European Union
News and blog
Holding the corrupt to account: the promise and potential of corruption sanctions
When states fail to hold corrupt actors to account, ordinary citizens pay the price. Corruption sanctions were born from the idea that no one should be above the law, no matter where they are in the world. In a new Working Paper, Dr Anton Moiseienko explores how these tools have evolved and offers recommendations for their more effective and legitimate use. Here we share the foreword to his paper by the Basel Institute's Andrew Dornbierer, Head of Policy and Research, International Centre for Asset Recovery. Foreword Every state has an obligation to investigate and prosecute corruption within their jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many states around the world are not willing to fulfil this responsibility. As a result, the very individuals within these states tasked with serving the public interest are instead given free rein to commit acts that not only serve themselves but also corrode the fabric of the state. And ordinary citizens have no alternative but to endure the ensuing economic and social damage. The development of sanctions tools targeting corruption stemmed from the idea that justice should be universal; that no one in any society around the world should be above the law. They are powerful tools, built on powerful principles. States introducing them understand that unchecked corruption will always suffocate a state’s ability to provide security, fairness and prosperity to its citizens. Comparatively though, corruption sanctions are still an underdeveloped concept and are far from perfect. Only a handful of states have introduced them, and those that have are not often using them to their full potential. They also spark valid concerns surrounding due process. These criticisms shouldn’t be ignored: they offer an insight on how these tools could be further developed and enhanced to ensure that they are more credibly and consistently applied. In his paper, Anton Moiseienko provides an excellent and well-researched overview of how corruption sanctions could be designed and employed to better achieve their potential. He explains how these tools have evolved over the last two decades and how they could be further refined to be more effective and achieve a wider range of impact. Critically, his paper is an indispensable resource for those looking to understand exactly how such sanctions can help states deter, disrupt and debilitate the notoriously corrupt that are unreachable through standard criminal justice tools. Learn more Read Dr Anton Moiseienko’s Working Paper “Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know” for a deeper analysis of the topic and key policy recommendations. Get a brief introduction to corruption sanctions from our related Quick Guide. Register for our public webinar "Corruption sanctions – reaching those beyond the law" on 18 June 2026, marking the launch of Dr Moiseienko's Working Paper.
Publications
Quick Guide 43: Corruption sanctions
Working Paper 62: Corruption sanctions: What governments need to know
Tackling the complexity of border corruption: How technological tools such as the project FALCON dashboard can support investigations
Corruption at land and sea borders facilitates smuggling, sanctions evasion, tax offences and the entry of counterfeit, substandard or unsafe goods into countries including EU member states. This report conceptualises border corruption as a complex system of actors, events and illicit exchanges that is difficult to detect and investigate.
Drawing on research from the Horizon Europe FALCON (Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project, it explores how innovative technological tools – illustrated by the “FALCON dashboard” – can help investigators manage, visualise, interpret and report large volumes of heterogeneous data in support of more effective investigations.
About this report
You may share or republish this report under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.
This report was written as part of the FALCON project. FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).
The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.
Policy Brief 14: Cibler la fortune inexpliquée : Implications de la Directive de l’UE de 2024 relative au recouvrement d'avoirs
La Directive de l’Union européenne de 2024 relative au recouvrement et à la confiscation d’avoirs oblige les États membres, entre autres, à adopter des mesures législatives pour permettre la confiscation de la « fortune inexpliquée ».
Cette Note de politique examine l’article 16 de la Directive qui énonce cette obligation, ainsi que les pouvoirs et restrictions que les États membres devront inclure dans les mesures relatives à la « fortune inexpliquée » pour garantir la conformité à la Directive.
En bref, cela démontre la grande flexibilité accordée par le texte de la Directive aux États membres pour déterminer le champ d’application de leurs propres mesures en matière de fortune inexpliquée. Au minimum, les États seront requis d’introduire des mesures susceptibles d’être utilisées pour cibler la fortune inexpliquée liée au crime organisé.
Cependant, les États membres peuvent toujours décider d’introduire des mesures de plus grande portée ciblant la fortune inexpliquée liée à toutes les activités criminelles, y compris la corruption.
À propos de cette Note de politique
La présente publication fait partie de la série de Notes de politique (Policy Briefs) du Basel Institute on Governance, ISSN 2624-9669. Elle est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence internationale.
Il s’agit d’une publication de l’International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) au Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR reçoit un financement principal des gouvernements de Jersey, du Liechtenstein, de la Norvège, de la Suisse et du Royaume-Uni.
Policy Brief 14: Targeting unexplained wealth: Implications of the EU’s 2024 Directive on asset recovery
The European Union’s 2024 Directive on Asset Recovery and Confiscation obliges Member States to, among other things, introduce legislative measures to enable the confiscation of “unexplained wealth”.
This policy paper examines this Article and the powers and restrictions that Member States will need to include in such “unexplained wealth” measures to ensure compliance with the Directive.
In brief, the Directive gives legislators in EU Member States flexibility to decide the scope of their own unexplained wealth measures. At a minimum, they must introduce measures that can be used to target unexplained wealth linked to organised crime.
Member States could, however, adopt broader measures target unexplained wealth relating to all criminal activity, including corruption.
About this Policy Brief
This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. You may freely share or republish it under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence.
This is a publication of the International Centre for Asset Recovery (ICAR) at the Basel Institute on Governance. ICAR receives core funding from the Governments of Jersey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.