[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":60},["ShallowReactive",2],{"author-379":3,"author-team-379":6,"author-work-379":7},{"id":4,"name":5,"image":6},379,"Tolganay Umbetalijeva",null,{"publications":8,"news":59},[9,38],{"id":10,"title":11,"slug":12,"image":13,"type":14,"date_published":16,"publisher":17,"summary":6,"body":18,"area":6,"programme":6,"languages":19,"countries":21,"tags":25},1910,"Human resource management patterns of (anti) corruption mechanisms within informal networks","human-resource-management-patterns-anti-corruption-mechanisms-within-informal-networks","b8e5ff42-af6d-4e2e-ad97-d8bc752a6fba",[15],"Article","2019-01-15","Business and Professional Ethics Journal","In this article, we propose to comprehend the corruption mechanisms of tender bidding processes in terms of Human Resource Management (HRM) practices within informal networks. \n\nTaking the context of Kazakhstan, we analyze the behavior of individual actors as members of informal networks. Our analysis shows that both corruption and anti-corruption mechanisms can be explained in terms of HRM practices such as (camouflaged) recruitment (e.g. of powerful government officials via network ties), compensation (e.g. kickbacks for corruption; social recognition or shame for anti-corruption) and performance management (e.g. demonstrative punishment for corruption; extreme formalization, peer pressure or  social sanctions for anti-corruption).\n\nThis report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. ",[20],"English",[22],{"countries_id":23},{"name":24},"Kazakhstan",[26,30,34],{"tags_id":27},{"id":28,"name":29},973,"Corruption",{"tags_id":31},{"id":32,"name":33},1309,"Informality",{"tags_id":35},{"id":36,"name":37},1378,"Public financial management",{"id":39,"title":40,"slug":41,"image":42,"type":43,"date_published":45,"publisher":46,"summary":6,"body":47,"area":6,"programme":6,"languages":48,"countries":49,"tags":52},1940,"Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms in Kazakhstan","informal-governance-and-corruption-transcending-principal-agent-and-collective-2","7d3067d8-35dc-465b-8e69-0171169b7c3f",[15,44],"Report","2018-06-01","Basel Institute on Governance","This Kazakhstan country report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. \n\nThe project has identified informal practices in selected countries in order to establish their general and specific features in comparative analysis; assess their impact based on the functions they perform in their respective economies and indicate the extent to which they fuel corruption and stifle anticorruption policies. \n\nThe comparative research design involves seven countries from two geopolitical groups East Africa and Post-Soviet countries as follows:\n\n\n- East Africa: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda\n- Post-Soviet countries: Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia\n\n\nThe goal of the research is to produce evidence for the relevance of informality in support of the ‘localisation’ of anticorruption strategies and promoting the development of a new generation of policies that may harness the transformative potential of local patterns of informality.\n\nSee the research findings on the Basel Institute's \u003Ca href=\"https://www.baselgovernance.org/public-governance/research-projects/informal-governance\">Informal Governance website\u003C/a>.",[20],[50],{"countries_id":51},{"name":24},[53,57],{"tags_id":54},{"id":55,"name":56},1373,"Corruption prevention",{"tags_id":58},{"id":32,"name":33},[],1784560177831]