still further between 2021 and 2024:\n\nImmediate Outcome (paraphrased)\n\nAverage effectiveness\n\nIO7: Money laundering investigations, prosecutions and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions\n\n20% (down from 21% in 2021)\n\nIO5: Legal persons and arrangements prevented from misuse for money laundering and terrorist financing (ML\u002FTF); beneficial ownership information available to competent authorities\n\n21% (down from 22%)\n\nIO4: Financial institutions and DNFBPs apply AML\u002FCFT preventive measures commensurate with their risks and report suspicious transactions\n\n22% (down from 24%)\n\nIO11: Prevention of financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction\n\n22% (down from 24%)\n\nIO3: Appropriate supervision according to a risk-based approach\n\n23% (down from 26%)\n\nIO10: Prevention of terrorist financing \u002F abuse of non-profit sector\n\n24% (down from 27%)\n\nEven in the IOs with the highest average performance globally across all jurisdictions assessed with MERs, we see decreasing effectiveness as more countries are assessed:\n\nImmediate Outcome (paraphrased)\n\nAverage effectiveness\n\nIO2: International cooperation on information, financial intelligence and evidence against criminals and assets\n\n44% (down from 49% in 2021)\n\nIO1: Risks understood and domestic coordination to combat ML\u002FTF and proliferation financing\n\n36% (down from 38%)\n\nIO6: Financial intelligence and other information used investigations\n\n34% (down from 37%)\n\nIO9: Terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions\n\n33% (down from 37%)\n\nIO8: Proceeds and instrumentalities of crime confiscated\n\n27% (down from 29%)\n\nIO8 on proceeds and instrumentalities of crime confiscated dropped despite hopes for a rise, as [asset recovery was an FATF priority](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Ftopics\u002Fasset-recovery.html) in 2022–2023.\n\nThe big picture? Overall, countries’ AML frameworks are gradually becoming more technical compliant with the global standards but less effective in practice.\n\n### Effectiveness along the asset recovery chain\n\nData from the Basel AML Index Expert Edition Plus, which includes the full FATF dataset, can help to identify weak links in what we call the asset recovery “chain” – all the steps from preventing and detecting illicit financial flows through to their confiscation and restitution.\n\nApplying this concept to FATF data on effectiveness can give us a simplified picture of what might be weak links in the chain. The following figure shows FATF average effectiveness ratings applied to key links in the asset recovery “chain”:\n\n> The concept of the asset recovery chain is at the heart of the support provided by our International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) to partner countries, including Basel AML Index-based technical assistance in strengthening understanding of and resilience to money laundering risks.\n\n### 2 What other data and metrics can we use to better measure success in practice?\n\nFATF data is the best that is available for comparing money laundering vulnerabilities in different countries and jurisdictions, as the same assessment methodology is applied globally.\n\nYet alone it is clearly not enough to give an accurate picture of success. Critics point out that many countries with high performance in both technical compliance and effectiveness are favoured destinations for those seeking to stash, spend and launder money.\n\nThis is why the Basel AML Index methodology takes into account a variety of indicators beyond the quality of a country’s AML framework as assessed by the FATF. They make it easier to evaluate financial crime risk exposure more widely as well as the functioning of the system as a whole. They also make it possible to see where data is missing or could be misleading.\n\nMany of these metrics are useful in evaluating whether systems are working in practice not only to address illicit financial flows as an end in itself but considering wider implications for people and societies.\n\nThe following figure offers some illustrative examples. See the [methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fmethodology) online for more information and subscribe to the Expert Edition (free for most users outside the private sector) to view and filter the full data.\n\n### 3 Clearer goals, better evidence\n\nIt may seem obvious to readers, but it still needs to be stressed: the fight against financial crime is not a narrow technical issue but a multi-dimensional challenge that is interlinked with many aspects of our lives at both the national and global level. A single metric alone will never be sufficient to measure success.\n\nMeasuring success depends on defining the ultimate objective. The FATF’s purpose has always been to “protect financial systems and the broader economy”. This may be a useful intermediate goal. But we support rising calls to position the fight against money laundering and related financial crimes as ultimately key to achieving a more peaceful, just and sustainable world.\n\nAchieving this ambition requires a nuanced understanding of the broader factors driving money laundering risk and their far-reaching consequences, as illustrated above. It also demands robust evidence of the effectiveness and tangible benefits of AML measures, to counter scepticism and bolster the case for sustained investment in these efforts\n\nCrucially, building an effective AML system is not merely a technical task for a single government department or a compliance team. It is a collective mission that requires collaboration across sectors, industries and borders. Only through a shared commitment and clear vision of our end goal can we create a world where financial systems are resilient to exploitation for criminal purposes and where AML measures support broader societal goals.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Read the [13th annual Public Edition report of the Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024).\n*   Explore the [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F).","2025-02-20","anti-money-laundering-what-is-success-2768","Anti-money laundering: what is success?","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F947bee1f-add9-40fb-9346-e20626e7c915?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[94,193],"Asset Recovery",[96,195,17,18],"Research",[197,199],{"tags_id":198},{"id":168,"name":96},{"tags_id":200},{"id":201,"name":202},818,"Anti-money laundering",2768,[94,205],"Asset Recovery and Enforcement",[96,195,17,18],[208],1362,[],"English",[],"2025-12-04T11:01:47.000Z","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6","2026-05-29T22:22:39.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fanti-money-laundering-what-is-success-2768",{"id":218,"body":219,"status":6,"type":87,"date":220,"slug":221,"title":222,"image":223,"countries":224,"topic":225,"activity":226,"tags":227,"nid":230,"topics":231,"activities":232,"authors":233,"images":235,"websites":236,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":22,"translations":237,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":238,"user_updated":213,"date_updated":239,"content":240,"link":241},10532,"_This article is adapted from the_ [_2024 Basel AML Index public report_](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024)_._\n\nFinancial crime has far-reaching impacts on people’s lives. Yet often the only time it draws serious attention in the media is when a country is added to the [FATF’s grey list](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fcountries\u002Fblack-and-grey-lists.html). This designation of “jurisdictions under increased monitoring” frequently sparks debate and concern, and is clouded by misconceptions. This section looks at five common myths that we come across in our work to support partner countries seeking to avoid or leave the grey list.\n\n### Myth 1: The grey list = high-risk countries\n\nA common misconception about the FATF grey list is that it represents (the only) countries and jurisdictions that pose high risks for money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing.\n\nIn fact, in the FATF’s own words, the grey list is the public list of jurisdictions that are “actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.” It is the FATF’s black list that specifically identifies high-risk countries and calls for enhanced due diligence and\u002For countermeasures when dealing with these.\n\nThe distinction is important because not all grey-listed countries pose the same level or type of risk. Many are on a rapid path to improvement. Not all will require enhanced due diligence. And some countries that are not and never have been on the grey list may still present significant risks.\n\nInclusion on the grey list is based on the FATF's [International Co-operation Review Group](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FHigh-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions\u002FMore-on-high-risk-and-non-cooperative-jurisdictions.html) (ICRG) process and on the criteria summarised under Myth 2, rather than merely on its own criteria for identifying a higher-risk country (see box below).\n\nA complicating factor for financial institutions seeking to identify clear criteria for applying enhanced due diligence is the use of both the black and grey lists by the EU and UK for their own lists of high-risk third countries.\n\n> What is a higher-risk country?\n> \n> The Interpretative Note to the FATF’s [Recommendation 10](https:\u002F\u002Fcfatf-gafic.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Ffatf-40r\u002F376-fatf-recommendation-10-customer-due-diligence) on customer due diligence sets out guidelines on country or geographic risk factors that might trigger the application of enhanced due diligence according to a risk-based approach. The criteria (note 15b) refer to countries that are “identified by credible sources” as having inadequate AML\u002FCFT systems, high levels of corruption and crime or high levels of terrorist activity and financing, or that are subject to sanctions or similar measures. It does not specifically refer to either the grey list or the black list, though this may be one factor that organisations take into account.\n> \n> Similarly, [Recommendation 19](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cfatf-gafic.org\u002Fdocuments\u002Ffatf-40r\u002F385-fatf-recommendation-19-higher-risk-countries) on higher-risk countries and its Interpretative Note require enhanced due diligence by financial institutions to be applied only to countries “for which this is called for by the FATF”, indicating the black list of jurisdictions subject to a call for action.\n\n### Myth 2: Grey listing is a surprise\n\nEach time the FATF holds a plenary session, commentators appear to “bet” which countries will be added or removed. This leads some to believe that grey listing comes as a surprise – even to a country’s authorities.\n\nIn fact, grey listing is based mainly on a country’s poor performance in its mutual evaluation report, specifically in one of four criteria:\n\n*   Fifteen or more non-compliant or partially compliant ratings for technical compliance in any Recommendation.\n*   A non-compliant or partially compliant rating for three or more of the following Recommendations: R.3 (money laundering offences), R.5 (terrorist financing offences), R.6 (targeted financial sanctions related to terrorist financing), R.10 (customer due diligence), R.11 (record keeping) and R.20 (reporting of suspicious transactions).\n*   A low or moderate level of effectiveness for nine or more of the 11 Immediate Outcomes, with a minimum of 2 low ratings.\n*   A low level of effectiveness for six or more of the 11 Immediate Outcomes.\n\nThe authorities typically have a year or more to work on their specific weaknesses without being publicly listed, under the FATF’s International Co-operation process.\n\nThe FATF also prioritises countries and jurisdictions with significant financial centres. For the fifth round of evaluations, the threshold has been increased from USD 5 billion to USD 10 billion, measured in [broad money terms](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.oecd.org\u002Fen\u002Fdata\u002Findicators\u002Fbroad-money-m3.html).\n\nSo grey listing is rarely a surprise to the authorities. It is however less easy for third parties like financial institutions and foreign donors to predict whether a jurisdiction will end up on the grey list.\n\nOur [Expert Edition Plus](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fexpert-edition) now offers subscribers an assessment of the risks that a particular country will end up on the grey list. This makes it possible to better anticipate this and prepare accordingly – including, we would recommend, by using the Basel AML Index to assess the broad range of factors contributing to a higher level of money laundering risk.\n\n### Myth 3: Grey listing has only negative impacts\n\nBeing added to the FATF grey list can trigger severe economic consequences for countries, especially low-income countries dependent on foreign investment and assistance. Investors and financial institutions may reduce their business in the country. A 2021 [IMF paper](https:\u002F\u002Fpapers.ssrn.com\u002Fsol3\u002Fpapers.cfm?abstract_id=4026331) found that capital inflows decline on average by 7.6 percent of GDP following grey listing, for example.\n\nFinancial institutions may also “de-risk” completely – cutting off all business to avoid the extra compliance and risk management costs. Individuals and businesses may have challenges accessing financial services as a result, leading to lower financial inclusion. Other [unintended consequences](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fpb-12) may include an increase in the use of less regulated channels to move money.\n\nNegative economic consequences are not inevitable, however, especially for more developed economies. [Croatia’s economy and its financial sector](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.imf.org\u002Fen\u002FPublications\u002FCR\u002FIssues\u002F2024\u002F07\u002F26\u002FRepublic-of-Croatia-2024-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-552561), for example, both appear to be relatively unscathed by its placement on the grey list in 2023. S&P Global even [upgraded](https:\u002F\u002Fdisclosure.spglobal.com\u002Fratings\u002Fen\u002Fregulatory\u002Farticle\u002F-\u002Fview\u002Ftype\u002FHTML\u002Fid\u002F3250133) its long-term sovereign credit rating from BBB+ to A- in September 2023.\n\nWould it have done even better if it hadn’t been grey listed? It is hard to know – but in some cases perhaps being grey listed could even help a country’s performance in the long run, by motivating it to conduct necessary reforms quickly. For example, Iceland and Malta both managed to leave the grey list after just a year, having speedily fulfilled the requirements of their action plans.\n\nFor countries receiving development aid, grey listing can bring the benefit of increased targeted assistance to implement reforms and eventually exit the grey list. However, since authorities are typically aware of the risk of grey listing in advance (see Myth 2), it would be more effective if this assistance were provided earlier to help prevent the country from being listed in the first place.\n\n### Myth 4: The grey-listing system is inherently unfair\n\nCritics of the grey-listing system point out that it unfairly penalises low-income jurisdictions with less capacity for AML\u002FCFT but also lower significance due to their small financial centres.\n\nIt is true that low-income countries are disproportionately represented on the grey list, but this is changing. More than half of grey-listed countries at the time of writing are in [Sub-Saharan Africa](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Ff2c74bc1-2760-4bea-a118-aaa96b9cdf09), for example. Yet the addition of European countries in 2023 and 2024 – Bulgaria, Croatia and Monaco – shows that the geography is shifting.\n\nThe following figure shows the percentage of jurisdictions in each region on the grey list as of October 2024:\n\n[](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2025-02\u002FGraphic%20regional%20percentage%20FATF%20grey%20list.png)\n\n[New prioritisation criteria](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFatfgeneral\u002FFATF-grey-listing-criteria.html) announced in October 2024 in effect apply a risk-based approach to grey listing. High-income countries and jurisdictions with financial centres over USD 10 billion will be prioritised. Least developed countries as defined by the UN will not be prioritised except in rare cases of high risk, in which case they will have a longer time period to work on their deficiencies before being grey listed.\n\nAs these changes take effect, we should see the grey-listing geography shift towards higher-income countries that are deeply integrated in financial markets.\n\nAnd there are some simple things that a country can do to avoid grey listing – namely, prepare well for the mutual evaluation process, which is always announced well in advance. Quite basic actions can help, like preparing an up-to-date [national risk assessment](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-26-national-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risk-assessments) (and specific sectoral assessments where relevant), gathering statistical data and developing strategies to mitigate identified risks.\n\nThe Basel AML Index methodology does not penalise countries for being on the grey list, since the deficiencies that led to them being grey listed are already apparent in the mutual evaluation report data. In 2023, we also [updated our methodology](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2023-reflecting-the-progress-of-grey-listed-jurisdictions-2513) to better capture improvements in the effectiveness of jurisdictions that exit the grey list, even if the FATF does not release new effectiveness data.\n\n### Myth 5: Leaving the grey list is the end of the story\n\nGrey listing is just one period in a country’s anti-money laundering journey. Being delisted is naturally a cause for celebration and hope, but it’s not the end of the story. Many jurisdictions have been grey listed more than once, including Cambodia, Nicaragua, Panama and Pakistan.\n\nFATF standards continue to evolve and to strengthen, so jurisdictions need to constantly improve in order to keep up.\n\nA prominent example highlighted in several Basel AML Index reports over the years is Recommendation 15 on virtual assets. After it was updated in 2018, almost all subsequently assessed jurisdictions [achieved lower levels of compliance](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fvirtual-currencies-are-we-missing-a-trick-insights-from-the-basel-aml-index-2023-2541) than previously. We can expect a similar effect with the [updated Recommendations 4 and 38](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Ffatf-seeks-change-landscape-international-asset-recovery-what-means-latin-america) on asset recovery, where there are still some countries that do not meet basic criteria such as having a non-conviction based forfeiture law or enforcing international judgements based on these laws.\n\nThe FATF’s fifth round of evaluations will [emphasise effectiveness](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fcontent\u002Ffatf-gafi\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FMutualevaluations\u002FFatf-methodology.html) over technical compliance. Countries will need to put in more effort to improve their effectiveness ratings, which are, on average, less than half as strong as their ratings for technical compliance.\n\nAs financial systems continue to evolve, criminals will find ever more ingenious ways to steal, launder and hide money or to use it for illicit purposes such as the financing of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Avoiding or graduating from the grey list is one step along a never-ending journey to a resilient system that successfully wards of money laundering and related threats while not limiting financial inclusion and innovation.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Read the [13th annual Public Edition report of the Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fbasel-aml-index-2024).\n*   Explore the [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F).","2025-02-06","fatf-grey-list-truth-and-myths-2760","FATF grey list: truth and myths","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2397c564-394a-4f1e-8448-ec230a14810c?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[94,193],[18],[228],{"tags_id":229},{"id":201,"name":202},2760,[94,205],[18],[234],1090,[],[24],[],"2025-02-06T11:01:49.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:34.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Ffatf-grey-list-truth-and-myths-2760",{"id":243,"body":244,"status":6,"type":10,"date":245,"slug":246,"title":247,"image":248,"countries":249,"topic":251,"activity":252,"tags":254,"nid":255,"topics":256,"activities":257,"authors":258,"images":259,"websites":260,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":22,"translations":261,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":262,"user_updated":213,"date_updated":263,"content":264,"link":265},10354,"International cooperation is vital to investigate corruption cases and recover stolen assets, and thus to end the impunity associated with high-level corruption. Few would dispute that, but achieving commitments made under international treaties such as the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) remains a work in progress.\n\nNew recommendations by the Summit for Democracy’s International Cooperation for Anti-Corruption Cohort outline how to build on progress in international cooperation made over the last 10–15 years. They seek particularly to overcome challenges related to:\n\n*   Non-cooperative territories that continue to offer secret hiding places for illicit money.\n*   Mutual legal assistance (MLA), widely acknowledged as still too slow, bureaucratic and underfunded in most states.\n*   Political will to change the status quo.\n*   Corruption fighting back, through disinformation campaigns and malicious lawsuits against prosecutors, judges and journalists.\n\nThe Cohort is a cooperation between the Government of Moldova, Basel Institute on Governance and Transparency International under the [Summit for Democracy](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.state.gov\u002Fsummit-for-democracy-2023\u002F) initiative of US President Biden.\n\n### 30 steps to better international cooperation\n\nThe recommendations cover 30 key actions in four categories:\n\nThe first category concerns enhancing compliance with international standards by establishing or strengthening implementation review mechanisms and demanding more accountability from non-cooperative jurisdictions. An annual public reporting mechanism could shine a spotlight on countries’ performance in MLA.\n\nThe second deals with widening the scope of international standards and related domestic legislation. This includes recognising grand corruption offences as serious organised crimes, as Transparency International and others have long campaigned. It also includes closing loopholes by implementing centralised beneficial ownership registers (see [data on this](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openownership.org\u002Fen\u002Fmap\u002F) published by Open Ownership), properly regulating non-financial businesses and professions, and boosting the implementation of asset disclosure requirements for public officials.\n\nThis category also covers ways to widen the prosecutor’s toolbox and maximise the amount of assets that can be lawfully recovered. And, vitally, to ensure returned assets are used transparently for the benefit of the people harmed, with adequate remedies for corruption victims.\n\nThe third category deals with operational coordination and cooperation between states. It encourages the use of informal channels and networks, available technical assistance offers such as from the Basel Institute or StAR Initiative, early engagement with foreign jurisdictions, and cooperation between law enforcement and non-state actors.\n\nThe recommendations also cover ways to externalise cases and to involve more jurisdictions in order to increase the striking power of enforcement.\n\nEnhancing domestic enforcement and asset management capacities is the final and longest category. Actions here range from ensuring enforcement authorities have the necessary powers, independence and resources to providing a safe environment for whistleblowers and other stakeholders to report corruption.\n\nIt also offers several technical solutions to better manage recovered assets and promote their transparent use for crime prevention or social purposes.\n\n### About the Cohort\n\nThe recommendations arise from two workshops bringing together individuals at the leading edge of fighting the type of high-level corruption that transcends borders and threatens democracy.\n\nThe broad participation, spanning governments, civil society\u002Fnon-profit organisations and the private sector, recognises that international cooperation on fighting corruption is a joint responsibility of all those committed to democratic principles and the rule of law.\n\n*   [See the full recommendations](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fsites\u002Fdefault\u002Ffiles\u002F2023-03\u002FS4D%20AC%20Cohort%20Recommendations%20and%20Countries.pdf) and list of participating governments and organisations.\n*   Learn more about [anti-corruption under the Summit for Democracy initiative](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnews\u002Fanti-corruption-centre-stage-summit-democracy)\n*   Watch a [video](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.youtube.com\u002Fwatch?v=8x-quSAziwE) featuring short statements from Gretta Fenner, Managing Director, Basel Institute on Governance; Iulian Rusu, Director, National Anti-Corruption Centre, Moldova; and Daniel Eriksson, CEO, Transparency International.","2023-03-27","action-on-international-cooperation-for-anti-corruption-summit-for-democracy-recommendations-2418","Action on international cooperation for anti-corruption: Summit for Democracy recommendations","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F2e6379e7-6a8a-43e2-9e49-196764c63b50?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[250],6922,[193],[18,120,253],"International cooperation",[],2418,[205],[18,120,253],[],[],[24],[],"2023-03-27T16:01:27.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:25.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Faction-on-international-cooperation-for-anti-corruption-summit-for-democracy-recommendations-2418",{"id":267,"body":268,"status":6,"type":87,"date":269,"slug":270,"title":271,"image":272,"countries":273,"topic":274,"activity":275,"tags":277,"nid":278,"topics":279,"activities":280,"authors":281,"images":283,"websites":284,"area":22,"programme":22,"language":22,"translations":285,"translation_of":22,"user_created":42,"date_created":286,"user_updated":213,"date_updated":287,"content":288,"link":289},10486,"Is financial crime really a security threat, as an increasing number of countries and experts now say? If so, in what sense? And what implications might that have for our efforts to fight it?\n\nThe issues around framing financial crime as a threat to national and international security were a key topic on the agenda of the first international Summit of the [Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gcffc.org\u002F) (GCFFC) in Stockholm, Sweden, on 10–11 September 2024.\n\nUnder the theme [Accelerating Cooperation](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gcffc.org\u002Fannual-summit-in-stockholm-sweden-10-11-september-2024-conference-materials\u002F), the event drew 140 financial crime fighters from a broad range of backgrounds, including law enforcement, financial intelligence units (FIUs), civil society, tech companies and banks.\n\nHans-Peter Bauer, Senior Advisor on AML\u002FCFT and former Board Member of the Basel Institute on Governance, chaired a panel on Financial Crime as a Security Threat together with:\n\n*   David Lewis, Managing Director and Global Head of Anti-Money Laundering Advisory at Kroll and former Executive Secretary of the FATF;\n*   Marcus Pleyer, Deputy Director General of the German Finance Ministry and former Chair of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF);\n*   Ian Tennant, Director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime; and\n*   Ilze Znotina, Chair of GCFFC Europe Chapter and former Head of the FIU of Latvia.\n\nThe panel discussed whether financial crime could and should be considered a serious threat to national and international security – and what the implications might be for political action against financial crime and the resources dedicated to it.\n\n### Financial crime causes immense harm\n\nThe discussion highlighted how financial crimes inflict terrible harm on individuals, societies and the global community. The damage goes well beyond the financial aspect.\n\nCrimes like corruption and fraud are not victimless, even if the victims are sometimes hard to identify. Financially motivated crimes like the trafficking of drugs, humans and weapons cause immense harm to individuals and threaten the stability and security of whole societies. The same is true for environmental crimes like the illegal trade in wildlife and timber, which are now finally being recognised as a form of financial crime.\n\nAnd as Markus Pleyer emphasised in a follow-up [social media post](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.linkedin.com\u002Fposts\u002Fmarcus-pleyer-4658bb1b6_financial-crime-as-a-national-security-threat-activity-7240741506330882048-pzi_), financial crime feeds terrorist activity and aggression, fuelling conflict. Even in relatively peaceful areas of the world, he said:\n\n> Criminals can use their dirty money to exert economic or even political influence destabilising social order and subverting our state and economic structures.\n\nDespite the wide scope of meaning of the term “security”, the big picture is clear. It is vital to look not only at the monetary aspects of financial crime, but to consider the whole chain of actors involved in the crimes and the resulting impacts on peace, stability and social cohesion.\n\n### High profits for criminals, low rates of enforcement\n\nThe sheer scale of the impacts of financial crime is well illustrated in the GFCCC’s [information wall](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.gcffc.org\u002Finformation-wall\u002F), whose latest version shows estimates of criminal activity and resulting illicit funds across a wide spectrum of crime typologies.\n\nYet detection and conviction rates for financial crime offences remain stubbornly low across the world. Estimates of the amount of illicit financial flows intercepted and recovered hover around 1 percent, as the [Basel AML Index](https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002F)’s latest public report shows.\n\nThis gap led the panel – and many in the audience – to agree that a profound reform of the current system and approach to fighting financial crime is required.\n\n### Political implications\n\nOne political implication of recognising financial crime as a security threat is organisational. For example, Germany included the fight against financial crime into its [national security strategy](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de\u002FNational-Security-Strategy-EN.pdf) in 2023. Among its measures will be the setup of a new [Federal Financial Crime Authority](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bundesfinanzministerium.de\u002FContent\u002FEN\u002FStandardartikel\u002FTopics\u002FPriority-Issues\u002FFinancial-Crime\u002Ffight-against-financial-crime.html) with powers and competences that go beyond those of a typical FIU.\n\nOther implications might be new structures to facilitate public-private information sharing on financial crime cases. Legal reforms may be needed to allow this, as well as to facilitate private-private exchange of such information.\n\nThe rollout of beneficial ownership registers might see a boost if government leaders understand the critical need for accurate information on the owners of companies and assets to be available to the competent authorities and others with a legitimate interest.\n\nAnother positive outcome of recognising financial crime as a security threat would be a much-needed increase in resources for law enforcement and the judiciary, including to follow up on cases where financial institutions report suspicious activity.\n\n### Fighting financial crime is not an end in itself\n\nThe conference topics showed a clear recognition that tackling financial crime is critical to tackling some of the world’s greatest challenges.\n\nIn addition to the panel on financial crime as a security threat, the participants explored modern slavery and human trafficking, trade-based financial crime, dealing with mercenaries and private military, information sharing through public-private partnerships, balancing data privacy concerns, and how to improve the effectiveness of anti-money laundering supervision.\n\nThe energy and dynamism in the room also demonstrated the value of bringing together leading voices from across the world to discuss critical emerging issues and find consensus where possible.\n\nWe are proud to have been a member of the Global Coalition since its establishment and to have taken part in this first global conference. Congratulations to the organisers, particularly John Cusack and Che Sidanius. There was much interest in making this an annual event – so we look forward to being present again at Stockholm 2025!","2024-09-16","framing-financial-crime-as-a-security-threat-2687","Framing financial crime as a security threat","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F998e60c1-df73-4b7c-a031-a976e9dfe17e?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[94,193],[276,18,120],"Events",[],2687,[94,205],[276,18,120],[282],1103,[],[24],[],"2024-09-16T16:01:41.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:32.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fframing-financial-crime-as-a-security-threat-2687",{"left":291,"top":291,"width":292,"height":292,"rotate":291,"vFlip":293,"hFlip":293,"body":294},0,20,false,"\u003Cpath fill=\"currentColor\" fill-rule=\"evenodd\" d=\"M17 10a.75.75 0 0 1-.75.75H5.612l4.158 3.96a.75.75 0 1 1-1.04 1.08l-5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 0 1 0-1.08l5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 1 1 1.04 1.08L5.612 9.25H16.25A.75.75 0 0 1 17 10\" clip-rule=\"evenodd\"\u002F>",1780676495002]