[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":93},["ShallowReactive",2],{"author-365":3,"author-team-365":6,"author-work-365":7},{"id":4,"name":5,"image":6},365,"Maral Muratbekova-Touron",null,{"publications":8,"news":92},[9,47,71],{"id":10,"title":11,"slug":12,"image":13,"type":14,"date_published":16,"publisher":17,"summary":6,"body":18,"area":6,"programme":6,"languages":19,"countries":21,"tags":34},1797,"Insider’s corruption versus outsider’s ethicality? Individual responses to conflicting institutional logics","insiders-corruption-versus-outsiders-ethicality-individual-responses-conflicting","e69b6c35-a012-4988-bae5-c9ad6b23ed41",[15],"Article","2021-07-12","The International Journal of Human Resource Management","This article arises from the work of the Basel Institute's \u003Ca href=\"https://baselgovernance.org/public-governance\">Public Governance team\u003C/a> on informal governance. It was produced by research partners at the ESCP Business School (Paris) and the EDC Paris Business School (Courbevoie), France.\n\n### Abstract\n\nIn this article, we seek to understand whether and to what extent the sense of belonging to a powerful network affects individual decision-making in terms of ethicality with regard to a corrupt situation. We study the behaviour of insiders (individuals who belong to a power network, i.e. a network of individuals connected by interpersonal relationships to a person in a position of power) and outsiders in a corrupt versus non-corrupt environments using the theoretical frameworks of institutional logics and informal networks. Our hypotheses were tested with the help of a vignette-based experiment with 464 participants from countries considered as corrupt (Kazakhstan and Russia) and non-corrupt (UK and USA).\n\n### About this research\n\nThis research was funded by the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the British Academy through the British Academy/DFID Anti-Corruption Evidence Program. However, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the British Academy or DFID.\n\nFor more information on the wider project and to download other country findings, see the Basel Institute’s \u003Ca href=\"https://www.baselgovernance.org/public-governance/research-projects/informal-governance\">Informal Governance website\u003C/a>.",[20],"English",[22,25,28,31],{"countries_id":23},{"name":24},"Kazakhstan",{"countries_id":26},{"name":27},"Russia",{"countries_id":29},{"name":30},"United Kingdom",{"countries_id":32},{"name":33},"United States",[35,39,43],{"tags_id":36},{"id":37,"name":38},848,"Behavioural science",{"tags_id":40},{"id":41,"name":42},1309,"Informality",{"tags_id":44},{"id":45,"name":46},1274,"Ethics",{"id":48,"title":49,"slug":50,"image":51,"type":52,"date_published":53,"publisher":54,"summary":6,"body":55,"area":6,"programme":6,"languages":56,"countries":57,"tags":60},1910,"Human resource management patterns of (anti) corruption mechanisms within informal networks","human-resource-management-patterns-anti-corruption-mechanisms-within-informal-networks","b8e5ff42-af6d-4e2e-ad97-d8bc752a6fba",[15],"2019-01-15","Business and Professional Ethics Journal","In this article, we propose to comprehend the corruption mechanisms of tender bidding processes in terms of Human Resource Management (HRM) practices within informal networks. \n\nTaking the context of Kazakhstan, we analyze the behavior of individual actors as members of informal networks. Our analysis shows that both corruption and anti-corruption mechanisms can be explained in terms of HRM practices such as (camouflaged) recruitment (e.g. of powerful government officials via network ties), compensation (e.g. kickbacks for corruption; social recognition or shame for anti-corruption) and performance management (e.g. demonstrative punishment for corruption; extreme formalization, peer pressure or  social sanctions for anti-corruption).\n\nThis report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. ",[20],[58],{"countries_id":59},{"name":24},[61,65,67],{"tags_id":62},{"id":63,"name":64},973,"Corruption",{"tags_id":66},{"id":41,"name":42},{"tags_id":68},{"id":69,"name":70},1378,"Public financial management",{"id":72,"title":73,"slug":74,"image":75,"type":76,"date_published":78,"publisher":79,"summary":6,"body":80,"area":6,"programme":6,"languages":81,"countries":82,"tags":85},1940,"Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms in Kazakhstan","informal-governance-and-corruption-transcending-principal-agent-and-collective-2","7d3067d8-35dc-465b-8e69-0171169b7c3f",[15,77],"Report","2018-06-01","Basel Institute on Governance","This Kazakhstan country report is part of a research project funded by the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Programme of the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the British Academy. \n\nThe project has identified informal practices in selected countries in order to establish their general and specific features in comparative analysis; assess their impact based on the functions they perform in their respective economies and indicate the extent to which they fuel corruption and stifle anticorruption policies. \n\nThe comparative research design involves seven countries from two geopolitical groups East Africa and Post-Soviet countries as follows:\n\n\n- East Africa: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda\n- Post-Soviet countries: Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia\n\n\nThe goal of the research is to produce evidence for the relevance of informality in support of the ‘localisation’ of anticorruption strategies and promoting the development of a new generation of policies that may harness the transformative potential of local patterns of informality.\n\nSee the research findings on the Basel Institute's \u003Ca href=\"https://www.baselgovernance.org/public-governance/research-projects/informal-governance\">Informal Governance website\u003C/a>.",[20],[83],{"countries_id":84},{"name":24},[86,90],{"tags_id":87},{"id":88,"name":89},1373,"Corruption prevention",{"tags_id":91},{"id":41,"name":42},[],1784560149830]